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Letter from the Co-Presidents

Rarely has there been a time when being a scholar of migration seemed more urgent. Google “migrant crisis” and you will find the bleak stories from last summer of Central American children arriving alone at America’s southern border, followed by grim tales throughout this past year of Syrians drowning as they seek to cross the Mediterranean in overcrowded, makeshift crafts to enter southern Europe, Somalis drowning as they try to cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, and Burmese Muslims and impoverished Bangladeshis suffering similar fates as they try to get to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The U.N. places the number of persons displaced by conflict, persecution, and compounding disasters at over 43 million, with the numbers still rising. Palestinians, Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis, Congolese, Burmese, Colombians, and Sudanese represent the largest refugee groups, but they are not the only, or even the main, drivers of migration disputes.

Immigration politics in the U.S. remains as contested as ever, with every level of government now engaged in welcoming or discouraging immigrant settlement through a growing number of laws and policies. As legislation at the grass roots has grown in every direction, the federal government seems to be toning down its efforts to engage local police in detecting unauthorized immigrants. The current enforcement picture at the federal level is confusing, with family detention under increasingly critical scrutiny while “crimmigration” increases the penalties for lack of legal status.

The target of most of the anxiety about unauthorized immigration in the United States remains fixated on Mexicans and other Latinos. In Europe, it is the presence of Muslims, regardless of whether they are from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or homegrown, that preoccupies, not to say obsesses, the still-rising anti-immigration parties. Migration controversies are central and toxic to the domestic politics of many immigrant-receiving nations today. Barack Obama, despairing of legislation from a polarized Congress, has taken executive actions that courts have currently stalled. David Cameron in the United Kingdom and Nicolas Sarkozy in France are deciding that their paths to power require them to try to placate increasingly virulent anti-immigrant movements.

Citizenship is also in flux. Israelis have been fighting over a nationality bill asserting that Israel is a Jewish state. The Dominican Republic is denying citizenship to those who consider themselves Dominican but who are of Haitian descent. Members of UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations, formally pledged in 2012 to fulfill the Bolivarian dream of a single, unified South American citizenship by 2020 in ways that would somehow be compatible with multiple nationalities. But indigenous peoples in Ecuador contend today that the promise in their 2008 Constitution that Ecuador is genuinely multinational is being betrayed, leaving them second-class citizens.

The EU’s effort to create a common European citizenship is being buffeted by movements for civic devolution. Not only is the United Kingdom’s continuing membership in the EU in
doubt after the recent British elections; Scotland’s membership in the United Kingdom is again very much in question as well. Of course, many Scots believe they can flourish within the EU once freed from the yoke of perfidious Albion. A surprising number of Texans feel similarly about perfidious Obama and his suspicious military exercises in the locale of the Lone Star state. They think they can secede if need be and thrive with regional alliances: after all, they have never relinquished their rights to bear arms.

And many on the American left as well as on the right fear that Obama’s cherished Trans-Pacific Partnership will authorize tribunals that will override the sovereign self-governing rights of American citizens in favor of the interests of multinational corporations—companies which the Supreme Court considers “persons,” if not “citizens,” for purposes of political expression. Meanwhile the non-voting congressional representative of Guam wants all people born in the U.S. territories to be declared birthright citizens, not just citizens by statutory decree.

In contrast, voting congressional representative of American Samoa wishes for American Samoans instead to remain birthright American nationals, not U.S. citizens; and so far the courts have agreed. A 2012 referendum showed that more than 60% of Puerto Ricans do not approve of their political status quo, but there is no agreement on whether they should become citizens of a U.S. state or of an independent Puerto Rican nation. And in Japan a declining, aging population is creating pressures for abandoning its traditional resistance to immigration and naturalization. Movements for improved conditions and access to citizenship for Korean and Chinese immigrants are on the rise.

On matters large and small, then, existing legal and political structures of citizenship are being challenged, contested, defended and transformed, in every hemisphere in every part of the world. On the level of lived human experiences, some of the turmoil is bitter and sad, some is inspiring, and some is even comic. On the level of political science, these churning developments make our work compelling, even, dare we say it, exhilarating.

But our section can be sustained only so long as people make it happen! This means two things: first, it is important for everyone to keep their memberships active, so that we maintain the numbers that the powers-that-be require. The vagaries of the APSA website sometimes have made renewing memberships tricky—you can think you’ve done it and you haven’t. But the APSA staff promises that things will get better technically. We also, of course, need the active efforts of our members to do the work that makes membership worthwhile for us all. One of the pleasant tasks of co-presidenting is to express thanks to all those who have made such efforts: to Els de Graauw, the section co-founder and former co-president who is our current Secretary; to Tom Wong for prudent management of our funds during his term as Treasurer; to Marc Helbling for editing a truly terrific newsletter and continuing its upward trajectory; to program co-chairs Elizabeth Cohen and Daniel Tichenor; to all our Council members; and especially to all the award committee members whose efforts recognize the excellent work that is the section’s life-blood and reason for being. We very much look forward to seeing you all in San Francisco!

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Letter from the Editor

The main part of this issue is dedicated to a symposium on the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and the questions what these attacks can and cannot tell us about France and French Muslims. The attacks happened while I was collecting ideas for the next issue of this newsletter and it was immediately clear to me that a broader academic discussion is necessary to understand these events and what followed. For this reason I invited Jennifer Fredette to organize this symposium. As you will see she brought together excellent scholars of France from North America and Europe who provide a rich variety of perspectives to put these events in a broader context. The symposium also caught the interest of the Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog that gave Jennifer the opportunity to write about the findings of the various contributions (see here).

In further contributions Ines Valdez provides in her policy brief a review of recent executive orders in the immigration field issued by Barack Obama. Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown present the Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy at UC Irvine. Ricard Zapata-Barrero from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona presents their MA program in immigration studies that offers a combined focus on research and policy orientation. Finally, the news section features again information on the latest book and journal publications, as well as member news.

I would like to thank everybody who contributed to this issue and especially Helga Nützel and Nadja Wehl for their assistance. If you have any suggestions for the various sections of the newsletter, please contact me. Future issues will continue to rely on your ideas and contributions.

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Introduction
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Roughly six months ago, two brothers burst into the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and killed eleven people, then a police officer during their getaway; the following day, a conspirator killed another police officer; on the third day, with the brothers cornered by police, the conspirator entered a kosher supermarket and took hostages, killing four of them. Police killed all three attackers later that day.

There are many ways to embellish this bare-bones account of what took place in Paris between January 7–9, 2015. We could introduce the religious and ethnic background of the attackers: French Muslims with immigrant parents from Algeria and Mali. We could focus on the targets of the attacks: a kosher grocery store and a magazine known for publishing controversial cartoons that irreverently depicted Mohammed. Or we could discuss the police officer Ahmed Merabet, a Muslim and a French citizen born to Algerian parents, killed by the attackers after pursuing them outside the magazine’s offices. We could equally discuss the heroism of Lassana Bathily, a Muslim immigrant from Mali who worked at the grocery and risked his life to shelter Jewish customers in the walk-in freezer before escaping to alert police officers (who would initially handcuff and detain him) to their location (Jenkins 2015). Different details of the attacks lend themselves to different angles for interpreting an event that we may never be finished trying to make sense of.

This symposium, co-sponsored by APSA’s French Politics Group, brings together five respected scholars of France located at institutions across the United States, Canada, the UK, and France. I asked each participant to write an essay that would situate the attacks within the broader context of French politics and the experience of Muslims in France today. All five contributors produced work that relentlessly interrogates, albeit in different ways, conventional wisdom about the meaning of French secularism, the significance of the State’s response to the attacks, and the nature of France’s Muslim population. I outline below two important points of convergence among the essays.

We Must Analytically Disentangle “Muslim” and “Marginalized”
The attackers professed to be Muslim, but their actions are not representative of France’s Muslims. Research (Brouard and Tiberj 2005; Fredette 2014; Maxwell and Bleich 2014) indicates that French Muslims embrace their civic identity, despite constant criticism leveled at Muslims and Islam. Furthermore, research suggests that riots (Riots in France 2005; Mucchielli 2009) and violence (Mucchielli 2005) that are sometimes attributed to Muslims have little if anything to do with religion (and may not even be committed by Muslims). Instead, the research attributes these kinds of acts to socioeconomic marginalization and educational failure.

Abdellali Hajjat writes about how the attackers “are the products of traumatizing life events, social marginalization, and systemic inequality”; their slide into delinquency actually paralleled their retreat from their local Muslim community into a fringe group. Such fringe groups, he argues, feed off of the desperation of vulnerable youths who cannot see a path forward for themselves in France. Hajjat discusses longstanding efforts of “residents, activists, and local politicians” to counter these fringe groups, a narrative missing from most political and media accounts. Ironically, as isolated as the attackers were, Hajjat (along with Jean Beaman) notes that Muslims in France experienced a sort of “collective punishment” following the attacks, from violence suffered at the hands of strangers to alienating demands that they apologize for and distance themselves—désolidariser—from the attackers. Hajjat deconstructs the myth of “the Muslim community” in France, explaining that while French Muslims share the experience of “collective punishment,” they do not share a collective sense of identity.

Additionally, Muslims in France experience marginalization, and respond to it, in different ways. Jean Beaman describes the identity work of successful, middle-class French Muslims who are the children of immigrants, and who refuse to be limited by the expectations and prejudgments of others. She wonders if “Je suis Ahmed,” referring to police officer Ahmed Merabet, might have been a more effective call to unity given Merabet’s stereotype-defying sacrifice for the values of his nation.

**Translating More Than Words: What Do “Laïcité” and “Je Suis Charlie” Mean?**

Referring to laïcité as the “French approach to” or “French model of” secularism is somewhat unavoidable, given that it clearly needs to be distinguished from the secularism that we find in, say, the United States (Kuru 2009). It would be a mistake, however, to assume that there is consensus across France on the requirements of laïcité. There may not even be just one laïcité: multiple symposium contributors note opposing models.

Philippe Marlière is somewhat skeptical of the call to unity made by political leaders following the attacks. He points to instances where they couched this invitation in a patriotic, “imperial rhetoric” that drove a wedge between those who interpret laïcité as the right “to deride religions” and those who interpret it as the right to religious expression and a guarantee of equal treatment regardless of belief.

Nor does Marlière believe that the sentiment “Je suis Charlie” was purely a defense of the ideal of free speech. “Je suis Charlie” took on another meaning when it became expected of people. Marlière evocatively refers to McCarthyism when describing incidents in which young students were punished and interrogated for comments that were thought to be critical of “Je suis Charlie.” It is hard to miss the irony that, for some, “Je suis Charlie” became a kind of password that needed to be uttered to prove membership in the Republic. Furthermore, Marlière
argues that the majority of the French joined the unity demonstrations out of disgust at the violence and not in defense of a radically limitless vision of free speech. The French, he notes, have long acknowledged that there are certain speech utterances that are unacceptable (such as holocaust denial), and many in France who supported Charlie Hebdo’s editorial freedom were nevertheless uncomfortable with magazine content they perceived as Islamophobic.

Amélie Barras describes a kind of mission creep within the discourse on laïcité. Borrowing from Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), she describes the concept as an “invented tradition,” one that is today put to work as a justification for repeated efforts “to scrutinize, interfere with, and ultimately govern the bodies, sensibilities and practices of Muslim citizens.” Barras notes that laïcité’s requirement for neutrality was, until as recently as 2004, applied only to public institutions and their servants. I would add that even the Stasi Commission (2003), which urged a law banning all within public primary and secondary schools from wearing conspicuous religious symbols, justified this proposal as something of an exception necessitated by the particularly impressionable nature of children (sec. 4.2.2.1). Barras argues that with laïcité now reframed as the key to saving the purportedly besieged Republic, the concept has been used to justify policies like banning mothers who wear headscarves from volunteering on school field trips. In his essay, Abdel-lali Hajjat details other extremes to which “neo-laïcité” has gone, including banning employees of private institutions from wearing the headscarf and suggesting that grown adults should be banned from wearing it at universities.

How is this possible? In great detail, Barras unpacks how laïcité has come to be depicted as the guarantor of free expression and conscience, gender equality, fraternity, and even democracy. The stakes have become very high. With so much riding on what Barras describes as an empty signifier that provides little instruction for its use, laïcité can now enthusiastically be implemented in a way that marginalizes Muslims, without (at least, to some observers) seeming contradictory.

With caution, Françoise Lorcerie suggests that there may be yet another version of laïcité breeding in French politics...“maybe.” Lorcerie would doubtlessly agree with Marlière and Bar ras that laïcité has been and continues to be used by some to justify the exclusion and marginalization of Muslims. But in looking at some subtle developments at the margins of political life in the last two years, Lorcerie postulates that a new definition is starting to gain traction within political discussions. This new vision of laïcité sees it as “a symbolic tool for a politics of inclusion, to be put to work in the fight against discrimination and social injustice.” She identifies this version of laïcité within a document produced in 2013 for then-Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault called the Tuot Report and the response of five working groups (led by community leaders and activists) to the Tuot Report. The reports were overshadowed by political debates of the day and all but forgotten. Yet Lorcerie argues that the government has returned to the spirit of their conclusions in the wake of January’s attacks by introducing a policy campaign (the Great Mobilization for the Values of the Republic, which has a branch within the public school system) that has reframed the discourse on French pluralism in terms of laïcité. In this way, laïcité replaces the two previous, polarizing frames on pluralism in France: “French-style integration” (a Socialist frame of the 1990s that divided leftists and was unpopular among the children of immigrants) and “French identity” (a largely Right-wing frame of the 2000s that alienated Muslims and many others).
Both Marlière and Barras are critical of the post-attack educational reforms that have placed what they identify as a marginalizing *laïcité* more centrally within the French classroom. Lorcerie, however, might suggest that this is a step forward compared to an inherently othering discourse on "integration" or "national identity." What remains to be seen is if the mainstream political discussion of *laïcité* will take on the flavor of the Tuot Report and the reports of its related Working Groups. Furthermore, will those French Muslims who have felt marginalized by a certain type of *laïcité* for many years develop faith in a re-interpretation of the concept? As Lorcerie notes, it is too soon to tell.

**Reflections on the January 2015 Killings and their Consequences**

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*Translation by James Terry, Oglethorpe University*

Taking into account the fact that these killings are recent and close to home, and that the feeling of pure fear provoked by the political violence that occurred in the heart of the French capital is now felt by the entire nation, it is difficult to measure the social and political effects of the killings of January 7, 8, and 9, 2015: the massacre at *Charlie Hebdo*, the assassination of police officers, the taking, and then killing, of Jewish hostages; all of these acts that were perpetrated by a commando-style militia of three armed combatants claiming to belong both to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. In the field of social science, it is generally preferable to let the aftermath of these types of events play out before undertaking any kind of scientific investigation. Given the lack of the usual historical distance and empirical investigation in this case, we can expect a certain amount of analytical error. However, I would like to take advantage of the APSA Migration and Citizenship Section’s offer and depart from convention even if doing so means attracting criticism from my colleagues. My goal is not so much to discuss the results from some survey, which would be impossible at this point anyway, but rather to shed light on a few trains of thought on the new era brought about by the January 2015 killings. Using haphazardly-collected material from print and television media, observations, and statistics, I aim to show that the concept of "hidden solidarity" with the killers leads to a kind of "collective punishment" within a neo-*laïc* framework that in turn impedes any effort at a clear analysis of Islam-related political violence.

