Letter from the President
The celebration that was to accompany our launch as APSA’s newest section was cancelled, along with the rest of the New Orleans annual meeting, due to Hurricane Isaac. No matter. We’ll simply convene and celebrate this year in Chicago, and hopefully at many future annual meetings.

Let me start by thanking all those who have worked so hard to get us here. Together, we petitioned successfully for recognition as an official Section after several years of Working Group and Related Group status. This matters from an institutional perspective because Sections have a guaranteed minimum panel allocation for the annual meeting and can organize short courses and access other APSA resources. This gives migration and citizenship scholars an institutional home.

Section status matters also from a disciplinary perspective because it demonstrates that citizenship and migration studies are important within political science. APSA previously did not have a formal way for scholars of citizenship and migration to connect with each other and demonstrate the importance of migration and citizenship studies. As the petition for establishing our Section notes, the purpose of our Section is to bring together political scientists working on issues of migration and citizenship, promote teaching and research in the field, and encourage communication among political scientists and scholars of migration and citizenship in related disciplines, including policy makers and other professionals, domestically and internationally. Long may the Section raise our collective professional stature.
Now that we exist, our first challenge is to survive and grow. Under APSA rules, in order to maintain Section status, each Section must have at least 250 members at least once per year. As I write this, our membership count is 244, so we're almost there! Please encourage your colleagues to join. Membership is very affordable: $8 for non-students and only $3 for students.

Next time, I’ll discuss ideas for the future. Now, let me thank those who are already serving our Section: Els de Graauw deserves extra gratitude for doing the lion's share of presidential work, which she'll continue doing so after my term ends at the annual meeting in Chicago. (Since our bylaws provide for overlapping two-year terms, we decided I’d step down after one year while Els carries on for a second year.) Leila Kawar was similarly instrumental in helping establish the Section, and serves now as Secretary. Antje Ellermann, Newsletter Editor responsible for the fabulous first newsletter you’re reading, and Tom Wong, Treasurer, round out the officers. Thanks also to the first members of the Executive Committee: Janna Bray, Erin Chung, Alexandra Filindra, Gallya Lahav, Hillary Mellinger, and John Mollenkopf, and to the others who also ran for office. Thank you to Immanuel Ness, James F. Hollifield, and Evren Yalaz for serving as the first elections committee. It’s a sign of a healthy Section when there are more volunteers than jobs to do!

Speaking of volunteers, let me thank those who will serve on the Section’s first awards committees: Gallya Lahav, John Mollenkopf, and Rogers Smith (best book); Erin Chung, Jennifer Hochschild, and Willem Maas (best dissertation); Audie Klotz, Ron Schmidt, and Maarten Vink (best chapter); and Erik Bleich, Elizabeth F. Cohen, and Monica Varsanyi (best article). Nomination details can be found on the Section website; please encourage those whose work you admire to apply; nominations (self-nominations welcome!) are due March 31.

Two other volunteers also deserve immense thanks, as anyone who has organized conferences can attest: currently putting together our panel sessions are 2013 annual meeting program chairs Joseph Carens and James F. Hollifield.

Looking forward to celebrating with you in Chicago; may the Section continue to grow and thrive.

Willem Maas
Glendon College,
York University
maas@yorku.ca

Letter from the Editor
Welcome to the Section newsletter’s inaugural issue! I am extremely excited about the many excellent contributions featured in this issue and hope that it will whet our appetite for future issues. The Section Council has decided to make the inaugural issue widely available. Starting with the next issue, we will follow APSA protocol and distribute the newsletter to section members only.
(older issues will be publicly available on our webpage). If you are not yet a member, make sure to join the Section!

This first issue features an appraisal of the state of the migration and citizenship literature in political science. This Symposium features articles by Terri Givens, James Hampshire, James Hollifield and Tom Wong, Martin Schain, Eiko Thielmann, and Phil Triadafilopoulos. For our Teacher's Corner, Leila Kawar examines the teaching and practicing of the politics of immigrant rights. Tom Wong's Policy Brief discusses the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In addition to these substantive pieces, the newsletter features information on the latest book and journal publications, member news, and a profile of the African Centre for Migration & Society at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Thank you to everyone who contributed to this issue!

Plans for future issues are beginning to take shape. Our second (summer) issue will feature a research symposium on “How to Measure Immigration Policies,” organized by Marc Helbling. Future issues will continue to rely on your suggestions and contributions. Please get in touch with your ideas and suggestions for symposia – whether research, teaching, or policy focused – and for Teacher's Corner and Policy Brief contributions.

I hope you enjoy this inaugural issue. Feel free to circulate it among friends and colleagues. You might even encourage them to join the Migration and Citizenship section!

Antje Ellermann
University of British Columbia
antje.ellermann@ubc.ca

Symposium:
The State of the Study of Migration and Citizenship in Political Science

International Migration: Cause or Consequence of Political Change?

James F. Hollifield, Southern Methodist University, jhollifi@mail.smu.edu
Tom K. Wong, University of California, San Diego, tomkwong@ucsd.edu

Introduction
The scholarly study of migration has, over the past several decades, slowly entrenched itself in the mainstream of political science. From research that intersects migration and the study of racial and ethnic politics in order to understand the implications of changing democratic electorates, to work that examines how migration collides with the foundational principles of national security, sovereignty, and citizenship, ours is a cross cutting issue that touches the heart of political science. As the recent U.S. presidential election and the intricate way in which immigration has already been woven into the narrative of President Obama's reelection further demonstrate, answers to “why is migration relevant for political science” questions are becoming increasingly clear across the
discipline (Hollifield 2010a). It is, however, premature to declare the triumph of political scientists who carry the banner of the migration scholar. While the volume of research contained under the umbrella of migration and citizenship that has followed the pioneering work of Gary Freeman (1979), Mark Miller (1981) and others (see Hollifield 2008 for a review of the literature) may very well signify a Kuhnian-like paradigm, the breadth of our work can be cast even wider and the depth of our analyses can deepen even further. In short, this road that we collectively travel is winding and leads far, and much more work remains.

In this brief essay, we outline a research agenda for migration scholars rooted in political science. This builds from a discussion in Hollifield (2008), and it is not meant to be an exhaustive list of research questions and avenues; but it does point to many potential roads ahead. We then examine the migration-related work that has appeared in five major general political science journals from 2000 to present. We acknowledge that this choice of framework neglects the many important works that have appeared in other journals, as well as the large number of books that have been published by top university presses. However, our choice of framework is intended to encourage migration scholars to consider the place of our work in relation to broader debates and trends in political science.

**Crafting a Research Agenda**

Among some political and intellectual elites, migration, particularly immigration, provokes a sense of crisis – a crisis that, while often presented in the form of cultural or economic threat, is as much political as it is social or economic (Weiner 1996). Yet the complex and multifaceted political aspects of migration have, until recently, received little attention from political scientists. Indeed, the politics of migration is a rapidly emerging field of study. Compared to the other social sciences – especially sociology, history and economics – political scientists came late to the study of migration. Whether migration poses as dramatic a threat to the integrity of nation-states, as some suggest (Huntington 2004), remains an open question. But clearly, the latest waves of migration in many countries in both the developed and developing world have had significant political ramifications. As a result, a new literature in political science is emerging.

Not unlike many of our discipline's most complex phenomena, migration is both an outcome to be explained, as well as a cause whose effects can be far reaching. Crafting a research agenda thus requires us to, at the most basic level, identify our research questions and objectives in relation to migration's duality, as both consequence and cause. This initial sorting is useful, as it gives direction to the theories of politics and of state, as well as to the other ideational frameworks that will guide our research efforts and put our work in conversation with others. These are essential first steps, as they pave the way for debate – and possibly agreement - on the categories and concepts whose observable implications will constitute our independent and dependent variables. But, as we will see, migration is a subject that often defies our attempts at any strict categorization.

**Migration as a Consequence of Political Change**

As an outcome, migration – whether our focus is on immigration to advanced industrialized countries, emigration from developing ones, or refugee movements and asylum flows – in effect, becomes our dependent variable wherein politics and the state assume explanatory roles. For Aristide Zolberg – who was among the first to try to insert political variables into the equation – the
state does matter and has the capacity, if not always the will, to regulate migration flows and stocks. Zolberg’s argument is that we can measure and observe the independent effect of state policies for controlling entry and exit (Zolberg 1981, 1999). However, even if we accept this argument prima facie – that politics and the state matter – this does not explain how, when, and to what extent they matter. The challenge for political scientists then is to bring the power of political explanations to bear in the development of theories of migration that not only incorporate political variables, but also lends themselves to generalizable and testable propositions. This can help inform political theories of migration, wherein our research objectives include theorizing and empirically testing the political determinants of migration outcomes.

At the same time, our analyses often push much further than explaining migration outcomes. Our attention to the role of politics in migratory processes can be seen as a deductive first step that begs other important and politically salient questions. If politics do indeed matter, then what explains the modes of politics that forms around migration (Freeman 1995)? Who are the consequential political actors involved in migration policymaking and what makes them consequential? What interests are at play and what determines these interests? What role do political institutions play in mediating between the state, the broader political sphere, and society? These questions help inform our understanding of the politics of migration, wherein our research objectives include theorizing and empirically testing the political determinants of migration politics and policies (for example, see Ellermann 2009; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Hopkins 2010).

The two constructs that we have sketched here are not mutually exclusive and are, of course, intimately related; however, returning to the important distinction between migration outputs and outcomes – the former defined as the policies that result from the politics of migration and the latter reflecting the real or perceived results that follow these policies– makes clear their analytical importance. The so-called “gap hypothesis” provides an example (Hollifield 1986; Hollifield et al. forthcoming).

As immigration increased across advanced industrialized democracies during the postwar period, many states, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, began searching for ways to stop or slow the influx of foreigners (Hollifield 1992). At the same time, as the presence and visibility of newcomers grew, immigration injected itself into the broader public discourse and politics of these countries. In traditional countries of immigration, such as the U.S., this was certainly not the first time that immigration had become a national political issue (Tichenor 2002; King 2000; Hollifield 2010b). For many Western European countries, however, immigration was a relatively new phenomenon (Messina 2007; Schain 2008). As political scientists began to survey the politics of migration in these countries, a central puzzle emerged. Since at least the 1970s, almost all Western immigrant-receiving countries were trying to reassert control over migration flows, often using similar policies and in response to public opinion, which was increasingly hostile to high levels of immigration (Freeman 1995; Fetzer 2000). Yet, immigration persisted, which revealed a gap between migration policy outputs (e.g. admissionist v. restrictionist policies) and outcomes (e.g. high v. low levels of
flows and stocks). This has become known as the gap hypothesis (Hollifield et al. forthcoming), but the challenge is to explain the gap.¹

The gap hypothesis illustrates a simple, yet powerful point: the political milieu that gives shape to migration policy outputs and logics need not map neatly onto migration outcomes. The difficult challenge for political scientists, therefore, is to identify areas where dissonance exists between outputs and outcomes, to provide compelling explanations for this tension, and to develop some generalizable or unifying hypotheses that bridge the politics of migration policy with the migration outcomes that we actually observe. Can political theories of migration explain outcomes while also accounting for the nuanced politics of migration? Taking a different view, can theories about the politics of migration explain outputs while also leading us to empirically valid predictions about outcomes? Or do we continue to treat outputs and outcomes as two separate dependent variables? We offer these questions as a heuristic for future research and we look forward to the new generation of migration scholars who will validate, augment, or entirely explode this ontology.

**Migration as a Cause of Political Change**

As migration has become one of the most prominent features of globalization (Hollifield 2010a), many political scientists have taken up the task of examining its political implications. How does migration affect international relations, the state, politics, and society? Research that takes on these questions ranges from the systemic, state, and domestic levels, down to the individual level. But before surveying the main questions in these areas, a couple of notes are in order.

Analyzing the impact of migration requires us first to specify our dependent variables – in other words, the impact of migration on what? This initial task of identifying our objects of inquiry need not be done only for the sake of operationalizing variables for empirical analyses; some of our most promising intellectual pursuits have theory building and the development and refinement of concepts and ideas, rather than theory testing, at its core. For example, questions about how migration impinges on the national security of states or whether migration weakens or strengthens the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship (Brubaker 1989; Joppke 1998), as well as the ethical and normative debates that migration evokes (Carens 2000, Benhabib 2004), are not easily reduced to models or equations. Second, conceptualizing migration as a cause demands that we adhere closely to established criteria for evaluating causality and that we not overstate our causal claims. For example, paying closer attention to historical context and using time-series analyses can help establish temporal separation between migration as a cause and the outcomes that follow (for an example of this approach, see Hollifield and Wilson 2011). Process tracing and instrumental variables can potentially address problems of endogeneity and confounding variables when migration and our outcomes of interest share dynamic, as opposed to static, relationships (e.g., migration network theory). Matched case-control studies can shed light on counterfactual assumptions and claims. This is particularly important if, for example, our aim is to infer what we know about the impact of immigration in places that have a history of it relative to new immigration destinations. While a fuller discussion of methods in migration studies is beyond the scope of this essay, this point in itself may prove to be a fruitful avenue of inquiry. Work on the

¹ See Hollifield (1986, 2008) for a more detailed explanation of the gap hypothesis, as well as for a discussion of debates and controversies surrounding the politics of migration.
impact of migration cuts across different levels of analysis, as well as sub-fields. At the systemic level, what does migration, and globalization more broadly, mean for the future of the Westphalian system of nation-states (Hollifield 2004)? What are the implications of migration for global governance (Betts 2011)? How does the treatment of migrants in the context of immigration control affect the march of human rights (Weiner 1996; Gibney 2004)? At the state level, is migration a threat to national security (Rudolph 2006)? Is it a threat to sovereignty (Joppke 1998)? To what extent does migration augment or enhance the meaning and practice of citizenship (Brubaker 1989; Bauböck 1994; Benhabib 2004)? At the level of domestic politics, there is a continued desire for answers to questions related to how political parties position themselves vis-à-vis the issue of migration and to immigrants themselves, why they choose such alignments, and what the electoral implications of these decisions are (Mudde 2007; DeSipio 1996; Norris 2005). At the individual level, strong demand also exists for research about the determinants of native attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (for example, see Fetzer 2000; Brader et al. 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), the political behavior of citizens in response to immigration, which focuses mostly on the determinants of support for the radical right (for example, see Kitschelt 1995; Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Norris 2005; Givens 2005), and for work on the political incorporation of immigrants, which ranges from citizenship acquisition and voting to more abstract questions related to feelings of national attachment and social solidarity (for example, see Crepaz 2008; Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Ramakrishnan 2005; Money 1999).

