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http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
Letter from the Co-Presidents

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Documents and the Regulation of Immigration and Citizenship

Western states face a dilemma. They need, in varying proportions, both cheap and high-skilled labor to enhance their economies and meet demographic challenges, and yet, there is increasing recognition that some unwanted migrants and refugees entering the western world pose a cultural and security challenge. To avoid admitting criminals, militants, and terrorists, governments envision an international standardized and secure travel document and database regime—based on National ID systems—that would permit smooth flows of migrants and refugees, while screening out undesirable individuals. And yet, the only way we know an immigrant’s identity and location is through the document, paper or digital, s/he holds.

“Documents…embody individual identity, making the individual visible to the state”

An international regulatory regime rests on the assumption that documents make individuals visible and knowable to states within the international system. A renewed emphasis on visa issuance processes, and the urgency to interlink databases from the local and regional level to a national one, all highlight the complicated relationship between tracking individual identity and assessing risk. The international mobility of individuals hinges on this verification and assessment. The sending state validates biographic information through standardized and biometric paperwork; this validation legitimizes an immigrant’s nationality and locality, verifying residence and individual phenotypic characteristics. Documents thus embody individual identity, making the individual visible to the state. Each document, a birth or marriage certificate, school matriculation form or diploma, confirms a distinct social and economic activity. Above these documents rests one standardized international travel document—the passport, the primary assumption being there can only be one passport per person per state.

How do states respond when individuals lack such essential documentation or are found to be in possession of fraudulent ones? They may turn to countries of origin

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or transit. The fly in the ointment is that many states are likely to be unable or unwilling to cooperate in an international effort to confirm the identity of their emigrants (and refugees) with standardized documentary information. Developing countries may hesitate to divert precious resources to build, standardize and biometrically upgrade their immigrant and citizenship databases. Conflicting state goals widen the gap between expectations and outcomes for states with varying capacities.

To be successful, a global documentary regime will have to strengthen the passport mechanism of all emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving states. It will also have to standardize and strengthen the entire document-based citizenship infrastructure of a country (Sadiq, Paper Citizens, 2009). Merely focusing on travel documents such as the passport, only partially addresses the challenge of unwanted individuals traveling under assumed identities. A comprehensive solution requires a major diversion of resources by the UN, World Bank, EU, and other international agencies to support document-producing institutions, i.e. the infrastructure of citizenship, in developing states. A global integrated travel regime requires nothing less than state making.

“A global integrated travel regime requires nothing less than state making”

Building document-verifying capacity is only the beginning of what will be required for a smooth flow of labor and travel across national boundaries. As there is a renewed emphasis on building national borders and sovereignty, both metaphorically and physically, future inquiries may focus on the wide-ranging role of documents in deportation processes, amnesty programs, bilateral or multilateral border agreements, among other security and control measures. These questions will complement an emerging literature in Political Sociology and Surveillance Studies which link identification documents with state capacity and security (Lyon, Identifying Citizens, 2009; Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 2000).

Additionally, while identification and registration systems are used to control immigrants, they are also vital to accessing welfare benefits and the rights of citizenship. By sorting eligibles from ineligibles, they produce graded levels of citizenship. So while there is a renewed scholarly interest in how documents strength state security, it is important to note that dependence on documents alone may produce restrictive and hierarchical citizenship practices which may leave out and exclude many. Thus, scholarly discussions on immigrant rights and citizenship challenge the efficacy of an infrastructure of citizenship. The field of migration and citizenship will become more rigorous and
relevant when it engages the role of documents in the institutional life of states, immigrants and citizens.

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Letter from the Co-Editors

As scholars of citizenship and migration, we are well aware that we live in a world of blurred boundaries, even as political forces attempt to categorize, contain and constrain the borders of belonging and human movement. Many of us are comfortable working in the fuzzy spaces of the worlds “in-between,” or of slipping among the realms that play “across” different purported boundaries. We often work with colleagues from diverse fields or disciplines or incorporate concepts and language from other scholarly perspectives, attempting to see the world of human movement and belonging from a variety of angles. Often, however, we work within a specific niche when it comes to the subject matter of our APSA Section. We are either a migration studies scholar or a citizenship studies scholar.

As migration studies scholars, we study the various facets of human movement (forced, voluntary and that which falls in between). We want to know why people move, how their movement is supported or constrained, and the effects of such movement upon host societies, those who have migrated, and those who have been left physically behind. As citizenship studies scholars, we study formal and informal modes of belonging and acting within various types of political organization (from the community all the way up through the state to the space of “global citizenship”). We want to know who belongs, who sets the criteria for belonging and how, and the ramifications of various forms of inclusion and exclusion upon ourselves and upon others (both within and outside of our particular polities). Within our specific niches, we do not as readily reflect upon the relationship between human movement and our understanding of what it means to belong. And seldom do we make clear the ways in which various understandings of belonging (or citizenship) restrict or support various forms of human movement.

As a Section of scholars dedicated to the study of citizenship and migration, we need to play more at the interstices of citizenship and migration studies. We need to paint grey the borders that many of us have erected around these two subjects and begin to ask, if we have not yet done so, what it would mean to study our particular subject or question from the “other” side. What could a citizenship studies approach to this matter add to our understanding of this particular migration issue? What could a migration studies perspective add to our knowledge of this specific citizenship question? The
Winter issue of our APSA Migration and Citizenship Section’s Newsletter, while not explicitly constructed to address the interplay between citizenship and migration studies, does so in several ways. The Symposium reveals the ways in which human movement impacts notions of belonging and vice-versa within the Asian context; the Policy Brief examines the Indian diaspora and the subsequent creation of Indian overseas citizenship; and the Research Institute Profile focuses on OBMICA, an organization that expressly works at the interstices of belonging and migration, especially as pertains to statelessness in the Caribbean.

We hope that you enjoy this Winter issue of our APSA Section on Migration & Citizenship as much as we do, and we look forward to hearing your thoughts about it. We also welcome feedback from you on the new format of the Newsletter, which includes changes that many of you addressed in our membership Newsletter survey last year. One of the key changes that we hope you take advantage of is the use of hyperlinks throughout the Newsletter. You can now click on an article of interest in the Table of Contents and it will take you directly to the text without having to do a search for it or scroll through the Newsletter. Similarly, you can click on the title of an article or section and it will take you straight back to the Table of Contents.

We look forward to continued conversations on migration and citizenship and thank you for your support,

Kristy and Marc

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Symposium: International Migration and Citizenship in Asia
Symposium Coordinator & Introductory Essay Author, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, National University of Singapore

Introduction

The challenges that contemporary migrations pose to meanings and practices of citizenship in Asia have to be understood in the context of the historical development of nation-states in the region. When large-scale labour migration within the region and beyond (mainly to the Middle East) started in the 1970s, many Asian countries – including several that had only recently cut their colonial apron strings – were still in the process of consolidating projects of nation-state building (Asis and Battistella 2013: 31). Nation-building projects in Asia differ both from the European model of supposedly homogeneous and insular states, as well as the North American and Australasian settler colonies, featuring versions of multiculturalism that privilege “white” subjects as the core of the nation. Southeast Asian postcolonial nation-states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, strained towards welding together a nation-state from ‘an already existing plurality’ rooted in the diasporas and people movements of colonial times, while East Asian polities, such as Japan and South Korea, constructed a sense of nationhood on the basis of idealised narratives of ethnic homogeneity that denied the presence of ethnically-different others (Collins, Lai and Yeoh 2013: 15).

In this context, the specific labour migration system that developed in Asia was one that minimised challenges to the fragile imaginary of the nation-state in the making, by rendering migrants as transient sojourners whose place in host societies is to sell their labour but to make no claims on the receiving nation-state. In other words, the migration regime that emerged in Asia was premised on keeping migration temporary, and, apart from creating a privileged pathway for highly skilled migrants to gain residency and citizenship, most Asian receiving nation-states “rule[d] out settlement, family reunification and long-term integration, including acquisition of citizenship, for less skilled migrants” (Asis and Battistella, 2013: 32). At the same time, from the perspective of the sending nation-states, temporary migration does not necessarily connote short-term exits, and in fact may be characterised by long or indefinite duration, repetition, circularity and sometimes de facto settlement in host societies. In this light, some sending states are actively engaging their citizens abroad by extending the right to vote and allowing dual citizenship, often in view of cultivating transnational flows of remittances and reaping investments from their diaspora populations.

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Migrants' access to legal citizenship in receiving states

In the context of Europe, Soysal (1994) has argued that national citizenship has given way to postnational citizenship, where immigrant groups without formal citizenship status are able to mobilize around claims for particularistic identities by appealing to universal principles of human rights and connecting themselves to the wider public sphere. This argument has little traction in Asia; instead the view that citizenship describes a one-to-one umbilical relationship that allocates persons to states and confers specific bundles of rights and responsibilities tied to national territory is seldom challenged in policy discourses. In exercising exclusive power of sovereignty in determining borders and terms of membership, the nation-state wields citizenship rules as a legal instrument of exclusion that sharply separates citizens as insiders from those deemed outsiders.

While most Asian countries allow for (but do not necessarily encourage) naturalisation, and some extend special consideration to long-term residents (as exemplified by the longstanding Korean community in Japan), the requirements for naturalisation – which often include residency criteria, economic wherewithal as indicated by highly skilled employment or substantial investments in host countries, and a proclivity for integration as demonstrated by a knowledge of language and culture – tend to operate in a black box of considerable opacity. Gaining a foothold in the legal framework of citizenship in receiving states is out of the reach of the vast majority of labour migrants in low-waged jobs. In contrast, pathways to permanent residency and citizenship are most clearly discernible for highly skilled or professional migrants, as they are often valorised as “talent migrants” essential to providing nation-states with the competitive edge and innovative capacity to advance in the global knowledge economy (Yeoh and Huang 2012). These talent attraction policies, however, have reconstituted the boundaries and meanings of citizenship in contested ways. As Shirlena Huang (this issue) argues, the global race to attract talent migrants has led to a marketization of citizenship through “citizenship-for-talent” exchange schemes, and this has precipitated scepticism over the integration and loyalty of newly minted “talent” citizens. The creation of privileged pathways to citizenship has also raised ethical and distributive concerns, and this has fuelled increasing tensions between old-timers and newcomers in the nation-state (Yeoh and Lam 2016).

Among student migrants, as Francis Collins (this issue) shows, pathways to citizenship have become more common in the policy armature of Asian governments, linked in many cases to these same notions of the so-called global war for talent. International students are regularly framed as potential human capital who not only enhance the knowledge economies of aspirant nations but, given their relatively young age, are well-placed to also address concerns about decades of low fertility in several countries in Asia. Yet, while the discourse and policy initiatives around student migration and citi-
Citizenship in Asia have followed similar trends, there is considerable unevenness in the extent to which students pursue these opportunities, in the hurdles they face institutionally and in employment, and in the potential for countries of education to trump the pull of home. While the instrumental acquisition of citizenship opens up internationally or regionally mobile career pathways for more privileged student migrants, those with fewer resources and less sought after qualifications are likely to face growing levels of noncitizenship.

Apart from the citizenship pathways exclusively paved for those who possess talent or capital, the other available route to legal citizenship in Asia – one ridden with far more uncertainty and risk – lies through entering into marriage unions with citizens of the host nation-state. In recent decades, East Asian industrialised economies such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have experienced a significant increase in the rate of non-marriage and delayed marriage, partly as a result of the growing mismatch in marriage expectations between the two largest groups of singles: on the one hand, independent-minded, financially well-resourced graduate-degree holding women who have sophisticated expectations of marriage partners, and, on the other, less educated men in lowly paid jobs with a preference for women willing to uphold traditional gender roles and values. Following the logic of the “marriage gradient” (Constable 2005), these men who find themselves marginalised in the local marriage market turn to less developed countries in the region for sources of brides, and in the process create the impetus for intra-regional marriage migration. The links between this form of marriage migration and citizenship, however, tend to be constrained by gendered hierarchies central to the patriarchal family, as well as gendered notions of women as domestic caregivers and biological and social reproducers.

Marriage migrants straddle the ambivalent position of being “outsiders” within the state and family; they are entitled to stay and “theoretically become new citizens… [but are] not yet members of the society” (Wang and Belanger, 2008). Incorporated into the private sphere of the family as wives and dependents of their citizen-husbands, this highly gendered mode of “familial citizenship” accounts for their vulnerable status both within the family and the nation-state, as well as for the restrictions on their rights to formal citizenship in accessing paid work and social subsidies (Yeoh, Chee and Vu 2013). As Nobue Suzuki (this issue) shows, despite prevailing rhetoric extolling the foundational nature of the Asian family as a haven and a source of support, the family in neoliberal times is under pressure to disenfranchise previously taken-for-granted rights, entitlements and belonging, particularly in the case of less powerful members such as the young and the old, while increasingly placing de-
mands on “worthy” participation as a membership criterion. As she illustrates, despite legal victory over the right for children of mixed Japanese-Filipino parentage to claim Japanese citizenship, some of these youths returning from the Philippines to Japan on the premise of newly acquired legal citizenship find themselves confronted with exploitation and infringement of their substantive rights. Accessing legal citizenship through familial incorporation hence often presents the migrant with a rocky road complete with U-turns and detours that may in the end detract from any real gains from citizenship status.

Migrants at the margins of citizenship in host societies

Rather than a static framework of rights and obligations, it has been argued that citizenship is better understood as “a terrain of struggle” (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997), shaped by state-led as well as socially embedded ideologies of gender, race and class, and negotiated on an everyday basis within public and private spheres. Scholars interested in the social realities of migrant experience have argued that “social citizenship” cannot simply be read through a singular focus on the legal framework governing citizenship status. Instead, citizenship rights are negotiated across a multifaceted terrain and at different scales from the local to the transnational.

For the migrant, social citizenship is often availed – albeit in partial ways – through membership in their own communities. Despite restrictions on length of stay and rotating door policies intended to ensure transience and disposability, migrants have established communities of their own in the host society, often along ethnic and nationality lines, leading to “the transforming of temporariness into de facto permanence” (Asis and Battistella 2013: 47). Often supported by civil society groups with an interest in promoting migrant welfare and rights, these migrant enclaves provide sources of information, mutual assistance, essential services, social networks and cultural activities that substitute for the lack of support and safety nets emanating from the nation-state framework. Migrant activist groups can also play an important role in expanding migrant rights through advocating for more inclusive modes of citizenship in Taiwan (Hsia, 2013) or through pushing the agenda on substantive issues such as the day-off campaign for migrant domestic workers in Singapore (Koh et al. 2016). Even in countries such as Japan, where the national imaginary remains highly exclusionary towards migrants, local government initiatives in developing policies of “multicultural co-existence” to “secure the rights of all residents [including migrants]” result in more inclusive modes of incorporation while not presenting a direct challenge to the nation-state (Nagy 2013: 61).
Through a comparative study of three groups of Filipina women who have migrated to South Korea – factory workers, wives of citizen-men and hostesses working at American military camptown clubs – Choo (this issue) shifts the focus from legal citizenship to examine how migrant claims-making in the broader pursuit of dignity, security and mobility is enacted and challenged in the warp and woof of everyday life. As she argues, the politics of inclusion and exclusion worked in different ways for the three groups, not so much in accordance to legal status, but rather through the prism of on-the-ground struggles over labour processes, civil society and community mobilisation, and the construction of symbolic boundaries separating the morally “tainted” from “respectable” citizens.