**The “hidden solidarity” between “Muslims” and the killers**

In 1903, W. E. B. DuBois wrote, “How does it feel to be a problem?” That is the nagging question that so-called “Muslims,” both French citizens and foreigners living in France, have asked themselves for the last three decades. For Islamophobes, these killings serve only as morbid
realizations of prophecies both literary (Michel Houellebecque) and journalistic (Eric Zemmour, Alain Finkielkraut) that conceive of the "Muslim community" as "a people within a people," and whose problematic presence can only be remedied by "remigration" (Renaud Camus), a euphemism that simply means "deportation." For other intellectuals, even if their goal is not to link Islam with terrorism, the solution is nevertheless a "reformation of Islam" that ought to be initiated by theologians and Muslim leaders. This is the solution proposed by intellectuals such as Abdennour Bidar, according to whom political violence can be explained by the "malady of Islam."

These two modes of interpreting the killings fail because of one major social point that all sociologists know: that the "Muslim community" does not exist. Muslim organizations do not represent so-called Muslims. These so-called Muslims constitute a diverse population in terms of social class, nationality, and political and ideological leanings, all of which are erased entirely by the call for "désolidarisation." This neologism assumes that there already exists a solidarity between the killers and all other supposed Muslims. In other words, these so-called Muslims are also presumed guilty, even when one of them is a police officer killed in cold blood (Ahmed Mrabet) and another is a former illegal immigrant who saved several lives in a kosher supermarket (Lassana Bathily). So-called Muslims are thus confronted with a terrible situation: they might even be the source of the problem because they are in fact Muslims while at the same time they feel compelled to "désolidariser" themselves publicly as Muslims.

If these two kinds of discourse are disseminated in France, it is because the immigrants of yesterday have become the so-called Muslims of today. After the "problem of immigrant integration," we have now moved on to the "Muslim problem," though both of these "problems" share the same stakes: Do they (the so-called Muslims) have the right to live in France? We do not believe that deporting unemployed French citizens is the solution to the "unemployment problem," but for some reason deportation becomes a viable option when applied to the "Muslim problem." There is thus a shameful truth that arises when we reduce the identity of so-called Muslims to their association with Islam. This is not a new tactic: doing so makes them French on paper only—citizens who deserve to be deported even thought they have French nationality.

From now on we can only wonder about the general blindness toward the sources of the violence that struck the capital. The emotional response on both the national and international levels incited by the killings tends to discredit social science researchers and journalists whose job it is to deconstruct the mechanisms behind this violence. They are discredited for being "excessively idealistic" or "politically correct" or because of their perceived "inability to see what is directly in front of them." The historical context is similar to that of post-9/11, when arm-chair journalists and television philosophers were giving geography lessons to political scientists, sociologists, and journalists who had for years conducted research on violent groups associated with Islam. What is at stake here is the possibility to produce a rational discourse based on empirical research, at the very moment when Islamophobes are taking advantage of a window of opportunity to proclaim the return of the concept of "the clash of civilizations."

After the finger-pointing toward so-called Muslims, it is the journalists and protesters who, by denouncing the editorial choices of Charlie Hebdo, have now been scorned. For example, Caroline Fourest and Jeanette Bougrab called
out associations such as Les Indivisibles, founded by Rokhaya Diallo, for having armed the killers with ideology. According to them, anti-Islamophobic activists might even be "responsible" for the killings and ought to explain themselves, as if their articles and speeches had somehow inspired the killers to undertake their operation. This accusation attributes to these activists a media platform that they do not actually have since reaching a larger public is in fact much more difficult than that. Furthermore, to make such an accusation is to misunderstand the real ideological influences of the militia, which are rooted in the writings of Sheiks and the nebula that is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The underlying reasoning for this accusation originates in sophism: the denunciation of those who criticize Charlie Hebdo makes it seem that the murders could have been justified by the accuracy of the criticisms. In this sense, it seems that emotion prevails over reason and that there is a risk of censoring all types of university, journalistic, and protest speech denouncing the very real social phenomenon that is Islamophobia. The risk is that collective responsibility becomes collective punishment. That is, all those who "are not Charlie" could be potential enemies.

**Collective punishment**

The proliferation of anti-Semitic acts committed during periods of violence in Palestine clearly shows that so-called Jews are punished collectively and held responsible for Israeli war crimes. Similarly, so-called Muslims have been subject to a form of collective punishment, which has manifested itself in a rash of Islamophobic acts and extremely problematic accusations of a perceived “defense of terrorism.”

Indeed, data from the Ministry of the Interior show that as many Islamophobic acts were committed in January, 2015 (128) as in the entirety of the year 2014 (133). Police counted 33 acts committed against mosques and 95 threats, and some of these acts involved the throwing of grenades or the shooting of firearms. This racist violence was nourished by the “fascist-sphere” of social media that relayed actual calls to murder. However, considering the extreme tension that blanketed the country, one cannot help being struck by the difference between Islamophobic acts and anti-Semitic acts. Although anti-Semitic acts have become less frequent over the last decade, they are more violent, and now often involve murder. Conversely, Islamophobic acts occur much more frequently, but only rarely do they come down to homicide. The only case recorded after the killings is that of Mohamed El Makouli, a 47-year-old Moroccan killed at his home in Le Beaucet (Vaucluse) on January 14 by his neighbor, who stabbed him 17 times while screaming, “I am your god, I am your Islam.” Physical attacks that are Islamophobically related are more common, but relatively less violent, more anonymous, and are generally directed at women wearing a hijab. This discrepancy is perhaps due in part to the differing levels of legitimacy assigned to different types of racist speech: whereas anti-Semitic speech is largely denounced by the entire French elite, as the latest “Le Pen affair” has shown us, Islamophobic speech appears to be much more acceptable, and certain public figures do not hesitate to label themselves as Islamophobic. The link between the level of physical violence and the level of symbolic violence is not easy to determine, but examining this link might allow us to problematize analyses of “racism” in general. For what it is worth, we might have even expected an even greater level of physical and symbolic violence, but none ever happened, even in the mainstream media. For example, the commercial radio station RTL broadcasted on January 7 a daily show hosted by Marc-Olivier Fogiel, in which the extreme-right-wing editoralist Yvan Rioufol had called upon the Muslim
journalist Rokhaya Diallo to “désolidariser” herself from the killers. The journalist began to weep and was comforted by the other participants, including Fogiel and Laurence Parisot, the former head of the French employers union MEDEF. This kind of situation, which we find elsewhere in the media universe, can bring about a call to stop symbolic Islamophobic violence: the fear of civil war. Those journalists who openly and tactlessly drew a link between Islam and terrorism have been met with challenges from all sides. It was as if this link, which is the bread and butter of the mainstream print and television media, had been suspended for the short time around the killings in order to avoid sinking further into an ever-widening hole of violence.

The second form of collective punishment has to do with the crackdown on the crime of defending terrorism. Until the anti-terrorism law of November 14, 2014, this offense fell within the guidelines of the 1881 law about the freedom of the press: the proceedings were very long and were handled by a special judicial committee because the freedom of expression could only be limited in very special cases. This offense is now included in the penal code (article 421-2-5), can be invoked by any judge in a criminal court, and can compel an immediate court appearance. The violence that occurred in January, 2015 was so great that the Syndicat de la Magistrature,\(^5\) Amnesty International, and prominent attorneys such as Maître Eolas all sounded the alarm and denounced a “swift justice” that had nothing to do with the goal of the law: to challenge the defense of political violence related to Islam.

The general public noticed a few inconsistencies: an eight-year-old third-grader named Ahmed questioned in Nice because he allegedly declared, “I am with the terrorists”; another student, nine years old, accused of breaking the moment of silence in Villers-Cotterêts, following another ill-intentioned student’s tattling; a left-wing activist and philosophy instructor at a high school in Poitiers accused by his students’ parents of defending the attacks; or even a metal worker represented by the SUD union who allegedly made some “shocking” remarks defending the attacks while working at the Bombardier factory in Crespin. The first one did not even know what the word “terrorism” meant, but nevertheless suffered stigmatization at the hands of faculty who, if those remarks really had been genuine, should have turned the situation into a teachable moment. The second and the third are the victims of what amounts to slander by a student and by the parents of a student, respectively. The fourth is the result of union pressure within the context of a serious conflict with management. The accusation of defense of terrorism has become an easy weapon to wield when one wishes to spread rumors about an enemy, whether on the playground, in the political sphere, or in the workplace. The same accusation was even made by servers at an Angoulême restaurant against four men who were later released by a judge. Accused of “celebrating January 7 in a bar,” they were, in fact, simply happy about winning money at a horse race.

What little information that is available in the press is enough to show that the application of the anti-terrorist law after the January 2015 killings has mostly affected those who had nothing to do with violence relating to Islam. Out of a total of 46 cases reported by the press (there are actually about 60), only three have to do with a person who subscribes strongly to the ideology of the Islamic State. On January 13 in Elbeuf, a certain Franz Petermann insulted some police officers during an altercation with them: “I’m not gonna move, asshole (...) it’s not enough for you that we killed three cops? There are a lot of us and we have AK-47s.” This temp
worker, a Muslim convert of French origin, was placed under arrest for “criminal association with intent to commit acts of terrorism” in Syria. Though the charge of “defense of terrorism” was dropped, he still got a three-month suspended prison sentence and five years’ probation for insulting an officer and threatening death. On January 19 in Lille, a 58-year-old bookseller allegedly sold Islamic State flags and then declared at the police station, “I am not Charlie, I am Coulibaly, I am a terrorist.” He was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence of a one year for “defense of terrorism.” On January 22 in Valence, a divorced 45-year-old man allegedly forced his children to look at “extremely violent” images that “defended terrorism,” with the supposed goal of indoctrinating them (unknown verdict). It should be noted that these sentences are lenient for a crime that can demand up to five years in prison and a 75,000€ fine or, in the case of defense of terrorism online, up to seven years in prison and a fine of 100,000€. The real targets of the law are, in the end, given suspended sentences.

On the other hand, severity is the norm for all the others. For example, an 18-year-old man, who made an “offensive gesture” toward a police station and screamed “100% Kouachi!” several times (January 9, Nice), was sentenced to a one-month mandatory prison sentence; a 34-year-old man, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, refusing multiple times to take a breathalyzer test, involuntary assault, and defending terrorist acts by screaming “There should be more Kouachis. I hope you will be next (...) You are holy bread for terrorists” (Valenciennes, January 10), got a four-year mandatory prison sentence, his driver’s license taken away for two years, and stripped of his civil and family rights for three years. Between these two extremes, most of those convicted are given a prison sentence (rarely suspended) of a few months.

The gap between the spirit of the law and its application in reality is even more surprising when we take into account the conditions that led these people to “defend terrorism.” At least twenty or so cases have to do with a direct challenge to police authority (BAC, CRS, police, gendarmerie) or to public transportation workers. In other words, the new crime of “defense of terrorism” is used as a crime of contempt and rebellion, which is a classic judicial tool used by police to maintain social order. The only difference is the use of words like “AK-47” or “Allahu Akbar” (God is great)—as if “Allahu Akbar” were synonymous with the defense of terrorism—and the explicit reference to the Kouachi brothers or to Coulibaly. Far from being ideologues of the Islamic State, these individuals make reference to the killings in order to taunt, insult, and provoke those who represent the authorities of social control. It was the height of absurdity when judges dealt extremely severe sentences to seven people under the influence of alcohol. One intoxicated 31-year-old man got a ten-month mandatory prison term for saying, while in a police station on January 11, “Dirty Africans, Allah Akbar, fuck France, the Arabs are there” and “that’s not good, AK-47 better, I’ll smoke you with an AK-47.” The lawyers tried to argue that the state of drunkenness makes people say stupid things, but the judges were unmoved. They were unmoved as well in the case of two people with psychiatric problems, such a 38-year-old Moroccan man from Paris, who insulted police officers on January 15: “French pork-eaters (...) deserve what they got”; “when I see bombs explode and police die, I laugh”; “Police officers deserve to die, I am Bin Laden’s son.” In spite of psychiatric evidence proving his mental illness, he still got a three-month mandatory prison sentence.

In the end, the law of November 14, 2014, as it has been applied after the January 2015 killings, is in a way a strategy for compensating for
the inability of the government to deal with the problem of violence related to Islam. Instead of attacking the root of the problem, i.e. social violence in France and the political violence in the Middle East, government authorities have convicted around fifty people, most of Maghreb origin or of Muslim faith. Those cases that have been made public, especially the case of young Ahmed, show that so-called “Muslim” men and women are suspects from an early age.

Neo-laïc framework
We cannot understand the logic of collective punishment if we do not come back to what I call “the neo-laïc framework.” Laïcité as defined by the 1905 law corresponds more or less to the separation of church and state and the guarantee of the freedom of religion and worship, even in public spaces. Neo-laïcité distinguishes itself by expanding the realm governed by laïcité, which now includes the use of public services (no longer only public service workers) and religious practice not only in public areas, but also in private companies. The defining characteristic of neo-laïcité is that since 1989 it has strived to eliminate Islam from public view, all in the name of a perceived threat to “national identity”: specifically, that the children of postcolonial immigrants have persisted in believing in and practicing Islam. From an assimilationist point of view, which is precisely the type of perspective that has inspired neo-laïcité, this persistence is considered an anomaly within the “republican model” and constitutes the source of the “Muslim problem.” It is therefore not an accident that the first institution summoned to “respond” to the killings was the national school system and that the first tenet called upon was that of laïcité. From that point of view, the solution to the problem of political violence might lie in teaching about laïcité in public schools; hence the extensive teacher training program and the institution of December 9 as “National Laïcité Day.”

This neo-laïc framework has also appeared in the legislative branch of the government. On February 18, the UMP National Assembly representative Eric Ciotti proposed a bill seeking to extend the principle of laïcité to include public institutions of higher education. On March 2, Pascale Boistard, Secretary for Women’s Rights, went further, declaring that the veil might not belong in a university setting. On March 12, a bill adopted by the Senate in January 2012 in response to the “Baby Loup” affair, and subsequently relegated discretely to the fringes of the legislative agenda, resurfaced and will be submitted for adoption by the National Assembly in May 2015. The bill seeks to ban the wearing of religious symbols in private daycare facilities that receive any government funding, which is to say the vast majority of daycares in France. It is thus apparent that representatives on both the right and the left have conflated the killers with women who wear the hijab in universities and daycares; this conflation holds those women responsible for acts that they did not commit—acts that they are suspected of secretly supporting. Thus, one of the likely effects of the killings is a process of entrenched legal discrimination that aims to construct a special legal statute that subverts the right to education and the right to work.