It is no stretch to say that these questions lead inevitably to discussions of national identity, the inviolability of citizenship, and the inclusiveness of rights, which are at the heart of the way in which every polity defines itself (Carens 2000). Migration is thus likely to remain relevant for political science for the foreseeable future, as it will continue to be a central force in the shaping and reshaping of society.

Migration Research in Political Science Journals

By many accounts, the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the European Journal of Political Research, and the British Journal of Political Science are among the most respected general political science journals in our discipline. This is not – and we do not present it as such – a representative sample of all journals. However, in addition to the reasons that we discussed above, this snapshot of the impact that migration research has had on our discipline may further propel graduate students to pursue their interests and passions in this area, as “big hits” in major journals have been increasing.

Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, there has been a general upward trend over time. From 2000 to present, there have been sixty-one migration-related articles in the journals that we surveyed. Only a small number of these articles look at migration as a consequence (6 articles, or just under 10 percent), while the large bulk of articles examine the various impacts of migration. Of the fifty-five articles that examine the impact of migration, the overwhelming majority focuses either on attitudes (31 percent), behavior (24%), or incorporation (22%).

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2 We searched the databases of each respective journal’s website using the keywords “migration,” “migrant,” “immigration,” “immigrant,” “emigration,” “emigrant,” “citizenship,” “refugee,” and “asylum.”
Conclusion
A generation of scholars has made clear that migration can change the composition of societies, alter political coalitions, disrupt the party system, and transform citizenship and national identity. And while a boom in migration research in political science is under way, we feel that we have still only just begun to scratch the surface.

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The Comparative Politics of Immigration
Martin A. Schain, New York University, ms5@nyu.edu

Until recently, most social scientists with an interest in immigration were economists who specialized in labor economics, sociologists who focused on immigrant and ethnic communities, and a few historians (mostly American) who challenged the frontier focus of American history. Prior to the 1980s, few political scientists had a scholarly interest in immigration, and most who did, at least in the United States, were specialists in urban and local politics. In Europe there was a similar lack of interest. The first political scientist to write her dissertation on the politics of immigration at the Institute of Political Science in Paris could not find an advisor who knew anything about the subject.¹

Comparative research was even rarer. For comparativists interested in social and political conflict, for example, socioeconomic class generally trumped immigration as a basis of analysis in Europe, while in the United States studies of ethnic conflict dominated. After about 1990, however, as immigration questions became politicized in Western Europe, scholarly interest began to increase. In an analysis that I did for the journal Comparative Politics, I found that during the twenty-year period from 1970–1990, fourteen articles alluded to questions of immigration in an important way; during the following decade, there were twenty-seven.²

Among the earlier discussions of the political importance of immigration in Western Europe, with the exception of Mark Miller,³ few scholars saw immigrants as political actors, or potential political actors, in the sense that Kristi Andersen analyzed immigrants in the United States at the time of the New Deal.⁴ Rather, immigrants and immigration were generally analyzed in terms of social tensions and policy problems.

Seymour Martin Lipset’s landmark volume, Political Man, first published in 1959, was one of the earliest studies of stable democracy to compare Europe and the United States.⁵ A key concern throughout were the questions of how groups were integrated into a larger society and how integration related to loyalty to the political system. For Lipset and many other social scientists concerned with problems of democratic development, the movement of the working class toward full citizenship, both political (in terms of voting) and social, was a means of integration and the development of democratic regime stability. It is striking that in the literature of this period, while considerable attention was devoted to social, economic, and political integration and to the impact on political behavior and political stability, virtually no attention was given to immigrants and immigration; this at a time when immigration in such (then) “unstable” democracies as France and Germany was high and growing rapidly (more rapidly than now).

In France immigrants constituted almost 5 percent of the population at the time Lipset’s book appeared, and increased to almost 7 percent over the next twenty years. In Germany non-German immigrants amounted to just over 1 percent of the population in 1960 (about 700,000), but increased to almost 7 percent of the population over the next decade. In addition, by the time the recruitment of non-German immigrants (technically “guest workers” who were under contract) commenced, more than 15 million ethnic Germans had already moved either from East Germany or countries further to the east into the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and constituted about a quarter of the population. Thus, in Europe the potential political consequences of cleavages between immigrants and natives went largely unrecognized, while in the United States immigration had slowed to a trickle by the 1960s, although the concept of “ethnicity” had become well established during the pre-WWII period. Race, of course, was another matter for the United States, to which Lipset also gave relatively little attention.  

During the past decade, scholarship on the politics of immigration has vastly increased among political scientists; and among comparativists first-rate scholarship in this area is no longer marginal. At the 2012 conference of the Council of European Studies, there was standing room only at the meeting of the immigrant studies group, and more panels were organized around immigration questions than any other subject; and of course the establishment of this section in the American Political Science Association is a tribute to the dynamism of scholarship in the this area. A second (and third) generation of scholars in this burgeoning subfield of comparative politics is building creatively on work first begun twenty-five to thirty years ago.

Scholarly work on the politics of immigration has tended to focus on several important questions, among which three tend to dominate. The first concerns state capacity, that is, whether liberal democratic states are capable of effectively regulating the flow of immigration, as well as managing the social and political consequences of immigrant settlement. James Hollifield first analyzed the limits on immigrant regulation imposed on (or accepted by) liberal democracies more than twenty years ago, but the importance of these limits has been challenged in a lively and ongoing debate. Anthony Messina confirms the significant impact of post-war immigration on the societies and politics of European countries, and he focuses on explaining why (and how) migration policies remained relatively open in the face of growing public opposition and a surge of support for anti-immigrant political parties. Messina argues that policy is interest driven and well within the control of sovereign state actors. Why, then, have they permitted high levels of immigration?

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He argues that immigration was initially labor market driven, that European planners either recruited workers from their former or present colonies or, in the absence of colonial labor, developed guest worker programs. Thus, through this market rationale, workers were recruited from Muslim countries in North Africa and Turkey and eventually settled in Western Europe. Few policymakers were concerned about the long-term economic, social, or political consequences of this wave of immigration when it commenced in the 1950s, and most assumed that many if not most of these immigrant workers would return home in the event of an economic downturn.

Nevertheless, although entry may have been labor market driven in a broad sense, both Messina and Gary Freeman demonstrate that governments discriminated among available sources in very specific ways. In this sense, market-driven recruitment was not a random process, and was effectively shaped by policymakers. Labor recruitment from friendly and familiar labor-exporting sources (generally former colonies) seemed rational at the time, and these foreign workers were seen as relatively easy to absorb socially because they were predisposed to identify psychologically or culturally with the host society. The problem was that these immigrants would be the least likely to leave, and the most apt to opt for permanent settlement, establishing the first link in an expanding chain of economic and noneconomic migration to Western Europe, which had unanticipated social and political costs.10

The second question relates to citizenship and integration, and to changes in citizenship policies with regard to immigrants. What accounts for differences in citizenship laws and naturalization procedures among countries of comparable levels of development? This question has been approached historically, in terms of state development, by Rogers Brubaker.11 Although Brubaker’s historical argument has not been directly challenged, more recent studies argue that evolving citizenship law has been more responsive to the politics of immigration than to historical tradition.12 It is often assumed that immigration has had an impact on citizenship regimes, and that this transformation is in the direction of convergence. In fact, while some countries have moved toward more inclusive and open citizenship and naturalization processes, others have developed more restrictive legislation.

Marc Morjé Howard analyzes the process through which these policies are changing by focusing on the impact of the politics of immigration in European countries on the evolution of citizenship policy. He emphasizes the importance of left vs. right governments, but also the mobilization capacity of an energetic extreme right, and their ability to force citizenship issues into the electoral arena.13

Questions of citizenship have been linked to a much broader scholarly debate on immigrant integration, which in turn has been related to models of integration. Since the 1980s, an extensive literature in sociology and political science has grown around the idea of models of integration, an approach that focuses on sharp contrasts among historical, political, philosophical, social, and cultural drivers of integration policies in different national settings.

This approach suggests mutually exclusive "public philosophies," such as French republicanism, British and American multiculturalism, liberal (Dutch) multiculturalism, and German (ethno-) nationalism. At their limit, they are developed as policy paradigms that suggest a strong coherence among different aspects of policy linked to one dominant rationale behind a policy. The models also suggest a path dependency over time that hinders any prospect of transformation, and defines integration policy objectives, citizenship rules, and the categories related to the population conceived as the target of integration policies.

Although this approach has endured as scholarly shorthand, it has been challenged primarily because of the growing gap between empirical reality and the assumptions drawn from these models. While normative models and public philosophies generally function as guideposts and tools for developing policy, even the normative aspects of national models have been increasingly undermined by policy rationales for the orientations and implementation of integration policies that seem to contradict the assumptions of these models. At the core of this scholarly debate is not simply the question of the dynamics of policy, but what explains policy change.

The third focus of scholars is the relationship between immigration and changing patterns of conflict in politics and society. First, there is a growing literature on the importance of immigration for the emergence and development of radical right parties in Europe, and considerable debate on how this relates to immigration, or rather to the politicization of issues of immigration. Scholars are preoccupied with the question why voters have shifted their allegiance to radical right parties during the past twenty-five years.

Although reaction to immigration has been an important motivation for this political shift, scholars also point to broader socioeconomic conditions that have provided a window of opportunity for radical right success and the political opportunity structures that have provided space for the electoral success of the radical right. While most of this literature examines the electoral

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development of radical right parties as a dependent variable, some scholars also focus on these parties as independent variables, as actors that have framed issues of immigration, mobilized anti-immigrant sentiment, and altered patterns of conflict within the political system.17

From a different point of view, a small but growing group of scholars examines a broader range of immigrant-native conflict and immigrant-state conflict as patterns that have become part of domestic politics in some European countries.18 For the most part, these studies directly or indirectly derive from the vast literature on ethnic and racial conflict in the United States.

They also focus on a comparative problem. For studies of radical right parties, as well as immigrant-native conflict, the challenge has been to explain why these phenomena have emerged in some countries but not in others, and in some localities but not others. The answers to these questions are not easy, and scholars have wrestled with them for many years. Raphaella Dancygier convincingly demonstrates that a cooperative administrative or political relationship between immigrant communities and state authorities leads to immigrant-native conflict, since natives are likely to react to this shifting allocation of benefits by attacking immigrants. On the other hand, without political leverage, immigrants are more likely to make demands directly to state actors. In addition, both types of conflict are more likely to occur when the state (as opposed to the market) is responsible for disbursement of scarce goods.19

Then there is an important and growing literature that deals with the impact of growing immigrant-ethnic communities on party competition and party systems in Europe and the United States. For the United States, Kristi Andersen first analyzed how the mobilization of immigrant voters at the time of the New Deal first altered the Democratic Party, and then changed the balance of power between the two major parties.20 In Europe, although immigrant-ethnic communities have been growing, particularly in France, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, their impact on political parties and the electoral balance within the party system has been remarkably marginal in terms of both representation and policy influence.

Some scholars have explained these differences between Europe and the United States by differences in political party recruitment and mobilization patterns.21 In the American case, parties

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19 Raphaella Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).


have often been active mobilizers of newly enfranchised immigrant groups, and have integrated mobilization into their strategic outlook. Viewed from this perspective, immigration is an opportunity. This helps to explain why George Bush decided, during the presidential election campaign of 2000, to shift the Republican Party away from the hard anti-immigration position that it had taken four years earlier. Confronted by the gains that the Democrats had made in California among Mexican voters, the presidential candidate began to give short speeches in Spanish. Although there was little hope of the Republicans attracting a majority of Latino voters, by 2004 they had succeeded in reducing the Democratic advantage.

Alternately, political parties can use immigration as a different kind of opportunity, to attract committed native voters from one party to another. Rather than focusing on immigrants as potential voters, this strategy usually implies a focus on questions of national identity, and the challenge to national identity posed, not only by newly-arrived immigrants, but by their integration into the national community as well. Here, the opportunity is not the immigrants themselves, but the problem that they pose, and their usefulness in altering the electoral balance.