Engaging diaspora through extraterritorial citizenship

Turning to the nexus between migration and citizenship from the perspective of Asian sending states, it is interesting to note that discourses around exiting the original nation-state have tended in the last few decades to shed connotations of flight, disloyalty and exile, and take on more positive developmental value for “home” nation-states. For instance, while individuals who leave the People’s Republic of China were once regarded as “traitors” within state narratives, such mobility is now encouraged for certain groups as a strategy to tap business potential inherent in the development of diasporic networks. International student mobility was also promoted under the “twelve-words approach”, 

“discourses around exiting the original nation-state have tended in the last few decades to shed connotations of flight, disloyalty and exile”

zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu ziyou (meaning “support study overseas, encourage returns, guarantee freedom of (international) movement”). In the case of the Philippine state, turning citizens into labour commodities for the global marketplace by institutionalizing employment abroad through the Philippine Overseas Employment Program has become a major strategy to address poverty and unemployment, and to siphon in remittances vital to sustaining the Philippine economy.

A key impetus for the discursive shift in meaning attached to acts of migration out of the “home” nation-state can be traced to the advent of the “migration and development” nexus on international agendas from the 1990s, which is based on the emergence of “the migrant” as a celebrated agent of development and characterised by the rolling out of new policies and programmes to more effectively channel transnational remittances in order to promote development (Hickey et al. 2015; Koh 2017). As Elaine Ho (this issue) argues, in the light of newfound interest in diaspora-centred development across Asia, nation-states including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam are promoting diaspora strategies and, in some cases, extending extraterritorial citizenship to emigrants and diasporic descendants. She also cau-
tions that such diaspora strategies risk being construed as exploitative practices that deepen social inequalities within and between countries, and instead advocates developing nation-diaspora relations on the basis of a care ethics framework oriented towards building more equitable and sustainable engagements between home-nation on the one hand, and the citizen-in-migration on the other.

References


Please direct inquiries about the Symposium’s Introductory article to Brenda S.A. Yeoh (geoysa@nus.edu.sg).
Talent Migration and Citizenship in Asia
By Shirlena Huang, National University of Singapore

The Global War for Talent

The war for talent is one that is currently taking place in countries across the globe, in both well-off and emerging economies, including many in Asia. It is a war that is taking place on an uneven terrain in which countries that are higher-income, perceived as places that are more attractive to live and work, and importantly, where governments are more willing to be innovative in their strategizing, are the ones that have moved ahead. This war is being fought because policy makers have come to recognize the positive impact that the right kind of highly-skilled (im)migrants can have on the economy – not just in terms of job creation, increasing capital investment flows, and boosting global competitiveness, but also in knowledge transfer and in maintaining a country’s standard of living, particularly in societies where the population is ageing\(^1\) (Abella 2006; Harvey and Groutsis 2015; Shachar and Hirschl 2013). The desired skills and occupations targeted for recruitment span a variety of fields and include not just the “sharpest minds, the greatest innovators, and other top performers in the arts, science, and sports” who have the potential to disproportionately contribute to establishing or cementing the admitting country’s international stature and reputation for excellence and innovation” (Shachar and Hirschl 2013: 76).

“Attracting and retaining transnational talent is a complex issue”

The need to draw in highly-skilled migrants is particularly important for the rapidly emerging economies in Asia where the domestic pool of talent is limited (Zheng et al. 2008) and often, their own top talents have been lured to more developed economies to work and even stay on as permanent residents or naturalized citizens. Attracting and retaining transnational talent is a complex issue as seen by the fact that some Asian countries (such as Japan) are not very successful in luring mobile elite talent even when the ideal list of strategies is deployed. It is also a region that is varied in terms of culture, levels of economic development and goals related to global and domestic talent (Harvey and Groutsis 2015). While Singapore and Hong Kong have been the most successful in Asia in competing for global talent, most of the other Asian countries are not highly ranked on the hierarchy of places competing for highly-skilled professionals. This is slowly changing, however, and new talent magnets (such as South Korea and China) are developing in Asia (Lanvin et al. 2015) and being regarded increasingly positively by

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\(^1\) This is the case for the high-income economies of Asia such as Japan, Korea and Singapore.
nomadic talent (particularly their own diaspora) “shopping for the ‘best’ job platforms now emerging” in the region (Ong 2007: 89).

Governments understand that skilled migrants are not only highly strategic in their migration decisions – their primary goal of “moving out” of their own countries is to “move up” (Favell et al. 2006) in their careers, wealth, social status, and so on – but are also highly mobile; although, as Wang points out, they are rarely as mobile as “the triumphal portrayal of skilled migrants as ‘global careerists’…in a ‘frictionless world’” often makes them out to be (2012: 566). Governments in Asia, while somewhat later than countries in the West, have taken proactive steps to identify the kinds of talent they wish to import, and put in place a range of strategies to compete for and retain these talents. The experience in Asia demonstrates that implementing these measures, even when successful, is not unproblematic.

Strategizing to Attract and Retain Global Talent

It is becoming increasingly common for “governments ‘picking winners’” to use “fast-tracked, strategic grants of citizenship for those with exceptional skills and extraordinary talent” (Shachar and Hirschl 2013: 71). To bring back their highly-skilled diaspora, as well as to attract targeted groups of foreign talent and investors, many Asian governments, beginning with the more dynamic economies of Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and China in the late 1980s/early 1990s, now have specialized recruitment programs offering opportunities for more secure migration status by easing the barriers and restrictions to entry, permanent residency and citizenship.

For example, to develop its programs in engineering and the sciences, China set up the “One-Hundred-Talents Program” in 1994 to bring in top scholars and researchers to lead key laboratories and projects in China. In 2008, it broadened the search to the entire spectrum of scholars, professionals and entrepreneurs under its “Recruitment of Global Experts” program (more popularly known as the “One-Thousand-Talents Program”). Although there are variations among its various programs, China’s preference is for talent aged 45 years and below, with degrees from reputable overseas universities, international work experience and outstanding contributions to their respective pro-

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2 The United States of America pioneered skills-based admission for immigrants in 1965, amending its Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 to include skills as a basis for immigration to the country. Other western countries like Canada (1967) and Australia (1973) soon followed suit, adopting a point system to assess talent and fit (Shachar and Hirschl 2013: 80-83).
3 Policies often differentiate between the various groups on the talent pyramid, with the most highly sought offered the best incentives.
4 These are just two of several programs offered at national, provincial and municipal levels in China, targeted at skilled talents, both foreigners and Chinese nationals (e.g. Chang Jiang Scholar Program, 1998; Measures for Relevant Treatment Enjoyed by Foreigners with Permanent Residence Status, 2012) and their diaspora (e.g. National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars, 1994; Parental Love Program, 1996; Red Son Plan, 2006).
fessional fields (the last three aspects feature in many of the other Asian countries’ stated criteria).

Beyond financial and taxation perks and the same medical, pension and other social welfare benefits as Chinese citizens, and work visas for spouses, foreign talent (and family members) are also offered long-term stay visas and the opportunity to become permanent residents.⁵ Other Asian countries (e.g. Hong Kong, Japan and Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) have also adjusted their visa schemes to offer permanent residency and citizenship pathways to high-caliber foreign talent or investors who have resided and contributed to their respective societies for a few years. However, not all countries are interested in foreign talent or wish to offer them settlement opportunities. The efforts of the Indian state, for example, are focused on bringing “persons of Indian origin” home (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006), and while Malaysia and Thailand welcome high-skilled workers, they “do not give settlement to them” (Kaur and Metcalfe 2007).⁶ Notably, Korea is one of the rare countries in Asia that provides for the possibility of dual citizenship.

Not all recruiting countries have achieved their goals of attracting the best and brightest from the rest of the world, especially where English is not the language of business and government. For example, the bulk of foreign talent in Japan comes primarily from the Asian region (almost half are from China, and a large proportion comes from Korea and India) (Oishi 2012), as is the case for Korea. Similarly, Malaysia has been attracting an increasing flow of skilled workers from Southeast Asia – Cambodians, Thais, Vietnamese and Filipinos (Chen and Wong 2015: 73). China has also been more successful at attracting its own talent diaspora home than skilled foreigners (Harvey and Groutsis 2015; Zweig 2006).

Talent retention is another issue. Oishi (2012: 1094) notes that although “Japan has one of the most lenient immigration policies for highly skilled migrants among industrialized countries” (it offers permanent residency potential, fast family reunification and has measures to facilitate integration), there remains “a peculiar disjuncture between immigration policies and the migration outcome”. Oishi identifies the Japanese organizational structure as a major factor: companies are perceived to provide very little opportunity for career advancement for non-Japanese, demand long hours resulting in poor work-life balance and generally have a strong emphasis on group harmony and cooperation.

⁵ See http://www.cas.ac.cn/ggzy/rcpy/brjh/; http://www.1000plan.org/.

⁶ Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia offering settlement to its high-skilled foreign workers (Kaur and Metcalfe 2007).
balance, and the uniqueness of Japanese business practices means that the work experience is not transferable to other countries. In particular, language and cultural gaps are key issues that present problems for work and socializing as well as opportunities for children’s multicultural education. Harvey and Groutsis (2015: 9) point out that “it is not merely understanding the Japanese language…but also understanding the [cultural and social] subtleties and nuances” that hinders professional and social integration (see also Kamibayashi 2006). Thus, as Oishi (2012: 1094) notes, the Japanese case demonstrates that “a large economy and immigration policies alone do not attract sufficient levels of global talent”, let alone retain them.

So what other factors will enhance Asian sites as talent magnets? Studies suggest that it is mainly non-pecuniary factors. Other than the potential for professional and personal growth and development that is transferable to other international settings (Lanvin et al. 2015), a high standard of living and quality of life, including the ability to live an international lifestyle, are also important. As with Japan, Hong Kong’s poor reputation for quality of life has not helped it retain foreign talent (Harvey and Groutsis 2015). Language is also key as it is a necessary condition for communication and narrowing cultural gaps between the foreigner and work colleagues as well as the host society. Thus, Pang (2006) argues that a crucial factor in Singapore’s success in attracting talent is its use of English as the main language of government and business while Wang (2012) contends that even with a common written language, mainland Chinese talent who speak Mandarin struggle to integrate in Hong Kong where Cantonese is spoken extensively. The language of business and government, however, is not something that can be easily changed.

Asian nations could also do more to market themselves to global talent. As Aihwa Ong (2007: 88) argues, “From the perspective of emerging Asia, the metropolis becomes the strategic site for…reaching out to foreign talent while securing national interests.” Foreign talents are attracted to cities and regions rather than countries in Asia: the pull is to Shanghai rather than China; Tokyo rather than Japan; Bangalore, the Silicon Valley of India, rather than the country itself. Asian nations must use “glamorous urban centers” – particularly the megacities which “carry the imprint of enormous state investments” (p.83) – if they are to become more effective “magnets of desire” for foreign talent.

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7 A recent global survey (Expat Insider 2015) found that “although many make more than US$250,000 a year, expats in Hong Kong have plenty to grumble about … Atrocious housing prices, long work hours and difficulty finding a decent school for their kids are among the biggest gripes (http://www.ejinsight.com/20150826-expats-hong-kong-make-loads-cash-aren-t-happy-about-it/).
Questioning the Prize and Price of “Market Citizenship”

There have certainly been benefits gained in Asia from the import of high-caliber foreign talent: continued growth of the economy, the transfer of cutting-edge knowledge and intellectual practice to citizens, global lifestyle conditions as governments develop international class infrastructure and facilities to attract and retain talent. But foreign talent recruitment also raises important dilemmas for host societies. The biggest issue revolves around “equality of access to rights and entitlements” (Ong 2007: 84). Given that nations are now willing “to go so far as to exploit the most sacrosanct resource under their control: the distribution of membership goods, including the valuable ‘prize’ of citizenship” for the “wanted and welcome” (Shachar and Hirsch 2013: 103), this citizenship-for-talent exchange – what Ong (2007) has labelled “market citizenship” – raises questions about the meaning of citizenship and threatens to tear apart the fabric of belonging for locals.

Singapore is a good case in point to further examine the issues. “Singapore’s liberal talent policy has been put under increasing pressure from its electorate” (Chen and Wong 2015: 73) and the resulting tension between citizens and noncitizens has become a central political issue” (Thompson 2014: 315). Heated debates (particularly on online platforms), referencing foreign talent as “Foreign Trash” rather than Talent, and “Permanent Rubbish” rather than Residents (cited in Gomes 2014: 36-38), center on two broad concerns. The first is the extent to which foreign talent impinge on the living conditions of the locals. Unhappiness is often expressed through complaints that the rapid influx of foreign talent places a significant strain on infrastructure, drives up housing, transport and healthcare costs, and increases the competition for jobs. The second area revolves around a politics of identity and is linked to questions of foreign talents’ level of assimilation, integration and loyalty. Probably tied to the notion of international talent as “a [globetrotting] figure who expresses the fundamentally denationalized character of fast-moving capitalism itself”, Singaporeans also question why foreigners should be so easily granted citizenship and permanent residency when “their loyalty to the nation-state is

8 Singapore has been ranked second in the world (after Switzerland) and first in Asia in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index (GTCI) since its first report in 2013. The GTCI is an annual benchmarking report that measures the ability of countries to compete for talent and ranks 118 countries according to their ability to grow, attract and retain talent (http://global-indices.insead.edu/gtci/).

9 Considerable academic literature has analyzed Singaporeans’ angst against foreign talent, particularly since Singapore’s 2011 General Elections revealed how much popular support the ruling party had lost over the issue of new immigrants (see, for example, Gomes 2014; Liu 2014; Thompson 2014; Yeoh and Lin 2013).
uncertain” (Ong 2007: 91). This issue was given particular prominence when Singapore won medals in table tennis at the 2008 and 2012 Olympics. The image of the medallists comprising former citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) struggling with the Malay lyrics of Singapore’s national anthem raised the ire of many and has remained a sensitive issue for Singaporeans.

The situation has not been helped by at least one Olympics medalist’s decision to return to China after retirement, or her confession that “despite living in Singapore for more than 10 years, [she] spoke little English... revealing that she hardly assimilated into Singapore society” (http://www.theindependent.sg/tale-of-2-singaporean-olympic-medalists/). Online discussions around the 2016 Rio Olympics once again drew on-line jibes against naturalized citizen-athletes “pledging faux pride and false allegiance” (online comment cited in Gomes 2014: 38) in exchange for the opportunity to participate in the Olympics (and be financially well-rewarded should they be medalists). The hyper-visibility and symbolism of foreign-born athletes brought in to boost a nation’s medal chances in the international arena unsurprisingly challenges national pride and raises questions about the meaning of citizenship: is it true allegiance or merely an “instrumental bargain” (Shachar and Hirschl 2013: 91)?