Toward an unbiased analysis of political violence relating to Islam
In order to avoid the unfortunate blindness brought about by the neo-laïc framework, we must return to the facts themselves and adopt an unbiased analysis of political violence. These combatants are not the only ones to make use of violence: other groups do it in the name of other ideologies and in response to other conflicts. In order to fully understand the basic mechanisms behind violence related to Islam and—for lawmakers—prevent this sort of violence from happening, we must consider this violence from a more general perspective. We
must now ask the questions: “How does one embark on the career of a combatant? Under what conditions is political violence likely to occur?” The personal history of the members of the terrorist commando gives us a few clues: Their struggle originated in the political quagmires provoked by Western military intervention before and after 9/11 (Syria, Yemen, Iraq, etc.). After being supported by the United States against the Soviet Union, the “freedom fighters” that consisted of Taliban and future Al Qaeda leaders took aim at their former American allies after the fall of the Wall. In Afghanistan they imposed their own politico-religious order with the help of foreign powers, and created a haven for every fighter in the world who shared their ideology and wished to easily learn techniques for death and destruction.

This “bête immonde” is the offspring of Western intervention, nursed by the power struggles in Algeria, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc. It struck at the heart of Western political powers in 1995 in Paris, 2001 in New York, 2004 in Madrid, and 2005 in London. After the accumulation of military capital since the 1970s, an unprecedented wave of violence has washed over these Western powers, perpetrated by these seasoned warriors. Whereas these violent groups were initially confined to a few countries, the “war on terror” in fact led them to expand into countries that had previously been spared or at least hardly affected by their presence: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Mali, Pakistan, etc. A new generation, embodied by the leaders of the organization dubbed “Islamic State,” radicalized by what they have seen in the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, has undertaken military training for combat against Western occupation and now moves freely within a truly transnational network that extends from Africa to Asia. In other words, the primary source of political violence relating to Islam lies in the state-sponsored violence in the Middle East and the disastrous consequences of wars waged precisely in the name of the “fight against terrorism.”

The second source of violence is linked to the social anomie that is worsening in working-class neighborhoods in France. Contrary to the implication of the Islamophobic cry for “désolidarisation,” the three members of the commando are in some way “free electrons” attached to no one and nothing in particular; they are the products of traumatizing life events, social marginalization, and systemic inequality, all of which led these would-be attackers toward lives of delinquency and membership in violent groups. These “free electrons” “désolidarized” themselves from their own peers, especially from their extended families and fellow worshippers at the local mosque; they were never given another chance for help in school and were drawn in by preachers convinced of the imminence of the “clash of civilizations,” an ideology analogous to that found among neoconservatives. These children of working-class families internalized a high level of violence that turned them into tortured souls who no longer found existential meaning within traditional structures, but found it in a nihilistic and murderous ideology that promised them power and recognition. This type of ideology was, and still remains, popular only among a tiny minority in working-class neighborhoods.

We can distinguish between multiple trends within the Islamic landscape in France: non-affiliated mosques, large organizations that maintain close ties with their country of origin (Maghreb and Turkey), fellowship societies like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tablighi Jamaat, the “Salafists” of both the purist and the apolitical type, the Sufis, etc., and finally the violent sub-groups labeled “Takfiris.” Every day, residents, activists, and local politicians struggle
almost unnoticed against the influences of these violent sub-groups without ever making front-page news. Thus, the members of the “Buttes de Chaumont Network,” to which the Kouachi brothers belonged, in the early 2000s got themselves banned from the pro-Palestine protests by immigration and antifascist activists. The grand irony of the story is that the very people who used to fight on the ground against violent sub-groups are the same people who are now held responsible when they denounce Islamophobia. The existence and the resilience of these violent sub-groups are thus directly linked to power struggles within working-class communities. If they have influence over certain free electrons, it is because other political forces, specifically those led by the heirs of the marches for equality and against racism, have now begun to lose momentum and have left behind a relative political void from which terrifying candidates are emerging. This phenomenon is also supported by the disconcerting ease with which weapons from the former USSR can be bought and the constant mobilization by Takfirist networks to recruit via social networking sites, transmitting ideology and military know-how beyond geopolitical borders.

The conditions of possibility for the political violence of January 2015 are many. Analyses by sociologists likely deserve to be paid more attention by lawmakers. Yet it is the experts in “Islam and terrorism” who have the ever-indulgent ear of the president, his advisers, and the media. The failure of intelligence services, which had detected and interrogated the killers, seems to be hidden behind their aura of “neutralization.” The initial political reactions appear to be heading toward the worst: adopt a French-style “Patriot Act” even though a freedom-killing terrorism law was already passed two months ago; restart the debate about the death penalty; target the “enemy from within” that is Muslims who resist assimilation, etc. We can expect that certain people will want to reconsider the concept of ius soli. In brief, the lessons of post-9/11 policies do not appear to have been learned: political violence feeds on state-sponsored violence and social violence.

Qui est Ahmed?: Understanding Race, Racism, and French Muslims in the Wake of Charlie Hebdo
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In 2009, during a debate on national identity on the radio, Nadine Morano, then-French Minister for Families and Solidarity, explained:

We are not putting young Muslims on trial. I respect their situation. What I want for them is to feel French because they are French. I want them to love France when they live here, to find work and to not speak in slang. They shouldn’t put their caps on back to front.
What do remarks such as this mean when viewed in light of January’s massacre at the editorial offices of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and its related hostage situation at a HyperCacher supermarket? These acts, committed by terrorists with ties to Islamic extremism, exacerbated existing concerns about the presence of Muslims in France and their perceived incompatibility with Western society (Bleich 2006; Bleich 2009). There have been more than 50 anti-Muslim acts since these events, as Islamophobia continues to rise in France and elsewhere in Western Europe.

Morano’s comments blame French Muslims for their own marginalization. Yet, their experiences of exclusion cannot be attributed to their refusal to take part in the nation, or to a dislike of France. As my own research shows (Beaman 2012), despite their attachment for and identification with France, ethnic minorities face a “glass ceiling” in terms of actually being included in France’s imagined community (Anderson 1991). In her statement, Morano provides a supposed model for what it means to be French. Yet that interpretation fails to capture the complexities of the lives of minorities in France, as well as how ethnic and racial exclusion actually manifests itself. In the aftermath of the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, a great deal of attention focused on the cartoonists and the columnists, including the international slogan, “Je suis Charlie.” But another slogan soon appeared, recognizing another victim of the attacks: Ahmed Merabet. Merabet was a Muslim police officer of Algerian origin killed during the attacks while trying to pursue the shooters. It was “Je suis Charlie,” however, that became an international rallying cry; “Je suis Ahmed” was a far less common sentiment.

While many blame the religion of Islam for the terrorist attacks and decry how French Muslims—established to be about 6 to 8 percent of the total population (d’Appolonia 2009; Gray 2008)—are transforming or otherwise threatening French society, they are conflating religious difference with racial and ethnic difference. In other words, the elephant in the room, or what is rarely discussed in France, is the role of race and racism in structuring marginalization in French society.

**Racial and Ethnic Exclusion in France**

My ethnographic research—including semi-structured interviews with 45 second-generation, middle-class North African (or ‘Maghrébin’) immigrants in the Parisian metropolitan region—reveals that race and ethnicity do very much affect their everyday lives (Beaman 2012). Even though race and ethnicity are not “officially” recognized in France, many of the individuals I interviewed feel marginalized solely because of their North African origins, or because they are not white.8 These individuals are part of the legacy of French colonialism in the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco). These are individuals who were born and have spent their entire lives in France. Their parents emigrated to France between 1950 to 1970 for better economic opportunities. They generally had lower levels of educational attainment, often not greater than elementary school, and communicated mostly in Arabic. Usually fathers worked in low-skilled jobs such as construction and factory work while the mothers labored as homemakers or domestic workers. The individuals I interviewed, however, are upwardly-mobile compared to their immigrant parents and have attained a middle-class status based on their educational attainment and employment status. Yet, they still feel like they are on the margins of mainstream society, and just as excluded as their immigrant parents.

Fully understanding the nature of racial and ethnic exclusion in French society requires acknowledging the colonial relationship between
France and the Maghreb, which influences how descendants of that colonial history are treated within France. France’s relationship with the Maghreb began with the colonization of Algeria in 1830, of Tunisia in 1831, and of Morocco in 1912. Tunisia and Morocco remained under French control until 1956. Algeria would become independent only in 1962, after a bloody war whose impact on the French psyche has been compared to that of the Vietnam War in the U.S. It was World War I that first brought immigrants from these French colonies en masse to France for work. They were expected to only be temporary residents, often settled in the outlying banlieues, or suburbs, of major cities because of the presence of cheaper housing and factory employment. More than half of the immigrants who arrived before 1974 came for employment-related reasons. Another third came to join their husbands or family (Silverman et al 2007). My respondents are descendants of this population.

Despite France’s colorblind ideology and its renunciation of racial and ethnic categories, as well as its promotion of an inclusionary nationalism through its Republican model, many respondents experience exclusion solely because of their ethnic origins. One of my respondents, Nadia, a 49-year-old of Algerian origin who works as an executive manager at a social services agency, explained to me that “France belongs to everyone who lives here.” Yet she recognizes that this is more theory than practice, as there are barriers to full societal inclusion for Maghrébin-origin individuals like herself. She was born and raised in Paris, yet feels her place in French society is continually questioned by others because of her Algerian origins. When she was a child, she remembers people commenting that she should “return to [her] country,” and making other derogatory remarks. She thought there would be more acceptance as she grew older, but she thinks people notice ethnic differences more and more today. She senses that they still do not accept her as a full citizen of France. “I see it clearly every day that there are small marks or indications [of differences]. I believe it is because France has not addressed certain problems in its past, it has not always acknowledged its past,” she explained.

Sabri, another respondent who is 30 years old and of Tunisian origin, expressed a similar sentiment. “… We have to help those who are still stuck in the past, colonialism is still in the spirits of some people. Meaning, when I tell you that people treat us like children, for me that’s because of colonialism. Today, people still think children of immigrants in France are still strangers. That we are not really French. So, we have to show them that they are not superior, that it’s a question of equality. Once they see us as equal to them, once we have that relationship, then things will change, but now, today, that is how it is.”

Hicham, a 29-year-old of Moroccan origin who until recently worked as a banker, similarly expresses the complications of being an immigrant-origin individual and an ethnic minority in France. “They don’t want me, they tell me to integrate. Me, I don’t want to integrate,” he explained. “I am French, I don’t need to integrate. I was born in France, I respect the laws of the Republic. But they still tell us, ‘No, you are not French. You will never be French.’ They tell us that because our parents have foreign origins and that automatically we automatically do too ... we are sometimes obligated to hide our differences as if we [were] ashamed of them. But I’ve arrived at an age when I tell myself, ‘It’s my difference. I am not looking to put it out front, but I don’t want people to tell me to hide it.” Even though Hicham and other second-generation Maghrébin immigrants are French, they are not treated as such.
Finally, Ahmed, a 29-year-old practicing Muslim with dual Algerian and French citizenship who works as a technical director for his company, relayed his frustrations with the daily indignities related to being of Maghrébin origin. "If I’m walking in a bourgeois Parisian neighborhood and an old French lady sees me, she’ll cross the street to walk on the other side," he explained. "I think it’s going to take several more generations for people to not see differences like this, for someone to see a black person or an Arab walk by on the street and not even notice it."

This ethno-racial marginalization has been documented in various quantitative studies as well. In a 2012 Human Rights Watch report in France, the majority of North African-origin individuals identified police checks as a major problem: individuals of North African origin were about five times more likely than “whites” to undergo “pat-downs.”

**Islamophobia is not just about Islam**

I argue that part of why Islamophobia is such a problem is not that there are a large number of “radical” Muslims in France (and throughout Europe), but rather that religion stands in for racial and ethnic difference in a society that refuses to grapple with the salience of race and ethnicity. As legal scholar Leti Volpp argues, “For Muslims in France, the state perspective on their religious practice conjoins with concerns about ethnic, not religious, difference. Culture and religion become fused ... for French Muslims, religious difference is conflated with a racialized cultural difference” (2011: 187). In other words, cultural difference is framed as religious difference despite its ethnic underpinnings.

My respondents who do not identify as practicing Muslims nonetheless feel as though they are treated differently from other French citizens because they are not white. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss the intersections of religion and immigration without discussing race and ethnicity. I argue that it is easier to mark difference based on religion because religion is seen as something one chooses, as in choosing to be Muslim. But it is harder to confront individuals who are seen as different simply because of their ethnic origin—in other words, individuals who are French and not “white.”

Moreover, the future of immigrant integration in France is placed on the backs of its Muslim population, who as Morano suggests, must love France and adapt accordingly. They are blamed for the ills of French society. Yet, much research shows that many French Muslims do love France, and do see themselves as French (Fredette 2014; Simon 2012). Many French Muslims value being French as much as they value being Muslim, and do not see a contradiction between the two (Beaman forthcoming; Maxwell and Bleich 2014).

The current situation in France is not about Muslims and ethnic minorities failing to integrate themselves. Rather, they are not accepted as French by their fellow citizens. To fully understand Ahmed and other French Muslims, we must account for the centrality of race and ethnicity in French society – both historically and in the present.

In addition, we must be clear that Islamophobia is a form of racism—one that sees certain individuals as too culturally different to ever be fully accepted as part of or integrated into the mainstream. Islamophobia is part of the social construction of race and ethnicity, in which differences are framed as religious and therefore cultural as opposed to racial and ethnic. This is clear when we consider Ahmed Merabet. Merabet was just as French as he was Muslim, and as a police officer he fought to defend the French motto of liberté, égalité, et fraternité; yet
he was rarely mentioned in the analyses of these events. The international slogan, “Je suis Charlie,” has been far more popular than the slogan, “Je suis Ahmed,” especially in affirming a sense of community within France. When we consider the lack of attention given to the plight of France’s racial and ethnic minorities, it is not hard to understand why.

The Charlie Hebdo Sequel: the Making of a Republican McCarthyism?
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In the aftermath of the killings in Paris in January 2015, the French media as well as the government and most politicians delivered an emphatic verdict on those barbaric assassinations: what was at stake, they concurred, was the issue of freedom of speech. In other words, through their actions, the murderers had attempted to silence free speech, a cardinal value in French society.

From the outset, it was clear that the deeply unpopular socialist executive was trying to rally public opinion under the “Je suis Charlie” banner. To some extent, President François Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls managed to achieve this objective. The “Charlie Effect”—as it was called in the French media—did not last long though. The grand march in Paris on 11 January brought together very large segments of the nation: people from various social, religious and ethnic backgrounds took peacefully to the streets of Paris (as well as in many cities across France).

But what was the meaning of those peaceful demonstrations? Was it really in defence of freedom of expression and the “right” to ridicule believers and their beliefs, as it was depicted by the French media and most politicians? Did the public do so with a view to supporting the “right” to blasphemy? It would be hard to answer those complex issues unequivocally; however one can certainly challenge some of the official assumptions of the nebulous “Nous sommes Charlie” movement. In short, one can attempt to contextualise and objectify the government narrative on the matter.

The Hollande-Valls Narrative
The only way not to concede victory to terrorists is to remain calm (Laborde 2015). This is not what George W Bush did after 9/11, and this is not what the French government did either. The point here is not to draw a parallel between the two situations which were, in many respects, dissimilar. But what was striking in the hours following the Paris attacks—and this was somehow reminiscent of the American reaction—was the public outpouring of emotion, and the active role played by the media and the government in conveying this sentiment. The fact that the attack was perpetrated by French Jihadists against a left-libertarian publication certainly struck a chord with large sections of the public. Although Charlie Hebdo’s “anti-Islamic” stance was increasingly seen as divisive and politically ambiguous by some on the left (Cyran 2013), the cartoonists
who were killed—notably the elder ones such as Cabu and Georges Wolinski—were held in high esteem by the public.