The way political parties understand “electoral considerations” can therefore involve different kinds of policy considerations, depending on whether they project the immigration issue as a challenge to identity for voters they anticipate to be anti-immigrant, or as a means of mobilizing a potential immigrant electorate. And, of course, each of these strategic views of immigrants and immigration also implies a different policy perspective and outcome. If the first pattern has often been identified as the politics of identity, the second has been characterized as ethnic politics, the “pandering” to the sensibilities of ethnic or naturalized voters. When parties focus on the first strategy, immigrant-ethnic representation tends to be low or non-existent. However, even in the Netherlands, where representation is relatively robust, influence on policy development and policy choices tends to be weak.

Both patterns have clearly been present in the politics of countries in Europe as well as the United States. However, if the former focus has dominated the thinking of political parties in Europe in recent years, the latter focus has been more dominant among political parties in the United States - although as we know from the U.S. elections of 2012, the struggle within the Republican Party over the framing of the immigration issue has been intense.

Thus, the electoral strategies of political parties with regard to immigrants are important, but so are the strategies of organized immigrant communities. More recent work has focused on patterns of integration and organization by immigrant-ethnic groups themselves. From this perspective, some groups have been successful in penetrating society and the economy, and have not focused on developing political influence; others have been more dependent on ethnic representation and

political influence. The problem is that there is no country in Europe, even those where the proportion of immigrant-ethnic voters is large and growing bigger, where immigrant voters have been mobilized by major parties, and where immigrant political influence is important beyond the local level.

These rich studies of the comparative politics of immigration draw, in turn, on an increasing volume of research that has developed in the last twenty-five years. They synthesize and critically analyze the best scholarship in this area, and present us with a baseline for new scholarship to follow.

They also indicate some fruitful paths for future research. Most needed, still, is additional work on immigrants as political actors. There is an abundance of scholarship that deals with immigrants and politics, but relatively little with immigrants in politics. Most striking about the politics of immigration in Europe today is how marginalized immigrant and ethnic populations appear to be in political life. Scholarship tends to focus overwhelmingly on immigrants as objects of xenophobic movements, political party conflict, and voter backlash. Yet, in Europe, there are large immigrant populations who will participate increasingly in political life in the twenty-first century.

The limited number of quality studies of immigrants in politics concentrate for the most part at the local level. However, there is almost no scholarship that deals with how political parties are adjusting to a changing electorate on the national level; or how immigrant groups are mobilizing to have their issues heard; or changing patterns of state organization to deal with immigrant demands or incorporation of immigrant populations.

A generation ago, the study of the politics of immigration was somewhat exotic for political scientists. This is no longer true. Some of the best and most creative students of comparative politics and international relations have now made this the focus of their interest.

**Immigration Politics Research: Political Behavior – Voting, Public Opinion and Party Politics**

*Terri E. Givens, University of Texas at Austin, tgivens@austin.utexas.edu*

**The Politics of Immigration, Integration and Race**

In the mid-1990s, as I was beginning my research on immigration politics, it became clear very quickly that political science had paid little attention to this topic, particularly from a comparative perspective. Immigration was mainly a topic for sociologists, anthropologists and to a certain

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extent, economists. As I began to explore the issues, I relied on authors like Gary Freeman, Mark Miller, James Hollifield and Jeannette Money for their innovative studies, particularly on immigration politics in Europe. The study of immigrant political behavior didn't gain much attention from political scientists until the late 1990s. Jeannette Money's 1999 study of immigration politics was one of the first to examine in detail how immigration impacted political behavior.

What did political science have to offer that other fields didn't? For one, more recent studies have shown that politics plays a key role in the development of immigration policy, and that it is often the behavior of immigrants as voters or potential voters that impact the actions of politicians. It is clear from the work of Daniel Tichenor (2002) that immigrant voting behavior played an important role in the development of immigration policy in the United States since the 1800s. However, the behavioral revolution overlooked the impact of Latino immigrant voting, at least until the last 20 years. The 2012 presidential election was a watershed for the study of Latino voting behavior\(^1\) and it was clear that immigration was an important issue for these voters, as well as the economy. However, as Segura and Rodrigues note in a 2006 article, racial politics was seen through a lens of black and white up through the 1980s. It is only since the 1990s that scholars began to pay closer attention to the differences across racial groups: “There has been considerable recent growth in our knowledge about nonblack minority groups, aided by the emergence of new and valuable data sets and a generation of (largely) younger scholars whose interests in race and ethnicity extend far beyond the black-white paradigm. This literature speaks directly to how the experiences of Asian-Americans and Latinos differ from that of African-Americans, individually and in their relations with Anglos” (Segura and Rodrigues 2006, 378). One of the challenges facing researchers has been a lack of data, particularly for comparative research. New surveys have been developed in the last ten to fifteen years that have improved the situation, but more needs to be done in this area.

Issues of race and politics have been an important aspect of the study of political behavior in American politics since the 1960s and the Civil Rights movement (for a review, see Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Throughout its history, immigration and race have often been at the center of policy debates in the United States. However, it is also important to keep in mind that race and ethnicity have long played a role in the history, politics and particularly civil conflicts in Europe. What is clear from the study of immigration in both the U.S. and Europe is that the issue is deeply intertwined with issues of race.

The study of race has been a difficult topic in Europe (outside of Britain) for social scientists. As Ruzza argues, “although racial intolerance has been broadly covered by the European media, the specific academic literature is limited; as well, the coverage of racist movements is more extensive than that on anti-racist mobilisations. Whilst there is abundant early work on race and migration issues in the UK - which also include studies of anti-racism (see for instance Gilroy 1990) – the work done in other EU countries is limited (see for instance Silvermann 1991 and Wrench and Solomos 1993 for a review)” (Ruzza 1999, 4). Ruzza notes that different academic traditions and differences in approach to issues of race have made it difficult for researchers to compare the issue

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\(^1\) In particular the work of Gary Segura and Matt Baretto at Latino Decisions http://www.latinodecisions.com
across countries. The problems with this topic rise not only from issues of comparability, but also due to different historical experiences before and during World War II.

The French case is illustrative of some of the issues arising from the experience of genocide in World War II. French social scientists Valerie Amiraux and Patrick Simon note that studies of racism in France “remained marginalized in the academic ‘field’ until the early 1990s” (Amiraux and Simon 2006, 191). Studying race, immigration and immigrants is considered illegitimate unless the researchers remain in the realm of ideas. The collection of statistics on race, never practiced by postwar French governments, has been seen as harkening back to the Vichy era, and new attempts to begin collecting this data have led to open battles in the French media between those like Simon who argue for this collection, particularly in the context of antidiscrimination policy, and those who feel that mentioning race in order to fight racism only reaffirms it. As Amiraux and Simon note, “while choosing not to use ethnic and racial categories in statistics, the French scientific community prevents the accumulation of discrimination data and contributes to euphemizing the social impacts of racism” (Amiraux and Simon 2006, 204).

In Britain there has been an ongoing focus on issues related to immigration and “race relations” as these issues have risen on the political agenda. However, Small and Solomos also point out that “researchers working in this field have found it hard to i) establish a rounded research agenda that included all facets of race and racism in British society and ii) have been pulled in different directions by contrasting political and academic pressures” (Small and Solomos 2006, 250).

Immigration and issues related to the integration of settlers have become some of the most salient political issues in Europe over the last two decades. This is a relatively new and potentially fruitful area for political science researchers, as is the area of immigrant and ethnic minority voting. In the following sections I will examine some of the literature addressing the different aspects of political behavior that have been impacted by immigration.

**Immigration and Voting Behavior**

In his analysis of immigrant participation in the U.S., Lous Desipio finds that “when asked about the most important reasons for naturalizing, immigrants cite the right to vote” (Desipio 2012, 177). Voting is an important act for many immigrants who want to integrate into their new countries, although naturalized immigrants, at least in the U.S., are less likely to vote than natives. In Europe as well, research on minority political participation often focuses on why voter turnout rates are lower than among the majority population. One standard explanation is that minority communities often suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages that dampen turnout rates. In addition, migrant minority communities may face cultural barriers that inhibit their full participation in mainstream society. Yet research also suggests that minority and migrant communities can benefit from co-ethnic networks that provide unique resources for political mobilization, at times leading to turnout rates higher than those of the majority population (Maxwell 2010).

Literature on migrant and minority representation in Europe also tends to start from the empirical baseline of a lack of representation and then analyzes numerous explanations for this dynamic. One of the main insights is that minority communities by definition have small population numbers, and when that is compounded with socioeconomic disadvantages and low participation rates it will be
very difficult to obtain significant representation. However, research suggests that different institutional and contextual settings can make those disadvantages more or less easy to overcome (Maxwell 2012). In addition, there are debates about whether descriptive representation (having elected officials who look like their constituents) is necessary for substantive representation, that is, allocating political resources in the best interests of certain constituents (Mansbridge 1999).

Immigrant participation in Europe as political candidates is the focus of a recent edited volume by Givens and Maxwell (2012). The book provides in-depth analyses of minority political participation, focusing on elected officials. This is an area of research which will grow in importance in years to come, particularly in countries like Germany where more immigrants are becoming citizens and playing a greater role in the politics of their adopted country.

**Immigration and Public Opinion**

In his analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment and racial prejudice in Europe, Quillian (1995) tests group threat theory and finds that perceived threat, operationalized as a function of economic conditions and the size of the subordinate group, explains most of the variation in average prejudice scores. His analysis focuses on the 12 member states of the European Union (at the time, the European Economic Community) that were surveyed in 1988 as part of the Eurobarometer 30 Survey. Quillian's finding suggests that individual characteristics (e.g., age or class) are not sufficient to explain cross-national differences in levels of prejudice. Quillian also points out, however, that the individual characteristics of immigrants can also have an impact on attitudes.

Another dimension that affects attitudes to Europe's immigrants is religion. Muslims have been the focus of attention, particularly since the terror attacks of 9/11, but Islam was becoming a controversial topic in Europe even before those events. In an analysis of French public opinion, Fetzer finds that “immigration politics in France appears to turn just as much on whether the country's culture will remain primarily Catholic and European as on whether most native-born French workers will be able to find jobs” (Fetzer 2000, 122).

Other factors can also play a role in public opinion formation – for example, Sniderman et al. (2002) found that Italians had more negative attitudes toward North Africans and Eastern Europeans than they did toward Central Africans. They attribute this finding to the type of encounters the average Italian has with the average member of each immigrant group. The authors argue that Italians see Central African street merchants as quiet and respectful as compared to North African and Eastern Europeans who are seen as more likely to be involved in criminal behavior.

In general, authors have found that public attitudes toward immigration do “matter” – for example, Lahav (2005) has found that publics and elites share similar opinions on restricting immigration in the EU which has had implications for EU cooperation on restrictive immigration measures. Many authors have focused on convergence in policy (Givens and Lueldtke, Cornelius), but Lahav also points out that immigration policy preferences change over time: “during the early stages, there was a large cross-party consensus in each country in an attempt to defuse the issue. However, as the immigration debate invariably became politicized, parties have increasingly struggled to differentiate themselves and break the mainstream consensus” (Lahav 2005, 142). Therefore the impact of public opinion needs to be understood in the context of party competition and ideology.
Immigration and Party Politics

In terms of party competition, although both the left and right tend to favor immigration control, left parties have also favored expanded rights for immigrants and minority communities. In the United States and other traditional countries of immigration, there have been ongoing struggles between political parties over who can attract new migrant community votes, or who can be tough on immigration. At different times in history, as Daniel Tichenor (2002) describes, parties in the U.S. have taken more or less restrictive stances on immigration, depending on their analysis of the impact on their electoral fortunes. In recent times, however, right-wing conservative parties have generally taken a more restrictive stance on immigration and immigrants’ rights. Left-wing parties have also supported restrictions, but have simultaneously advocated for immigrant rights and easing restrictions on policies such as healthcare for immigrant children. Similar trends have been seen across Europe.

In his 1979 book, Gary Freeman describes how governments in France and Britain depoliticized the racial aspect of immigration. He looks at the structure of the immigrant labor markets in France and Britain, noting that “The French economy may be less dependent on a steady supply of new foreign labor than it was in the past, but certain sectors of the economy are seen to be more or less permanently dependent on migrants. That is, shortages in these sectors -- construction, mining, and low-status service occupations primarily -- are structural and not the result of a temporary unavailability of French workers” (Freeman, p. 139). He also shows that France tends to be more assimilationist than Britain and that this affects government policies toward foreigners. He notes that, “the stubborn insistence on assimilation grows out of a nationalistic assumption of the superiority of French culture and the decision to discourage permanent settlement by North Africans represents a conclusion that their assimilation may be impossible... It is only Arabs and black Africans who are capable of exciting resistance in France” (Freeman, p. 325).