The anxiety and anger over the growing numbers of foreign talent in Singapore and its related issues are certainly not unique to Singapore or Asia. What is interesting though is how the discourses of racism and xenophobia in Singapore reveal a strong co-ethnic dimension (unlike the more prevalent white vs non-white discourse in many western countries). The most vitriolic comments have been aimed at talent (and non-talent) from the PRC and to a lesser extent, India (Singapore’s population comprises approximately 75 percent ethnic Chinese and 10 percent ethnic Indians). Singaporean Chinese are at pains to highlight that “[m]ainlanders may look like us but they aren’t like us” and point to many everyday occurrences that demonstrate the differences in mental attitude and make-up, social and cultural customs and practices, levels of allegiance and the like (Liu, 2014: 1229).

A similar co-ethnic politics of identity can be observed in Hong Kong’s foreign talent landscape. Wang (2012) found that mainland Chinese are regarded as “alien threats to Hong Kong’s social, economic and moral stability”; as a result, despite apparent ethnic and cultural similarities (and absence of visible signs of difference of race and skin color) with the ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong, PRC talents face distrust and discrimination in the workplace and in larger society because of perceived cultural distances. Ironically, expatriates from the West often find themselves enjoying “white privilege” and “positive racism” in many Asian countries (including the Chinese-dominated societies of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan), who are more likely to be “warmly welcomed as ‘global talents’ and perceived as ‘superior others’ who can benefit the economic development and cultural enrichment of the country” (Lan 2011: 9).
Conclusion

Despite the image of the unfettered skilled cosmopolitan, able to move freely in response to demands for his or her talents, and able to feel at home anywhere in the world, pathways to entry and citizenship are still the prerogative of national governments. Further, beyond the governance structures imposed by states, global mobility has a human face (Favell et al. 2006) and is influenced by migrants’ everyday experiences on the ground. Depending on race, nationality, qualifications and so on, flows of talents will shrink or swell according to the degree they are welcomed by the societies that attempt to bring them in.

“Asia is an under-researched region in the context of talent management and regulation”

Moving forward, how will Asian economies keep up in the intensifying competition for talent in order to maintain a competitive edge in the global economy? According to Zheng et al (2008: 3), this is a battle that “has been waged most brutally” between Asia’s “Tigers” (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) and “Dragons” (Singapore and Taiwan). Some have suggested that one way is to compete as a region through developing inter-governmental agreements and/or regional accords to reduce barriers to movement (Abella 2006). In Southeast Asia, the eleven members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC) have moved towards this, agreeing to, *inter alia*, “standardize the issuance of employment passes across member countries to facilitate the free flow of skilled labour.” However, in a region where the levels of economic development are so varied, some fear that such “an open door policy towards talent movement will be a zero-sum game”, with disproportionate benefits for the high-income ASEAN members while impoverishing lower-income neighbors (Chen and Wong 2015: 69).

The increasing prevalence of the talent-for-citizenship strategy also has implications for understanding the contours of citizenship in Asia. As Shachar and Hirschl note: while “provid[ing] an easy-pass to membership for those with extraordinary talent may bring significant returns for recruiting nations in the short term... in the long run it may transform, indeed possibly erode, our current understandings of membership and mobility, requiring us to think hard about the ethical and distributive ramifications for the receiving country’s population as for ‘standard’ immigration applicants who cannot boost a country’s level of extraordinary talent” (2013: 104). Given that Asia is an under-researched region in the context of talent management and regulation (Harvey and Groutsis 2015: 2), future research on talent mobility in Asia will have much to contribute to how we theorize migration and citizenship.
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International Student Mobility in Asia and the Prospect of Citizenship

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Introduction

Over the last two decades there has been a remarkable growth in the number of international students studying at institutions around the world. In 2013 there were 4.5 million students studying outside of their country of origin, an increase of nearly 250% since 1990 when there were only 1.3 million (OECD 2015). While this movement of students is not altogether new, the recent rapid growth is striking and raises questions about the impacts of international education, the place of students in society, and the relationship between education, migration and citizenship. What has generated this growth in student mobility? While there is a vast range of influences on student mobility, scholars observe there has been a growing emphasis globally on the importance of higher education and concomitant pressure on gaining distinction for young people (Brooks and Waters 2011; Cairns 2014). In many countries, and this is particularly notable in China, India, South Korea and other countries in Asia, the number of people gaining tertiary qualifications has grown massively over recent decades, leading to increasing competition in graduate labour markets. One response to this amongst middle class families has been to pursue overseas education as a form of distinction that is perceived to carry substantial economic benefits for students.

“International student mobility... overlaps considerably with labor migration and long term settlement”

International student mobility also needs to be viewed as a type of migration that overlaps considerably with labor migration and long term settlement (Raghuram 2013). Throughout the twentieth century this was apparent in the ways that US colleges and universities supported by open immigration policies attracted students who graduated to become workers, residents and then citizens. Similar processes occurred in the UK where Commonwealth students undertook study which sometimes transformed into other forms of migration (Madge et al. 2009). In the contemporary context too, there is evidence that international student mobility is only sometimes restricted to the acquisition of university qualifications and can also be linked to plans for work, aspirations to settle or an interest in onward migration (Robertson 2013).

The value of overseas education and its flow through effects for migration has historically been most apparent in Western contexts, particularly the United States but also several European colonial centers (Brooks and Waters 2011). This is reflected in

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the rather uneven geography of international student mobility. In 2000, for example, the United States hosted 28% of all globally mobile students, and a combined 55% studied in only four countries: US, UK, Germany, and France (UNESCO 2017). In 2016, while the absolute number of students in the US grew it now represents 25% of global totals and those same four countries host 51%. By contrast, a greater proportion of students study in Asia, including in China (397,635), Japan (152,062), Singapore (65,200), South Korea (82,000), and Taiwan (55,463).¹

There are some particularities to international student mobility in Asia that are important to note. The first is that the movement of students is overwhelmingly intra-regional, so much so that in South Korea and Japan students from Asia exceed 90% and those from China constitute two-thirds of all students (UNESCO 2017). Similarly, most “cross-border” students in Hong Kong are from mainland China (Gao 2014), whereas in Singapore there is a more diverse student population that is still nonetheless dominated by students from China, India and the ASEAN region (Gribble and McBurnie 2015). Diaspora groups can also be prominent, with ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet republics being substantial in South Korea and Overseas Chinese making up around half of all international students in Taiwan (Ma 2014).

Secondly, unlike their Anglophone peers, universities in Asia have not primarily recruited international students as part of revenue generating exercises aligned with the export of education. Indeed, many universities and nations in Asia offer scholarships at much higher rates than elsewhere and generally international students pay similar tuition fees to domestic students. International student mobility has instead been articulated directly into knowledge economy discourses that place a premium on the achievement of “world class status” in the making of diverse campus spaces (Sidhu et al. 2016) and in internationalization of curricula (Phan 2016). At the national scale, international students are also often seen as “talent-in-the-making”, as future human capital that can address the concerns in advanced Asian economies about low fertility rates and ageing societies (Shin and Choi 2015). Hosting international students, then, forms part of what Huang (this issue) refers to as “the global war for talent” in which governments seek strategies for attracting and retaining highly skilled individuals including through privileged pathways to citizenship.

Talent-in-the-Making

Over the last ten years I have been working with colleagues in Singapore, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan on the dynamics of international student mobility and the globalization higher education. We have observed the ways universities have reconfigured themselves in response to globalization and traced the biographies of ¹ These national level statistics are derived from the following sources: China and Japan (Institute of International Education 2016); Singapore (Ong 2015); South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2016); Taiwan (Study in Taiwan 2014).
students moving through these spaces (Collins et al. 2016; Sidhu et al. 2016; Yeoh 2014). Our research did not initially extend to questions of citizenship but we note that the growing numbers of students and their prominence in knowledge economy discourses demand greater attention on migration aspirations and the manner these articulate with state conceptions of desirable citizens. We have observed a growing similarity in discourses around the competition for students as human capital but also considerable unevenness in the ways that these discourses manifest around national, regional and global notions of citizenship.

The accent on international students as future talent and citizens has been nowhere more evident than in Singapore, where the state has situated higher education and highly-skilled migration as key components in transforming the city-state’s economy (Collins et al. 2014). Established in 2002, the *Global Schoolhouse* project captures key dimensions of the role of student mobility. As the Minister for Trade and Industry described it, the aims have been “first, for the education sector to be an engine of economic growth; second, to build industry-relevant manpower capabilities for the economy; and third, to help attract, develop and retain talent for the economy” (Lim, 2012). Most notable within the wide array of initiatives has been the provision of scholarships for high-performing international students from as young as 15 years old, through pre-tertiary and university study with the expectation that they will remain in Singapore following graduation (Yang 2016). Many of these scholarship holders have come from ASEAN and China, but it is noteworthy that many more international students also self-fund their study and are encouraged to work following graduation and seek residence and citizenship status. As Sidhu et al. (2011: 32) argue, these initiatives contribute to a “re-modelling the institution of citizenship, with those who can provide intellectual capital for the development of the city-state enjoying entitlements and accommodations above and beyond that of its citizens.”

Other Asian nations have established similar policies that favor international students as potential human capital. In South Korea, for example, it has been claimed that “foreign students can potentially provide Korean society and companies with valuable resources” (Shin and Choi 2015: 35) that can address future demographic decline, create social capital that links Korean students and their peers from the Asian region, and capitalises on “foreign students as transnational bridges” to support the expansion of Korean economic activity. The government, corporations and universities provide extensive scholarships and have also established a graduation pathway so that students
can gain job search visas, professional work visas and then apply for permanent residence and potentially citizenship in the future. Similarly, Japan has become more aggressive during the last decade in the way policies link the recruitment of international students to the need to attract highly skilled migrants (Oishi 2012). The current immigration points system provides extra points for fluent Japanese and completion of a Japanese qualification on the basis that such individuals will have better labor market success (Burgess 2015). While China has not yet focused on recruiting international students as potential citizens (Zhang 2016), their efforts to encourage the return of Chinese students from abroad follows similar logics linking globalizing higher education and mobility with current and future needs for high skilled labor (see Huang this issue).

**National, Regional or Global Citizenship?**

The success of strategies for retaining international students need to be understood in relation to the socio-cultural contexts students move through and their own capacity to imagine futures in the countries they study in. It is often assumed that international students are ideally positioned to be future migrants given their high levels of mobility and varied education. Indeed, international students “appear to be archetypal ‘transmigrants’; travelling frequently over national borders, living for an extended period of time in one country whilst maintaining significant ties (emotional, social, material) to another, and embodying a “cosmopolitan sensibility” that often includes simultaneous proficiency in more than one language and culture” (Waters and Brooks 2012: 22). It is exactly this conception of the international student that informs the imaginaries of policymakers who design new pathways to citizenship and see students as individuals who can move smoothly through these opportunities.

While international students have been discursively constructed as ideal highly skilled migrants, the actualisation of these imperatives have been much more uneven. In South Korea and Japan where notions of ethnic homogeneity run deeply through the institution of citizenship there has not been widespread naturalization or even take-up of residency opportunities (Shin and Choi 2015; Liu-Farrer 2011). In some instances this has related to rather ad-hoc application of eligibility criteria (Burgess 2015) but it also reveals reluctance on the part of graduates. In her study of Chinese students in Japan, for example, Liu-Farrer (2011) found that while many acquire residency rights to access jobs very few wanted Japanese citizenship given that neither China nor Japan allow dual nationality. Similarly, in our study of alumni from Asian universities (Collins et al. 2016), we found evidence of cross-border mobility, employment and long-term residence but little sense that graduates change nationalities. Even in Singapore, which has arguably been the most successful at linking stu-

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dent and other forms of migration to citizenship, popular disquiet saw the government cap international student numbers and somewhat mute its advocacy for more migration following the 2011 election (Tan 2011).

One of the key concerns surrounding the potential of international students as future citizens relates to their educational experiences and the implications this has for after-study lives. Students are often presumed to have a unique opportunity to learn about the country they are studying in. While this is no doubt always the case to some degree, one effect of the globalization of higher education is growing similarities in curriculum and even medium of instruction. In several countries in Asia, English-medium courses are becoming common as part of efforts to attract international students and are altering classroom dynamics and opportunities for cultural learning (Phan 2016). In such contexts, international students may well be more privileged but they may also be less motivated to learn local languages and to build relationships with domestic peers (Li 2015). Indeed, there is growing research in Asian contexts that suggests that international and domestic students have difficulty building friendships (Moon 2016). While this does not differ from findings in western contexts, it can be compounded by the use of non-local languages in classrooms to create situations where individuals have greater affiliation with regional and global contexts than with the nations they study in (Sidhu et al. 2016). As students become graduates, then, they can see their country of education as a “transition point rather than a destination” (Gao 2014: 223).

There is also considerable unevenness in the opportunities available to international students as they graduate, a factor that can trump any desire to seek citizenship. In the well-developed migration context of Singapore, international students can acquire work visas relatively quickly and encounter a highly globalised labor market where bilingualism and international experience are highly valued (Yang 2016). While not all will necessarily become residents and citizens, pathways exist for progression. By contrast, entry into the labor market in more ethnically homogenous contexts like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan can be more challenging (Liu-Farrer 2011). While students have skills that are of value, they do not have exposure to the kinds of networks necessary for progression. Employers are also less familiar with the processes involved in hiring graduating international students and can be hesitant about their capacity in the workplace (Shin and Choi 2015). Without appropriate career pathways, international students with freshly minted global qualifications are likely to look elsewhere, bypassing even the most privileged pathways to citizenship that government’s offer.
Conclusion: noncitizen futures?

Despite the rhetoric surrounding international students as ideal human capital and future citizens, the pathway from international study to graduation, work and then citizenship is far from certain. Perhaps this should not be surprising given that international study is known to cultivate not only familiarity with local contexts but also wider interests in the world (Cairns 2014). International students can become more mobile through their studies, imagining themselves as regional and even global citizens in ways that make the acquisition of citizenship only instrumental. They are more likely to work for periods of time in countries of education while postponing or leaving open future plans. There is also a pull from home, both from family and social obligations but also in relation to career opportunities where the value of international qualifications may appear greater (Fong 2011). In this context, Asian nations seeking to retain international students as future citizens may struggle in the short term, especially those countries like China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan that do not have notable immigration histories and where citizenship is closely linked to ethnicity.