There were unusual reactions in France the days following the attacks: in the “unity marches,” people were seen flying the tricolour flag (for most French, it seems cheap nationalism to do such thing); they sang the Marseillaise (a song normally associated nowadays with the right or the extreme right despite recent attempts on some parts of the left to somehow “reclaim” it). More extraordinary still, citizens on the streets cheered and praised the police; a public institution which is traditionally fairly untrusted by the population. Marching with other heads of states—some of them declared enemies of free speech at home—François Hollande declared on 9 January that “Paris is today the capital of the world.” Manuel Valls, with similar self-restraint, affirmed: “France carries free speech everywhere.” This was, in a way, the expected Gallic response to those tragic events: a brand of patriotism, which mixes abstract statements about the “Country of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,” and references to the so-called “universal values” of the French “republican model.” This imperial rhetoric is reminiscent of that used by the US establishment when describing the United States as the “Land of the free” or as the self-appointed “leader of the Free World.” Once a guerrillero in the Bolivian forest alongside Ernesto “Che” Guevara, now a conformist writer, Régis Debray summed up the national mood in his trademark grandiloquent manner:

“There were four million of good citizens marching in the streets of France [on 11 January]; rightly proud to be there; unbelievers [in God]. This is admirable, but let’s think that there are one billion of believers in the world; people who do not think like us. We cannot ignore this reality” (Debray 2015).

Régis Debray’s interpretation of the historic show of unity was as follows: the crowd marching through the streets of Paris was celebrating “French exceptionalism,” that is the Voltairian spirit of the French revolution and its associated values: reason and free thinking (which for some in France is synonymous with anticlericalism if not anti-religious sentiments). However, in line with the movement of “déclinologues” (politicians, journalists and intellectuals who lament France’s economic and geopolitical decline or loss of influence over the past decades), the writer acknowledged that outside France, few people in the world understood, let alone embraced the values of laïcité à la française, that is French-style secularism. Laïcité constitutionally separates the State and the Church and mandates strict neutrality from the state in regards to religions.

Re-establishing “Republican Values”

The defence of laïcité against what Manuel Valls has labelled “Islamofascism” was, for some, a key component of the mass support after the Paris attacks. A few days after the Paris killings, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the 2012 presidential candidate for the Left Front (a radical left coalition of parties) gave a public conference. At that public event, Mélenchon argued that the attacks had aimed to undermine laïcité. According to this line of reasoning, the attacks had allegedly taken place because some could not tolerate that religions—in this instance, Islam—be the butt of mockeries or blasphemous cartoons. Blasphemy—as it was argued almost unanimously in France at the time—constitutes a fundamental right as laïcité allegedly protects all kinds of beliefs including the right not to believe and to deride religions.

The day after the shooting, the French ministry of education decided that a minute of silence would be observed in all secondary schools across France to honour the victims. Teachers
were invited to talk about the values of the Republic—notably laïcité—that had allegedly been threatened by the killings. In the days which followed the massacres, a 12-year old girl was temporarily excluded from school for saying in the playground that “all Muslims are friends with jihadists.” An 8-year old was interrogated for two hours at a police station for allegedly refusing to respect the mandatory minute of silence and to join a “chain of solidarity” on the playground in support of Charlie Hebdo. He also allegedly declared that he was “on the side of the terrorists” (those claims were strongly denied by the child’s parents and lawyer). About 200 incidents of that nature were reported to the Education ministry. When no incidents took place, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the Education minister, still lamented that “too much questioning came from pupils,” hinting that it was suspicious on the part of youngsters to discuss critically what had taken place in Paris or not to express full solidarity with Charlie Hebdo.

On 22 January, Vallaud-Belkacem presented a series of measures which were to constitute a “great mobilisation for schools around the values of the republic.” Several of those measures focused on laïcité. It was decided that a day of laïcité would be celebrated every 9 December to mark the passing of the law separating the Church and the State on 9 December 1905. Other measures include explaining La Marseillaise, the French national anthem, or the flag in order “to re-establish teachers’ authority and Republican rites” in the classroom. Teachers were on the whole not impressed. Some regretted that those measures were ill-conceived and ineffectual as it was like imposing “something from the outside to kids who don’t understand it.” Some even challenged the reference to laïcité seen as a tool “that could be perceived as Islamophobic” by some pupils (Costa-Kostritsky 2015).

Sociological studies have shown that Islam has given some youngsters from banlieues a chance to socialise at the mosque; it has helped them to steer out of delinquency and focus on their studies. In short, Islam has provided them with a way to find some dignity (Truong 2013). The importance that Islam today holds in the suburbs is the consequence of failed promises and policies in the 1980s. In 1983, a march for equality was organised: people walked from Marseilles to Paris. This was the first time that second generation immigrants—mostly from Maghreb and former French colonies—publicly spoke up in favour of a multicultural and more inclusive France. After being initially courted by the Socialist government, they were rapidly ignored. This generation was failed and was never represented by the political system as a whole.

When Manuel Valls described France as a “territorial, social and ethnic apartheid” on 20 January 2015, most politicians were outraged: how could the Prime Minister compare the country of the Rights of Man to the institutionally racist South African regime? Valls, however, did not intend to suggest that France has failed to integrate the population of foreign descent. It is true that he unwittingly admitted that, in France, there is indeed “race politics”: contrary to the elites’ republican discourse, successive French governments from the left and from the right have implemented policies which have stigmatised and discriminated against those populations. For example, while serving as interior minister in March 2013, Manuel Valls crudely stated that the Roma population (hardly 2,000 people in France) could not integrate because its culture was “incompatible” with “French values” and “lifestyle.” This commentary was perceived as blatantly discriminatory and also arguably racist by anti-racist associations (Le Monde 2013). Yet the reaction of
mainstream media and of political parties was tame if not inexistent at all.

**The Sanctitification of laïcité**
Given the size of the Muslim population, the French authorities cannot be as dismissive as they are with the Roma people. In France, one does not refer to “Blacks” or “Arabs,” but to “people from immigration”; one talks about universal values and although one alludes to Islam, one mentions *laïcité* instead. In other words, race politics in French politics is heavily understated and codified (Fassin 2015).

What had Valls intended, then, with his unsubtle comment about apartheid in France? After recognising that France was an “ethnic apartheid,” did the prime minister plead guilty for France’s failures and for treating sections of its populations as second-class citizens? He did not in the least do that. Rather than saying that the French government had imposed “apartheid policies” on some individuals, the Prime Minister argued that some (notably Muslim) “communities” had imposed an apartheid on the rest of society. In short, the population which originates from abroad allegedly regroups and creates isolated “ethnic areas.” The French call it *communautarisme* (communautarianism, not to be confused with the word as it is used in English); a cardinal sin as the French republic is allegedly “indivisible.” Therefore it cannot accept segregated populations because they represent a “threat” to the unity of the nation. What this discourse fails to acknowledge is that those “segregated” populations do not choose to live in poor suburban areas. The successive governments put them there in the first place (Hussey 2014). Banished from the physical, as well as political and economic centers of French society, many “French Muslims” have sought acknowledgement of their culture. The promotion of a “Muslim identity” has been for some a strategy to receive attention and some form of recognition. The political reaction to these new demands has been to radically redefine French secularism in terms of a normative set of rules and boundaries (Bowen 2015).

Throughout the whole process of demonization and segregation of individuals of Muslim faith, French “republicans” of late emphatically—some would say obsessively—refer to the notion of *laïcité*. The great universalist values of *laïcité*—freedom of conscience for all, common rules for everyone and equality between men and women—have become the instrument used to distinguish between “Us” (the “good” French citizens who abide by French law and customs) and “Them” (those who do not) (Rancière 2015). This is not what *laïcité* and the law of 1905 was meant to be. In the 19th century, *laïcité* was a political concept which allowed republicans to free schools from the grip exerted by the Catholic Church. From the 1980s, it has become a kind of universal—and in a sense, religious—principle; a rule that every individual has to obey. It is up to the immigrants (first and second generations) and to the Muslims to conform to a kind of “Frenchness,” a set of unwritten rules of conduct and lifestyles which are compatible with “being French” or simply with living in France. In this respect, Catholicism is largely integrated in this new *laïque* space; Judaism and Protestantism are tolerated, but Islam is seen and portrayed as an alien and incompatible body within the French nation. Worse, Islam is described as a “threat.” For women, to wear a hijab is a threat to *laïcité* because the majority of the population disapproves of the norms and values they ascribe to the garment. No pluralistic accommodation of those minority practices may possibly be found. In this situation, the role of the State is to intervene to “liberate” and “emancipate” women; to challenge decisions that most have freely made. The State interference into people’s privacy goes as far as controlling women’s dress code.
and physical appearance. This explains why, since the late 1980s, the wearing of the hijab (first in school but now in the public sphere at large) has become a thorny issue for the tenants of this holistic interpretation of laïcité (Fouteau 2015). Such a take on laïcité relies on a false universalism. It proposes in fact a “majority communautarisme” (Marlière 2004); meaning a set of Franco-centred values and norms which are compatible with the views and culture of a majority of French citizens. After the ban on the hijab in state schools (in 2004) came the ban on the face veil in the street (2010). More recently, girls in secondary education who were not wearing a hijab were expelled from schools on the grounds that the “long dark dress” which they were wearing constituted a “conspicuous religious [Islamic] sign.”

The public narrative on “Islam” and “the Muslims” (as opposed to “the Arabs,” the more widely used term until the 1990s) by French politicians, the media and intellectuals/writers have shaped very negative representations of Islam in general. It can be argued that there has been an attempt—deliberate or not—to vilify and ostracise people who are Muslim (Fredette 2014).

**Republican McCarthyism**

Obviously, everyone was horrified by the Paris attacks and everyone agreed to condemn them. But this is not to say that everyone agreed with Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons, nor that the great marches across France were meant to support “freedom of expression.” Free speech is obviously an essential component of liberal societies. It follows that the State cannot prevent dissenting views being expressed unless they break the law. The “Charlie Hebdo effect” and the show of national unity were short-lived exactly because French citizens did not take to the streets in support of an unqualified conception of free speech. People know that some ideas and viewpoints are suppressed. For instance, France has the most draconian laws in Europe to fight Anti-Semitism. So everyone understands that one can defend free speech in theory, but without having to publish, let alone embrace offensive ideas.

This is the main reason why the whole nation could not possibly come out in support of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons, which were seen by many as crude and offensive. On the left, there was unease with anti-Islamic criticisms as Muslims have virtually no representation and no political clout in society. Simply put, people took to the street to express their disgust at the cold-blooded killings. They sent a simple message: it is not right to shoot someone because you do not like what they have to say. This underlying principle of tolerance sets the terms of how individuals can live together and learn to respect each other. The French authorities, however, chose instead to polarise the debate in terms of freedom of expression with, on the one hand, partisans of the Republic, laïcité and free speech (the “good” citizens), and on the other the first and second generation immigrants (the “bad” citizens), who are “communitarian,” culturally backward, sexist and Islamist.

Reducing the Charlie Hebdo attacks to a question of freedom of speech allows the government to ignore the disastrous socio-economic context in which some young French people become murderers. In truth, the obsessive reference to Islam in French society can be seen as a proxy for class and race. Muslims are discriminated against owing to their religion, but also because they belong to the lowest segments in French society: they live in deprived areas where school and public service provisions are poor, and where there are few job opportunities. They are stigmatised due to the colour of their skin. In those hostile socio-economic cir-
circumstances, Muslims in France were urged by the government and the media to pledge their allegiance to the Republic by publicly stating: “Nous sommes Charlie.”

In a pluralist society, laïcité should not involve banning religions from the public sphere, but should enforce equality of all—believers or not—before the law. Under those circumstances, minority religions should only be limited when they break the law or when they do not respect the principles of liberty and equality for all. Religions should not be banned on the grounds that they do not please, or even offend, the majority of the population (Laborde 2009). The ban on “conspicuous” religious signs in schools (the hijab notably with the 2004 law) and in the street (2010 law) is not “republican” as it goes against the underlying republican values of liberty (to decide how to appear in public) and equality (the laws 2004 and 2010 laws primarily discriminate against Islam). For some, a new republicanism—pluralistic and strongly egalitarian—should be founded (Laborde 2010).

Since the January killings, France has not become more tolerant and more united. Quite the opposite. It started out with the condemnation of those—at school and elsewhere—who were not joining in the “Je suis Charlie” movement. The claim that the public was in favour of free speech was grossly exaggerated as dissenters were briskly silenced. Of more serious and lasting consequence has been new legislation restricting freedom of expression and dissent as well as drastic internet surveillance in the name of the “fight against terrorism” (Fouteau 2015). Since January 2015, the French government has robustly reigned in vocal support for terrorism: up to 100 people are currently under investigation for “making or posting comments that support or try to support terrorism.” The Valls government is preparing its own Patriot Act “to fight terrorism.” It is described by critics from all political persuasions as the “single most important attack” on French civil liberties since the end of the Second World War (Plenel 2015).

Emmanuel Todd, a demographer and a historian, also a staunch “French republican,” has come out recently against this intolerant and illiberal drift calling the march of 11 January an “imposture” (Todd 2015a): “This neo-Republic is a weird socio-political object which keeps shaking the grand rattles of liberty, equality and fraternity which have made France famous all over the world, whereas, in fact, our country has become unequal, ultra-conservative and closed” (Todd 2015b). In the aftermath of the Paris killings, it is not free speech which is making inroads, but a brand of French republican McCarthyism.
Contemporary Laïcité: the Crafting of a New ‘Invented Tradition’?  
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In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the French Minister of Education, announced that the government would invest 250 million euros into a program to reinforce Republican values in schools, in which the transmission of laïcité is identified as central. The program plans to offer training on laïcité to existing educators, to make the ability to communicate republican values a recruitment criteria for future teachers, to require parents and children to sign a Laïcité Charter, to ask teachers to systematically report behaviors that violate republican values, and to reinforce republican rites, including the celebration of a laïcité day on December 9th (commemorating the law of December 9th 1905, also often known as the separation law). Laïcité is, thus, being transformed into a national ritual that has to be revered, studied, learned, lived, performed, and celebrated.

This short essay accomplishes two main tasks. First, it explores this ritualization of laïcité in greater detail to suggest that this process resembles the construction of ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Like an ‘invented tradition,’ the content of laïcité is never clearly defined; also similar to an ‘invented tradition,’ one of the aims of developing a grammar around laïcité is the “incultations of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behavior” (1983: 9). Second, drawing on previous work (Barras 2013, 2014), I argue that despite its lack of definition, ritualization around laïcité is used as a justification to scrutinize, interfere with, and ultimately govern the bodies, sensibilities and practices of Muslim citizens—ensuring that these citizens conform to certain standards of French “normality.”