Several authors have analyzed party positions on immigration and integration policy. Money (1999) has noted that the growing political salience of immigration has given rise to competing hypotheses about whether immigration policies are converging or diverging. One of the reasons behind this lack of scholarly consensus is the failure to distinguish between immigration control and immigrant integration into society. Money argues that there are different causal variables for immigration control policies, as compared to immigrant integration policies. Her analysis shows, for example, that the main political parties in Britain had similar policy positions on immigration control, but diverged on immigrant integration. In the case of Britain, authors such as Shammit Saggar have done extensive work on race and electoral politics. Saggar finds that beginning in 1975 the Tories sought to exploit racial issues for electoral gain. By the mid-1980s, however, Tory policy had eased mass anxiety, thereby becoming a victim of its own success. By the mid-1990s, reality forced the Tories in office to stray from their traditional rhetoric, in order to to deal with on-the-ground realities of immigrant integration. However, intra-EU migration, immigration and asylum policy integration at the EU level, and the rise in asylum-seekers have served to maintain the saliency of immigration, and to maintain widespread anti-immigrant sentiment among the general population (Saggar 2000).

Looking forward, there are many scholars who are entering the field and finding new ways to approach questions around immigrant integration, participation and areas of conflict. Rafaela
Dancygier’s study of immigration and conflict in Europe is an example of the potential for political science to provide richly detailed analyses that challenge existing narratives on the causes of urban unrest. Rahsaan Maxwell’s recent book uses a variety of qualitative methods to get at the issue of ethnic minority integration in Europe. The manuscript sets out to explain differences in incorporation outcomes between immigrants from the Caribbean, South Asia and Maghreb in Britain and France. These types of studies use innovative methods and approaches that should be an inspiration for those looking to enter this growing field of study.

Conclusion
Political science has clearly added a new dimension to the study of immigration behavior, but also the response, particularly of political parties, to immigration and the development of ethnic minority communities. One of the areas that will need more attention is the development of survey data, particularly in the comparative context that will allow researchers to track immigrant political behavior, as well as the impact of immigration policy on natives, and politicians who are trying to attract immigrant voters. Immigration policy, and in particular the integration of immigrants, is likely to stay high on the agenda for political parties in Europe, particularly in a time of recession. It remains to be seen if immigrants themselves will be able to play more of a role in these political systems, and if that might impact the discourses surrounding immigration flows.

References
Policy debates over immigrant integration have proceeded without any real agreement on what integration is. Integration is usually understood in relational terms. Through the passage of time and the exertion of effort, immigrants come to resemble “natives” – the greater the resemblance, the greater the degree of integration. Hence, it is assumed that well integrated immigrants’ labor market outcomes and earnings are comparable to those of native-born workers, while poorly integrated immigrants experience higher rates of unemployment and lower levels of earnings relative to native-born workers. Similar assumptions are evident in other spheres. Reasonably well integrated immigrants are able to speak the official language(s) of the receiving state in a manner that approximates that of native-born members. Immigrants’ children are considered to be well integrated when they do about as well in school as the children of non-immigrant citizens (as measured by graduation/dropout rates and other indicators). With respect to political integration, well integrated immigrants (who have naturalized) vote at about the same rate as the native born. Integration is also viewed in terms of identity. Well integrated immigrants show levels of support for their adopted country that approximate those of native-born citizens and do not support “anti-system” ideologies and movements. One area where relational comparisons do not work is naturalization, as nationals’ membership is granted at birth and does not need to be confirmed through some other set of procedures. Here comparisons are often made among immigrant groups; well integrated immigrants naturalize at higher rates than less well integrated immigrants.

Integration, then, is also a highly normative concept. A well integrated immigrant is employed, makes a decent living, supports and identifies with his or her adopted country, is able and willing to naturalize and, having done so, participates politically through voting, running for elected office, and taking part in civil society organizations. The poorly integrated immigrant exhibits precisely the opposite characteristics and attitudes: he or she is under- or unemployed, poor, does not identify with his or her adopted country (and may even be actively hostile to it), does not speak its official language(s) well, and does not take part in its political life. At an extreme, the poorly integrated immigrant constitutes a threat to the proper functioning of the receiving society – to its “social cohesion.” According to some more alarmist narratives, poorly integrated immigrants are isolated in poor, underserviced neighbourhoods, and are incapable and perhaps even unwilling to take part in the “normal” life of the receiving society. In the very worst cases, poorly integrated immigrants raise similarly unintegrated children, thus imperilling social cohesion both now and in the future.
The unintegrated thus constitute a “problem group” requiring state intervention in the form of integration policies. Indeed, it is fair to say that one of the more fearsome spectres haunting contemporary post-industrial societies is that of legions of unemployed, disconnected and angry immigrant youth stewing restlessly in anarchic “parallel societies” (Carr 2006; Caldwell 2009). Their perceived threat has only been compounded in the wake of religiously inspired terrorist violence at the turn of the last century. For some observers, “unintegrated” young immigrant men constitute the potential shock troops of fanatical religious movements bent on bringing western societies to their knees (Leiken 2005; Lachmann 2006). The religious dimension of integration debates has also informed highly gendered understandings of immigrant Muslim women, who are often rendered defenceless victims of communal patriarchs set on instituting pre-modern norms in modern secular societies (Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013; Sauer 2009). Not surprisingly, given the high stakes involved, integration has emerged as a central preoccupation of governments and, hence, of political scientists as well.

Political scientists have tended to explain individual and group level integration outcomes with reference to the influence of prevailing institutions in immigrant receiving countries. In some analytical frameworks these institutions come together to form “national models” of integration, which orient the beliefs and actions of elite and mass actors as regards immigration and integration. Such approaches generally seek to explain variation in integration policies and policy outcomes through reference to the distinctive influence of “civic republican,” “multicultural,” or “ethno-differentialist” models. Other scholars look at ideational structures that encompass state-level decision makers in a broader transnational field and lead to convergence in integration policy approaches. More recently, scholars of integration have compared countries across a common set of indicators to determine the degree to which their policies cohere to popular and scientific understandings of national models.

After saying more about arguments for and against national models and the divergence/convergence debate, I discuss the turn to indices in studies of citizenship and immigrant integration. I note that indices have been helpful in terms of adding empirical heft to arguments for and against broad trends. However, like most of the extant research on immigrant integration, index-centered approaches neglect the opinions and positions of the subjects of integration policies: immigrants. Progress in the study of immigrant integration will require greater openness to the views of immigrants, lest scholars affirm the often problematic assumptions of policymakers and publicity seeking public intellectuals. This, in turn, will require in-depth fieldwork oriented toward better understanding how integration measures are received by immigrants and the degree to which their needs are registered by policymakers. In particular, research on whether integration policies help or hinder the development of affective ties between immigrants and their adopted countries is essential. It would be both ironic and tragic if policies ostensibly aimed at encouraging integration ended up alienating newcomers.

While necessary, I fear that such a research orientation is less and less likely given the denigration of “area studies” in political science and the preference for large and medium-N research designs over single and small-N case studies. The turn to indices in political science research on immigrant integration is an understandable response to the lowly status of area studies approaches and the recognition that truly large-N quantitative studies are not well suited to the subject matter.
Research oriented around indices may provide a methodologically safe halfway house for migration scholars in political science; however, like all tools, index-based research is limited in terms of its scope – it is well suited to testing the validity of sweeping claims derived from small-N case studies but ill-suited for making sense of integration policy from the perspective of its subjects.

Accounting for Variation and Convergence: National Models, Transnational Norms, and the Logics of Liberal Democracy

Political science was a latecomer to the study of immigrant integration. The most important early work was done by sociologists, stretching back to the Chicago School’s contributions to assimilation to more recent efforts aimed at updating theories of assimilation, especially with reference to the United States (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003). Contemporary discussions of immigrant integration were catalyzed by Rogers Brubaker’s seminal Citizenship and Nationhood and France and Germany (1992). According to Brubaker, immigrant integration, capped by naturalization, proceeded more quickly and successfully in postwar France because of its civic republican tradition of nationhood. Conversely, immigrant integration and citizenship acquisition for postwar migrants in Germany were hampered by an ethno-nationalist tradition of nationhood that sharply distinguished between ethnically defined Germans and “foreigners” who, because they could not lay claim to German descent, were effectively shut out of the polity. The politics of citizenship in both countries was thus over determined by their distinctive histories of state formation and attendant traditions of nationhood.

Brubaker’s argument provided a handy tool for scholars interested in explaining variation in immigrant integration policies across industrialized countries (Castles 1995; Favell 1997). Integration trajectories, according to proponents of national models, followed from historically-rooted and broadly shared understandings of national membership and belonging. This emphasis on enduring variation prompted its own reaction on the part of scholars interested in explaining important points of convergence among immigrant-receiving states in Europe and North America. “Postnationalists” such as Yasemin Soysal (1994) and David Jacobson (1996) noted that after the Second World War non-citizens in a wide range of liberal-democratic states were granted civic and social rights previously reserved for nationals. They argued that this expansion of rights frameworks to include non-nationals was premised on migrants’ status as “persons” falling under the terms of international human rights regimes. The state’s role in immigrant integration and citizenship policy was thus reduced to implementing rules derived from transnational norms (Sassen 1998: 72). The importance of national traditions and domestic institutional factors, more generally, was severely downgraded in postnationalist conceptualizations of immigrant integration and citizenship policies. National citizenship was deemed an institution in decline.

Critics of the postnationalist argument agreed that liberal-democratic states were converging toward more open and inclusive membership regimes, but argued that this trend was premised on liberal democratic states’ inherent dispositions and identities (Joppke 2001; Hollifield 2000: 148). Liberal democracy itself drove the logic of rights expansion for non-citizens. Moreover, critics of postnationalism maintained that national citizenship was far more consequential than Soysal,

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1 Noteworthy exceptions include Freeman (1979), Hollifield (1992), and Zolberg (1981).
Jacobson and others allowed (Hansen 2009). Citizenship had not been transcended but rather had been made more accommodating through the growing toleration of dual citizenship, the adoption of conditional *jus soli* in countries such as Germany, and the erosion of the state’s discretionary power in granting naturalization (Hansen and Weil 2002; Faist, Gerdes and Rieple 2004; Gerdes, Faist and Rieple 2007).

The argument for convergence has shifted of late, as scholars have reacted to liberal-democratic states’ willingness to use coercion to compel immigrants to integrate. Policy instruments such as mandatory integration courses, citizenship tests, and bans on certain religious attire for women (e.g. the hijab, niqab, and burqa) have been adopted across a wide range of countries ostensibly with the aim of encouraging the integration of immigrants (Triadafilopoulos 2011). At the same time, anti-discrimination laws have also proliferated, leading Christian Joppke (2004, 2007) to announce the end of national models and the triumph of a common civic integrationist approach to immigrant integration premised on the interests of the liberal “competition state,” the individualizing logic of neoliberal ideology, and the widely perceived failure of immigrant integration across Western Europe.2

According to Joppke, the rise of civic integrationism marked the “retreat of multiculturalism,” with multiculturalism understood as a policy orientation aimed at recognizing and preserving the distinctive cultures of immigrants through group rights, exemptions from common standards (such as dress codes), and the toleration minority cultural and religious practices (Kymlicka 2007). Joppke and others have noted that civic integrationism has taken a distinctively illiberal turn in cases where officials have sought to plumb the inner dispositions of immigrants in an effort to determine whether they are genuinely suited to membership in the liberal state (Joppke 2010; Orgad 2010). Similarly, integration policies have been used to limit “unwanted immigration,” for example by requiring that spouses wishing to enter a liberal state via family reunification demonstrate that they can speak the receiving state’s language in advance of their departure (Besselink 2009).

It is worth noting that the civic integrationist “turn” has largely bypassed the United States, despite similar concerns regarding the integration outcomes of some immigrant groups and their American-born children – especially Mexicans and other Spanish-speaking groups (Huntington 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). This may be due to the highly polarized nature of immigration politics in the United States, coupled with the difficulty in advancing any kind of immigration reform given the nature of American political institutions (Tichenor 2008; Zolberg 2006). Most of the “action” on immigrant integration in the United States of late has unfolded at the state and local level, with local political elites passing highly restrictive policies in some jurisdictions and more liberal alternatives in others (Fraga 2009; Varsanyi 2010; Newton 2012).

**Indices and Integration: Progress and Limits**

Joppke’s argument regarding the retreat of multiculturalism picked up momentum as a result of

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2 Others have rejected model-based thinking on more practical grounds, arguing that the actually existing integration policies, such as they are, are rather messier than proponents of national models would have us believe. See Bertossi (2011) and Freeman (2004).
high profile denunciations of multiculturalism by European political leaders, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron. Despite this apparent confirmation of Joppke’s thesis, there is a vigorous and ongoing debate as to whether multiculturalism really is in decline. Arguments regarding the liberal expansion of citizenship regimes have also been subject to scrutiny. In both cases, scholars have developed comparative approaches based on indices to test the degree to which arguments regarding broad trends in integration policy hold.

With respect to citizenship, Marc Morjé Howard’s (2009) Citizenship Policy Index has allowed for comparisons across European states. Howard has concluded that there has indeed been a broad shift to more liberal citizenship policies across Western Europe, but that this trend has been uneven and subject to distinctive political dynamics. In particular, liberalization has stalled or been subject to restrictive conditions in cases where citizenship policy has been politicized by conservative or extreme right wing parties. Distinctive political dynamics across European countries have allowed for continuing variation in states’ citizenship policy regimes. Janoski (2010) similarly highlights enduring differences in industrialized states’ citizenship regimes through an even more elaborate “barrier to nationality index.” Janoski maintains that differences in naturalization rates reflect deeply rooted “nationality regime types” and the disparate influence of left wing and green party governments.