Perhaps a more apt focus for studies of international student mobility, then, is growing levels of noncitizenship. If the growth in student numbers in many Asian countries does not involve clear pathways to citizenship and social inclusion, then the presence for study, work and residence of these students represents part of a growing trend towards temporary forms of migration (Robertson 2013). Many privileged international students may not view lack of status as a problem as they imagine internationally mobile careers or rely on the presumption of the return home. However, as student mobility increases in Asia, there has also been a growth in mobile students from more modest backgrounds undertaking degrees that are more likely to be described as ‘mediocre’ (Phan 2016). They are unlikely to be viewed as positively by nation states and their prospects for rights claiming through work and residence will be limited by the value ascribed to their qualifications. The growing normalization of this pattern of life “where access to basic political rights is precarious and insecure” (Tambakaki 2015: 922) should raise questions about the widespread promotion by policy makers and scholars of globalizing higher education and its linkages with migration and citizenship. While such claims are often tinged with notions of inclusion and the promise of knowledge economy, it is clear that such possibilities are not always easily achieved and as such also run the risk of more variegated and exclusive forms of citizenship and nation-building.
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Citizenship Struggles in/and the Family: Neoliberalism and (Im)migrants in Pacific Asia
By Nobue Suzuki, Chiba University

Migrants and Citizenship in the Family Context

In 2011, Dolores,¹ an (im)migrant Filipina in Japan fell ill after working hard for many years in order to financially support her families in Japan and the Philippines. As she is a single parent with minor children, her supporters at a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Tokyo requested that her birth family looked after her in the Philippines. Callously, the family responded, “Who is she?” In 2016, Totong, who had lived as a musician in Okinawa, Japan, since the 1950s, was hospitalized due to age-related health problems. He returned to the Philippines with hopes of being cared for by his family but hurriedly returned to Okinawa when rebuffed. When he saw me at the hospital, Totong could only repeat in anguished tones, “What happened to my family?” After receiving support from Dolores and Totong for long years, their families were quick to deny them family membership and refused their expectations of receiving care. These developments among Filipinos – who are thought to value reciprocity (utang na loob) and subscribe to the importance of maintaining relationships between people, especially family members – raise significant issues regarding citizenship in/and the family.

For nearly 30 years, I have dealt with Filipino (im)migrants in Japan and one thing that has kept haunting me is the gap between the idea(l)s and the realities of “the Filipino family.” When asked the question, “What are the characteristics of Filipinos?” Filipinos will likely say, “the family!” or “strong family ties!” As a longstanding institution, the family does in fact offer a “haven” where people, including migrants, anchor their roots and leave their hearts. However, as illustrated above, the lived experiences of the family among Filipinos in Japan, especially when their lives overseas extend over long stretches of time, reveal more complicated, and sometimes vexing, relationships.

In order to understand their experiences, I explore the concept of citizenship as practiced in the family. I do this by giving heed to Filipino (im)migrants’ feelings of their sense of belonging and entitlements as expressed in the minutiae of their everyday lives in the Philippines and Japan, amidst the workings of the institutions and states concerned. The ethnographic data used in this essay are those I have collected in urban Japan since the late 1980s.

¹ All names are pseudonyms.

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“studies of citizenship involving global migration have…given little attention to considering the way citizenship is negotiated within the domestic sphere”

Although many scholars (e.g., of domestic violence) have shown that intimate relationships can become a site of threat and/or burden, studies of citizenship involving global migration have thus given little attention to considering the way citizenship is negotiated within the domestic sphere. This paucity may be attributed to the conceptualization that citizenship presumes the state and/or other “public” entities, which are customarily contrasted with the family, a “private” entity. The family is, however, not merely private but the foremost social institution into which individuals are incorporated as members. This is especially so in Asia, where collectivity weighs more heavily in importance than in the West, and the family as a social site has immense significance, though it should also be remembered that such generalizations are not without change (Chang and Turner 2012).

In many countries around the world, the family is recognized as the foundation of the nation, and as stated in Article XV of its Constitution, the Philippines is not an exception. Meanwhile, Japan’s present regime is trying to fortify the role of the family by amending the Japanese Constitution to suit the neoliberal agenda. Given the weakness of welfare schemes in the Philippines and their erosion in Japan, membership in the family today has become increasingly important for people’s basic life needs and rights claims in and across both countries.

Concurrently, ongoing social conditions have generated a tendency to measure one’s worthiness based on market values (Somers 2008). The family too has come to disenfranchise previously taken-for-granted rights, entitlements, and belonging and now increasingly demands “worthy” participation of individual members. Indeed, economics have constituted essential dimensions of intimate relationships (Zelizer 2005) and people with fewer resources today may have to face harsh realities such as the loss of their citizenship in the family realm. One of my Filipina informants thus poignantly told me, “If you have money in the Philippines, all your relatives will take care of you. Don’t go home if you don’t have money!”

Many of the Filipinos I have come to know in Japan have hence intensely struggled to retain and earn citizenship in their families back home. This has engendered constant negotiation and participation: e.g., regularly telephoning, sending large remittances to, and making important decisions for family members back home. As illustrated above, despite active communication with their families in the Philippines, some families still exclude certain members and deny the latter’s rights claims. In other cases, (im)migrants distance themselves from their respective families and try to seek an alternative “family” elsewhere. Indeed, family citizenship is not simply granted upon birth but fluctuates with time according to members’ multidimensional personal attributes, life
While Filipino families are not monolithic and long distance relationships in particular can range greatly in the support provided to/from overseas members, this essay focuses on more negative and disconcerting instances for two reasons. First, these cases provide new insights into the studies of citizenship within the “private” sphere. Second, where global migration has stretched across decades as in the case of the Philippines, the emergence of adverse relationships and situations deserve scholarly attention with a view to inform policy considerations.

In the following, I first provide a historical glimpse of Filipino migration to Japan as background for the present discussion. I then introduce an important dimension in understanding the motivations for Filipinas’ migration decision-making, illustrating this with an example of a Filipina’s subjective experience of her citizenship being denied by her natal family in the Philippines. This section also shows that citizenship struggles within the family are influenced by the economic condition of her family, the workings of religion, gender and sexuality, as well as the labor export policy of the Philippines. A subsequent section discusses citizenship negotiations along (im)migrants’ changing life stages and family relationships over the extended time that Filipinos have resided in Japan. Of significance here are the long absence of face-to-face interactions among family members, the citizenship laws in the host society, and the ongoing neoliberal practices underlying (im)migrants’ struggles for citizenship claims.

Filipino Migration to Japan

While Filipino migration to Japan since the 19th century has involved members of the political elite, professionals, and other individuals, the numerically dominant group of Filipino (im)migrants has been entertainers. From the turn of the 20th century to the early post-World War II era, male Filipinos, such as jazz performers like Totong, led the music scene in mainland Japan and U.S.-occupied Okinawa (1945-1972) (Suzuki 2017). As Japan became a world economic power in the 1970s, this flow was replaced by women entertainers, most of whom worked in nightlife industries as hostesses and sex-related workers. At the peak in the mid-2000s, there were 80,000 Filipinas with entertainer visas entering Japan. A significant number developed affective relationships with Japanese men and gave birth, either within or outside of marriage, to children of mixed heritage and varied legal statuses. The influx of Filipina entertainers was abruptly ended in 2005 after the United States asserted – with little substantiation – that this kind of entertainment was a foil for human trafficking. However, corollaries of their migration and sexual liaisons continue to this day.

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In June 2016, the vast majority (85 percent) of registered Filipino residents in Japan (237,103) held permanent, spouse-or-child, or long-term visas – the last of which are commonly issued to foreigners who are divorced from their Japanese spouses but are custodians of minor Japanese-national children (Ministry of Justice 2016). About three quarters of all registered Filipinos are women. These numbers suggest that most of the recent Filipino (im)migrants in Japan are/were intimately associated with local men.

Roots of International Migration

Despite widespread representation of Filipina entertainers in Japan’s nightlife scenes as sex workers, many actually worked as hostesses providing feminized affective labor involving flirting gestures. Nevertheless, the image that emerges from the nature of night work in bars, the provision of services catering to foreign men, and their ability to bring home relatively large sums of money – partly due to exchange rates – has cast these young women as moral villains in Catholic (and Muslim) Philippines. Why then did tens of thousands of Filipinas decide to go to Japan? One reason, *inter alia*, lies in that while still in the Philippines, many of these women had experienced rape, spouses'/lovers' violence, desertion or divorce, and/or single motherhood. Although Filipinos’ sexual attitudes have become more liberalized today, the women I interviewed between the 1990s and 2000s lived at the time when Filipinos generally supported the religious ideals of virgin marriage and devoted motherhood. Women’s (assumed) sexual engagements outside of idealized conditions became a source of family shame as well as a burden, particularly for the poor. Having lost their sexual value in their home society and sometimes becoming targets of ostracism at home and in the community, these women opted for migration as a means out of diminished marital prospects and an insecure life. Farah’s case illustrates these.

Farah was 12 years old (in the late-1960s) when her father died. She immediately began working for her family. Soon after, she was raped and gave birth to a child at age 13. This incident not only made Farah an embarrassment to her family under the gaze of the community but also a burden by adding an extra mouth to be fed. Living in an impoverished rented home, Farah’s brothers and especially their wives viciously bullied Farah in contradiction to the ideals of an all-inclusive family sanctified by the state and the church. In order to escape from verbal and physical abuses that Farah felt were “killing” her, she stayed out all weekend nights. Like many other Filipinas, especially those from underprivileged backgrounds, who felt that their right to belong in their respective families had been revoked, Farah took her chances in participating in the already well-established infrastructure for international migration in the Philippines in the 1980s. Having become sexually active, by force or otherwise, Japan’s then wide-open entertainment industry was, even if morally risky, attractive to these women who had
been disenfranchised from their religious, gender, sexual, and economic statuses. Likewise, such marginalization has similarly subjected other women from China, Korea, Thailand, and elsewhere who have made use of entertainer or tourist visas or commercially arranged marriage schemes to migrate to Japan and to other destinations in the Pacific Asian region.

**Childbirth, Legal Challenge, and Boomerang Effects**

Working in the nightlife industry, providing affective labor to (drunken) men, dealing with their own personal feelings of homesickness and desires for affection, as well as awareness of the legal, economic, and social (in)securities tied to their visa status have all led many of these Filipinas to enter into sexual relationships with their male customers and others. Many are married to this day, but others have been deserted with children born out of wedlock. Japan observes *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) and the marriage institution is one crucial imprimatur to determine one’s nationality (Nationality Law Article 3(1)). Originally, children born to unmarried foreign mothers are not granted Japanese nationality and legal citizenship unless the parents marry before the child’s birth or unless the father prenatally recognizes the child. Postpartum recognition was not honored. As the number of these children rose, ten mothers with support from NGOs sued Japan on their children’s behalf. They won the case in 2008 and since then, such children – regardless of their place of residence, whether in Japan or the Philippines – were able, if certain conditions are met, to claim their Japanese nationality from birth. However, this legal victory has ironically borne boomerang effects: some of the “new Japanese” youths “returning” from the Philippines to their “homeland” on the premise of newly acquired legal citizenship face exploitation and infringements of other substantive citizenship rights (Suzuki 2010, 2015a, 2015b).

Firstly, their new “homeland” Japan adheres both to the postwar ideology of being an ethnically homogenous nationhood based on the unity of race, culture, and language and to policies reinforcing non-immigration statehood (with the exception of highly skilled workers). Moreover, as a prime example of a capitalist developmental state, the country tends to protect its labor market, in this case, for “pure” Japanese. This is not moderated by broader humanitarian policies as Asia lacks a regional political body (such as the European Union) that would ideally promote such policies. Consequently, the newcomer, culturally-Filipino youths must navigate their lives in Japan by their own resources, with some support from local, makeshift (and underfunded) support pro-
grams where available. This situation has widened the gap between nationality and citizenship. Secondly, making use of such young people’s newly recognized Japanese nationality, some labor brokers have practically trafficked them to Japan, with or without their mothers, and have forced them into undesirable occupations (National Police Agency 2016). There have also been cases where some mothers take advantage of their “Japanese” children to earn money for themselves and their families in Japan. Unlike the brokers, these women are often motivated in part because of their marginal status linked to their sex-worker image, age, and illiteracy in Japanese writing, as well as the fact that they have few marketable skills in the Japan’s labor market.

Let me give the example of a Japanese-Filipino youth called Aiko, who grew up in the Philippines and who, when she reached her early teens, insisted on living with her mother, Norma, in Japan. Upon Aiko’s arrival, Norma reluctantly sent her to local schools as education for the first nine years in Japan was compulsory, but refused to pay for high school. Instead, when Aiko turned the legal marriageable age of 16, Norma forced Aiko, her only child, to enter into a paper marriage with a Filipino tourist in order to receive money from the man. Aiko felt that this permanently soiled her Japanese family registry – the records of which remain for life – and that, to this day, she had been prevented from marrying someone of her choice. Moreover, Norma took then teenage Aiko to the nightclub where Norma was working and had Aiko serve customers. Aiko, like Norma, also learned to take drugs. Although Aiko had today left Norma, though not of her own choosing, and quit illicit activities, she continued to feel that she had lost her rights to be loved and nurtured by her mother, to become better educated and to achieve a securer life, and to be free from forced marriage, labor, and illegal activities. With no other reliable family to depend on, Aiko continued to suffer from the trauma of not being accepted by her birth mother.

Citizenship in/and the Family

Underlying the actions and predicaments of young migrants and their families discussed here is the lack of governmental efforts, in both countries, to support diverse citizenships, including people’s subjective feelings of dignity as seen from their positions as minor children, women, and culturally-foreign people. This lack of support can have devastating consequences for them, in part because literacy in the Japanese language, one of the most fundamental tools for successfully navigating society for migrants, is difficult to acquire. While (legal) foreign residents as a whole have benefitted from state social welfare and various other assistance offered by NGOs and volunteers, Filipinos have nevertheless been identified as one of the most underprivileged (im)migrant groups in Japan, experiencing the cycle of poverty more than other groups. Their economic hardships – together with ubiquitous xenophobic, sexist, and class-based discriminations against them – seem to have led many to betray family values they would
otherwise adhere to as a means to consolidate a sense of belonging and social rights. Under these adverse circumstances, some mothers have enacted generational and ideological superiority over their Japanese-national children and placed the youngsters in a "race to the bottom" within the family. As a consequence, some of these youths have, more so than their mothers, experienced the stripping away of their entitlements, membership, dignity at home and in society, and hopes for social mobility.

"as neoliberal practices produce numerous second-class citizens...citizenship struggles within (im)migrant families may become increasingly observed in many other localities"

Under these challenging circumstances, numerous (im)migrants wish to demonstrate their self-worth by financially and materially contributing to their families back home or in both societies. Yet, under the current political-economic climate, when devoted family contributors, like Dolores and Totong, show signs of potentially becoming burdens on their beneficiaries in the Philippines (and in Japan), the latter may turn their backs on their (overseas) family members, disenfranchising their family citizenship.

The conflicted articulations of public nation-state citizenship and private familial citizenship are, under the intensifying conditions of global neoliberalism, made ever more precarious for the people I have discussed above. Filipinos’ migration roots in the Philippines and working lives in Japan, as well as Japan’s idiosyncratic body politic, have accordingly inflected with citizenship experiences among Filipinos and their “Japanese” children. Given few recourses, (im)migrants’ struggles to achieve citizenship in Japan have led some to prey on weaker, including both young and aging, family members whose citizenship within the family is thus put at risk. These circumstances may, unfortunately, intensify as the graying of the (im)migrant population accelerates in the near future. Looking globally, as neoliberal practices produce numerous second-class citizens even among local nationals who in turn myopically blame (im)migrants, such citizenship struggles within (im)migrant families may become increasingly observed in many other localities in the wake of diminished and endangered citizenships.