Hobsbawm and Ranger in the introduction to their edited collection discuss the concept of ‘invented traditions’ at length. While this concept is frequently mobilized to explore the construction of national symbols and rites in the 1800s and early 1900s, it is a particularly useful lens to understand the recent transformations of French laïcité. Laïcité, which was until a decade ago mobilized periodically in relation to the neutrality of state institutions and to recall the separation of church and state in France,11 has recently become the new French motto that—if implemented systematically—should, it seems, solve most of France’s socio-political problems. This was clearly visible in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, where many French commentators described laïcité as the antidote that had to be administered to French society (especially French children, and more particularly French children identified as Muslims) to prevent future attacks of the same genre. Thus, laïcité is being narrated as the framework that enables citizens to live together, that enables the Republican triptych—equality, fraternity and liberty—to prevail. This new saving mission is well articulated in the introduction to the 2013-2014 annual report of the Observatoire on Laïcité;12
France has never been as diverse as today. This is why laïcité has never been so needed, as it guarantees that all citizens live together in the respect of freedom of conscience and religious convictions, [be they] agnostics or atheists, in [an environment that guarantees] the equality of rights and duties and fraternal citizenship. In a period marked by profound economic and social crisis that is accompanied by an increase in intolerance, laïcité is the irreplaceable tool to preserve democracy (2014: 4).

In other words, besides identifying laïcité as the condition for living together, the report notes that it is particularly needed given the bleak state of French society.13

Hobsbawm and Ranger underline that while the content of ‘invented traditions’ is ‘rather unspecific and vague,’ practices put in place to enforce them are ‘virtually compulsory’:

The crucial element seems to have been the invention of emotionally and symbolically charged signs of club membership rather than the statutes and objects of the club (ibid, 11).

Rituals around the new Laïcité Charter in French schools are good examples of such practices. This Charter, an initiative of the Education Ministry, was first released in September 2013 in schools throughout France. In its annual report, the Observatory on Laïcité notes that most schools endeavored to make this document visible by displaying it in ‘strategic’ places: “in the school or college main hall, on the information board, close to republican symbols (under the flag for instance), in the hallways” (2014: 73). While a few institutions chose to distinguish it from other ‘posters’ by ‘carefully’ framing it, the Observatory recommends that in the future all schools opt for such a formal display conveying the symbolic and official character of the document. The Observatory also praises the initiatives of several schools to organize ceremonies around the release of the document, to which elected representatives, prefects, the media, and/or parents are invited and where students read or/and perform articles of the Charter (2014: 74). Thus, through this solemn process, the Charter becomes an automatic reminder, a symbol that laïcité is the Republic’s bedrock.

To further ensure that parents and students do not remain passive actors in this reverential process, the current Minister of Education has made it a requirement that, as of September 2015, they sign this Charter when they first enroll in school, and at the beginning of every school year after that. This is not the only place in the program of Minister Vallaud-Belkacem where students are imagined as active receivers and learners of laïcité. For instance, building on a 2010 Senate resolution and a recommendation of the Observatory on Laïcité, December 9 has been singled-out to become the national day of laïcité. Rather than being an official holiday, this day will be set apart in the school calendar to commemorate and celebrate the December 9, 1905 law. It is conceived as a day where students will be invited to partake in activities that give a special place to this ‘constitutional republican principle’ (Senate resolution n320: 2010) and that will, at the same time, help counter threats to this principle: ‘it [laïcité] is increasingly being questioned by communitarian, corporatist, fundamentalist or racist movements’ (ibid).

It is interesting to think of these initiatives in light of the importance given to repetition in sustaining ‘invented traditions’: “[repetition] automatically implies continuity with [the] past” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: 1). As seen here, when it comes to the new grammar de-
veloped around laïcité, repetition is given a central role, whether it be through the yearly signing or/and reading out of the Charter or through the annual laïcité day. In fact, the reference to December 9, 1905 constructs a clear, stable, and 'suitable' 'continuity with a 'historic past,' a continuity that obscures the debates around the meaning of laïcité, as well as the fact that the March 2004 law (also often known as the laïcité law) prohibiting students from wearing visible religious symbols has been criticized for deviating from the spirit of the 1905 law. The past is thus being repeatedly (re)constructed, ensuring the cohesiveness, stability, and longevity of this new 'invented tradition.'

Not surprisingly, the content of the 15 articles of the Charter remain rather broad. The first four articulate the 'values' of the French Republic, including some of the parameters of laïcité. Article 3 for instance reads as follows:

*Laïcité* guarantees freedom of conscience for all. *Everyone is free to believe or not believe.* It enables the freedom of expression of one's convictions, while respecting others and within the limits of public order (original emphasis).

The remaining articles are more specific to laïcité in schools, but their content remains open to different interpretations here as well. Consider for instance article 9:

*Laïcité* is about rejecting all types of violence and discrimination, guaranteeing equality between girls and boys and rests on a culture of comprehension of the other (original emphasis).

Thus, laïcité, aside from ensuring the separation between religions and state and the neutrality of the state (article 2 of the Charter), protects freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and gender equality, as well as ensures that a culture of equality and fraternity prevails throughout France. To put it differently, not unlike democracy, laïcité resembles an empty signifier with a very ambitious (and most likely impossible) mission: 'to which any and all can attach their dreams and hopes' (Brown 2010).

While the ideals carried by laïcité are aspirational, unfortunately their translation into practice over the past decade has enabled the constant scrutiny of and interference in the bodies, sensibilities, and practices of particular citizens, namely Muslim citizens (and even more specifically Muslim women). Again not unlike democracy, laïcité seems to rely on an 'unincorporated substrate': "that at once materially sustain democracy [or in our case laïcité] and against which democracy [or laïcité] defines itself" (ibid). This is clearly visible through how the 'neutrality' principle, which laïcité is sought to protect and foster, has been defined in practice. Until 2004, neutrality was conceived as applying to public institutions only, which meant when it came to public schools that they were not to promote a particular religion. Since the late 1980s, one way of showcasing this neutrality has been to systematically prohibit public servants from wearing visible religious symbols—a prohibition that has been articulated in French jurisprudence almost as systematically in relation to Muslim women wearing headscarves, and that has in practice affected these same women. While this particular interpretation of neutrality for public servants has become a non-negotiable requirement of laïcité, who is considered a public servant has and continues to be subject to discussions (on this see Barras 2014). For instance, one of the key debates in schools has been whether mothers of students, who wear headscarves and participate in public school events or outings, ought to be considered 'occasional collaborators of pub-
lic services’ (HCI 2010) and therefore be subjected to the neutrality requirement. This extension of the neutrality requirement to parents, first confirmed by the Ministry of Education in 2012, was later challenged in a study by the Conseil d’État (the highest administrative court in France), which stated that they were not public servants, but specified at the same time that institutions could still recommend that they refrain from showcasing their religion to ensure the good functioning of schools (2013). This confusing climate—that resembles in many ways the one prior\(^\text{19}\) to the passing of the 2004 law—has resulted in a situation where some schools prohibit mothers from wearing visible symbols while others do not (on this, see Collas 2014), and in calls to legislate on the issue in order to officially determine the extent of this neutrality requirement (Le Monde 2013).

Actually, the opinion of the Conseil d’État regarding whether parents, even if they are not public servants, could be asked to abstain from manifesting their faith is perhaps best understood in light of the March 2004 law. This law extended for the first time the principle of neutrality to users of public services. This, as indicated in French policy reports on laïcité, represents a ‘change in paradigm’ whereby: “the principal of laïcité [effectively meaning neutrality here] [is applied] not to public service providers but to a certain category of users of public services” (Richard 2011: 8). This prohibition is spelled out in article 14 of the Charter:

In public schools, the rules of different spaces, specified in the internal regulations, are respectful of laïcité. The wearing of religious signs or clothes through which students ostensibly manifest a religious belonging is prohibited. Here again, debates preceding the passing of the law and discussions on how this law has been implemented focus almost exclusively on women wearing headscarves (on this see for instance: Bowen 2007; Scott 2007; Selby 2012). The Observatory on Laïcité’s assessment of the current status of the law is an excellent example of how this widened focus is ongoing. The Observatory notes that despite a generally appeased climate, a few students continue to challenge the law. In some cases, ‘young girls’ ask to wear the veil outside school premises but ‘during school time,’ while others come to school with bandanas hiding their hair, long skirts of dark colors, and/or gloves. The report also points out that in some rare instances schools have reported incidents where boys wear djebala (long white robes) on Friday, or come to schools with a beard (2014: 76). These examples are telling. First, one can clearly see how in practice the application of the 2004 law seems to affect almost exclusively students identified as Muslims, in particular women. In fact, there is no mention of other faiths in this review. Moreover, the fact that the law bans ‘ostentatious religious signs,’ but does not give more indication of what constitutes an ‘ostentatious’ sign, allows the state (and in these particular examples school employees) to further scrutinize and interfere with the bodies and practices of students identified as Muslims. School officials are left to determine whether a skirt of a certain length and color, or a bandana that covers a certain amount hair, or a beard of a certain length are considered to be ‘religious’ signs when worn or grown by specific students. In so doing, school employees effectively become theological arbitrators; a noteworthy position given their requirement of neutrality.

While headscarves and ‘Islamic’ attire are perhaps the most explicit examples of how current applications of laïcité tend to affect a particular group of citizens, other ‘religious’ practices
such as special dietary requirements and requests for prayer space/time are also subject to special scrutiny. In effect, vague language such as 'public order,' 'collective life,' ‘general interest,’ 'equality,' and ‘fraternity,' woven throughout the Laïcité Charter, is mobilized to justify this scrutiny in and beyond schools. As such, practices considered to carry the risk of segmenting public space in any way or disturbing the ‘order’ of a public place can be limited. The Observatory on Laïcité notes, for instance, that collective prayer can be prohibited in state-run summer camps to ensure their smooth functioning, as well as to avoid divisions among campers. This, the report continues, is not discriminatory since participants can pray individually on their own time and in their own intimate space (2014: 57). While ‘collective prayer’ is not defined, one can suspect here that it includes making available space for students to pray (as this could not only be considered to segment ‘public space’ but also to incite the ‘collective’ dimension of prayer). Of particular relevance in this case, once again, is how the ‘Republic,’ i.e. public servants (and camp counselors more precisely), ends up regulating and defining what is religiously appropriate and what is not in spaces narrated as being governed by laïcité.

Based on our discussion, it should not come as a surprise that President Hollande in his speech to educators after the Charlie Hebdo events (2015) chose to share his own understanding of laïcité:

Because laïcité is not about forgetting beliefs, or [about] whatever conflict with religion, laïcité is the freedom of conscience and the rules that ensure that religions do not have their place in schools.

While this definition is a nice example of how laïcité can act as an empty canvas onto which ‘any and all can attach their dreams and hopes’ (Brown 2010), it clearly speaks as well to its potentially (or perhaps inherently) exclusive dimension when translated in practice. Indeed, if laïcité is about freedom of conscience, then it protects individual beliefs located in an intimate space (not unlike the prayer example above), yet once these beliefs become visible, through embodied practices for instance, they are subject to scrutiny, governance, and ultimately limitations. As already pointed out (e.g. Danchin 2011; Mahmood 2009; Sullivan 2005; Barras 2013, 2014), this distinction between intimate beliefs that deserve protection and practices that are not worthy of the same safeguards is influenced by and favors dominant Christian interpretations of faith, whereby religion and the right to religious freedom are constructed/narrated as being private, located deep within one’s own conscience.

In light of this context, one may wonder whether putting in place a pedagogy of laïcité—including turning it into an ‘invented tradition’ with rites, rituals, and ceremonies—despite its aspirational goals, does not carry the serious risk of focusing in practice almost exclusively on ensuring that students identified as belonging to a particular religion (in this case, Islam) work on transforming and reforming their relationship to their faith so that it becomes ‘compatible’ with the exercise of French citizenship (on the risks of this new pedagogy see: Baubernot 2015). This process, which not only substantially reduces pluralism and leads to the stigmatization of already marginalized individuals, also resonates with worries conveyed by Wendy Brown in her reflection on democracy:

In our time, the figure of (radical) ‘Islamism’ comforts democrats that they are [democratic] [...] Thus has an overt anti-universalism always rested at the heart of democracy, suggesting that were the imperial
dream of universalizing democracy to materialize, it would not take the shape of democracy (Brown 2010).

Perhaps, then, we should take Brown’s comments as an invitation to be particularly wary of empty signifiers. Especially in so far as their translation taps into an idealized past that needs to be viscerally protected from ‘imminent’ threats; a translation that relies therefore on (re)producing a deeply alienating ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide.

From ‘French-Style Integration’ to ‘Republican Inclusion’…maybe.
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For some time now, the French government has stopped talking about integration. Not long ago, this silence was the expression of a kind of paralysis in decision-making (Lorcerie 2014). Now—that is to say, since the attacks of January 2015—it should be interpreted as the first step in an attempt to reframe the issue. This has happened so recently that it is risky to analyze this development. This symposium nevertheless provides the opportunity for an initial report, understanding of course the difficulties inherent in describing events that are still unfolding.

We must historicize and, more importantly, politicize the supposed “French model” of integration. It is primarily a partisan fabrication, supported by some intellectuals, that is dialectically linked to what Habermas describes as a “subjugated” public opinion. French public discourse on integration developed in the early 1990s under a Socialist government in response to the first “headscarf affair” (1989), which was a result of the permanent settlement of Muslim immigrant workers and their families and the emergence of Muslim activism (Laurence and Vaissé 2006). But discourse about “French-style integration” was ambivalent; it never succeeded in transcending political and social cleavages. It was poorly received by the children of immigrants whom it supposedly welcomed into the Republic, and it was opposed straightaway by a bloc of politicians, prominent intellectuals, and magazines that mobilized to defend and define “national identity.” Their conservative orientation was taken for the “republican consensus” in the 2000s (Laborde 2009)—this is the way in which they presented it. This view was cemented within public policy starting in 2002, when the Right enjoyed single-party control (they occupied the presidency, the parliamentary majority, and the government). Socialists immediately put “re-working” integration policy on the agenda when they returned to power in 2012. But nothing, or hardly anything, had been done right up until the attacks of January 2015, apart from reports that were quickly set aside. The attacks, however, transformed this situation. They inspired among part of the Left a desire to prolong the “spirit of January 11” by proclaiming an inclusive system of rights, and this discourse now dominates the government’s com-
The vague intention to relaunch some kind of discussion about integration was forgotten. Instead, the catchwords of “Republican values,” citizenship, inclusion, *vivre ensemble,* etc. came to the fore. Part of the Right and Far-right countered this new discourse with a demand for assimilationism. But in the spheres where the new discourse has been articulated since January 2015—the Ministry of National Education and urban policy, principally—it has undoubtedly found legitimacy. Because of this, the government now has the ability to undertake crucial school policies that previously would have struggled to see the light of day.

The following briefly examines transformations within integration policy and discourse regarding Muslims in France between 1990 and 2012, before venturing to analyze what has happened since 2012.

**The season of ambivalence, 1990-2002**

The year 2002 marks a break in the political timeline of 1990-2012. Before this date, the Right had only ever been alone in power during a brief interlude (1995-1997), and the Left had only been alone in power between 1988 and March 1993. The rest of the time, the country had been governed by dissonant political combinations (periods of “cohabitation”). This environment was conducive to generating temporary solutions for the symbolic management of the presence of Muslims. It became clear during this period that Muslim integration created tension between commonplace assumptions and the law. The French legal system has proved to be much more liberal than public opinion. The Left tried to manage these two clashing normative worlds without fundamentally changing the law—aiming for, albeit timidly, a change in public opinion (Nancy Frazer celebrated this: Frazer 2003)—while the Right’s capacity for action was limited by electoral instability (all the legislative elections during this period ended with alternating parties in power). The political definition of integration and the interpretation of laïcité illustrate these discrepancies.