The multiculturalism debate has also prompted the development of indices focused more broadly on integration, including the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 2012), the Civic Integration Index (Goodman 2010), the index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (Koopmans et al. 2005, 2010), and the Migration Integration Policy Index (Niessen et al 2007; Huddleston and Niessen 2011). One of the most important aims of research based on indices is to move beyond the analysis of a small number of cases to determine whether posited trends such as the retreat of multiculturalism hold for a larger universe of cases. Indices have also been used to determine whether a particular amalgam of policies (e.g. multiculturalism) leads to better or worse integration outcomes.

For instance, Banting and Kymlicka (2012) draw on their Multiculturalism Policy Index to refute claims that multiculturalism is in retreat. By comparing states’ adoption of policies deemed multicultural, they demonstrate that, if anything, multiculturalism has steadily advanced across most liberal-democratic countries since the 1980s. They suggest that the retreat of multiculturalism has been in the sphere of political rhetoric rather than policy outputs. Banting and Kymlicka also note that states that scored highly on their Multiculturalism Policy Index did not suffer from poor integration outcomes. Indeed, they maintain that robust multiculturalism policies lead to better integration outcomes. Matthew Wright and Irene Bloemraad (2012) confirm and reinforce this claim, through their careful analysis of surveys aimed at measuring immigrants’ attitudes concerning social inclusion, political inclusion, and political integration. Wright and Bloemraad conclude that there is no evidence to suggest that multiculturalism hurts or impedes immigrants’ social-political integration.

Conversely, Ruud Koopmans (2010) has argued that states that combined robust multicultural integration policies and generous welfare provisions (such as the Netherlands and Sweden)
experienced relatively poor integration outcomes, as measured by immigrants’ labour market participation, crime rates, and residential segregation. Koopmans therefore concludes that successful integration might be better pursued by scaling back the welfare state and/or moving away from multiculturalism to more forcefully assimilationist integration policies.

Neither Banting and Kymlicka nor Koopmans considers the opinions of immigrants as regards integration, generally, and integration policies, specifically. Wright and Bloemraad do tap immigrants’ attitudes but only through survey data and not with respect to integration policies per se (also see Maxwell 2010; Buckley 2013). While some index based research has taken a critical approach to integration policy (Goodman 2010), there has been very little interest in probing how the application of coercive state power is received among immigrants. This marks a significant gap in political science research on integration.

I believe the absence of such research and the popularity of index-based, medium-N research, sometimes supplemented by analyses of survey data, is due to prevailing professional expectations in political science that place a premium either on large-N quantitative analyses or, at the very least, “mixed methods” research designs that combine large-N statistical analysis and case studies.3 Area studies have been increasingly marginalized in political science and, despite exciting methodological advances (Schatz 2009), the value of ethnographically oriented research based on one or a small number of cases has been sharply discounted.

While there is no gainsaying the importance of index-oriented research, especially in challenging the veracity of claims regarding convergence/divergence, it is ill-suited to probing the consequences of policy “on the ground,” especially for those on the receiving end of the state’s integration measures. A fuller understanding of the meaning of integration from the point of view of its subjects is essential, both for making sense of the concept in a manner that goes beyond the relational status quo and for determining whether policies are likely to meet their stated objectives. Recent work highlighting French Muslims’ views on and approaches to integration provides examples of how such research might be structured (Bowen 2011; Selby 2012). Political scientists interested in moving research on immigrant integration forward, beyond debates over models and indices, might once again benefit from drawing on the insights of scholars in other disciplines.

References

3 The debate between Beck (2010) and Collier et al (2010) provides a useful illustration of this point.


Principal-Agent Dynamics in EU Asylum Policy – Or How Integration Rescued Refugee Protection in Europe

Eiko Thielemann, LSE, E.Thielemann@lse.ac.uk

The challenges of forced migration have been very different in Europe compared to less accessible destination countries in the developed world. While the US, Canada and Australian have operated large refugee resettlement programs, such initiatives are either insignificant or non-existent in European countries, given the comparatively large numbers of asylum seekers who apply for refugee status after their arrival in the territory of a host state (see graph 1).

This has meant that the refugee debate is very different in Europe where the unpredictable asylum inflows, comprising mixed flows of both genuine refugees and economic migrants posing as such, has long been a major concern. Like all signatories of the Geneva Convention, European states cannot turn back asylum seekers until they have examined their individual persecution claims. This has led to the perception of states not being in control of the asylum system with parts of the media and public opinion portraying asylum seekers in a highly negative light.

In a recent UK report, opinion poll data by YouGov suggests that although 89% believed providing refuge to those in danger is an important British tradition, 90% were worried about abuses in the system and 71% thought that Britain accepted too many. Focus groups conducted for the same report agreed that ‘the system is stressed and its legitimacy under threat’ (Asylum and Destitution Group 2008: 95; 90). Another study into newspaper coverage of asylum seekers notes that the top six national daily newspapers in the UK have long described the asylum system as ‘in chaos’ or ‘out of control’ (Smart, Grimshaw, McDowell and Crosland 2005).

In response to these challenges, EU Member States have cooperated at the European level since the 1980s, first through police and internal security cooperation, later through the establishment of the Dublin Convention which was designed to prevent so-called asylum shopping and welfare abuse by allocating responsibility for each asylum seeker to one Member State. This type of intergovernmental cooperation at the European level, however, led to widespread concerns, in particular among legal scholars, about the potentially negative impact of European cooperation on refugee protection (Hathaway 2003; Juss 2005; Fry 2005). Three main concerns have been raised.

1 I am indebted to Nadine El-Enany and Natascha Zaun for many insightful discussions on issues that are raised in this paper.
First, there was the concern about the potential downgrading of existing national standards in the context of the abolition of internal border controls, with the expectation of a spiral of restrictionism reinforced by adaptive pressures exerted from the EU level. The aims of European cooperation in this area were seen as having 'less to do with the establishment of a common European asylum system and more to do with reducing immigration pressure and compensating for the perceived losses of internal security in the wake of full freedom of movement inside the Union' (Juss 2005: 749). Other lawyers saw the EU as a convenient policy venue for the pursuit of more restrictive policies. Hathaway (1993: 719) writes: ‘Collaborating within a covert network of intergovernmental decision-making bodies spawned by the economic integration process itself, governments have dedicated themselves to the avoidance of national, international, and supranational scrutiny grounded in the human rights standards inherent in refugee law’. Political scientists conceptualized these dynamics through the concept of ‘venue shopping’ which refers to processes by which strategic actors (such as security-minded interior ministry officials) ‘set out to find policy venues more amenable to their ends [...] seizing upon windows of opportunity to occupy political space’ (Guiraudon 2000: 258).

Second, when negotiating common policies at the EU level, Member States are unlikely to agree on policies beyond the level of the lowest common denominator, in particular under unanimity voting requirements. Lavenex writes: ‘[I]n the event of unanimous voting in the Council, the Commission will anticipate the position of the most reluctant government […], thus perpetuating harmonisation with the lowest common denominator’ (Lavenex 2001: 865). Hence there was a widely held expectation that European cooperation on asylum matters would lead to new restrictions and lower standards.

Finally, it has been argued that the adoption of higher standards at the EU level would only be possible in the context of ‘calculated evasion’ (Vedsted-Hansen 2005: 374). Strategic evasion or ‘calculated non-implementation’ (Héritier 1996: 154) means that Member States only accept costly commitments if they expect that they will be able to evade their implementation. The expectation therefore was ‘the absence of real coordination and non-implementation of agreed measures to regulate entry of non-nationals to the European Union, both with respect to asylum seekers and to external border control generally’ (Bhabha 2005: 105).

However, these concerns have not been observed in reality. Instead, political and institutional processes have challenged these pessimistic legal accounts. Recent empirical studies have pointed to numerous examples of how the Member States have agreed on common standards at the EU level that have necessitated legislative changes and the adoption of higher standard domestic policies (for a summary see Thielemann and El-Enany 2011). These studies have shown how common EU policies on the reception-, qualification-, procedural- and return aspects of the asylum process have led to the adoption of EU standards that are higher than those that previously existed domestically. Higher EU standards have generated significant adaption pressures in several, if not all, Member States and these dynamics have intensified with the growing role of European Courts.

The use of the ‘principal-agent’ model (Kiewet and McCubbins 1991) and its application to the European Union (Thatcher and Stone-Sweet 2002; Strom, Mueller and Bergman 2006) provides
several useful insights to account for these developments that have contradicted some of the early commentators. From its intergovernmental beginnings in the 1990s, European cooperation in this area has increasingly been characterized by a significant increase in delegation to EU supranational institutions (European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice). As the principal-agent literature suggests, such delegation was undertaken to lower transaction costs and enhance the credibility of commitments. Specifically, this has been due to the desire to overcome inefficiencies of intergovernmental cooperation, but also to legitimize EU policy-making in this sensitive policy arena through more accountable processes and an attempt to limit free-riding through non-implementation.

As a result of this delegation, today’s governance rules for immigration and asylum matters under the Lisbon Treaty operate under the same supranational arrangements that exist for the most integrated parts of the EU project, i.e. the regulatory system of the Single Market. The European Commission now holds the monopoly of legislative initiatives, decisions among the Member States are taken by qualified majority voting, the European Parliament is a co-legislator with full veto powers and the European Court of Justice has the authority to adjudicate over both the making and the implementation of EU policies. Over the past 20 years, Member States have continuously re-evaluated the cost and benefits of delegation in the making of European asylum policy. They have re-assessed the trade-off between the need to establish more effective common policies and the risk of losing influence in the policy making process. Their frustration with the ineffectiveness of national policies and of intergovernmental cooperation on EU asylum matters strengthened their belief in the necessity of reducing transaction costs and in tackling collective action problems more effectively through more devolution of powers to the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. This delegation has resulted in a number of both intended and unintended consequences which have safeguarded and at times raised refugee protection standards in the following three main ways.

First, delegation has addressed collective action problems of refugee protection in Europe by limiting regulatory competition and the ‘race to the bottom’ through the adoption of common EU minimum standards. Refugee protection entails a number of collective action problems that result from the fact that under the international refugee regime, states’ responsibilities are largely limited to protection seekers on their territory. Only once asylum seekers are on the territory of a signatory state, that state is required to engage in the costly process of determining whether or not they deserve protection and therefore access to residence and other rights in that state. States face no similar obligations for forced migrants and refugees outside their territory. This provides states with an incentive to discourage or deter asylum seekers from seeking protection on their territories, or to encourage them indirectly to seek protection elsewhere. This used to encourage the adoption of ‘tit for tat’ regulatory restrictions as states have sought to limit their relative responsibilities with regard to asylum seekers and refugees by adopting policy measures that were more restrictive than those of other states in their neighbourhood in an attempt to deflect asylum flows to these other countries. Delegation to the EU and the establishment of common minimum

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2 For a broader conceptual discussion see Thielemann and Zaun 2012.
standards has effectively halted such regulatory competition and the risk of continuous downgrading of protection standards.

Second, delegation to EU institutions has resulted in raised standards by isolating European policy makers from populist pressures at home while at the same time creating new opportunities to shift responsibilities to the EU and avoid blame for unpopular decisions or outcomes. Rather than leading to policy harmonisation at the ‘lowest common denominator’, EU asylum rules have increasingly led to the upgrading of domestic asylum laws, which has strengthened protection standards for forced migrants. While elite preferences on migration and in particular asylum will always tend to be more liberal than those of the general public, politicians will be tempted to ditch their liberal preferences when confronted with electoral incentives to do so even if this risks bringing their country into conflict with its obligations under international law (the case of recent Australian asylum policies are perhaps the best recent example). By delegating agenda setting powers to EU institutions, national politicians not only leave the development of rights-based initiatives to elites in mostly non-majoritarian actors that are less subject to direct electoral pressures. Consequently, one can expect that such non-majoritarian institutions will tend to promote more liberal (less restrictive) standards than those promoted by majoritarian institutions (national governments) where liberal preferences of national decision makers will be constrained much more directly by anti-immigrant sentiments of the wider electorate. The influence of non-majoritarian institutions like the European Commission can be expected to be greater, the more supranational the European decision-making rules. Decision making rules under qualified majority voting (QMV) will tend to lead to a stronger influence by the Commission than more intergovernmental governance arrangements (when unanimity voting rules apply). Hence one would expect higher (less restrictive) standards the more supranational (communitarised) the policy process through which EU asylum laws are being adopted. Recent developments around the revision of some of the EU’s key asylum directives illustrate these governance and agenda-setting dynamics.

There is plenty of evidence that shows that the European Commission has used its powers of legislative initiative to propose legislation that is more liberal (less restrictive) than the preferences (and existing national standards) of a number of Member States. Many of the amendments that the Member States have insisted upon in the process of transforming the initial proposals of the Commission into the final legislative text have reflected these differences. At times, Member States forced the Commission to take back some of its more ambitious liberal (high standard) proposals, e.g. to apply minimum procedural standards also to border procedures or to grant free legal aid without exceptions. Often, however, the Commission’s liberal proposals made it into the final text (for a summary of such rights-enhancing measures in the reception, qualification, procedures and return directives see El-Enany and Thielemann 2011 and Thielemann 2012).

