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Letter from the Co-Presidents

Citizenship and immigration scholarship is central to revived and reshaped debates about populism. As nativism has surged, anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies have become a way to both stoke and satisfy discontent. But this is neither where populism begins nor ends.

In the US there are questions about whether this is at root racial resentment or rather is fueled by misdirected economic anxiety. In many European countries, where xenophobic political parties are newly popular but hardly new, claims that this is purely about material interests are harder to make. Furthermore, in either place it appears that the most visible and fervent supporters of nativism are not the very poorest people in their societies. They are not always even working class. Often those waving flags, hurling slurs, and voting for the far right are solidly middle class. The most likely sources of material uncertainty and loss they will face in their lives are not immigrants, whose presence often correlates with economic growth, but harder to pin down culprits such as climate change and unregulated capitalism. Seen this way, populism isn’t just unfortunate because it is often accompanied by racism and hatred. It is tragic because it trains our eyes inward on a smaller and more circumscribed nation at just the moment when our lives depend on solutions that require cooperation among a large and diverse set of actors.

Just as nations ought not to become myopic, so too should scholars look both outward and inward. It is tempting to view our work in this section solely through the lens of migration. Often it can seem as if more of our members focus on immigration-related research than any other single topic. But populism is not just about foreignness, strictly understood, or about limiting free movement. The circumscription of a nation happens at its physical margins and in its interior. The central claims of populists – that there is one true authentic people – can be used to justify expelling from the demos people who have generations-long history in a country and could never be understood as foreign-born.

Our research needs to be as attuned to how the citizenship rights of all persons are expanding or contracting. This means paying attention not just to immigration policies and immigrant reception, but also to a wide array of policies that are not inherently populist, but which can be marshaled in the service of a populist agenda. Understood in this way, an array of actions ranging from vote suppressing voter ID laws to racialized partisan gerrymandering are as much a part of a populist movement as is Brexit or building a border wall. They wall off whole segments of the population from the core rights of citizenship. Abortion rights restrictions can
be promoted by people who want to subjugate women. But they can simultaneously be a powerful tool for a pronatalist agenda that seeks to increase the population of ‘true’ citizens. Social welfare programs can be demonized as handing out a country’s resources to the undeserving and weak who aren’t self-sufficient while what Suzanne Mettler has termed ‘the submerged state’ operates undetected in ways that redistribute large quantities of resources to ostensibly more deserving and clearly more powerful members. None of these policies are inherently populist. But they can be advanced using populist language and in ways that achieve populist goals.

Not only is it the case that we want to look at how citizens, foreign-born persons, and immigrants fare when experiencing a wave of populism, but we will want to look as closely at internal politics of place as we do at immigration from outside the nation-state. As populism declares itself to be a movement to empower the true people of a nation, it becomes responsible for declaring who and where the people are. Fights over which regions of a country deserve resources or inclusion can reveal schisms about which populations are true citizens. Former colonies all around the world are likewise engaged in struggles about their relationship to the states and nations that colonized them.

Seen in this light, migration research is an important element of a larger agenda that seeks to understand how citizenship is enacted, expanded, restricted, and denied. Immigrants and people who seek to emigrate are exceptionally vulnerable to the same processes of exclusion that native-born people might be subject to but the processes are not just relevant to interstate migration. Our job as scholars is not just to produce data demonstrating phenomena and their causes, but also to see the connections between these phenomena and their sources.

To contact the Co-Presidents, email Elizabeth F Cohen (efcohen@maxwell.syr.edu) and Sara Wallace Goodman (swgood@uci.edu).
Letter from the Co-Editors

Fiona Barker  
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2019 marks two important anniversaries for liberal democracy and international cooperation: 30 years since the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and 70 years since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union were seen as a turning point, the ‘end of history’, and the triumph of liberal democracy over the last standing ideological alternative: communism. This year, however, celebrations will have a more cautious tone. History seems to be alive and kicking, with liberalism now more under attack than it has ever been in the last three decades. There is open talk of ‘illiberal democracy’ as a political goal in Hungary, both intra-European solidarity and trans-Atlantic cooperation are strained, and a resurgent identitarian politics of exclusion is evident around the globe.