Integration consists of arousing active participation across the whole of society by women and men called to live long-term on our soil, while accepting without reservation what remains of particularist (especially cultural) commitments but [nonetheless] emphasizing commonalities and convergence in the equality of rights and duties in order to ensure the cohesiveness of our social fabric (HCI 1993: 8).

The normative discourse here attempts to recognize what would be called after 2005 “diversity”; but it does it clumsily, in such a way as to be unsatisfying from both a legal and empirical point of view (Brouard and Tiberj 2005; Lorcerie and Geisser 2011). This circumlocution evokes an identity-based vision of integration, which is consistent with majoritarian social representations but not with republican law, at the risk of reinforcing the idea that Muslim immigration is a foreign element within the nation. In trying to prevent “communitarianism,” it carried its specter into an already fearful public opinion.

Shortly before this, the first “headscarf affair” and its legal outcome had ignited public debate. Following the controversial expulsion of three middle school students who would not remove their veil (*hijab*) in class during the start of the school year in 1989, the education minister sought an advisory opinion from the Council of
State. The resulting opinion made a sharp distinction between instructors and students: the former, it recalled, are bound by neutrality, while the latter enjoy “freedom of conscience,” broadly defined. Based on this, the opinion reaches a clear solution:

It follows from what has been said that, in educational establishments, students wearing symbols by which they mean to manifest their religion is not in and of itself incompatible with the principle of laïcité, to the extent that it constitutes the exercise of the freedom of expression and expression of religious belief.25

This opinion stupefied the political and intellectual world. This liberal vision of French laïcité was not the one they believed in, nor was it what the whole world thought “French secularism” to be, namely an authoritarian version that constrains the freedom of religious expression. In reality, French law had been broadened over the course of the twentieth century, and especially after the second world war, without the world at large recognizing it (apart from specialized legal experts). Notably, France had withdrawn its reservations concerning Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which establishes a much higher degree of protection for religious liberty. Among supporters of so-called laïcité, only the Education League, a large umbrella group of social organizations traditionally dedicated to the defense of laïcité, responded to this normative shift with ethical and political reflection, starting with its July 1989 meeting celebrating the bicentennial of the Revolution.26 Following the opinion of the Council of State, no government took it upon itself to explicitly accept the liberal value of laïcité, as defined by the law, or to explain it to French society. Simply put, successive governments have made do. They did this in different ways: Socialists tried to calm local conflicts through mediation while Neo-Gaullists incited skirmishes.27

The legal offensive, 2002-2012

Back in power in 2002, the Right sought to reverse this discourse and policy approach. They implemented a platform that pandered to nationalism within public opinion and tried to change the law as far as French institutions would permit—which can only happen at the margins, because French law on civil rights is superseded by European norms (the directives issued by the European Union) and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and its court, the European Court of Human Rights (which is dependent on the Council of Europe). First, the Right made sure that it emphasized the one-sidedness of the process reflected in the word “integration” (contrary to how it was understood within the previous discourse) by refocusing the integration discourse on the “Reception and Integration Contract” (Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration, or CAI). Signing this document is now a requirement for permanent residency.

But most importantly, it was the offensive on laïcité that left its political mark on the decade from 2002-2012. Beyond some differences between the presidencies of Chirac (2002-2007) and Sarkozy (2007-2012), authorities worked on promoting a “new laïcité” styled as a national identity, and conceived as opposed to Islam. The work launched by Chirac’s supporters in 2003-2004 to ban the Islamic headscarf from school succeeded spectacularly because it breached a legal dam (Lorcerie 2005). Spread out over a year, the campaign was highlighted by a report from François Baroin entitled “For a new laïcité,” then by the Stasi Commission and the Debré Mission,29 and finally by a major speech from Chirac on December 17, 2003, all before a vote took place on March 15, 2004 for
a law that banned students from wearing religious symbols and that called for the publication of a policy circular in May 2004. The exact title of the law is: the Law “limiting, as an application of the principle of laïcité, the wearing of symbols or clothes that express a religious affiliation in primary schools, middle schools, and public high schools.” It is important to note the deceptiveness of this title. The law limits, in the name of laïcité, a freedom that continues to be legally recognized outside of schools; the title, however, presents this exemption as an application of that principle. During Sarkozy’s time in office, the HCI used this argument to justify its attempts to extend the obligation for neutrality into all sorts of other spaces: the workplace, universities, and day care centers—all with the support of a contingent of leftist representatives who subscribe to an anti-religious vision of laïcité.

Coupled with “national identity” and French history, the “new laïcité” was legitimated by implicit comparison to defects attributed to Islam. For example, we read within the Stasi Commission’s report:

Laïcité is produced by the alchemy of history, political philosophy, and personal ethics. It rests on the balancing of rights and obligations. The laïque principle is designed as the guarantee of autonomy and freedom for everyone to choose to be himself [...] Laïcité also relates to national identity, social cohesion, equality between men and women, education, etc.

For their part, intellectuals searching for the secret of the French approach to values of this type, henceforth considered part of the shared national heritage, went all the way back in history to the 18th century (Scott 2011/2012).  

2012 and after: Crisis as an opportunity

After the Right’s offensive on integration policy and the blurring of the meaning of laïcité, the return of the Socialists to power in 2012 made a policy shift seem likely. Because Muslim voters had given their support en masse to the newly elected president, one could expect there would at least be a new discourse reflecting their status as full members of society, as opposed to outsiders, deprived of a voice, or embodying “elusive citizenship” (Fredette 2014). One might also have anticipated a discourse that made better reference to the law on matters of laïcité.

The new government quickly demonstrated its intention to calm the debate around laïcité by closing down the HCI and entrusting the Observatory on Laïcité to a legal expert well acquainted with the Socialist Party, Jean-Louis Bianco. But in terms of integration policy, the government appeared to procrastinate until it totally lost all initiative in 2014, hindered by a media campaign (Dhume 2014). It was the attacks of January 2015 in Paris that changed the situation. The government found within them the opportunity to relaunch its efforts by taking advantage of the need for national unity and faith in the values that were expressed after the attacks. Since then, it has led, under the name “The Great Mobilization for the Values of the Republic,” a campaign publicly affirming republican values in neighborhoods and schools, ranking first among them laïcité and fraternity. All we can say at the moment is that these initiatives have been relayed well in these areas—far less well among the media, however. At the same time, a delicate education reform that addresses social justice and inclusion and that had been waiting for its window of opportunity at the middle school level has been accelerated. In this context, the Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, a 38-year-old born in Morocco and the first female minister in the
Ministry of National Education (only just nominated to this position in August 2014), has demonstrated herself to be a major political player, even if the results of current negotiations remain uncertain.

Immediately following the electoral turnover in 2012, the first step the government took regarding integration policy was to request a report from Thierry Tuot, a member of the Council of State and former director of FAS, followed by the creation of thematic working groups charged with the task of refining legislative proposals. Thierry Tuot started from a key assumption that is the normative equivalent of methodological individualism within sociology: integration “is the social phenomenon by which real or supposed origins lose their primary role as a factor in the social challenges a person faces” (Tuot 2013: 11). With this assumption, he takes integration out of the previous identity framework in order to place the subject of integration within social relationships and their impact on legal subjects. From there were drawn the lines of a policy: (1) Eliminate smoke and mirrors: “The 'Muslim question' is a pure invention of those who ask it” (Tuot 2013: 62); (2) Posit the responsibility of the State, which is to typify the political line with the appropriate words in a “humanist” discourse that combines “respect with goodwill”; (3) “Require public services to incorporate an integration dimension in their interventions”; and (4) “Give local actors the freedom to design, adapt, and conduct the necessary interventions” (Tuot 2013: 23). Tuot asks whether it is possible or necessary to have a liberal republicanism—of the Rawlsian type, if you will. Neither assimilation, nor multiculturalism, nor a contrast between the two. The question was to change the paradigm in order to reconnect with the social experiences of individuals placed in the position of minorities and their real challenges, which an adequate policy must aim at erasing. The human individual, the person, and ethnic discrimination—and not “cultural differences”—must be at the center of this renewed discourse, suggested Tuot.

The thematic working groups that came together as a result of this report have largely followed this line of thinking. Only one among them attempted a “critical republicanism” (Laborde 2008) and urged revisiting the law of March 15, 2004. This set in motion the media campaign that would paralyse central decision making up until the attacks of January 2015. As a whole, the working groups have converged on the liberal republican line formulated by Tuot. This convergence suggests that the views expressed within the Tuot report have some support within society (Lorcerie 2014). What is left to understand is which segments of society support it and why.

It is impossible to understand this by looking at the media coverage. But available research suggests two possible, less obvious explanations. The first is professional attitude. The working groups were composed of people who have demonstrated, while holding various positions (state administrators at the regional level, leaders of social organizations and unions, academics), their involvement in urban politics and integration policy, and about one third of them have an immigrant background from a predominantly Muslim country. The groups generally shared an attitude shaped both by regulatory norms and the management of real-world problems, therefore they were tasked with finding solutions that were at the same time standardized yet effective, implying that the solutions are acceptable to local actors. This attitude can be characterized as, in the words of Weber, an “ethic of responsibility.” It removes the ideology from “diversity” and accepts diversity as one encounters it professionally—even, sometimes, contrary to one’s own professed ideology (Vivarelli 2014). The second possible explanation
is found in recent work on social psychology that looks to identify more precisely the source of the rejection of multiculturalism found among the people of France (Guimond et al. 2015). They find that, in reality, the majority of the French do not, as individuals, reject pluralism; but they think that the rest of the French generally do. The republican norm in France is more typically an assumed collective belief, hammered home by the media, than it is a belief that is personally held by the French.

It remains to be seen whether these results can be confirmed; surveys do not help us to accomplish this. However, we note that these two explanations are not contradictory, and the “Charlie shock” could have strengthened them. A survey done in the immediate aftermath shows that at least the event did not increase French prejudice against minorities, contrary to what was feared (Brouard and Foucault 2015). Moreover, observation of exchanges on teachers’ social media accounts shows that the event delivered a shock, activating among “ordinary” teachers an ethic of responsibility and forcing them to question the moral divide among their students—which they did not see, or rarely saw, until then. In any case, the campaign named the “Great Mobilization of Schools for the Values of the Republic,” announced on January 22 and enthusiastically carried out by the Education and Interior Ministers, managed to introduce “diversity” without saying it, as an assumed part of reality, through the exalted concepts of fraternity and laïcité which are now insistently interpreted as freedom of conscience and freedom of expression given to students. One such sign of this change: Eric Favey, former Deputy Secretary of the National Education League who had been appointed to the General Inspectorate of Education in 2014, is taking an active part in this campaign.

Conclusion

We have proposed that, far from being timeless, the “French model of integration” has been unstable from the very beginning. Its first version was somewhat leftist but ambivalent; its second a product of the Right, nationalist and based on identity. In the third period, especially since the attacks of January 2015, the discourse on integration was taken away from us in favor of a renewed discourse on laïcité and “republican inclusion.” I conclude with three comments on this subject. First, this evolution certainly does not mark the end of the story, but it confirms a structural change in French society. The descendants of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries have moved from being outsiders to full members of society: the majority of them have French nationality and know their rights, and they intend to defend them. Something like the Stasi Commission (2003), where these people were talked about but never with, is unthinkable today. Second, and related to the first point, the principle of laïcité is, more than ever before, the subject of a symbolic battle; but in some circles today, its predominant interpretation is as a value that supports the social inclusion of Muslims. In this way, it has become a symbolic tool for a politics of inclusion, to be put to work in the fight against discrimination and social injustice. The Education League is behind this innovation in the history of laïcité. It is symbolic that the Education Minister who approved it is, herself, an immigrant from a predominantly Muslim country. Third, this reconstruction of the republican symbol of laïcité raises the possibility that the Left is working toward a consensus in favor of a politics of republican inclusion that agrees to treat Islam and Muslims as full members of French society, with the Left newly unified against the Right and Far Right.
In this policy brief I review a series of executive orders issued by President Barack Obama between June 2012 and November 2014 that provide temporary and conditional relief from deportation to an estimated 5.2 million migrants without legal status (Mathema 2015). These measures emerged as an alternative after the U.S. House failed to pass legislation known as Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR), a bill that would have granted a path to citizenship to selected groups as well as increased resources for enforcement. The executive measures confer "no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship" (a prerogative of the U.S. Congress) and they are not without its critics. Limitations notwithstanding, the measures provide relief from deportation, facilitate access to drivers’ licenses and give access to work authorization. To understand these measures, however, they must be analyzed as part of the full set of executive actions issued in November of 2014 and in the context of the broader immigration debate.

The executive actions are consistent with the dominant framing of CIR in that they combine a sustained focus on enforcement with the selection of particularly deserving subjects for inclusion. The latter includes migrants that came to the United States as children, parents of citizens or legal permanent residents (LPR), and those who enlist (or have family members who enlist) in the armed forces.

As I suggest below, these measures do not put an end to the production of illegality (De Genova 2004; Ngai 2004) that has historically characterized the immigration regime. Instead, they codify a new form of non-legality (a temporary deferral of expulsion) that a select portion of undocumented migrants can access. Those who do not qualify for these programs because they lack the qualifications, cannot afford the fees, or arrived after the cut-point (January 1st 2014) remain within the realm of illegality and subject to deportation.

In the rest of this essay I first detail the better known executive actions, DACA and DAPA, as well as the other executive actions passed in November 2014. Second, I discuss the rationale for inclusion and exclusion in these measures. Third, I review other recent executive measures taken by the Obama administration. In the conclusion, I briefly discuss the political context that led to these measures, and point out some lessons to be extracted from the failure to pass legislation.

DACA, DAPA, and Beyond
In June of 2012, an executive action known as Deferred Actions for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
directed immigration enforcement to de-prioritize “certain young people who were brought to this country as children” and “lacked the intent to violate the law” (Napolitano 2012, 1). This measure benefited those migrants who arrived before June of 2007 and were up to 30 years of age at the time. Additional requirements included attending school or having graduated high school, having a general education development (GED) certificate, or having been honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed Forces (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2015).

On November 20th of 2014, a new executive order expanded this program by eliminating the age cap and extending the eligibility of DACA to include minors who arrived before January 1st, 2010. Alongside the DACA expansion, a new program, known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Legal Permanent Residents (DAPA), granted deferred action to those migrants that have a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. To qualify, migrants must have resided continuously in the U.S. since before January 1st, 2010 and not be an enforcement priority (Johnson 2014a, 4). This latter qualification excludes those with a criminal background—including misdemeanors, and re-entry after a deportation—as well as those with a final order of removal (Johnson 2014e, 4).