With its recent initiatives to revise the reception and procedures directives, however, the Commission’s attempts to raise standards further (in some cases, such as with improved access to

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3 ‘Non-majoritarian institutions’ here are defined as ‘neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials’ (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 2).
the labour market for asylum seekers, above and beyond existing standards in not some but all Member States) has been highly contested. It has led to the UK’s decision to opt out of the revised directives (having been a party to the original directives) and encountered significant resistance among other big Member States in the Council. A joint memo by Germany, France and the UK to the Commission suggests that on this occasion the Commission might have been pushing its preferences for higher standards too far. The memo suggests that the Commission should re-draft key sections of directives so that they are ‘more in agreement with Member States’ objectives’ (Council 2011: 2). The joint text states with regard to one of the directives: ‘So far as the Reception Conditions Directive is concerned, the new proposals should contribute to the good management of the problem of asylum, in the context of the rise in intake, and should not make claiming asylum more attractive or increase costs on Member States.’ However, in the end a compromise was reached and with the help of the European Parliament, several rights enhancing proposals by the Commission on limiting detention, on safeguarding access to welfare benefits and on improved labour market access did make it into the final legislation. While the Commission will not get all its liberal proposals through the Council, these examples illustrate the important agenda-setting role of non-majoritarian institutions which continue to push Member States towards adopting higher common standards. This is now also accepted by some legal scholars. In the case of the revised 2012 reception directive, Steve Peers, while still not satisfied with current EU law, acknowledges that ‘the final agreed text is undeniably an improvement upon both the 2003 Directive and the Council’s version of the new Directive’ (Peers 2012).

Finally, delegation has started to limit discretion and non-compliance through the ‘completion of incomplete contracts’ and independent oversight. Higher EU asylum standards need to be properly implemented by the Member States in order to improve the protection of refugees. It is well established that EU asylum policies have suffered from significant implementation deficits. However, we know from other areas of EU law that the EU legal system and in particular delegation to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court), can play a crucial role in narrowing implementation gaps and curtail free-riding. To achieve more common outcomes, Member States agreed that the European asylum system needs a court that can rule on the interpretation of EU asylum legal provisions and oversee implementation. Over the years and most recently with the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States have extended the delegation of powers to the Court, bringing the whole of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within its general jurisdiction. No longer is the preliminary reference procedure limited to national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy, but rather it is now available to all national courts. Judicial activism has further strengthened the impact of this new delegation of powers. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of how the Court has been willing to interpret provisions of European asylum law in a manner that better protects the rights of asylum seekers at the implementation stage. This has happened through the Court’s interpretation of substantive provisions of EU law in cases (such as Elgafaji6 or B and D7) but also through the Court’s crucial intervention into implementation of

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6 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji and another v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie 17 European Court of Justice, February 2009.

7 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-109, B and D, European Court of Justice, 9/11/2010.
the Dublin transfer system with the NS case of December 2011. Here the Court held with regard to the operation of the “Dublin II” Regulation that the EU asylum system cannot operate on the basis of a "conclusive presumption" that all EU Member States “observe the fundamental rights of the European Union” (at para. 105). Under the Dublin regulation, asylum seekers must apply in the first EU country they enter and can be sent back there if they travel to other countries. The individual at the center of the NS case, an Afghan national, claimed asylum in the UK in 2009 after travelling through Greece. Identifying grave deficiencies in the Greek asylum system in implementing EU minimum standards, the Court’s judgment stated that Member States ’may not transfer an asylum seeker to the “Member State responsible” within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment’ (at para. 94). These cases demonstrate that the Court of Justice is willing to use its delegated powers to interpret the substantive provisions of the new EU asylum directives broadly, creating adaptation pressures in the Member States. While legitimate concerns about implementation gaps remain, some convergence in policy outcomes appears evident when analysing data on refugee recognition across the EU (see the example of Greece in graphs 2 and 3).

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8 Case C-411/10 N.S v Secretary of State for the Home Department, European Court of Justice, 21/12/2011.
10 See also the earlier case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights, 21/01/2011.
The data suggest that in the case of two of the principal groups of asylum seekers (those from Afghanistan and Iraq), there are signs of a convergence of asylum determination practices between Greece and the rest of the Member States. It seems reasonable to assume that the Court’s use of delegated powers has played a significant role in limiting Member States discretion in their interpretation of EU rules, enhancing safeguards for asylum seekers in the process.

From the above, it is clear that the highly pessimistic expectations put forward by early commentators on European cooperation have not been borne out in practice. While EU asylum laws are far from perfect, it would be wrong to suggest that European cooperation has undermined refugee protection (see also Thielemann and El-Enany 2010). On the contrary, there is ample evidence that suggests that the delegation of powers over agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation oversight to the EU’s supranational institutions have strengthened the more liberal voices in European policy-making, empowering actors that are less constrained by restrictive majoritarian preferences. As a result we have observed how delegated powers have curtailed regulatory competition, have led to higher standards than those previously existing in the Member States and have contributed to a convergence of policy outcomes across the EU. In doing so, it seems fair to say that European integration has not only safeguarded but also strengthened refugee protection in Europe.

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Citizenship, Migration, and the State

_James Hampshire, University of Sussex, J.A.Hampshire@sussex.ac.uk_

Over the last twenty years, few concepts have had to endure more conceptual stretching than citizenship. Citizenship is global, cosmopolitan, urban, cultural, environmental, corporate and sexual, to mention just some of the adjectives to which it has been attached. As a result, citizenship risks becoming everything and nothing at the same time. As Giovanni Sartori once complained, "gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by loses in connotative precision" (1970: 1035). Arguably one of the most important contributions of political scientists working on citizenship, as well as political sociologists and normative political theorists, has been to arrest this conceptual entropy by bringing the state back into the study of citizenship, or more precisely by relocating citizenship as a core institution of the contemporary liberal state (see, for example, Joppke 2010). Understood as membership of a state, the fundamental importance of citizenship for international migration, and indeed of migration for citizenship, is brought squarely into view.

Citizenship and Migration

Today, citizenship and migration are so intimately related that it seems strange they could ever have been treated separately. Citizenship constitutes and shapes international migration, while international migration has wrought transformations in citizenship. Yet some of the classic literature on citizenship ignores migration altogether. T. H. Marshall’s (1949) influential account of the evolution of citizenship – still useful for its disaggregation of civil, political, and social rights – does not consider migration at all. Focused on citizenship as an instrument of social integration to ameliorate class divisions, and writing before the onset of mass immigration in Europe, Marshall does not entertain the externally exclusionary dimension of citizenship: the fact that it is as much an instrument of social closure as inclusion. To read Marshall’s account of citizenship is to realise that the past really is a foreign country (the metaphor seems apt).

It was in the 1990s that political scientists, sociologists and philosophers began to rethink citizenship in an age of migration. The emerging literature focused on two questions: how to explain citizenship regimes, and how to evaluate the significance of citizenship. In addressing these questions, two opposed positions emerged: on the one hand, citizenship was analysed as an institution rooted in the nation, a formal expression of deeply held national-cultural attachments; on the other, citizenship rights were argued to be breaking free from their national origins and...
becoming ‘postnational’. The *locus classicus* of the first position, Rogers Brubaker’s *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992), argued that differences in these two countries’ citizenship laws and traditions – France’s *jus soli* attribution of citizenship according to birth on French territory against Germany’s *jus sanguinis* attribution according to descent – were expressions of contrasting national identities: France’s supposedly civic conception of nationhood versus Germany’s ethnic conception. Brubaker’s argument that citizenship laws are formalizations of national cultural idioms implied that citizenship laws are resistant to change, and that differences would likely persist despite the ‘great migratory waves’ washing over Europe. His analysis verged on a cultural determinism in which there was little role for intra-national contestation, in other words for a domestic politics of citizenship. It therefore looked increasingly unsustainable as citizenship was contested in these (as in other) countries and moreover as citizenship was liberalized, notably in Germany where reforms in 1999 introduced conditional *jus soli*.

If the national-cultural account of citizenship struggled to account for developments during the 1990s and 2000s, the postnational argument didn’t fare well either. The starting point for postnationalism was the plausible observation that immigration was blurring the distinction between citizens and aliens. The need to integrate immigrants was leading liberal democracies to grant selected rights to non-citizen permanent residents, thus formal citizenship status appeared to be less relevant for the enjoyment of rights that were once the preserve of citizens. This was the argument of Tomas Hammar (1990) who coined the term ‘denization’ to describe the status of permanent residents living between citizenship and alienage. Others went much further, arguing that nothing less than a ‘revolution’ was underway in which national citizenship was being wholly devalued as a generator of rights (Jacobson 1996: 3). The most influential statement of this thesis, Yasemin Soysal’s *The Limits of Citizenship* (1994), argued that national citizenship was being supplanted by ‘postnational membership,’ a status based on human rights discourse and international law, and premised on ‘universal personhood’ rather than a particular national identity. Postnationalism enjoyed a brief heyday in some parts of academia, but it was soon subjected to a barrage of theoretical and empirical criticism that is too wide-ranging to discuss here (for a review see Hansen 2009). Suffice it to say that although postnationalists were correct to argue that immigration was transforming citizenship, their claim that rights were being decoupled wholesale from national citizenship was at best a wild exaggeration.

**Citizenship Redux**

Today, all serious scholars of citizenship and migration agree that national citizenship is very far from being eclipsed. Citizenship remains and in some cases is increasingly important for access to rights. National level political rights, including the right to stand for high public office and vote in national elections, are almost everywhere the preserve of citizens (Chile, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay are notable exceptions). Regarding social rights, the significance of citizenship is mixed, but not unimportant. Whereas contributory benefits such as unemployment compensation and pensions are generally insurance-based and accrue through participation in the labour market, non-contributory social programmes such as income support, disability benefits, and housing benefits are in many countries restricted to citizens or offered to non-citizens only at a lower level of benefit. Even civil rights, the most universalistic of liberal rights, are potentially affected by citizenship, as became apparent in the UK and US government’s adoption of counterterrorism
powers specific to aliens in the aftermath of 9/11 (Hansen 2009; see Hampshire, forthcoming 2013, for a review of why citizenship matters for rights).

None of this is to deny that immigration has effected a transformation of citizenship (Joppke 2007). The most important effect of immigration, especially in Europe, has been the liberalization of laws regulating access to citizenship status. Unlike the settler states of North America and Oceania, where citizenship policies have long been geared towards the integration of immigrants and their descendants, in Europe citizenship laws were developed well before mass immigration. In many European countries, laws governing the acquisition of citizenship at birth and by naturalization were far from inclusionary: descent-based *jus sanguinis* traditions were common and high barriers to naturalization were widespread in the 1990s. Over the last two decades, there has been a clear trend towards the liberalization of laws governing acquisition of citizenship at birth. In many European countries, descent-based principles have been replaced or supplemented with automatic or conditional *jus soli*, which attributes citizenship to children of immigrants born on the state’s territory. Thus second and third generation immigrants automatically or at least more easily become citizens of the countries in which they are born. A study of 33 European countries conducted by the European Union Democratic Observatory on Citizenship (EUDO) found that between 1989 and 2010, *jus soli* in some form was introduced or strengthened in 12 of the countries surveyed, making a total of 19 with some form of *jus soli* provision in 2010 (Honohan 2010: 9).

The second way of acquiring citizenship is, of course, naturalization. Here the story is more mixed. On the one hand, several European countries have reduced the residency requirements for naturalization and most major immigrant-receiving countries now tolerate dual nationality. During the 1980s, just six of the then 15 EU member states allowed dual nationality for naturalizing immigrants; by 2012, ten of these states officially tolerated dual nationality and among the five countries that did not, there were significant exceptions in three (Wallace Goodman 2010: 10). The only Western European countries that enforce a prohibition on dual nationality today are Austria and Denmark. On the other hand, several European countries have recently introduced more stringent language requirements and country knowledge tests for naturalization. Citizenship tests are longestablished in Canada and the United States, but they are novel in Europe. Just six out of the 33 countries in the EUDO study operated formal language tests in 1998; by 2010, nineteen countries operated formal tests, including most of the major immigrant receiving countries (Wallace Goodman 2010: 16). The trend towards country knowledge tests is not as strong, but significant nonetheless. In 1999, just four European countries (Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) operated formal country knowledge tests; by 2010, twelve European countries used country knowledge tests, including major immigrant destination countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Wallace Goodman 2010: 15-16). These tests polarize opinion and are the subject of considerable debate (see below).

The overall direction of travel can be seen through Marc Morjé Howard’s (2009) citizenship policy index. For each country, Howard codes policies on *jus soli*, residency requirements, and toleration

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1 The 27 EU member states plus Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey.
of dual nationality on a scale of 0-2 according to how liberal or restrictive they are, and then adjusts the score for civic integration requirements and actual naturalization rates. His aggregate index shows a clear trend towards more liberal citizenship policies across Western Europe. Only Denmark became significantly more restrictive between 1989 and 2009, and several countries became more liberal. Beyond Europe, there has been little change in the citizenship policies of major destination countries since the 1980s, largely because these countries’ citizenship policies are, as mentioned above, already adapted to the demands of integrating newcomers. Interestingly, the one case of significant reform is Australia, where in 2007 the residence requirement for naturalization was increased from two to four years, a restrictive rather than liberalizing change albeit one that still leaves Australian policy comparatively liberal.