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Against Migrant Containment: Social Inequality and Claims for Citizenship in South Korea

By Hae Yeon Choo, University of Toronto Mississauga

Temporary Migration Regimes and Migrant Rights in Asia

Questions of migrant rights and membership are at the core of global politics today, challenging the terms of national membership. As the boundaries of nation-states become increasingly fraught terrain and growing numbers of noncitizens reside side by side with citizens, new struggles around rights and citizenship have emerged. On the one hand, these trends have provided a political impetus to extend citizenship rights to migrants; on the other, they have intensified anti-immigrant sentiments and social inequalities.

Scholars in the field of citizenship studies have discussed the emergence of “postnational citizenship,” in which rights and provisions that were previously limited to citizens based on membership in a nation-state are now extended to noncitizen residents based on universal personhood and human rights (Soysal 1994). Aptly captured in the slogan, “No One Is Illegal,” the international appeal to human rights principles has produced a glimpse of such promises, partly due to the long-standing mobilization of migrant justice organizations worldwide. In the case of South Korea, a primary site of my research, migrant advocacy organizations have made significant gains for the labor and social rights of migrant workers as a matter of human rights. Such efforts have included building a network to provide subsidized health care for undocumented migrants who are unable to benefit from the national health insurance.

Although these significant achievements are the hard-won fruit of migrant advocacy efforts, they reflect only a small part of the contemporary migrant experience. The nation-state retains the exclusive power of sovereignty to determine borders and terms of membership (Bloemraad 2004; Menjivar 2006), demonstrating highly visible markers of state power through deportation (De Genova 2011). In the recent case of the United States, a controversial and odious travel ban from select Muslim majority countries functions as an extreme measure of border control.

Migrant exclusion also operates in less visible and dramatic forms, through the state’s legal and institutional measures that preclude migrant settlement and deepen migrant precarity by creating a particular class of temporary labor migrants (Constable 2014; Lan 2007). These forms of temporary labor migration are on the rise, even in immigrant nations such as Canada and Australia that formerly accepted migrants predominantly as future citizens, and work to intensify the state of “transience” that characterizes the contemporary migration regime (Walia 2010; Walsh 2014).

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
Distinct from the United States or Western Europe – where migrant settlement is still possible, albeit limited – migration regimes in Asia are characterized by a higher degree of exclusion of labor migrants, except limited cases of highly skilled professionals. It was an uphill battle, for instance, for the Filipina women in my study to build a home in South Korea under a system that deterred migrants’ settlement, or to realize their wish for transnational mobility to a country higher in the global hierarchy of nations. These new forms of migration pose a serious challenge to migration scholarship, as they cannot be explained through the frame of immigrant assimilation that dominates in the United States, or through the Western European frame of migrant incorporation and “postnational citizenship.”

Labor and Marriage Migration in South Korea

Migration in South Korea is part of a broader trend of inter-Asian labor and marriage migration that is increasing in scale and significance. The 1980s witnessed neoliberal reforms and the transition to a post-socialist economy, combined with deepening inequality and weakening social security in countries like China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. This provided the conditions for emigration from what sociologist Robyn Rodriguez (2010) called “labor brokerage states.” Around the same time, the economic ascendancy of the “Four Asian Tigers” – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong – as well as the Gulf states, made these countries attractive new migrant destinations, especially as the doors to historical receiving countries such as the United States, Canada, and Britain were rapidly closing.

My book *Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea* (Stanford University Press, 2016) examines the global politics of temporary labor migration, through a comparative examination of three groups of Filipina women in South Korea: factory workers, wives of South Korean men, and hostesses at American military camptown clubs. Through an in-depth study of labor and marriage migration in South Korea as a case of migrant regimes in Asia, the book illuminates how social inequalities of gender, race, class, and nation operate on a global scale in the making of citizenship.

*Decentering Citizenship* moves investigations of migrant rights beyond the realm of law and policy to examine day-to-day interactions and contestation among the state, migrant, and civil society actors in the receiving nation-state of South Korea. Despite their shared life trajectories in the Philippines and the common experiences of migrant exclusion in South Korea, the three groups of Filipina migrant women in my study were included (and excluded) from full and equal membership in South Korea in very different
ways. This unfolded not according to their legal status, but rather through the organization of their work, the mobilization of the migrant community and South Korean civil society, and the symbolic and moral boundaries that distinguished them from “respectable” citizens. Through vivid descriptions of how these three groups of migrants negotiated and challenged what I call the regime of migrant containment, utilizing the discourses of human rights, labor rights, and gendered victimhood, Decentering Citizenship shows that the making of rights and citizenship is fundamentally an interactive process.

Making and Challenging the Regime of Migrant Containment

At the heart of the making of migrant containment lies a global system of temporary labor migration – a legal and institutionalized mechanism of using the bodies and labor of people without offering them full membership and rights. Most Filipina migrant women I met in South Korea were deeply embedded in this global system, and had been for some time. Many were “guest-workers” long before they travelled to South Korea, working as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong, factory workers in Taiwan, and hostesses in Japan. Although their labor is a desired commodity across the globe, their presence is allowed only on a short-term basis, contingent on their employment and without the possibility of permanent settlement. Their presence is rendered “illegal” after the contract expires.

Under this system, migrants are not excluded wholesale, but instead face a condition of containment, a mode of governing through fear that confines them within certain physical and social boundaries. The most notable mechanism for maintaining the containment, in my research in South Korea, was the on-the-ground practices of immigration raids. On the surface, immigration raids seem to have a simple purpose – that of regulating legal status and deporting those who lack documents in the host country. However, how the immigration raids were conducted reveal a more complex picture.

If the immigration office wanted to deport the vast majority of undocumented migrants in South Korea, it would certainly be possible, given that it was an open secret that undocumented migrants are concentrated in migrant segregated neighborhoods in industrial, working-class towns across the country. Yet the raids I observed frequently targeted the borders of these neighborhoods, creating a condition of physical containment of migrants. As long as migrants were working in low-wage jobs in the area and staying invisible to the eyes of the South Korean public, their presence was tolerated. Tellingly, the raids also selectively targeted migrants who transgress
socially, such as those who are seen to be questioning their role as “just a worker.” This includes those who took leadership roles in the Migrant Trade Union or demanded child support from the American GI boyfriends who deserted them.

When such physical and social boundaries were crossed, the immigration raids easily targeted those who phenotypically do not look like ethnic Koreans, such as those from South Asia and Southeast Asia. This includes naturalized citizens who have darker skin tones – such as marriage migrants who enter South Korea with a spousal visa and have eligibility to apply for permanency and naturalization.

Consider Joohyun, a Vietnamese migrant woman who married a South Korean factory worker and immigrated to South Korea with a spousal visa. Joohyun changed her name to a Korean-sounding one. One evening, when she was buying vegetables at the open market, a man wearing a beige jacket suddenly grabbed her arms from behind. Startled, Joohyun thought she was being robbed or, worse, kidnapped. She cried out for help, but the people in the market just walked by. It turned out that her assailant was an undercover immigration officer, and her “foreign” look made her a target. Although she was freed after the document check, the fear she experienced that day scarred her. From that day forward, Joohyun avoided public places whenever she could unless she was with her husband.

From the perspective of the South Korean state, marriage migrant women are called upon as a separate and distinctive group from labor migrants, namely as “multi-cultural families,” and become a subject of intensive immigrant integration programs as mothers of Korean children. The realities of their migrant lives as racialized others in South Korea, however, rupture the categorical division between labor and marriage migration. As Nicola Piper and Minna Roces (2003) rightfully pointed out, the distinction between “wife or worker” is a precarious one, as marriage migrants are an integral part of the ethnically organized migrant community in South Korea through kinship ties and labor market connections. Although the official purpose of the immigration raids was to deport people without legal residency status, its practice on the ground exposes a second dimension, namely to contain migrants – undocumented or otherwise, labor or marriage migrants – in segregated spaces out of public sight, and put them under surveillance and control under the global system of migrant containment.

Decentering Citizenship follows the on-the-ground struggles of migrants and South Korean advocates as a site of challenging the condition of migrant containment; in so doing, these actors remake citizenship. From a migrant rights march chanting “Don't Call Us Illegals,” to direct confrontation with employers about wage theft, migrant
groups and advocates contested the conditions of containment by deploying rights and citizenship claims in markedly gendered ways.

“the paradox of migrant containment – using people’s labor and bodies, without full rights and membership”

The successful mobilization of migrant advocacy groups and the migrant community in South Korea significantly expanded migrants’ labor and social rights over the past two decades. However, access to rights in South Korea is distributed unevenly across different groups of migrants, who are affected by the dynamics of intersecting social inequalities. For instance, migrant factory workers were able to exercise greater labor and social rights based on claims around the dignity of workers as worker-citizens, whereas migrant hostesses working in a feminized labor sector were largely excluded, gaining only a modicum of support as women victims in need of protection.

In the claims for migrant workers’ rights, the dignity accorded to paid labor has been an important discursive resource, which was highly effective given the long-standing connection between work and citizenship globally (Gordon and Lenhardt 2008) and the strong legacy of labor rights struggles in South Korea. Struggles for migrant rights fought in terms of the dignity of workers leave out other sectors of migration, namely sectors that do not offer the same level of societal and moral standing. These include, as scholars have shown, the feminized sector of carework that is often devalued as not being legitimate skilled work (Glenn 2011) and offering only “partial citizenship” (Parrenãs 2001), as well as work in sexual commerce that poses moral risks under the discourses of human trafficking and sexual immorality (Agustin 2007; Choo 2013; Cheng 2010). For migrant women in the manufacturing sector and for those in the illicit and feminized service sector of hostess work, the distinct gendered symbolic politics of each sector plays a significant role in their differentiated access to rights and claims for citizenship, despite their shared status as temporary labor migrants.

Future of Migrant Citizenship in South Korea

In April 2014, a group of National Assembly members in South Korea was spearheaded by the first immigrant assembly member Jasmine Lee, a marriage migrant woman from the Philippines. This group hosted a congressional hearing on the Migrant Children’s Human Rights Act, a law that would extend rights to education, health, and personhood to undocumented migrant children. If it were to pass, this legislation would create fissures in the sturdy wall barring many migrants from citizenship, and would bring migrant children out of the shadows.

After the hearing, many South Koreans responded with concern that the act would open the floodgates to undocumented migration into South Korea. The act has
yet to be proposed to the National Assembly, and its future remains uncertain – as does the question of how citizenship is bordered in South Korea. As citizenship’s promise of full membership and equality clashes with the realities of exclusion, struggles over migrant rights will continue and new forms of solidarity and opposition will emerge, questioning the paradox of migrant containment – using people’s labor and bodies, without full rights and membership. Although the global system of temporary labor migration is unlikely to wither away anytime soon, perhaps this is where citizenship’s persisting allure lies: not in the concrete promise of full inclusion, but in its very dynamic and contested nature – namely, the possibilities it opens for transformation.

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Nation-States, Diaspora and Citizenship in Asia

By Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, National University of Singapore

Diaspora, nation and state in Asia

As a collective noun, “diaspora” refers to emigrants who leave a country for another land but continue to identify with the place of origin even though they are abroad. As a conceptual category, ‘diaspora’ is associated with the multiple agendas leading to emigration such as labour migration, political displacement and more. The term ‘diaspora’ can also encompass the descendants of emigrants who live outside of the ancestral land (known as diasporic descendants). A diaspora maintains a ‘homeland’ orientation that is usually associated with a nation but not necessarily anchored in sovereign statehood. Colonial rule in Asia had carved up and demarcated national territories in ways that did not fit with the social histories and existing social spaces of affected populations, splintering their communities into multiple discrete territories that became nation-states. New forms of citizenship assumed that the identity and loyalty of national populations would be congruent with those territorial demarcations (Amrit 2011), but diaspora formations extend cultural citizenship (i.e. membership and identity) beyond the national territory (see Ho 2011). In the context of Asia, I highlight how citizenship as both a concept and in practice is changing further as the legal features of citizenship are extended to diaspora populations through legal and policy changes, and the creation of new diaspora-oriented ministries and government agencies.

Historically, diasporas originating from Asia (henceforth Asian diasporas) are known to have contributed to consolidating the nation-state by supporting anti-colonial or anti-imperial movements. But diasporas are equally capable of destabilising the nation-building projects of established governments on the basis of ethnic, religious or ideological agendas. For example, over the course of history, different segments of the Chinese diaspora have supported revolutionary movements against the Manchu dynasty, republican or communist rule, and subsequently Japanese colonialism. As ‘domestics abroad’ (Varadarajan 2010), diasporas galvanise domestic populations and resources around struggles for their vision of national sovereignty. National governments saw diasporas as troublesome populations that fuelled political instability and threatened national integrity, or as impoverished co-nationals who left the country to improve their life chances elsewhere.

In current times, however, Asian diasporas are increasingly valued as drivers of development by their origin countries (Hickey, Ho and Yeoh 2015). The ascent of diaspora-centred development has precipitated a series of diaspora strategies among migrant-sending countries. Diasporas can impact the societies they left in several ways. Apart from remittances and direct investment, diaspora can be a source of capital mar-
kets (e.g. deposits or bonds for diasporas) and tourism. Diasporas contribute to their countries of origin through philanthropy, volunteerism and advocacy. Diaspora return migration can have positive human capital and knowledge transfer impacts; equally diasporas that remain abroad can be mobilised to such effects (see Ragazzi 2009 on governing diasporas).

“diaspora strategies are transforming the institution of citizenship and its relationship to national territory”

Diaspora-centred development seeks to capitalise upon the financial, human and social capital of diasporas to meet livelihood needs and promote the growth of industries or economic sectors in a country. Diaspora strategies refer to the initiatives used by migrant-sending countries to reach out to their emigrants, and enhance national identity and belonging to cultivate loyalty and incentivise emigrants to contribute to their countries of origin. In so doing, diaspora strategies are transforming the institution of citizenship and its relationship to national territory.

Diaspora strategies and extraterritorial citizenship in Asia

The political institution of citizenship is traditionally ensconced with nation, state and territory. Citizenship confers legal status but it also defines membership to a national community. Emigration results in the dispersal of a national population to other countries, creating diasporas. Diasporas destabilise the institution of citizenship when migrant-sending countries appeal to emigrants by extending national membership and privileges to them from afar, thus practising extraterritorial citizenship (see MP Smith 2003; RC Smith 2003; Ho 2011). Such countries enact an extraterritorial reach over migrants in order to reinforce national belonging and enlist the support of their diasporas (also see Collyer and King 2014).

The extent and scope of diaspora engagement policies vary significantly across countries in Asia. Several Asian countries are considered global pioneers in designing diaspora strategies and forms of extraterritorial citizenship to appeal to their emigrants and diasporic descendants. Amongst them are China and India. These countries have developed what Raj (2015: 160) describes as “emigrant infrastructure” that encompasses a range of “institutional, policy, juridico-legal [sic] practices and engagements between the nation, state, government, non-state groups and institutions, as well as the imbrications of capital or commercial interests with emerging or extant emigrant populations”. As an example, as early as 1949 the new communist government in China had established the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs (subsequently renamed the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission) to engage the Chinese diaspora. This organisation lapsed temporarily in 1970 and was replaced in 1978 by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) of the State Council. The Chinese state also supported the for-
mation of a non-governmental organization known as the All China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, which similarly seeks to enhance outreach to the Chinese abroad. The Chinese state’s diaspora engagement draws together government and non-governmental organisations, and a range of social actors from the public and private sectors (Liu and van Dongen 2016).