None of these measures gives a “substantive right, immigration status, or pathway to citizenship” but simply provides a relief from deportation (Napolitano 2012, 3; Johnson 2014a, 5). The application of expanded DACA and DAPA programs is suspended at the time of writing by a temporary injunction issued by District Court Judge Andrew Hanen, which the Obama administration unsuccessfully tried to undo through an emergency stay (Duara and Hennessy-Fiske 2015; Lillis 2015). An additional set of measures issued on November 20th were not affected by the injunction and (1) benefit other groups with deferred action or waivers or (2) expand or reform enforcement. The benefits include the extension of parole-in-place to parents, spouses and children of new enlistees in the U.S. Armed Forces (this benefit had been available to the families of existing U.S. Armed Forces members) (Johnson 2014d). A second memo allows undocumented spouses and children of citizens and permanent residents to access a waiver of the 3/10-year ban imposed without leaving the country (Johnson 2014e). Finally, a third memo directs the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services unit within the Department of Homeland Security to promote the greater use of waivers and propose a program that would grant status to high-skilled migrants, including “inventors, researchers, and founders of start-up enterprises” (Johnson 2014h, 3-4).

Regarding enforcement, three memoranda (a) discontinue the Secure Communities program, (b) establish new enforcement priorities, and (c) strengthen border security. The discontinuation of Secure Communities follows from opposition to this program by activists and localities that refused to honor Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers. In its place, ICE is expected to design a program that, while still relying on fingerprinting and databases, would only transfer individuals convicted of a particular set of offenses or who had arrived in the U.S. after the cut-point, following the redefined enforcement priorities (Morton 2011; Johnson 2014e).

New priorities for enforcement are defined in a second memorandum, which updates the priorities enacted in 2011 by previous ICE director John Morton. The new set of priorities both hardens and softens enforcement, and establishes a different regime for those arriving be-
fore and after the cut-point. Notably, traffic incidents and immigration violations arising out of local legislation are explicitly excluded from any priority (having been first priority in the 2011 memo), and misdemeanors and significant misdemeanors are now only a second priority, down from first. The new memo also gives higher priority to apprehensions at the border and to those who enter or re-enter the country after a deportation, but only if they arrived after the cut-point (first and second priority, respectively). Finally, the memo gives the lowest priority to those who have received an order of removal but lack a criminal background, and it exempts those that arrived before the cut-point (Morton 2011; Johnson 2014e).

In sum, new priorities for enforcement exempt those with minor violations, or those targeted by local anti-immigrant laws from being a priority of enforcement, as well as the undocumented migrants who arrived before the cut-point. However, undocumented migrants who entered the U.S. after the cut-point, and new entrants intercepted at the border, will be automatically treated as priorities 1 and 2, respectively, regardless of any other qualifiers. In other words, the removal of the minor offenses as grounds for prioritizing individuals is accompanied by the prioritization of undocumented status per se, thus subjecting new entrants to a regime that is tougher than before.

Prioritizing the arrivals intercepted at the border is consistent with the toughened border policies ordered after the 2014 surge of arrivals of unaccompanied children from Central America, a focus confirmed by the third enforcement memo’s commitment to “building an even more secure border” (Johnson 2014j, 2). To address this crisis, the Obama administration also re-inaugurated the practice of family detention, which it had formally ended in 2009 (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service and the Women’s Refugee Commission 2014).

The latest budget forwarded to Congress by President Obama maintains the focus on increased enforcement. The budget request includes increased funds for detention, including family detention, and the “alternatives to detention” program, including electronic monitoring among other techniques. Despite its name, the program does not replace the detention slots, but increases the total number of migrants subject to some form of surveillance (Department of Homeland Security 2015; Perez 2015).

The executive actions outlined above would not have come about without the continuous activism of migrants, their relatives, and their allies: civil rights groups that challenged Secure Communities in the courts, DREAMers, the anti-deportation movement, and activism centered around the right to a family (Gonzales 2013; Pallares 2014). The benefits to high-skilled migrants and the families of U.S. Armed Forces members are consistent with a rhetorical strategy that positions immigration inclusion as beneficial to the economy and the military, de-emphasizing questions of rights. Moreover, these measures prioritize for deportation migrants with a criminal background, despite the fact that the criminal justice system has been found lacking in its racial neutrality.40

Ultimately, the executive actions inaugurate a new form of temporary status in which membership is not granted but expulsion is deferred on a renewable basis. It is not easy to trace in advance the implications of these measures for future immigration politics and policymaking. While this status might facilitate migrants’ activism in favor of legislation that could grant them legal status, it might also result in a permanently conditional status and a precarious inclusion into the U.S. polity.
Conclusion
The executive measures described above came after the immigration strategy of the Obama administration failed to get Republicans to the negotiating table. This strategy was avowedly to “get tough” to prove that he could enforce the laws and that the border was secure (Thompson and Cohen 2014). The failure of the strategy suggests that—as I argue elsewhere—that the “toughness” of enforcement is the goal of enforcement itself, rather than punishment in the sense of retribution (Valdez 2012, 2015). The centrality of punishment is continuous with other contemporary transformations in the United States areas of criminal justice and welfare, and consistent with an authoritarian shift among the U.S. electorate (Smith 2007; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Alexander 2010). If this is plausible, the strategy of “getting tough,” while conceived as an incentive, is in fact what Republicans are essentially looking for: to punish. Thus, such a strategy could not, in principle, be effective in coaxing Republicans to negotiate.

From a normative perspective, the chief problem of this strategy is a different one: the dehumanization of migrants. The claim to “get tough” implied the detention/deportation of enough migrants to convince Republicans of the willingness of Democrats to enforce the law. The pursuit of this strategy in the absence of the legislation it was supposed to bring about resulted in the over two million deportations overseen by the Obama administration.

If this interpretation of the immigration regime is convincing, a lesson for the future is that the retrenchment of enforcement should be prioritized over any other action. This was a missed chance of the recent executive actions, which—as noted above—subjects the groups that do not qualify for the deferral of deportation to expanded surveillance, detention, and border controls.

A strategy that shelters the would-be beneficiaries of a generalized-legalization-to-come, rather than thinking of their banishment as carrots that will bring about legislation, has a clear normative political advantage. The retrenchment of enforcement can only have salutary effects over the ability of migrants themselves to organize politically, even beyond what the DREAMers, the anti-deportation movement, domestic workers, and other grassroots organizations are already doing. Letting migrants make their case for incorporation is likely to be the clearest statement of their claim to belong.

Research Institute Profile:
The Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy

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The Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy (CRIPPP), originally founded in 2001 at the Irvine campus of the University of California, has been a UC Organized Research Unit since 2008. Today the activities of the center involve twenty-eight affil-
ated faculty (from eleven departments in seven schools), dozens of graduate students, and one staff member. The focus is both multi- and interdisciplinary: Faculty associates come from the social sciences, humanities, medicine, public health, education, and law. The center’s general role is to support in myriad ways basic and policy-related research concerned with international migration and immigrant settlement, including studies of how immigration affects U.S. population dynamics, American society, and the economy. Broadly speaking, the Center’s research deals with projects investigating what kinds of immigrants come, what happens to them when they are here, and what social, demographic, and economic effects they have on the United States.

In keeping with these emphases, three major lines of inquiry at the Center in recent years have consisted of (1) research that has sought to develop new statistical and demographic methodologies for estimating hard-to-detect kinds and flows of migrants (e.g., studies on the numbers and kinds of unauthorized entrants, the numbers and kinds of visa overstays, and the numbers and kinds of immigrants leaving the United States); (2) research that has focused on the implications of immigration for American society and the economy (e.g., studies on how immigration affects racial/ethnic identities, intermarriage, naturalization, immigrant housing patterns and residential locations, U.S. racial/ethnic relations, crime rates, and U.S. labor markets) and (3) investigations into how rapidly and in what ways immigrant groups are becoming integrated into American society, government, culture and the economy (e.g., various research projects have been completed or are still underway using the data from a large-scale $2 million study of what is happening to the young adult children of immigrants in greater metropolitan Los Angeles, including Orange County, collected by the Center’s researchers). Faculty involved with the Center’s programs have also conducted research on other aspects of immigration and immigration policy (e.g., research on comparative international migration policies juxtaposing Spain and the United States and studies on factors affecting the definition and treatment of unauthorized migrants in various parts of the world). The center anticipates continuing to support and encourage international and comparative work even as its main emphases remain on the U.S. case.

Some of the other many activities the Center has sponsored or been involved in over the past five years include 1) helping to initiate and participate in a University of California-wide program on migration and health; 2) obtaining new and continuing externally funded research grants; 3) serving multiple significant academic and public service roles, including disseminating policy-relevant research findings in major media outlets and serving on National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences panels and committees; 4) delivering talks in major public policy arenas; 5) organizing and participating in significant conferences and workshops; 6) publishing important books and articles; 7) sponsoring research workshops and seminars; and 8) (most recently) joining with five other UC campuses to apply for (and be awarded) a highly competitive research and program grant from the UC Office of the President (UCOP) to support research and activities focusing on immigrant integration in California over the next four years. Overall, Center researchers continue to be significantly involved in highly competitive externally funded research projects (totaling nearly $21 million dollars in financial support the past five years, of which about $4.3 million is new funding this past year).
The continuing participation of the center in the development of university-wide programs on migrant health has been enhanced by several UCI research grants: a $1.3 million grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development to the director of CRIPPP, Frank D. Bean, as co-PI to support research based on the linkage of data from the National Center for Health Statistics and the Office of Immigration Statistics at DHS; an important sub-grant to Bean (as co-investigator) that involves his participation in a five-year National Institute of Child Health and Development Program Project Grant on Family and Health among Mexican Children of Immigrants; a project to Bean (as PI) on “Coverage Error in the Mexican-Born Population of the United States” funded by the Science and Technology Directorate of the DHS through the BORDERS Center for Excellence Research Consortium at the University of Arizona; and a new immigrant-health research initiative undertaken as one of the activities of the new UCOP-funded project on the integration of immigrants in California.

Faculty affiliated with the center have designed two major publicly available and widely used U.S. surveys on the children of immigrants. Together with Alejandro Portes of Princeton, Rubén G. Rumbaut was a co-principal investigator of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey that examined the children of different immigrant groups in Miami and San Diego and led to the award-winning book Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Rumbaut, who was recently elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is also working with Cynthia Feliciano on a follow-up of the San Diego sample almost a quarter century after the initial second-generation persons were first surveyed in the eighth grade.

Bean and Rumbaut were also the lead investigators of the survey Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles in 2004. This survey looked at the young adult offspring of immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala, South Korea, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, together with native-born comparison groups. Two books by investigators affiliated with that project will be published this year: The Asian American Achievement Paradox, in which Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou show how highly educated immigrants from Asia define and reinforce a strict definition of success for their children; and Parents Without Papers: The Progress and Pitfalls of Mexican American Integration, in which authors Bean, Susan K. Brown, and James D. Bachmeier assess how much the lack of legal status hampers the mobility of not only the Mexican immigrant generation but also the children and grandchildren of the immigrants.

Graduate students involved with the center can also take advantage of weekly interdisciplinary brown bag research presentations on issues of Population, Society and Inequality, of which immigration-related research is a strong component. Speakers have come from across the United States, and some internationally. Recent migration speakers have included Douglas S. Massey and Marta Tienda, both of Princeton University; Pia Orrenius, an economist from the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, Patrick Simon from INED in Paris; Maurice Crul of the Free University of Amsterdam; and Jacqueline Hagan, a sociologist at the University of North Carolina. The center also has been able to offer (on a competitive basis) seed grants for students and faculty seeking to develop larger research proposals.

The center has also co-sponsored multiple conferences, including an annual International Migration Conference, held at varying UC campuses in Southern California, at which faculty and graduate students from across all UC campuses
interact. The center also has helped to underwrite periodic international migration conferences held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association (such as one at Berkeley in 2008 and one at the CUNY Graduate Center in 2014. In October 2015, UCI will hold a conference on the 50th anniversary of both the university and the Hart-Celler Act, the 1965 U.S. legislation which changed American immigration policy to eliminate national quotas and establish family reunification criteria as the key bases for obtaining legal permanent residence status.

In addition, immigration students at UCI can take advantage of one of the strongest academic programs in the country in immigration. Sociology graduates in immigration have been strongly competitive on the job market, accepting initial research or faculty tenure-track Assistant Professor posts at the University of Chicago; Harvard University; the University of Southern California; Brigham Young University; the State University of New York-Albany; Brooklyn College-City University of New York; the University of Denver; the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC; Temple University; Pennsylvania State University; the U.S. Bureau of the Census; and the University of Washington, among others.

### Teacher’s Corner:

**Master’s Degree in Immigration Studies: A Combined Focus on Research and Policy**

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This coming academic year begins the seventh edition of the Master’s Degree in Immigration Studies directed by GRITIM (Interdisciplinary research group in immigration) at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. It was the first Master’s program officially accredited by the Spanish Ministry at this University, and one of the first public ones in Spain that specializes in immigration studies. This Master’s program is recognized as one of the best in southern Europe due to its combined focus on research and policy orientation.

From a research point of view, immigration and human mobility are presented as complex and multidimensional social phenomena that overlap several social scientific disciplines. A key element of the Master’s program is a strong multidisciplinary and multi-methods focus,
invoking key-concepts and issues in Law, Sociology, Politics, Administration, Geography, Anthropology, Economics, Communication and even Psychology. The teaching is structured to follow three thematic axes: Theory and Methodology (The Foundation of Immigration Policies, and Sources and Tools for the Analysis of Migration), Law and Economics (The Legal Framework for Migration, and Economics of Migration), and Politics and Society (Comparative Migration Policies, and The Welfare State and Public Policy). Apart from the compulsory courses, students can choose between many electives on specific relevant topics and approaches within immigration studies, allowing the students to follow their specific research interests. For example, electives include Intercultural Policies, Qualitative Analysis, Discourse Analysis, Social Psychology, Externalization of Immigration Policies and the European Union.

The multiplicity of immigration studies is also reflected by the very diverse profile of our students in both training and origin. Their backgrounds are in various disciplines within the social sciences (politics, sociology, anthropology, geography, history, economics, law, etc.). Additionally, a large majority of our students are international, coming from Europe, Asia, and Latin America (80%). Last year, more than ten different nationalities were represented across the Master’s students, allowing them to "study diversity within diversity”. The fact that courses are taught in English favors the heterogeneity of our students' origins and enables us to invite scholars and recognized researchers from any background and center in Europe. This geographical and academic variety adds a very interesting multiplicity of viewpoints to the Master’s program, and makes the bidirectional teaching process very dynamic.

Another key element of the Master’s in Immigration Studies is a strong focus on policies and politics when analyzing immigration phenomena. In fact, one of the criteria driving the teaching program is to combine theoretical and applied research related to political and social agendas and, in particular, to contribute to the definition of a European approach. This is an added value of the program, especially for students coming from Canada, the US and other non-European regions.

This policy orientation is one of the key aspects of the Master’s in Immigration Studies. The aim is to foster student contact with stakeholders and institutions in the field of immigration and diversity policies at different levels of government. Understanding their point of view, their possibilities, and the rationale behind their actions will help students to consider the implications of their future research activities for stakeholders and policymakers in the field of immigration. The Master's program supports student internships with social, administrative, and political institutions. It also offers a special optional course allowing students to have direct contact with leading policy makers as well as social and policy officers at different levels of the administration.