While the recent experience of Europe suggests that there are strong imperatives driving the governments of immigrant-receiving countries towards liberalization it is important to avoid a teleological account. The need to incorporate immigrants coupled with liberal norms of inclusion does generate pressure for liberalization, but there are also latent pressures to maintain restrictive policies in many liberal democracies. Public opinion polls reveal significant levels of opposition to immigrants and demands for more restrictive policies. What matters is which of these latent pressures are more effectively mobilized. Howard proposes a two-step model. First, citizenship reform will occur more often under centre-left than centre-right governments. Second, where anti-immigrant sentiment is effectively mobilized by far right parties or through populist referendum campaigns citizenship reforms will be blocked. The evidence broadly supports these predictions. Most citizenship liberalizations in Europe have occurred under centre-left governments. And countries with significant far right parties, such as Austria, Italy and Denmark, have not liberalized their citizenship laws, whereas those that did liberalize, including Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, all had low levels of far right support at the time of reform (Howard 2009: 65-67).

**Liberal Norms**

Over the last twenty years, then, political scientists and sociologists have shown that national citizenship continues to matter for rights, and that access to the status of citizenship has generally been liberalized albeit with some exceptions and countertrends. These developments raise a number of normative questions about how citizenship should be adapted to an era of mass mobility. Space precludes a detailed treatment, so I shall mention just two questions that political theorists have examined in recent years: How should access to the status of citizenship be regulated? And how should political rights attach to international migrants, both non-citizen residents (immigrants) and non-resident citizens (emigrants)?

It is virtually a tautology that liberal theorists support the liberalization of citizenship. The spread of *jus soli*, reduction in residency requirements for naturalization, and increased toleration of dual nationality are variously implied by liberal principles of individual freedom and equality. Since citizenship still matters for rights, liberal justice requires that permanently resident immigrants and their children are able to become citizens without major obstacles. *Jus soli* is especially important to prevent the formation of a class of residents who live in a given country but are excluded from the political community. The situation of second and third generation immigrants without equal political and other rights cannot long be tolerated in a liberal democracy.
An area in which there is more contention among liberal theorists is naturalization policies, particularly language and country knowledge tests (see Bauböck and Joppke 2010 for a range of views). Joseph Carens (2002) argues that access to citizenship through naturalization should be as easy as possible, conditional only upon a relatively short residency requirement. Applicants for naturalization should not be tested for language ability or country knowledge, but presumed competent by virtue of a period of residence. Carens argues that residence establishes de facto membership of a society and thereby generates a claim to de jure membership of the political community. The governments and citizens of destination countries may well wish that immigrants acquire a facility in the official language and knowledge of society, but as a matter of liberal justice they cannot make citizenship conditional on demonstration of these things. This is a powerful argument, but it is clearly at odds with the spread of language and knowledge tests in Europe as well as their longstanding use in North America, and moreover it has been queried on principled grounds. In response to a range of critics, including communitarians and republicans, several liberal theorists have conceded that functioning democracies require a citizenry equipped with civic skills and competencies, and even what John Rawls described as ‘cooperative political virtues’ (Rawls 2001: 116; cf Macedo 1990). It is a short step from here to argue that naturalization requirements are a legitimate way of promoting these competencies and attributes (Hampshire 2011). This is not to say that anything goes: naturalization tests in liberal states should not probe the personal opinions or beliefs or applicants, nor should they seek to test knowledge about arcane historical or cultural events, but to the extent that some level of language and civic knowledge is essential for effective citizenship, then demonstration of this knowledge as a condition of naturalization might be thought consistent with liberal justice.

A second normative debate about citizenship and migration relates to the political rights of international migrants. This debate considers both immigrants’ rights in receiving countries and emigrants’ rights for transnational political participation. Since non-citizen residents are generally unable to vote or stand in national elections, immigration challenges a core principle of democracy, namely that all those who are subject to a political authority and its laws should have an equal right to participate and be represented in the making of those laws (Rubio-Marin 2000). Their exclusion from full political participation means that immigrants cannot represent their interests in the democratic process on an equal footing, something that becomes increasingly significant in the context of anti-immigrant mobilization. One way to address this would be to decouple political rights from citizenship and extend voting rights to all residents. However, aside from being politically unfeasible in most countries, residence-based voting would eviscerate citizenship and undermine the very idea of a self-determining political community as something more than an association of people living on the same territory. Arguably a more practicable and normatively desirable response to this problem is to make access to citizenship relatively straightforward (jus soli, short residency requirements, etc.) and actively encourage naturalization.

Immigrants have received most attention in the literature on political rights, but equally interesting questions relate to emigrants: to what extent should citizens who have left the territory of a state to reside in another retain their rights, and indeed their obligations? This question is increasingly pertinent in the light of attempts by governments of many sending countries to engage their overseas citizens, often with the intention of harnessing their development potential through
remittances or investment. Here, the same criterion that speaks in favour of the inclusion of immigrants – residence – speaks against the extension of rights to emigrants. On a strict residency-based view, rights should not travel beyond national borders; non-resident citizens forfeit their right to vote or stand for office. In practice, however, many states do allow expatriates to vote and some even reserve seats in their parliaments for overseas constituents (e.g. France and Italy). Theoretically speaking, there are several arguments against a narrow residency requirement, the most powerful of which being that laws and decisions made by a sending-country government may affect overseas citizens. In the case of the United States, for example, the obligation of citizens to pay income tax regardless of where they reside could be argued to generate a corresponding right to vote from overseas. Yet limits based on residence should not be dismissed. Claudio López-Guerra (2005), for example, has argued that permanent non-residents should be disenfranchised on the grounds that they are not fully subject to the laws of their home country. In practice, while some states extend overseas voting rights indefinitely, many others set time limits after which the right to vote expires. Rainer Bauböck (2007) offers some theoretical support for this practice, with his conception of 'stakeholder citizenship' under which voting rights may be extended to non-resident citizens, but not indefinitely and not for generations born abroad who have never lived in the country of origin.

Conclusion

Over the last twenty years international migration has undoubtedly brought about transformations in liberal democratic citizenship. But as the growing political science literature has shown, these transformations have not resulted in citizenship's redundancy. Contra postnationalists, national citizenship remains important for immigrants, not only for their political, but also some social and civil rights. The citizenship a person inherits in the 'birthright lottery' continues fundamentally to affect his or her life chances (Shachar 2009). As destination states continue to grapple with the integration of immigrants and sending states seek to engage with their emigrants, the question of how to adapt citizenship to an age of migration will persist.

References


Teacher’s Corner:
Teaching and Practicing the Politics of Immigrant Rights in “America’s Whitest State”

Instructor: Leila Kawar, lkawar@bgsu.edu
Course name: Immigrant Rights in Theory and in Practice
Institution where the course was taught: Bates College, Lewiston, Maine

What made this course distinctive or unusual?

This was an intensive five-week "Short Term" course taught at the end of the academic year, when students are expected to participate in 20 hours per week of focused instruction in a single subject. Although Short Term courses are graded, they are more experimental and hands-on than traditional classroom instruction. When I thought about what I could do within these constraints, I envisioned a "service-learning" course along the lines of a law school immigrant rights clinic. But rather than offering legal services to immigrant clients, I wanted the practical side of the course to involve student volunteer placements with grassroots organizations in Maine that work to advance immigrant rights. The idea was to pair these volunteer internships with assigned readings drawn from the scholarship on immigrant rights political mobilization, such as Jennifer Gordon’s Suburban Sweatshops. As a class, we also watched and discussed a number of films documenting community-based immigrant rights activism. These in-class discussions aimed to provide the students with a set of concepts for understanding how their volunteer experiences with grassroots advocacy organizations were contributing to building social change from the ground up.

What was it like teaching a "service-learning" course on immigrant rights in Maine, the state which the census named as the least diverse in the nation?

There were actually a number of advantages to teaching this kind of course in a place like Maine. The world of state politics in Maine is small enough that undergraduates can participate in political
debates and feel that their voices are being heard. For example, students in my course were able to present testimony before the Maine Senate as it was considering a bill that would have allowed Maine municipalities to give non-citizens voting rights in local elections (unfortunately, it came close but did not pass). Also, while there is a large geographic area to cover, the network of organizations providing services to Maine's immigrants, refugees, and migrant farmworkers is newer and less well-established than the immigrant community networks found in major destination cities. Grassroots organizations such as Maine Migrant Health Program, Somali Bantu Youth Association, and Maine People's Alliance were willing to give student volunteers substantive responsibilities that they probably would not have been able to have in a more professionalized organizational setting.

Can you describe some of the teaching highlights?

In the spring of 2010, while "comprehensive immigration reform" was still a major political issue, the students worked with organizers from Maine People's Alliance to plan a march for immigrant rights in downtown Portland that drew more than 500 marchers and attracted state media coverage. Many of the students told me that it was the first time they felt they had done anything explicitly political, but that they had been moved by the personal stories told by two undocumented students who came to speak in class and they felt that by organizing a public demonstration for immigrant rights they were doing something to make a difference. Another highlight was an event in May 2011 that involved a film screening and discussion about immigration and labor issues that the class helped to organize in collaboration with the Western Maine Labor Council and the Maine Fair Trade Campaign. Held at the local IBEW union hall, college students and faculty joined labor activists in listening to testimonials from immigrant workers about the oppressive conditions that they faced at a local agricultural plant that had been repeatedly fined for occupational safety violations. The aim of the event was to plant the seeds for future organizing and solidarity among immigrant and non-immigrant workers in Maine, and it took college students into a setting where they learned about politics directly from local activists.

Are there issues or challenges specific to teaching immigration-related courses?

One challenge that arose was that some of the students, at least initially, had trouble adjusting to a course in which they were asked to become political activists. Defending immigrant rights, at least for the grassroots organizations with whom the students volunteered, meant organizing on behalf of all migrants, including those who are undocumented. In working with these organizations, the students were asked to adopt a politically-engaged position. Thinking about the issues from the perspective of those who are engaged in collective struggle, rather than from the perspective of policymakers, placed some undergraduates on unfamiliar ground. It was important to clearly explain at an early stage what the course involved so that the students could decide whether this kind of political activism was something with which they felt comfortable. On the whole, the students that I taught seemed to really appreciate being given the opportunity to contribute to grassroots, bottom-up social change.
**Policy Brief:**

**Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)**

*Tom K. Wong, University of California, San Diego, tomkwong@ucsd.edu*

**Introduction**

On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced via an executive order that undocumented youth who met certain requirements would receive relief from deportation and be given two-year renewable work permits. 1.76 million people are estimated to be eligible for the program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). To be eligible, one must have been brought to the U.S. before the age of 16, be under the age of 31, have lived in the U.S. continuously for the past five years including having been physically present on June 15, 2012, have no serious criminal history, and either be in school, have graduated from a U.S. high school, earned a GED, or served in the military.

As of mid-December, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) received over 350,000 DACA applications. While the administration was initially slow to approve applications (zero approved during the first month of the program), the pace of approvals has increased dramatically over the past several months. Currently, over 100,000 applications have been approved and another 150,000 are currently under review; while just over 12,000 applications have been rejected, most of these rejections are requests for evidence (RFEs), which are not denials (e.g., an application was incomplete or was submitted without the necessary fees).

Based on aggregate data released by USCIS, we know that 26.5% of applications have come from California, with Texas being the second leading state with 15.4% of applications. Persons born in Mexico account for just over two-thirds of all applications at 68.8%. Moreover, as part of a new multi-institution collaborative project on DACA, individual-level data that my colleagues and I have obtained via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests suggest that severe patterns of national-origins underrepresentation exists in the pool of DACA applicants. To illustrate, despite being the largest undocumented Asian community in the U.S., with a large portion of its population estimated to live in Los Angeles County, Chinese applicants made up only 91 of the 30,066 DACA applications submitted to USCIS from the county during the first months of the program. This amounts to less than one-third of one percent. Results from the first phase of our collaborative project are expected to be released at the one-year anniversary of DACA.

**The Politics of DACA**

My experience working with undocumented youth and with student- and community-based organizations on a wide range of issues related to immigration reform lead me to conclude that DACA will have a positive and profound affect on the lives of not only the young people who are eligible, but also their parents, relatives, and friends who will no longer have to fear the removal of their loved ones. At the same time, this shift in policy leaves many important issues unaddressed.
DACA carries many of the hallmarks of the DREAM Act, a bipartisan federal immigration bill that was first introduced in 2001 to give undocumented youth a pathway to citizenship. However, it falls short of the DREAM Act in several respects. Most importantly, as the Napolitano Memo describing DACA notes clearly, “This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.” Moreover, the language of “deferred action” and the program of renewable work permits sidesteps one of the most important aspects of the DREAM Act: the certainty and security that comes with permanent legal status.

As a matter of politics, the announcement of DACA came just months in advance of the November presidential elections and its timing effectively took the wind out of the sails of Republican attempts, led by Florida Senator Marco Rubio, to push a revised version of the DREAM Act through Congress. A deeper subtext also exists. Immigrant advocacy groups have not been shy in criticizing the administration over the record numbers of deportations that have occurred under President Obama’s watch. In the weeks before DACA was announced, an assessment of the administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion in reviewing low-priority deportation cases revealed that relief was granted in only 7% of cases, as only 20,648 out of 288,361 cases reviewed by lawyers for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) were closed. Shorty before that, the administration was sued by the American Immigration Council for what it described as unlawfully withholding records related to another form of removal known as voluntary return. Altogether, the chorus of frustration and dissatisfaction with the Obama administration over the issue of immigration had taken on a sharper and more critical pitch.