China’s diaspora engagement approach remains at the level of policies and programs whereas the Indian state has enacted far-reaching legislative changes to provide formal recognition for members of the diaspora. India designed a scheme known as the Overseas Citizenship of India to formalise and bring under one umbrella the multiple legal classifications of Indians abroad. Changes made to India’s citizenship law in 2005 allowed foreigners of Indian descent who hold another country’s citizenship to apply for the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). Given that India restricts dual nationality, the OCI status is a long-term visa that enables foreigners of Indian descent to maintain legal and material ties with the ancestral land (up to the third generation). OCI cardholders are granted multiple entries and a life-long visa, which allows them to apply for Indian citizenship if they fulfil the residency criteria. OCI cardholders have residency and economic rights in India, but they are restricted from voting and standing for elections (India Bureau of Immigration 2015).

Both China and India have had a longstanding interest in diaspora engagement that promotes their image as an ancestral land for the Chinese and Indians abroad respectively. This approach enables such countries to achieve two ends. First, they can project soft power in the countries where their diasporas have settled abroad (Ho 2013). Second, diasporas represent a symbolic resource for nationalism (Callahan 2003) when they are portrayed as an extension of the national community that remains linked to the ancestral land by kinship bonds and co-ethnicity.

Japan’s outreach to diasporic descendants of Japanese ancestry follows a similar logic but with a distinctive twist. Japanese policies consider diasporic descendants, such as the nikkeijin (Brazilians of Japanese ancestry), a replacement labour force for its ageing society in low-skilled sectors shunned by Japanese citizens. The nikkeijin are given preferential visas to live and work in Japan because of their Japanese ancestry, but they are restricted from long term settlement and face barriers to social integration. Unlike the Chinese and Indian states that have developed emigrant infrastructure to engage their respective diasporas, Japan uses immigration policies to manage its relationship with diasporic descendants (see Yamashiro 2015).
Other prominent examples of diaspora strategising in Asia include Malaysia and Singapore which have created specialised government agencies and invested significant resources to reach out to their respective diasporas (see Ho and Boyle 2015 for Singapore; Fischer 2015 and Koh 2015 for Malaysia). Both Singapore and Malaysia emphasise the national identity and attachments of nationals and former nationals living abroad, and have designed policies to mobilise diaspora business and knowledge networks to advance their knowledge-based economies. Countries with large diasporas such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam leverage their migrants for remittances, investments and tourism (see Pham 2010 for Vietnam; IOM 2015 for Indonesia; CFO 2016 for Philippines).

“Asian states have capitalised upon diaspora strategising to extend not only cultural citizenship, but also legal membership to segments of their diasporas selectively.”

Although their policies typically focus on labour migrants, they are also incorporating diaspora knowledge mobilisation into their national agendas more explicitly. Vietnam adopts a centralised approach towards managing diaspora relations, while Indonesia and the Philippines integrate diaspora engagement into existing outfits that manage migration or work with external diaspora organisations to initiate such projects. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand also represent net emigration countries that are starting to recognise their diasporas as partners in development, but more academic research remains to be done on these countries.

The examples above highlight how Asian states have capitalised upon diaspora strategizing to extend not only cultural citizenship, but also legal membership to segments of their diasporas selectively. As Delano (2014) has observed of Latin American countries, diaspora engagement policies become transferred from country to country when notions of what constitutes best practices in this arena gradually becomes adopted internationally. However, diaspora strategizing is not limited to the initiatives of migrant-sending countries. Policy transfers are oftentimes facilitated through international institutions. Increasingly migrant-receiving countries in the Global North are intervening in diaspora-centred development agendas of countries in the Global South too, including in Asia.

**Diaspora-centred development and the reach of the West**

What motivates countries across Asia to promote diaspora strategies and extend extraterritorial citizenship to emigrants and diasporic descendants? Much has to do with the mantra of diaspora-centred development that has gained prominence in international development discourses and programs. Diaspora populations contribute to development through remittances and investments, as well as by acting as epistemic communi-
ties to facilitate global knowledge networks that benefit the countries they have left (Meyer and Wattiaux 2006). Support for diaspora-centred development has grown amongst powerful international institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union (EU), which receive funding from wealthier countries in the Global North.

“diaspora-centred development impacts the international relations between countries in the Global North and the Global South through development, migration and foreign policies”

National governments in migrant-receiving countries of the Global North, such as the United States, Norway and member states of the European Union, throw their backing behind organisations that promote diaspora-centred development in the Global South. Migrant-receiving countries in the Global North increasingly hold the view that countries in the Global South will benefit more from the developmental effects brought forth by their emigrants (Sinnati and Horst 2014). The focus of diaspora-centred development agendas is thus placed on engaging the networks, resources and knowledge of a country’s diaspora to enhance capacity building. The migrant-receiving country also benefits from the bridging role performed by their immigrants who are diaspora populations of countries in the Global South, such as when the former seeks an economic advantage to extract natural resources or start new agricultural and manufacturing industries in developing countries. Development in the Global South is said to promote national stability that will minimise illegal migration to countries in the Global North too. In these ways, diaspora-centred development impacts the international relations between countries in the Global North and the Global South through development, migration and foreign policies (see Shain and Barth 2003; Varadarajan 2010; Pellerins and Mullings 2013).

By promoting and funding diaspora-centred development agendas, Western nations and Westernised institutions introduce or entrench Western norms of what constitutes acceptable development and good governance in the Global South (see Boyle and Ho in press). As an example, Vietnam has featured prominently in diaspora-centred development initiatives promoted by international institutions and foreign governments. The United States State Department works with diasporas across the world through The International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA), a public-private partnership between the US State Department, USAID and other partners. One Vietnam, an online network started by Vietnamese-Americans, is a founding non-profit partner of IdEA. Its programs include channelling philanthropic donations by the overseas Vietnamese back to Vietnam alongside its mission to promote principles of transparency and accountability (IdEA n.d.). Vietnam is also the recipient of a World Bank loan for fostering growth of the country’s science and technology sector (see Pellerins and Mullings 2013 for an assessment of the World Bank’s loans for projects engaging dias-
poras). Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology is using those funds to attract experts, particularly the overseas Vietnamese, for knowledge transfer and to boost the country’s research and development capacity. Such diaspora engagement projects function as biopolitical projects that deploy governmentality techniques to create self-reliant and resilient market actors (Boyle and Ho in press).

Conclusion

Diasporas are emerging as important economic and social actors in Asia in the light of newfound interest in diaspora-centred development. In this article, I have highlighted the diaspora strategies adopted by nation-states in Asia to engage and elicit contributions from their respective diasporas. Of particular interest to migration and citizenship scholars will be the way that diaspora strategizing extends the extraterritorial reach of states beyond the national territory. When such states extend selective components of citizenship to emigrants and diasporic descendants they produce extraterritorial citizenship practices. The article also points to the way that wealthier countries in the Global North can influence development in the Global South, including in Asia, by promoting and funding diaspora-centred development agendas.

As prescription, diaspora strategies are neither benign nor malign measures for change. But when put in practice, diaspora strategies risk being construed as exploitative practices that further neoliberal agendas and entrench social inequalities within a society or between countries. Diasporas have rallied members to lobby for greater transparency and accountability in the way that government officials utilise the resources channelled from diasporas to their countries of origin. An example of this is the ‘zero remittances’ campaign in the Philippines during 2015. Members of the Philippines diaspora protested against a proposed tax increase on overseas Filipino workers and called for a stop to government corruption. In-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this short article. In formulating diaspora strategies, both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states can usefully reflect on the ‘diaspora economies of care’ (Ho et al. 2015: 210) or the care ethics that both underpin and which can further inform diaspora strategizing. Diaspora economies of care provide an analytical framework in support of nurturing caring relationships between diasporas, states and domestic constituencies that would channel resources towards serving the public good, and cultivating more sustainable and equitable social relations.

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Policy Brief

Mobilizing Diaspora Resources and Return to India: Lessons from the Circulatory Mobility of Diaspora Entrepreneurs of Indian Origin

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India has arrived. The diaspora has responded to its call. Throughout the course of the International Organization for Migration’s Diaspora Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in June 2013, India was heralded as a model for countries around the world, and specifically for those in the Global South, to develop policies that would connect diasporas to their “motherland.” With the goal of maximizing the positive relationship between migration and development, destination country governments have identified lessons from India’s seemingly model facilitation of return migration to ensure the states benefit from mobilizing diaspora resources.

While India has seen an increasing number of returning technology entrepreneurs impact the development of emerging technological hub cities like Bangalore, India, policy ambiguities remain as to whether these high skilled migrants, known as Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), are seen as “overseas” remitters or state “citizens.” As a result, policy questions emerge as to whether the Indian government’s adaptation of targeted directives in areas of innovation policy and migration enticement can impact the ways in which returning entrepreneurs support the future of a “shining” India. Furthermore, lessons from migration patterns, reasons for return, and settlement impacts can shed light for emerging Global South countries as to whether circulating high skilled migrants are contributing to a state’s growth and development and where policy interventions may best occur to support interdependent mobilities.

Return Migration and the Indian “Brain Bank”

From the moment of its independence from England in 1948, India as a nation-state has been a project in defining and connecting those who have a past association to this region as their “motherland.” Throughout the start of the waves of Indian immigration in the late 1960s-1980s, primarily to the US and the UK, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was most famously quoted in 1987 for stating that the flight of top professional talent from India was not a “brain drain,” but a “brain bank” that India would one-day profit from when the time was right.

The start of the new millennium ushered in an era of the valorization of diaspora members as heroes. Regarded in the past as those not a ‘brain drain, but a ‘brain bank’” – former Indian Primer Minister Rajiv Gandhi on Indian emigration

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
who had abandoned their country, Indian nationals living outside of India, known as Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), were regaled by the government as prabasis – an early 20th century Bengali term poetically connoting a Bengali living outside of Bengal, which had now been adapted broadly to mean a member of any group being away in exile. The strong compassion evoked by the government’s continued portrayal of a Mother India calling back its children – even for generations of children cast away by time – changed the face of the Indian diaspora forever. Such a newfound reverence for the Indian prabasis was in no small part an effect of globalization. The High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (HLCID) was created in 2000 to assess the impact and desires of overseas Indian communities globally (Indian High Commission 2002) as an outcome of the rapid growth in India. The 1990s saw a rise of multi-national companies, such as Texas Instruments and IBM, building headquarters in India. The development of global IT services powered by Indian companies Wipro and Infosys changed the very concept of telecommunications, tech support, and software development for the entire world where the specialized commodity was people, “Indian tech experts” – and no one has ever looked back. A vision of a future “India Shining” became a symbol of the transnational connections between persons of Indian origin within the West.

“The strong compassion evoked by the government’s continued portrayal of a Mother India calling back its children...changed the face of the Indian diaspora forever”

In 2002, the HLCID reported their findings. Among their recommendations, the Prime Minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), with the mandate to facilitate India’s development through all aspects of the “diaspora story” by serving as the intermediary between overseas Indians, diaspora associations, trade and industry, lawmakers, think-tanks, stakeholders of society and governance as well as by functioning as a facilitation service center for all matters pertaining to overseas Indians (Indian High Commission 2002). Hence, for the past 15 years, the prabasis were called to come home and celebrate their success in making India shine.

Over the last decade, the MOIA has developed programs aimed at building partnerships with the diaspora. They created an annual conference, Prabasi Bharatiya Divas, which celebrates overseas Indians while offering a forum for diaspora members to discuss their ideas with Indian politicians. In 2011, they also piloted the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) that was designed to help Indians manage business and investments in India, and the Council for Promotion of Overseas Employment (ICOP) for International Migrants abroad. By servicing diaspora members defined as Overseas Indians (OIs), the MOIA also championed the development of the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) Card as dual nationality is not honored by the 1955 amendments to the Constitution of India.
Woven into the fabric of India’s growth and development over the past 15 years, the narrative of a diaspora coming home links to the subtext of Indians abroad investing in India. Through economic booms across the world, remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) proved to be transformative for developing countries, as the amount of money sent from abroad in many states grew to several times the size of official development aid—proving an effective way to continue development efforts in the face of shrinking national budgets. At the millennial turn, India experienced a sharp growth of remittances, from $2.1 billion USD in 1991, $24.6 billion in 2006, and now more than $68.91 billion in 2015 (Reserve Bank of India 2016). Since India’s 2015 “Make in India” campaign, FDI inflows into India were estimated at $53.44 billion in 2015 with a 48 percent increase from the previous year. Returning entrepreneurs not only bring back savings, but also business skills and the desire to develop and innovate with new ventures in India. Policymakers have been left with an open question of whether energies should be focused on implementing better facilitation of remittance transfer while maintaining a separation of visa categories for non-resident investment, or whether decreased restrictions on mobility and development through programs like the OCI should be promoted while working with entrepreneurs to facilitate business development support. Questions abound as to what governs the reasons for entrepreneurs to return home and to what extent their business endeavors impact a changing India as well as whether investment, if spread across multiple investment countries in the Global North and South, can help stratify a policy to best serve India’s development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Status</th>
<th>Percent (n=108)</th>
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<tr>
<td>OCI</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Citizen</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian Citizen</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>EU Citizen/Other</td>
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Citizenship Status of Diaspora Entrepreneurs Returning to Bangalore, India (Acharya 2017)
Known as the “Silicon Valley of India,” Bangalore has become the obvious choice for entrepreneur returnees in the tech space in what has been dubbed the “R2I,” Return to India and even “B2B,” Back-to-Bangalore. Between 2004-2014, it is estimated that over 350,000 persons of Indian origin have permanently resettled in Bangalore, India, the technological capital of South Asia (BDA 2017). In 2012, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs created the OIFC to facilitate non-resident Indian investment in India and to potentially support return migration. Within this large pool of R2I candidates who have primarily shifted to India from living in the US after relocation with multinational corporations, returning entrepreneurs of Indian origin are a small but significant subset. After moving back to Bangalore, while calling Bangalore home, these entrepreneurs are constantly traveling back to Silicon Valley, to London and to other hubs across Asia and the Middle East, where Bangalore now functions as a center for emerging markets. These entrepreneurs circulate to anchor their lives in Bangalore, to build on their lives in Bangalore, and to imagine their ideal home and work space. In doing so, their impact on entrepreneurship development is not located in one space, but rather, is interdependent across the globe.

The entrepreneurial community of technology innovation, due to the circulation of entrepreneurs, unfolds in a landscape of mobility across technological hub cities. Silicon Valley, London, and other major technological hub cities, are therefore integral to the explosion of Bangalore as a major global site of technological innovation. This practice is both global, but also very much located in the locale of Bangalore itself. Having returned to Bangalore, and while circulating through the interdependent networks they create and build businesses across Silicon Valley, London and other global technological hubs, diaspora entrepreneurs also engage in entrepreneurial activities such as venture capital and early seed-funding “angel” investment within India. Within Silicon Valley, over 1,500 Indians have founded Silicon Valley companies with a total value of more than $80 billion, and the combined wealth of Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley is estimated at $500 billion (TiE 2015). These returnees carry a significant amount of capital and influence that has the potential to effect great change—and policy interventions must assess the potential impact of such change in Bangalore alongside interdependencies globally. Examining the pattern of circulation and its impact within India offers a likely pattern of mobility across emerging hubs throughout the Global South that are marked by diaspora return as circulation.