The aim of the Master’s degree is to complement high-quality university studies with a solid base in theoretical and applied knowledge leading to specialization in conducting academic research, case studies, comparative analysis, and implementing quantitative and qualitative techniques. At the same time, we are aware that not all students will pursue an academic career. Thus, we provide them with the necessary tools to help them develop a satisfactory professional career in other sectors (administration, political parties, civil society organizations, etc.). Although the main orientation of the Master’s program is towards social scientific research, various professional prospects are available for them after the end of the program, due to the
methodological, theoretical, and empirical background of our students, as well as their fluency in different languages.

Several of our previous students are employed as specialists in immigration management at various governmental levels (local, regional, national and supranational levels). Some students work in immigration programs as officers and/or managers for NGOs and consultancy bodies. Another professional avenue is to provide expertise for political, economic and cultural institutions, or to consultant for private foundations, consultancy companies, and other research-oriented entities. To take advantage of this new and diverse landscape, the program will help students build bridges with institutes and university centres, public administrations, immigrants associations, NGOs and other stakeholders.

Another added value of this Master’s program is its multi-methods approach that promotes reflection on various methodological questions. This methodological component is present not only in many compulsory and optional courses, but in the research seminar series which occurs throughout the three trimesters. Ten international scholars are invited to come and share their methodological reflections on their current research and their broader research career. This year, for instance, students have had the opportunity to listen and talk with recognized different scholars such as: R. King (Sussex, UK), M. Vink (Maastricht, Netherlands), E. Recchi (Sciences Po, Paris, France), P. Simon (Ined, Paris, France), Th. Kostakopoulou (Warwick, UK), A. Içduygu (Koç, Turkey), I. Rohlfing (Bremen, Germany). We ask them not to lecture on a particular topic, but to focus on how they do research and what methodological advice they can offer to students, given their academic excellence and career.

Most of the professors are international researchers at GRITIM-UPF, as well as visiting researchers at Marie Curie or other international fellows. Each year, some high-level guest professors join us to teach a course. During the academic year 2014-2015, the program has hosted Pieter Bevelander, Professor of International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER) at MIM, Malmö Institute of Migration, Diversity and Welfare of the Malmö University (Sweden).

One of the new program policies is to place the Master’s students in a European network of other similar Master’s programs in Europe. We consider that an additional asset to the program is the possibility to obtain a double degree, through the existing two-year program with another European university. At the moment, we have begun a double-degree with the University of Liège and the research group CEDEM (directed by Professor Marco Martineu). Students will then have a Master’s in Immigration studies combining policy and social orientations in just two years. We are now discussing with other recognized Master’s and research groups in Europe to study the possibility of enlarging these agreements and offering more double degrees to our students.

Catalan institutions provide support for the program, such as the Municipality of Barcelona and its immigration department, and the important key social institutions of La Caixa Foundation. Some other think tanks collaborate and even host some research seminars, such as IEMed (European Institute of the Mediterranean) and CIDOB foundation in Barcelona.

Because the Master’s program is affiliated with GRITIM-UPF, students will automatically benefit from all the activities organized by the recognized research group, such as seminars, workshops with stakeholders, and research meetings where students will have the oppor-
portunity to interact with any visiting international researchers. For these reasons, the philosophy of the Master's program illustrates the three pillars that make up GRITIM-UPF's activities: Research, Training and Knowledge Transfer.

Lastly, but for many students, not least, students will also benefit from the intercultural city of Barcelona from a human and social point of view, due to its many welcoming facilities.

More Information on Master's Degree:
- [http://www.upf.edu/immigrationmanagement/_pdf/Flyer_M_Immigration_Management.pdf](http://www.upf.edu/immigrationmanagement/_pdf/Flyer_M_Immigration_Management.pdf)

More Information on GRITIM-UPF:
- [http://www.upf.edu/gritim](http://www.upf.edu/gritim)

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**Section News:**
**January – June 2015 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, Member News**

**Books**


Castles, Stephen, Derya Ozkul and Magdalena Cubas (Eds.) (2015). *Social Transformation and Migration. National and Local Experiences in South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia*. Palgrave.


Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Ronaldo Munck, Branka Likic-Brboric and Anders Neergaard (Eds.)


Journal Articles

American Behavioral Scientist


American Political Science Review


American Journal of Political Science

British Journal of Political Science

Comparative Political Studies


Electoral Studies

Ethnopolitics

Ethnolinguistic Cleavage in Moldova.” Ethnopolitics 14(1), 52-71.


European Journal of Political Research


International Security


Journal of Conflict Resolution


Journal of Politics

Party Politics


Political Research Quarterly

Political Studies


Political Theory

Public Opinion Quarterly

World Politics

Member News

Irene Bloemraad (Sociology, University of California)
- Co-edited (with Eddy S. Ng) a special issue on "Multiculturalism During Challenging Times" for the *American Behavioral Scientist* 59(6).
- Published (with Eddy S. Ng) "A SWOT Analysis of Multiculturalism in Canada, Europe, Mauritius, and South Korea." *American Behavioral Scientist* 59(6), 619-636.

David Scott FitzGerald (Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego)

Terri E. Givens (Political Science, Menlo College)
- Was promoted to Full Professor in December 2014.
- Was appointed provost at Menlo College.

Sara Wallace Goodman (Department of Political Science, University of California)
- Was promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in the Department of Political Science at the University of California.

Els de Graauw (Political Science, Baruch College, City University of New York)
- Co-edited (with Erik Bleich and Irene Bloemraad) a special issue on "Migrants, Minorities, and the Media" for the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(6).
- Published (with Irene Bloemraad and Rebecca Hamlin) "Immigrants in the Media: Civic Visibility in the United States and Canada." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(6), 874-896.
- Published (with Erik Bleich and Irene Bloemraad) "Migrants, Minorities, and the Media: Information, Representations, and Participation in the Public Sphere." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(6), 857-873.

Jason E. Kehrberg (Political Science, Muskingum University)
- Published "Immigration and Social Distrust in the Construction of Welfare Policy across the American States." *Politics & Policy* 43, 256-286.

Melanie Kolbe (Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia)

Willem Maas (Political Science, Glendon College, York University)
- Started a Marie-Sklodowska Curie Fellowship on the future of European citizenship in comparative perspective.
- Published “Trade, Regional Integration, and Free Movement of People.” In: *A New Atlantic Community: The European Union, the US and Latin America*. Joaquín Roy (Miami: European Union Center of Excellence/Jean Monnet Chair, University of Miami, 2015), 111-121.

Michael Sullivan (Graduate International Relations, St. Mary’s University)

**Mary McThomas** (Political Science, California State University)

• Published “Engendering Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy: The Impact of Justice and Care.” *Public Integrity* 17, 177-188.

**Phil Triadafilopoulos** (Department of Social Sciences, University of Toronto Scarborough and School of Public Policy and Governance)


**Linda M. Williams** (School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University)


**Abigail Fisher Williamson** (Political Science and Public Policy & Law, Trinity College)

• Has been awarded a grant from the Ruth Landes Memorial Research Fund, a program of the Reed Foundation, in support of her book project "Beyond the Passage of Time: Local Government Response and Immigrant Incorporation."

**Tom K. Wong** (Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego)

• Published *Rights, Deportation, and Detention in the Age of Immigration Control*. Stanford. Stanford University Press.

**Joseph Yi** (Political Science, Hayang University)

• Was promoted to Associate Professor of Political Science in March 2015.

• Received a travel grant (Association for the Sociology of Religion conference).

• Published “The Dynamic of Liberal Indifference and Inclusion.” *Society* 52(3), 264-274.


• Published (with Joe Phillips) “Paths of Integration for Sexual Minorities in Korea.” *Pacific Affairs* 88(1), 123-134.
APSA – Migration and Citizenship Section Officers

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References

Introduction: What the Charlie Hebdo Attacks Can Tell Us About France—but Cannot Tell Us About French Muslims (Jennifer Fredette)


Qui est Ahmed?: Understanding Race, Racism, and French Muslims in the Wake of Charlie Hebdo (Jean Beaman)


The Charlie Hebdo Sequel: the Making of a Republican McCarthyism? (Philippe Marlèire)


-to-be-charlie (last consulted on 26 April 2015).

Contemporary Laïcité: the Crafting of a New ‘Invented Tradition’? (Amélie Barras)


Collas, Aurélie. 2014. “Femmes voilées interdites de sorties scolaires : combien de plaintes?” Le...


From ‘French-Style Integration’ to ‘Republican Inclusion’...maybe. (Francoise Lorcerie)


campagne de presse qui a mené à l’enterrement des rapports” Migrations Sociétés, vol. 26, n°155: 131-152.


DACA, DAPA and U.S. Immigration Politics: plus ça change? (Inés Valdez)

Please find additional references in the online appendix.


Notes

1 Link to Monkey Cage Blog: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/22/six-months-on-we-are-not-all-charlie/
2 Bathily was declared a citizen shortly after the attacks in recognition of this.
4 Still accessible at http://archives.gouvernement.fr/ayrault/presse/lancement-des-groupes-travail-de-la-refondation-de-la-politique-d-integration.html
5 Trans. note: a national association of judges.
6 Trans. note: Baby Loup was a private daycare facility in which a female employee was fired in 2008 for wearing veil to work.
7 Trans. note: Author is referencing the oft-quoted French version of Brecht’s allegory about the rise of Hitler, The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui; in the English version, the word “bastard” is used (Samuel French 1972 edition, p. 128).
8 I use the term “white” throughout this article to refer to français du souche or those of native French-European origin, even though I recognize that “white” is not a commonly used racial term in French society. Even though much of the extant literature uses the term native French, I use “white” as second-generation immigrants, being born in France, are also native French people. I am also following the lead of many of my respondents who use this term.
9 Two of the best sellers of the past twelve months in France are an essay by journalist Éric Zemmour (Le Suicide Français – French suicide), and writer Michel Houellebecq (Soumission – submission [of France to Islam]) which both portray France’s culture and values under threat due to immigration and the rise of Islam.
10 Parts of this text were first published on the Immanent Frame (2015): http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2015/02/17/values-and-violence-thoughts-on-charlie-hebdo/
11 Several scholars have unpacked the idea of ‘separation’ arguing that the act of ‘separating’ religion is political, as it requires the state to intervene in the religious if only to define and delimit what needs to be separated. The state, in other words, is regulating the religious. On this see for instance: Bowen 2007, 2010; Hurd 2008, 2012; Jackobsen and Pelligrini 2008.
12 The Observatory was created in 2013 by the French government to help with its promotion and respect of laïcité.
13 This assessment resonates with some of the reasons evoked by Hobsbawm and Ranger to explain the emergence of ‘invented traditions’ (see 1983: 4).
14 Kuru (2008) describes nicely the debates around the meaning of French laïcité that divided the French Left and Right for years.
15 On this see for instance Salton, 2013.
16 The Charter is available online: http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/09_Septembre/64/0/chartelaicite_3_268640.pdf (last consulted on 5 May)
17 In fact, like the concept of separation the concept of neutrality, in particular when defined in terms of ‘physical’ neutrality, has been questioned. For instance, Danchin (2011) notes that it is based on a Christian reading of religion, where ‘modern’ religion is understood as being a belief located in one’s conscience. Others argue that the baseline around which this neutrality has been articulated is a white, bourgeois male (Salih 2009: 421; Scott 2007: 169; Hurd 2014).
18 This neutrality principal for public servants was already important during the Third Republic (1870 -1940), when priests were unable to teach because of their direct affiliation with Catholicism, yet through a careful analysis of the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat, Section de l’intérieur, 27 novembre 1989, n° 346893, Avis “Port du foulard islamique.”
19 On the climate preceding the passing of this law see for instance: Bowen (2007); Scott (2007).
20 I am not implying that a pedagogy of laïcité would automatically be a failure. There are actually initiatives from teachers that are creative and promising (see for instance: http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-3d-le-journal-pedagogie-de-la-laicite). But I worry that the vague definition given to laïcité coupled with the current discursive and policy focus on ‘problematic’ Islamic practices will reinforce a climate, in which laïcité is mobilized to further justify the scrutiny of Muslim bodies and practices.
21 For an insightful discussion on this connection between Muslims and French citizenship see Fredette, 2014.
22 These lines were written in April 2015.
23 The Sunday following the attacks, enormous demonstrations across France extolled republican values, notably the freedom of expression and laïcité.
24 Translator’s Note: The French concept of living together in society. It is a skill one must learn, and it involves identifying appropriate behavior and habits for the public sphere.
25 Conseil d’Etat, Section de l’intérieur, 27 novembre 1989, n° 346893, Avis “Port du foulard islamique.”
26 See its site: http://www.laicite-laligue.org/ressources/textes-de-references
27 This was particularly the case with a 1994 circular requiring schools to ban “conspicuous [religious] symbols,” inciting a new wave of litigation.
28 Translator’s note: A French politician and protégé of Chirac.

Scott mocks this movement with the creation of an oxymoron: “aristocratic republicanism.”

The work of 2003-2004 was particularly remarkable in this sense. Muslims had no place in the hearings that examined the veil in public spaces in France and they had but a minimal presence among the social groups and individuals who were asked to provide testimony—even though the French Council for the Muslim Faith [le Conseil français du culte musulman, CFCM] had just been created.

http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid85644/onze-mesures-pour-un-grande-mobilisation-de-l-ecole-pour-les-valeurs-de-la-republique.html

The law of July 9, 2013 titled “Aims and Programs for the Reworking of the Schools of the Republic” [d’orientation et de programmation pour la refondation de l’Ecole de la République], notably includes a change in curriculum structure (including a “common core of knowledge and skills”), new pedagogical recommendations, and an emphasis on the instillation of values (moral and civic education has been introduced at every level). Since 2013-2014, elementary schools have been reforming their school routines [Translator’s note: For many years, French children had particularly long school days but short school years], a process that has been bedeviled by numerous problems.

Translator’s note: Fonds d’action Sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leur famille, a state institution that provided support to migrant workers and their families. It has gone through several institutional changes.

Translator’s note: By “origins,” Tuot means immigrant origins. He says “real or supposed” because many French citizens born in France to immigrant parents find they are pre-judged to be not truly French.

According to Laborde, critical republicanism is capable of revisiting established laws to evaluate whether they actually produce, on the ground and not just in theory, equality for all citizens; and in those situations where they fail to do so, critical republicanism searches for means to correct those disadvantages that are brought upon certain people.

Translator’s note: Most typically Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey, though this list is not exhaustive. This phrase refers to those who have a directly lived experience of immigration from such countries as well as those who are the descendants of such immigrants.

According to ICE, an immigration detainer is “a notice that DHS issues to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to inform the LEA that ICE intends to assume custody of an individual in the LEA’s custody” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2011). Regarding the opposition to honor ICE detainers based on due process rights, see Cindy Carcamo (2014).

Notably, the 2014 memorandum refers to the targets of enforcement as “undocumented immigrants” rather than “aliens,” in what represents a minor change of significant symbolic importance.

The population of Latino/as—the predominant demographic targeted by immigration enforcement—in prison increased tenfold between 1971 and 2001 and is the fastest growing group in the U.S. prisons (Morín 2009; Oboler 2009).

A note on methodology. Journals were selected from the list of 90 political science journals included in Michael Giles and James Garand’s article “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and Citational Approaches” (PS, October 2007, 741-751). We selected those that included at least 3 migration and citizenship related articles over the past decade (using the search terms “migration,” “citizenship,” “multiculturalism”). We only included articles written in English. We apologize for any oversight. For feedback and suggestions, please contact the editor.