**UnDACAmented and Unafraid**

Pushing the administration further, though receiving much less credit and attention, were the undocumented students themselves. In early June, two students staged a sit-in at President Obama’s campaign office in Denver, Colorado. These sit-ins, described by DREAMers as “Und Occupy Obama,” also took place at Obama reelection offices in Ohio, Michigan, and in various places in California. These actions were part of a larger strategy that has emerged over the past couple of years of undocumented youth “coming out of the shadows.” At the risk of their own deportation undocumented youth across the country have created a meaningful social movement. Their courage, resolve, and commitment to social justice demand a place in how we understand DACA.

For many who are a part of this movement, DACA is bittersweet. As the DREAM Act languished in Congress for over a decade, many have “aged out” of its provisions and are now too old to be eligible for relief under DACA. For these people, over a decade of uncertainty, struggle, and tepid but unyielding hope has passed only to see their dreams deferred, as their status remains unresolved. Indeed, while DACA covers a large segment of the undocumented youth population, it is important to remember that 2.7 million undocumented young people are not eligible for DACA because they have been in the U.S. for less than five years or were brought to the country when they were 16 or older. Thus, for many undocumented youth, the celebration of DACA has been but a short respite in what remains a long and difficult road ahead. To be sure, the struggle ahead is a pathway to citizenship not just for DREAMers, but also for the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S.
To illustrate, over 600 undocumented youth from across the country recently travelled to Kansas City, Missouri to attend the 2012 United We Dream (UWD) National Congress. On the agenda were issues ranging from planning and organizing in preparation for the 2013 push for comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), to in-depth political analysis of the actors that will potentially make the difference between a CIR bill with a path to citizenship, an enforcement-only bill, or no bill at all. Together with the more visible acts of political protest that have been organized by the Dream Activist network and the National Immigrant Youth Alliance (NIYA) - undocumented youth-led organizations that have publicly protested against Arizona’s SB 1070, Alabama’s HB 56, and conditions of immigration detention, among many other acts of resistance - the political activism of DREAMers illustrates a clear point: despite their immigration status, many are highly engaged in the political processes that directly impinge upon and shape their futures.

Research Institute Profile:

The African Centre for Migration & Society at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg

http://www.wits.ac.za/acms

Loren B. Landau, Director, loren.landau@wits.ac.za

Established in 1993 at the Refugee Research Project at the university’s rural facility near the Mozambican border, The African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) has established itself as the continent’s leading scholarly institution for research and teaching on the relationships among human movement, politics, labour, livelihoods and social transformation. While based in South Africa (with a new office in Nairobi), the Centre courts and conducts collaborative scholarly and policy-relevant work across sub-Saharan Africa and maintains partnerships in Asia, Europe and the Americas. It offers the region’s only post-graduate degree in migration studies and provides training to students and professionals on a broad range of substantive topics while equipping them with the conceptual and methodological foundations for independent research. Home to an international, interdisciplinary team of researchers, the centre is increasingly complementing its expertise on survey research and qualitative inquiry by partnering with filmmakers, visual artists and writers to better explore and communicate the roles of mobility in shaping contemporary African society.

ACMS research is organized into five overlapping thematic areas, each involving multiple researchers in collaboration with graduate students and colleagues in and beyond the academy. The first, Considering Community of Differences, interrogates the limits, functions, and forms of
Spatial and residential collectives. In doing so, it documents and theorises how social differences are enacted and re-enacted within migration-affected neighbourhoods and settlements. Intrinsic to these questions are the mediation and mobilization of violence.

Drawing on themes from Organizational Sociology, Political Science, and Human Geography, the ACMS’s *Governing Mobility in Southern African Cities* theme explores transforming social configurations and patterns of power, authority, and belonging across Sub-Saharan Africa resulting from rapid urbanization and decentralization. Projects developed under this theme explore how movement is transforming urban governance by redistributing population, resources and claims on these resources. The research projects highlight shifting policy networks, political configurations and novel political subjectivities.

The ACMS’s third theme, *Illness, Boundaries and Health Systems*, critically engages with scholars in anthropology and public health in exploring the physical and mental health and wellness of migrant groups. Within this initiative researchers are considering themes related to determinants of migrants health, sexuality and gender, health and citizenship, and the use of plural health systems and alternative healing strategies.

Drawing on threads within legal sociology and anthropology, the centre’s *Mobility, Rights and the Social Life of Law* concentration considers how people’s movements transgress and transform legal and regulatory orders. Research under this theme examines the legal rights of migrants and their interactions with legal institutions. The research seeks to understand how migrants claim rights from state and non-state power holders, and to identify their rights-mobilising strategies. It looks at how law is embedded in the social life through understanding popular ideas about rights, policing and corruption, and analysing the relationship and dynamics between power holders. Key focus areas include administrative justice in the asylum process, refugee rights, and detention practices; access to justice for migrants; the plurality of justice-seeking institutions and processes, and emerging global norms on the policing and regulation of mobility.

The Centre’s *Mobility, Labour and Livelihoods* investigates migration’s role in restructuring Southern Africa’s political economy. Research is informed by contemporary regional policy and practice dynamics while paying special attention to the relationships among governments and the private sector; the formal and informal economy; internal and international migrants and labour policy and actual working conditions in various sectors. Projects under this theme map migrants’ survival strategies and trajectories in their country-of-origin; critically analyse regional and national policy frameworks relating to labour, migration, and development; and seek to assess the impact of migrant labour on poverty and inequality reduction.

The Centre’s *Paradigms and Practices of Migration Policy Making* initiative is an effort to interrogate the processes producing migration and migration-related policies at local, national and regional levels. This includes the production and circulation of policy paradigms and how implementation practices and policies diverge and converge. Projects nested within this theme document government agenda-setting effort, power relationships between state and non-state actors, and the impact of governments’ regulation efforts on actual migration control practices.
In addition to its strong connection to the scholarly community, the centre is deeply embedded in national and regional policy discussions. Not only to such engagements offer important sources of funding and local legitimacy, by framing and maintaining dialogues, the centre offers researchers unique insights into policy and social processes that might otherwise go unobserved. Moreover, it opens the avenues for empirically informing policy and working against interventions imported uncritically from elsewhere in the world. By embedding student projects within its on-going research and outreach initiatives, the ACMS helps bring fresh perspectives and field experience to these debates while offering its graduate students the unique opportunity to conduct original research on a range of intellectually and normatively engaging topics.

Section News:
2012 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, APSA, Member News

Books


Bassel, Leah (see Member News)


Guelke, Adrian (2012). *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Wiley.

Helbling, Marc (see Member News)

Hochchild, Jennifer et al. (see Member News)


Maxwell, Rahsaan (see Member News)

Mylonas, Harris (see Member News)


Journal Articles

American Behavioral Scientist


1 A note on methodology. Journals were selected from the list of 90 political science journals included in Michael Giles and James Garand’s article “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and Citational Approaches” (PS, October 2007, 741-751). We selected those that included at least 3 migration and citizenship related articles over the past decade (using the search terms “migration,” “citizenship,” “multiculturalism”). We only included articles written in English. We apologize for any oversight. For feedback and suggestions, please contact the editor.

**Australian Journal of Political Science**

**British Journal of Political Science**

**Canadian Journal of Political Science**

**China Quarterly**

**Comparative Political Studies**
Comparative Politics

Party Politics

Political Behavior

Political Geography

Political Psychology

Political Research Quarterly

Political Science Quarterly

Political Studies

Publius
• Reich, Gary and Jay Barth (2012). "Immigration Restriction in the States: Contesting the Boundaries of Federalism?" Publius 42 (3): 422-448.

Social Science History
Special Section: Gender Ratios and International Migration

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Third World Quarterly
• Piper, N. and S. Rother (2012). "Let’s Argue about Migration: advancing a right(s) discourse via communicative opportunities." Third World Quarterly 33(9): 1735-1750.

**World Politics**


**APSA 2012**

The 2012 conference program included many migration and citizenship panels and papers. Our Related Group co-sponsored 2 theme panels (with Public Policy and Normative Political Theory) and 2 other panels (with Urban Politics and Comparative Politics). We look forward to expanding this list in future years!

**Member News**

For all submitted 2013 news items, please re-send after the next call for member news.

**Leah Bassel** (Sociology, University of Leicester)

- Published *Refugee Women: Beyond Gender versus Culture*, Routledge.
- Established and co-convenes the Leicester Migration Network (http://www2.le.ac.uk/projects/migration-research-group), an interdisciplinary initiative that brings together researchers across the university and different groups in the highly diverse city of Leicester. The Network is keen to establish contacts and collaborations with colleagues in the section.

**Erin Aeran Chung** (Department of Political Science, John Hopkins University)

- Promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in the Department of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University.
- Currently a Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Program Fellow (2012-2014) and Co-Director of the Racism, Immigration, and Citizenship (RIC) Program at the Johns Hopkins University.
- Worked with the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) as a collaborative partner in an international research project entitled, Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC), which surveys immigration policies in OECD countries.

**Alistair Cook** (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore)

- Participated on a number of conference panels: “Politics, Governance and the Constitution II,” NUS Law School, Singapore; “Managing Cross-Border Movements of People: Promoting
Capacity and Response for Irregular Migration,” Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; “Irregular migration and human security in East Asia,” Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei Darussalam; “EU – Asia Dialogue’s Policy Panel on Migration,” Manila, Philippines.

**Els de Graauw** (Political Science, CUNY-Baruch College)
- Published a co-authored chapter with Irene Bloemraad, “Diversity and Laissez-Faire Integration in the United States.” In: *Diverse Nations, Diverse Responses: Approaches to Social Cohesion in Immigrant Societies.* Spoonley, Paul, and Erin Tolley (eds.), McGill-Queen’s University Press. The entire book should be of interest to section members.
- Published a co-authored chapter with Irene Bloemraad, “Immigrant Integration and Policy in the United States: A Loosely Stitched Patchwork.” In: *International Perspectives: Integration and Inclusion.* Frideres, James, and John Biles (eds.), McGill-Queen’s University Press. The entire book should be of interest to section members.

**Antje Ellermann** (Political Science, University of British Columbia)
- Promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
- Published a co-authored chapter with Matthew Gravelle and Catherine Dauvergne, “Studying Migration Governance from the Bottom-Up.” In: *Deportation and the Constitution and Contestation of Citizenship.* Anderson, Bridget, Matthew Gibney & Emanuela Paoletti (eds.), Springer. The entire book should be of interest to section members.

**Marc Helbling** (Social Science Research Center (WZB), Berlin)

**Jennifer Hochschild** (Department of Government, Harvard University)

**Willem Maas** (Political Science, Glendon College, York University)
- Directs the EU Centre of Excellence.
- Organized two conferences: “Sixty Years of European Governance” (September) and “The Future of European Union Citizenship” (October) and co-organized a workshop “Equality Rights in Europe” (November).

**Helen Marrow** (Sociology, Tufts University)
- In collaboration with Michael Jones-Correa, Dina Okamoto, and Linda Tropp, Helen B. Marrow recently received a three-year Project Award from the Russell Sage Foundation to carry out a project entitled "Immigrant-Native Relations in 21st-Century America: Intergroup Contact, Trust, and Civic Engagement."

**Rahsaan Maxwell** (Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst)


**Harris Mylonas** (Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University)


**Daniel Naujoks** (United Nations and Hamburg Institute for International Economics)


• Supported the United Nations Population Division, Department of Social and Economic Affairs (DESA) in their endeavor to establish definitions for and code migration and citizenship policies.

• Principal investigator for research project “Local Authorities’ Practices in the area of Migration and Development,” funded by the European Commission–United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI).

**Diane Sainsbury** (Political Science, Stockholm University)

• Published *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, Oxford University Press.

**Jackie Stevens** (Political Science and Legal Studies Advisory Board, Northwestern University)

• Is director of The Deportation Research Clinic, which was established as part of the Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies [http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/programs/deportationresearch/](http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/programs/deportationresearch/)

• The Clinic conducts original research and works with a network of attorneys, journalists, activists, and U.S. residents in deportation proceedings to document and confront government misconduct.


**Elke Winter** (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Ottawa)

• Published “(Im)possible Citizens: Canada’s ‘Citizenship Bonanza’ and its Boundaries,” *Citizenship Studies*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2012.707010 (iFirst Article available online).

• Published with Marie-Michèle Sauvageau "La Citoyenneté Canadienne dans la Presse écrite Anglo-canadienne et Franco-québécoise: Convergence ou Divergence?" *Canadian Journal of Political Science, 45* (3), 553–578.
How to become a Section member?

1. Go to the APSA website: http://www.apsanet.org/
2. Click on “Membership”
3. Click on “Join or Renew NOW!”
4. Log in if you already are an APSA member (or create a new account and then log in if you are a new APSA member)
5. Go to the “Membership” section:
   a. If you already are an APSA member: click on “Your Section Membership” and then find “43. Migration & Citizenship”
   b. If you are a new APSA member: fill out both the general membership and section membership information
6. Click “Continue” – Section membership is only $8 for faculty, $3 for grad students

Tada, you are a now Section member and will automatically receive the next newsletter!