Though origin country officials have been creating diaspora ministries, there is a policy ambiguity on their desire to offer any real substantive rights or powers to the diaspora within origin countries.”
Migration Policy in a Global Context—Reframing the Question

While the concept of a Ministry of Overseas Citizens seems to be an ideal way to manage diaspora affairs for a country of origin connecting to its diaspora, the Indian case demonstrates many successes as well as challenges and pitfalls—some that can be specifically applied to other emerging Global South nations, where, with the emergence of the newfound power structures in the countries as a result of globalization and transnational communities and networks, people desire to be better connected to their countries of origin. But a question remains as to whether all of these implemented projects provide real policy that addresses the needs of diaspora members while best utilizing their connections and experiences as a “brain bank” in context to emerging countries in the South. Though origin country officials have been creating diaspora ministries, there is a policy ambiguity on their desire to offer any real substantive rights or powers to the diaspora within origin countries. States, particularly in the Global South, need to ask: what is the function and added value for origin countries to service diaspora members? If we extrapolate this global question to the Indian case, before even measuring impact and desire, a question must be asked about what stake India has in maintaining diaspora relations. Furthermore, what challenges arise for diaspora members upon returning, and in particular, those that desire to contribute to change in their countries of origin?

In order to understand how the diaspora is used, we must look to those that are answering the call—returning diaspora members—and attempt to understand the challenges they face both within their return to origin countries, and in connection to the Western countries where they may have become naturalized citizens and are now returning to India as a “homeland” but also as “expats.” Their problems and challenges also lend to taking a step back to put high skilled migration in the context of broader concepts of mobility and diaspora circulation across interdependent technological hub cities through immigration policy interventions and impacts in the Global North.

The discussion of migration and citizenship around the globe has focused on several themes: protecting borders, repatriating irregular migrants squatting “illegally” within Western nations, integration and regularization, and defining overall whom to let in and out to further a country’s economic growth. The case of the economic impact of diaspora entrepreneurs offers an opening where different policy questions must be asked. Anecdotes of human trafficking, violence, and “mini-Lampedusas” that occur on
a daily basis, have resulted in a backlash of rampant anti-migrant and “Go Home” sentiments. Investigating the subtext of stories as cautionary tales of the dangers of integration and migration control are relatively weak and unsolved with largely unabsorbed migrant populations around the world. Migration policy surrounding the Global North’s focus on how to keep out and bring in individuals is the wrong approach. We need to reframe the question.

The emerging Global South is changing the future through the ways in which diaspora members on the move are creating a new manner of seeing translocal mobilities globally in defining movement and settlement for themselves. Circulation allows for their very understanding and development of home. The diaspora entrepreneurs returning to India have always functioned as social actors in being the change they want to see. Policy interventions should therefore be an attempt at reconceptualizing how we speak about mobility, and how, by drawing from multiple policy approaches, it is possible to engage a new manner of seeing migration policy in the Global South universally, guided by the actions of the mobile diaspora entrepreneurs themselves.

References


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Migration is a contentious topic on the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea, posing an ongoing challenge for peaceful and productive bilateral relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (DR). Out of all the challenges to insular development debated by academics and policymakers at a 2007 conference on the topic, migration – specifically Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic – stood out as the most intractable. Thus the idea emerged of creating an observatory dedicated to studying migration dynamics here and in the wider insular Caribbean, with a view to producing timely and evidence-based inputs for improved migration and social policies that are respectful of migrants’ human rights.

The Caribbean Migrants Observatory, or OBMICA, was founded in Santo Domingo in 2009. Initially it operated as a research program under the joint coordination of two universities, the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO-DR) and Center for Social Research at the Ibero-American University (CIES-UNIBE). In 2012 OBMICA became an independent think tank, registered as a non-profit in the DR under the legal name Centro para la Observación Migratoria y el Desarrollo Social en el Caribe, with an eye to operate independently from – though always in concert with – the academic institutions that provided an incubator for the observatory to grow.

“OBMICA considers itself a ‘think and do tank’”

Today OBMICA considers itself a “think and do tank”: “think tank” because of our commitment to researching and continuously monitoring migration dynamics and related social development issues mostly in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but to a growing extent in the insular Caribbean as well as relevant diasporas; and “do tank” because of our on-going contributions to national, regional, and international networks advocating for the rights of migrants and their families, as a cornerstone of development, democracy, and inclusive citizenship.
OBMICA’S working model follows a cycle of action research, centered on five thematic areas:

(1) Right to nationality for Dominican-born descendants of Haitian migrants
(2) Labor rights of migrant workers
(3) Gender and migration
(4) Migration, climate change, and environment
(5) Trafficking in persons

In this cycle, research is grounded in and forms the basis of policy advocacy work to influence change on the ground. It is a model that involves key stakeholders, accompanies civil society, contributes to academic discussion, and also provides inputs for policy advocacy.

Put another way, our objectives are to: (i) Carry out applied research and observe the migration dynamics on Hispaniola, in the Caribbean and its diasporas, as tools for social change and policy advocacy in drawing up public policies; (ii) Strengthen the capacities of key civil society groups who work on human mobility and human development; (iii) Advocate for public policies respectful of the human rights of migrants and their family members, and due application of these policies; and (iv) Serve as a bridge between the duty bearers, human rights defenders and rights holders, encouraging dialogue and the identification of solutions which respect human rights.
On the island, OBMICA is gaining recognition as a respected source of information. Over the last eight years, we have made contributions towards improved public policies and their application through dialogue with a wide array of stakeholders including church organizations, migrant organizations, media, trade unions, academic institutes, international organizations (the European Union, the UN system, the OAS, and international financial institutions), NGOs and diplomatic missions in the DR and, perhaps most significantly, through the empowerment of civil society organizations.

OBMICA’s strategy for engaging this array of stakeholders comes from the sociological concept of “bridging social capital” – a key component to overcoming conflict in order to build and maintain democracy. Whereas migrant groups often engage in “bonding social capital” within their own community, factors such as their own material needs (leading them to prioritize immediate goals over long-term social and political change) and the conservative political climate in the Dominican Republic (characterized by historically anti-Haitian attitudes and increasingly restrictive migration and citizenship policies) limit their possibilities for directly engaging with other groups such as the media, government agencies, or employers, in order to improve migration and other social policies that affect them.

Without "bridging" social capital, "bonding" groups can become isolated and disenfranchised from the rest of society and, most importantly, from groups with which bridging must occur in order to improve possibilities for the realization of human rights. Based on this understanding, OBMICA has positioned itself as a bridging organization that works to conduct research on migrant populations and to empower civil society organizations working for migrants’ rights in order to engage in multiple forms of policy advocacy on a variety of policy questions.

Despite growing emphasis internationally on the link between economic development and migration, in the DR the prevailing public perception – shared by most policy makers – continues to consider migration as something that is negative for development. The lack of hard, timely and systematically-collected data impedes an objective treatment of the phenomenon of migration as it relates to the DR. Moreover, it has contributed to the uneven and unjust application of the 2004 migration law and its rules of procedure (2011), as well as gaps in the establishment of viable support mechanisms.

In the DR the question of migration is intimately linked to sensitive Dominican-Haitian relations with many facets, including historical-cultural, political-legal, and socio-economic ones. Currently there is a harder edge to the violations of the rights of the descendants of Haitian immigrants born in the DR to Dominican nationality, notably since the approval of the new Dominican Constitution in 2010, as well as the wide-reaching
Constitutional Tribunal sentence of September 23, 2013 and its legislative sequel, Naturalization Law 169, in May 2014. Statelessness among the population of Haitian descent persists, notwithstanding government efforts in 2015 and 2016 to regularize unauthorized Haitian immigrants and register a smaller number of their Dominican-born descendants, some of whom Law 169 turns into unauthorized migrants and creates a path for eventual naturalization as Dominican citizens.

OBMICA has been conducting research and advocacy on statelessness and the corresponding right to nationality for Dominican-born descendants of Haitian migrants since its inception in 2009. Publications in Spanish, and to a lesser extent, English and French, can be downloaded from our website, www.obmica.org, focusing on topics such as the origins of the documentation situation of the population of Haitian descent; and gender and the risk of statelessness. The latter led to the design of an experimental action research project focusing on preventing statelessness among children of ethnically mixed couples, primarily where the mother is an undocumented Haitian migrant and the father a Dominican national. While these children have the undisputed right to Dominican nationality by virtue of having at least one Dominican parent, in practice their access to the civil registry continues to be blocked by gender discriminatory birth registration practices. Each year OBMICA collaborates with ten or more associate and visiting researchers, research and communications interns. Staff and associates are multilingual in Spanish, English, French, and Haitian Creole, and strive to publish and present findings in the most relevant of these languages, both to be accountable to migrants and civil society organizations involved in our research and to strategically engage in policy advocacy across the island and internationally.

Our approach to the study of migration is necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on the expertise of geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, legal scholars, as well as experts in human rights, gender, literature, public health, and communications, among other areas. We also travel internationally to present our work at academic conferences, such as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and Caribbean Studies Association (CSA), and fora organized by international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Our travels have led to much different regional and international collaboration, for example with Johns Hopkins University, Rutgers University, the University of Essex, ICF/the U.S. Department of Labor and the Latin American Observatory on Trafficking in Persons (ObservaLAtrata). In the future we aim to continue expanding our capacity to engage in quantitative research and to engage with others in the Caribbean and beyond so that our geographical focus lives up to its foundational pretensions.
Some OBMICA Highlights

1. *Yearbook on Migration Dynamics*. For five consecutive years (2011-2015) OBMICA has compiled migration statistics to and from the Dominican Republic and within the broader insular Caribbean, while also monitoring the evolution of migration policies and practices, and the human rights of migrants and their descendants. All yearbooks, called *Estado de las migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana*, are available in Spanish on [www.obmica.org](http://www.obmica.org). At present, we are compiling statistics from 2016 and preparing an interactive web portal to present the most important data in a visually appealing format.

2. *Cutting-edge research on migration, environment & climate change*. OBMICA has conducted original research in the Dominican Republic, and put it into dialogue with comparative research in Haiti, in projects financed by the European Union and the International Organization for Migration.

3. *Original research on gender, migration, and human rights*. Studies have focused on violence against Haitian migrant women and girls on the border, labor and human rights of Haitian migrant women domestic workers, trafficking of Dominican and Haitian women, and gender and the risk of statelessness for descendants of Haitian migrants born in the DR.

4. *Leadership role in international advocacy on statelessness in the DR*. OBMICA director Bridget Wooding has given talks at events such as the UNHCR Global Forum on Statelessness, and served as an expert witness in 2014 before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. OBMICA has contributed to civil society alternative reports to UN treaty bodies, such as CEDAW, CERD, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and is the Caribbean focal point for the Americas Network on Nationality and Statelessness.

5. *Action research on restoring access to birth registration for children of mixed couples*. Since discovering that even children with Dominican fathers are facing obstacles to registering their children when the mother is foreign/undocumented in our research on gender and statelessness, OBMICA has been collaborating with local NGO Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas (MUDHA) to learn from their legal accompaniment of mixed families in batey communities, document obstacles and successes, and conduct policy advocacy for durable solutions. Initially a pilot project funded by the government of Canada, the initiative is now a three-year project supported by the EU.

6. *Monitoring deportations and due process*. OBMICA has been monitoring deportations of Dominican nationals from the U.S. and the effects of ambiguous policies under the Obama administration, including stigma and other challenges to depor-
tees’ reinsertion in Dominican society. A more recent project is investigating deportations of Haitian nationals by the Dominican authorities following the conclusion of the National Regularization Plan in 2015, from a human rights and gender perspective.

7. Taking a cultural perspective on Haitian migration. Collaborations with photographers, videographers, journalists, and cultural studies experts have enabled us to contextualize and reframe the issues through photo exhibitions, launches of documentaries, and discussions of literary and artistic production in the border region.

Please direct inquiries about the OBMICA Research Institute Profile to Bridget Wooding (bridget.wooding@gmail.com) and Allison Petrozziello (apetrozz24@yahoo.com)
Mentoring Matters
By Shyam K. Sriram
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**Building a Migration and Citizenship-Focused Research Agenda**

In recent essays on the topic of mentorship in migration and citizenship studies, Bloemraad et al. (2016) and Smith (2014) both remarked about the importance of faculty mentors encouraging their students that thinking critically about migration and citizenship might require a look *outside* the discipline. These authors offered suggestions ranging from curating student-specific reading and working groups; submitting articles to interdisciplinary and migration-specific journals; opening more networking opportunities for their students; and pushing graduate students and young scholars (albeit gently) to present their fledgling work to non-political scientists.

In my opinion, the most challenging aspect for a graduate student is often making the initial case for why a specific research agenda matters and getting the initial buy-in from an advisor or mentor. I think this is of particular concern for students in American Politics, which has historically neglected the study of refugees *in* the United States (apart from the Cubans and Vietnamese). And yet, this renewed interest in migration and citizenship studies across political science offers almost limitless possibilities for research. While it may not be the Wild West, there is a certain freedom available now for researchers – those beginning their careers as well as those more established – to chart a new direction at this critical time in refugee studies, as evidenced to great effect by the recent volume of this newsletter (4:2).

In the following essay, I would like to offer three suggestions to my fellow graduate students about how to develop an emphasis in migration and citizenship studies with the goal of getting that buy-in from an advisor or a mentor. I think these suggestions, coupled with the thorough and amazing ideas presented by Bloemraad et al. (2016), will go a long way in making mentees and mentors believe that there are multiple avenues to encourage and support migration and citizenship studies in political science.
a) **Lit Reviews Are Your Friend:** Doing a thorough review of the literature can often be frustrating, but it is that inability to find what you are looking for that opens the door to you making a cogent case for why your research topic matters. As a point of example, I took a seminar a couple of years ago, with Dr. M. Kent Jennings. While he is the “godfather” of political socialization, and knows the literature as well as anyone else, I still had to make a case for what I was studying at the time, namely the political socialization of refugee children. After exploring what had been written across the disciplines, my literature review became a research story in its own right. To make my case even stronger, I included this graphic:

![Graphic showing political socialization of children, 1.5/2 generations, and immigrant political socialization]

b) **Don’t Stop Believing:** Passion is never overrated, and it is vital for graduate students to be focused about a research agenda. Easier said than done, right, especially when others may not share your passion? But, I would still argue that if you believe that what you are studying matters and addresses something that has been neglected in the literature and that has a significant bearing on political science, then seize the day. 21st-century technology allows for even greater ways for a graduate student to showcase their research interests, build confidence, and develop more public speaking and networking opportunities.

Some of these new venues include the “lightning talk” and “research café” session formats at the annual meetings of the MPSA and APSA respectively; global phenomena like PechaKucha, where people meet and present six-minute presentations (20 slides and only 20 seconds per slide) to strangers; and campus events where graduate students are encouraged to present short, dynamic, and visually-captivating versions of their work to audiences. At UCSB, this last event is the yearly Grad Slam and students are given three-minute windows to present their best.
work; the winner walks away with a $2,500 research grant. I strongly believe that these events, whether in the discipline or not, are wonderful for not only building self-confidence, but also giving you the tools to share your ideas with others, which is particularly important when you are charting your own direction in political science.

“Passion is never overrated, and it is vital for graduate students to be focused about a research agenda”

c) **Become Your Research:** It is never too early to start planning your dissertation. While your research question may change (or, for that matter, your subfield or area of specialization), it is vitally important for all doctoral students to plan at least a year in advance before the prospectus or dissertation-writing stage. Political scientists are no stranger to intense and dedicated field research, but what graduate students often fail to do is lay the groundwork for their dissertation research earlier. To that end, I am a big fan of intensive coursework like ICPSR’s [Summer Program](http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home) in Quantitative Methods of Social Research and Syracuse’s Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research ([IQMR](http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home)).

Last year, I was able to take part in another kind of intensive – the summer language program in Nepali at Cornell University. I wanted to study Nepali because I had been making a case to my advisor and mentors about my interest in the unique situation of the recent wave of Nepali, Hindu refugees (who are of Bhutanese citizenship), but knew that I would not be able to convince them, or even myself, about the feasibility of picking this as one of the groups for my dissertation research, till I felt comfortable with the language. I completed one year of beginner’s Nepali in six weeks – Monday to Friday, five to six hours of instruction per day. This may have been one of the best decisions I ever made, and has certainly shown my department that I am committed to not only becoming an expert on Bhutanese forced migration, but that I am willing to take on an innovative project in citizenship and migration, albeit under the auspices of American Politics.

Nepali proverbs and aphorisms became a common fixture of my language studies at Cornell and our teachers insisted that we learn (and later memorize) one or two of these popular expressions every day. Two of these sayings really resonated with me, particularly as a young political scientist: नाच्न नजाब्रे आग टेडो। (He who doesn’t know how to dance, blames the stage) and आउछ पखेडैन बागेको खोला फखेडैन। (A flowing river stops for no man). I think it is extremely easy to lose inertia in graduate school and give up on a unique research perspective when faced with institutional barriers. But, I do believe that through a combination of perseverance and initiative, any graduate student should be able to get the support of their advisors and committee members and accomplish a truly unique project.
References


Please direct inquiries about this Mentoring Matters article to Shyam K. Sriram (shyam@umail.ucsb.edu).
Section News
Section Awards 2016

Best Book

Winner:


Selection Committee

Jacqueline Stevens (Northwestern University), Elizabeth Cohen (Syracuse University), H. Richard Friman (Marquette University)

Committee’s Commentary:

“Kawar’s book provides a comparative study of cause lawyering on immigration cases and policy in the United States and France. The agendas and actions of the lawyers she studies are extremely important to legal outcomes and also elusive to systematic, i.e., scholarly, research. To provide an explanation of what may otherwise appear to be episodic or ad hoc actions and results, Kawar creatively mobilizes the theory Bruno Latour: "the 'passage of law' should be understood as a process of ontological translation that assembles the human and nonhuman elements of the social world into webs of meaning whose precise elements cannot be known in advance and that are always subject to reassembly. Latour's unique combination of pragmatist empiricism and poststructuralist material-semiotics supplies an analytical toolkit for unpacking the 'black box' of formalist lawmaking, in which legal technicians are sealed off from the sociopolitical world and where attention to official case dispositions makes it difficult to appreciate all of the other new elements forged in these laboratories of law" (8). Kawar's book, navigating among interviews, court records, and a number of relevant scholarly literatures, makes excellent use of Latour's insights. In addition, Kawar made the bold decision to insert "boxes" to provide explanatory information necessary for non-specialists but too lengthy for the usual endnote format. The writing
throughout is lucid and engaging. We hope Kawar’s excellent book will inspire similar work among our colleagues.”

**Best Dissertation**

Co-Winners:

**Daisy Kim.** 2016. *Bargaining Citizenship: Women’s Organizations, the State, and Marriage Migrants in South Korea.* Submitted at Johns Hopkins University.


**Selection Committee:**
David FitzGerald (UC San Diego), Taeku Lee (UC Berkeley), Helen Marrow (Tufts University)

Committee’s Commentary:

(Kim)

“In her dissertation entitled “Bargaining Citizenship: Women’s Organizations, the State, and Marriage Migrants in South Korea”, Daisy Kim impressed the award committee by examining, with a rich array of qualitative methods, how female migration to South Korea has reshaped common understandings of citizenship, race, and ethnicity, specifically through an examination of international marriages, which have tripled in the last couple of decades. The central paradox Kim seeks to explain is why the South Korean government has proactively encouraged the immigration and incorporation of racially and ethnically diverse foreign brides, even as it continues to promote ideologies of racial and ethnic homogeneity. For Kim, the contradictions of Korea’s immigration politics, especially the conservative implementation of seemingly progressive legislation, reflect not just disjunctures between, or cooptation by, civil society actors by the Korean state, as existing scholars have argued before her. They also reflect competing interests among civil society actors themselves—especially Korean women’s organizations. To explain, by examining the interaction between state actors and women’s organizations in Korea, Kim argues that the discourse on women’s citizenship has long focused on women’s unpaid care and reproductive labor as wives and mothers in Korea and elsewhere. So while the women’s movement has certainly been central to the institutionalization of gender equality and women’s rights in the workplace and government, efforts to link
women’s rights with universal human rights in the past few decades have unintentionally buttressed patriarchal ideals of womanhood that, in the case of the women’s movement for migrant workers and marriage migrants in Korea, have resulted in policies and programs that aim to incorporate marriage migrants as wives and mothers, thereby prioritizing rights protection and service provision over political empowerment and agency. Thus, whereas political scientists and political sociologists have examined the tensions between political equality and racial and sexual inequality within the institution of citizenship, Kim challenges us to examine how movements for citizenship rights by women and racial minorities have themselves reinforced ideas that have been used to exclude marginalized populations. In this way, theoretically Kim approaches citizenship as the process by which state and non-state actors negotiate over individual and group rights and membership. Methodologically, she shows mastery of various methods in an international fieldwork setting, ranging from in-depth interviews with national and local Korean government officials, a survey of Korean multicultural family support centers, participant observation at those centers, and focus groups with immigrant communities as well as in-depth interviews with their representatives in pro-immigrant advocacy organizations."

(Tsourapas)

"In his dissertation entitled “Trading People, Consolidating Power: Emigration & Authoritarianism in Modern Egypt”, Gerasimos Tsourapas describes and explains Egyptian migration policy from the 1950s to the present. The committee was especially impressed by his ability to conduct his study under extremely difficult political conditions in a way that makes a grand stride forward in understanding the Egyptian case in particular, and more broadly, makes a theoretical intervention into the determinants of state emigration policy. Gerasimos interviewed key political leaders, conducted a content analysis of emigration coverage in three newspapers, and constructed an unprecedented dataset of Egyptian migration statistics. As a result of this work, he was able to challenge the received wisdom that movements out of the Middle East are primarily driven by economic factors and to highlight the national security origins of many policies. His nuanced account showing the different motivations and content of policies toward diverse groups of emigrants and returnees provides a lesson that will be broadly transportable to other contexts.”
Best Article

Winner:


Selection Committee:

Julie Novkov (University at Albany, SUNY), Maria Koinova (University of Warwick, UK), Cara Wong (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Committee’s commentary:

“What led us to select Professor Goodman’s article was its potential to strengthen scholarship in the field. Scholars who work on migration and citizenship often do so because they have a passionate desire to criticize how state policies and practices work, and to encourage positive policy changes. But in order for this work to be as effective as possible, strong empirical grounding is necessary. Professor Goodman’s article considers the major policy indices that scholars rely upon to develop their arguments. She illustrates that in thinking about policies, we need to have clearer concepts and sharper analytical boundaries when indices are developed. Through a thoughtful review of how indices are constructed alongside some concrete testing of questions using different indices, she shows convincingly that “What scholars know about the effects of immigration and citizenship policy is subject to data and sample selection.” Her article provides several sensible recommendations to improve how we think about and organize the data we use – with more attention to the construction of indices and the validity of the concepts used to sort information, scholars can produce better work that will ideally inform and drive their criticisms and recommendations for reform and transformation.”
Best Paper

Winner:

Anje Ellermann and Agustín Goenaga. 2016. Race, Gender, Class, Disability, and the Ethics of Immigrant Selection.

Honorable Mention:


Selection Committee:
James Hollifield (Southern Methodist University), Fiona Adamson (University of London, UK), Mara Sidney (Rutgers University)

Deadline for nominations for all awards (Best Article, Best Book, Best Chapter, Best Dissertation and Best Paper) is March 31, 2017.
Member Achievements

**Fiona B. Adamson** (Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London)

**Rainer Bauböck** (Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute)
- Edited (with Peter Scholten) “Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism”, *Comparative Migration Studies* 4(10).

**Kristy A. Belton** (Director of Professional Development, International Studies Association)
- Began a new position as Director of Professional Development for the International Studies Association.
- Published “Ending Statelessness through Belonging: A Transformative Agenda?”, *Ethics & International Affairs* 30(4): 419-427.
- Published “Heeding the Clarion Call in the Americas: The Quest to End Statelessness.” *Ethics & International Affairs* 31(1): 17-29.

**Irene Bloemraad** (Sociology, University of California, Berkeley)
- Published (with V. Terriquez) “Cultures of Engagement: The Organizational Foundations of Advancing Health in Low-Income Communities of Color”, *Social Science and Medicine* 165: 214-222.
- Published (with Els de Graauw) “Political Stories: Media Narratives of Political Participation by Asian Immigrants in the United States and Canada”, *Politics, Groups and Identities* 4(3): 425-443.

**Charles D. Brockett** (Political Science Sewanee: The University of the South)

**Els de Graauw** (Political Science, Baruch College, City University of New York)
- Published “Undocumented Immigrants and Identification Challenges,” a short essay in *People of Color in the United States*.
• Received an Advanced Research Collaborative Fellowship at the CUNY Graduate Center for Spring 2018.

Joel S. Fetzer (Political Science, Pepperdine University)
• Published “Opposition to Irish Travellers’ Halting Sites in the Republic of Ireland: Realistic Group Conflict or Symbolic Politics?”, Irish Journal of Sociology.
• Was the local arrangements host for the annual meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, October 7-9, 2016, at Pepperdine University.

Felipe A. Filomeno (Political Science, University of Maryland)
• Published “Theories of Local Immigration Policy”, Basingstoke (UK): Palgrave Macmillan.

Jill Goldenziel (Marine Corps University)
• Began in July a new position as Associate Professor at Marine Corps University-Command and Staff College.
• Published “Curse of the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in International Law”, Arizona State Law Journal 48(3).

Kelly M. Greenhill (Political Science, Tufts University)
• Received a 2017 National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Fellowship to support research on the influence on international politics of extra-factual information—such as rumors, conspiracy theories, and propaganda.
• Received a Faculty Research Senior Research Fellowship for AY 2017-18 in support of related research.

Jean-Michel Lafleur (Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liege)
• Published (with Mikolaj Stanek) “South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis”, Springer (Open Access).

Willem Maas (Political Science, Glendon College, York University)
• Is now Chair of the Department of Political Science, Glendon College, York University (Toronto, Canada).
James A. McCann (Political Science, Purdue University)
- Received (with Michael Jones-Correa) Research grant “2016 Latino Immigrant National Election Study (LINES),” Russell Sage Foundation.
- Published (with Michael Jones-Correa) the public-use dataset “The 2012 Latino Immigrant National Election Study.” Nationally representative survey of foreign-born Latino adults (*N*=1,304). Purdue University Research Repository.

Liza M. Mügge (Political Science, University of Amsterdam)
- Published “Bridging the Qualitative and Quantitative Divide in Comparative Migration Studies: Newspaper Data and Political Ethnography in Mixed Method Research”, *Comparative Migration Studies* 4(17): 1-17.

Harris Mylonas (Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University)
- Published (with Keith Darden) “Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality”, *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11): 1446-1479.
- Published “Never Alone/Find the Way” in James Faubion, Eugenia Georges and Gonda Van Steen (eds.) “Greece is Burning. Hot Spots”, *Cultural Anthropology*.

Jeffrey D. Pugh (Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance, University of Massachusetts, Boston)

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
• Received the International Studies Association (ISA) 2016 Outstanding Paper Award, presented by the Ethnicity, Nationalism and Migration Section (ENMISA) for the paper “A Networked Governance Approach to Host-Migrant Human Security and Peacebuilding: Evidence from Ecuador.”

Galya Ben-Arieh Ruffer (Political Science, Northwestern University)
• Received a Senior Fellowship from the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (University of Duisburg-Essen) for her project, “Does the Refugee Convention Regime Contribute to Refugee Protection? Understanding ‘Success’ in the Implementation of Refugee Status Determination Systems,” June-December 2016.

Alexander Sager (Philosophy, Portland State University)
• Published “Methodological Nationalism, Migration and Political Theory”, Political Studies 64(1): 42–59.

Michael Peter Smith (Human Ecology, University of California, Davis)
• Published “Explorations in Urban Theory”, TRANSACTION PUBL.

Sarah Song (Political Science, University of California, Berkeley)

Gerasimos Tsourapas (Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham)
• Is Lecturer of Middle East Politics at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham since October 1, 2016.

Monica W. Varsanyi (Political Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York)
• Published (with Doris Marie Provine, Paul G. Lewis and Scott Decker) “Policing Immigrants: Local Law Enforcement on the Front Lines”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tom K. Wong (Political Science, University of California, San Diego)
• Is now associate professor in Political Science at University of California, San Diego
Dvora Yanow (Communication, Philosophy and Technology, Wageningen University)

- Was awarded a fellowship at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, affiliated with the University of Duisburg-Essen in Duisburg, Germany.

NOTE: Please send Member News for the Summer edition of the Newsletter to Marc at marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de by July 15, 2017 with the subject “Member News” in the heading of the email.

Member news includes new publications, jobs, conferences organized (not attended), grants received, etc. since publication of the previous newsletter. Please use the following format: Name, affiliation in parentheses and then bullet points for each news item. E.g. Haley Comet (Catzrenein University)

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
Recent Books and Articles

Books

Citizenship


Governance


Human Trafficking


Law


Latino Studies


Migration


**Refugees**


Lokhande, Sanjeevini B. 2016. *Communal Violence, Forced Migration and the*


Religion


Articles

American Behavioral Scientist

Bloemraad, Irene, Heidy Sarabia, and Angela E. Fillingim. 2016. ““Staying out of Trouble” and Doing What Is “Right”. “


Comparative Politics

Honig, Lauren. 2016. “Immigrant Political Economies and Exclusionary Policy


**Electoral Studies**


**Ethnopolitics**


**European Journal of Political Research**


**Journal of Common Market Studies**


**Journal of Politics**


Political Geography


Political Research Quarterly


Third World Quarterly

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