Along with anti-establishment rhetoric, international migration occupies center stage. Politicians now talk about migratory flows as “crises.” This framing brings clear advantages: declaring a state of emergency or signaling the presence of a threat to national security and prosperity serves to justify the adoption of extraordinary measures or the empowerment of the executive to by-pass usual democratic processes in their policy responses. Politics as usual, goes the argument, simply does not work. Enter perpetual crisis mode. Such political rhetoric questions liberal democracies’ capacity to manage migration and handle diversity, in the short and long run, while remaining unsurprisingly vague about alternatives. While actual migration ebbs and flows in terms of numbers of border crossings, the idea of migratory crisis has become stuck on the radar of public opinion, where it is fueled by messages coming from both the mainstream and fringes of the political spectrum. National emergency politics of migration have not been effective: in the Mediterranean Sea, at the US-Mexico border, in Lampedusa, Ceuta and Melilla, at Pas de Calais, on the border between Spain and France, in detention centers in the Pacific Islands, and at refugee processing centers in Africa, international migration crises remain ‘unsolved’ despite interventions, securitization, outsourcing, and enhanced international cooperation. (The controversial agreement between Turkey and the European Union seems to have had some success, but civil society organizations question its costs.) If framed as crisis, and with no clear time horizons for resolution, this situation can seem to justify the indefinite extension of ‘state of emergency’ politics.
An alternative framing of international migratory flows is not as a crisis, but rather as the new normal. Migrants will continue to cross borders and all countries, developed and developing, depend on international migration in various ways, whether they acknowledge it or not. Approaching migration as the new normal would allow countries and citizens to contemplate an end to state of emergency politics when it comes to migration management. It would also shift the focus of immigration policy from borders to society, and the need to preserve national political community and build solidarity. It could reenergize liberal democracies by placing discussions about the meaning of citizenship, patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the impacts of marginalization at the core of policy-making. It would revive conversations about belonging, inequality, and the management of difference. It would shed new light on the question of how democratic polities can, in the context of growing diversity, reconcile the tensions between democracy (a political system predicated on equality: equal rights for all citizens, equality before the law, equal power to influence politics by voting) and capitalism (an economic system that sees inequality as natural and to be expected).

Migration scholarship plays an important role in examining political conversations about migration and diversity, both in its historical and contemporary forms. Our research can provide much-needed context and perspective in times that are often portrayed in the political sphere as exceptional or unprecedented. A good place to start is by investigating the rhetorical act of framing contemporary international migrations as crises, and the consequences this framing has for democratic politics and societies.

We are delighted to introduce this Spring 2019 Migration and Citizenship Newsletter. The contributions in this issue’s Symposium on Populism and Immigration address directly many of the issues mentioned above related to the framing of migration as crisis, with all the attendant impacts on policy making, electoral politics and management of identity and diversity in liberal democracies.

We inaugurate a Methods Corner in the newsletter. We introduce this section as a space for debate and fruitful conversations about current methodological issues in the study of migration and citizenship. We invite members to respond to this issue’s column on immigration datasets and to suggest other issues for section-wide discussion as we collectively seek to advance knowledge and understanding on the politics of migration and citizenship worldwide.

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Introducing the Graduate Student Members of the Executive Council

Beyza Ekin Büyüker, University of Illinois at Chicago (2017-2019)

Beyza Ekin Büyüker is a Fulbright alumnus and currently a PhD candidate at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research focus is on the role of intergroup relations structured around race, ethnicity, or religion, in shaping public opinion about democratic norms and institutions.

Her dissertation project “Democracy and the "Other": Out-group Attitudes and Support for Anti-Democratic Norms” examines how racial and anti-immigrant prejudice affects support for anti-democratic norms among whites in the U.S. For the most part, democracy and its discontents have been studied from institutional perspectives. However, the public has the power to choose leaders, and support political institutions and policies, which could, in turn, affect the level of conflict in a democratic society (either by escalating or mitigating it). When the majority group in a diverse society chooses which features of democracy to support, central to these choices are, in her view, attitudes towards racial, ethnic or religious groups. Her research agenda is designed to answer the following question: what is the role of intergroup dynamics in shaping majority group attitudes toward the norms and institutions of democracy in America and elsewhere? Her work analyzes data from the ANES and World Values Survey (WVS) as well as original survey experiments with white American respondents. Through these analyses, she demonstrates a causal relationship between racial and anti-immigrant prejudice and support for anti-democratic norms and institutions in the U.S. Her research has been supported by UIC’s Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy (IRRPP) and was recently awarded the Doris G. Graber Award for Best Paper in Public Opinion at the 2018 Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research conference.

Rita Nassar, Indiana University (2018-2020)

Rita Nassar is a PhD candidate at Indiana University in Bloomington. Her research focuses on public opinion and immigration in the United States.

Her dissertation project “Threat, Prejudice, and Media Exposure: American Attitudes toward Refugee Resettlement” examines the role of threat and media frames in influencing attitudes toward refugee resettlement in the United States. Her research looks at the discourse of different media outlets in the U.S. and the different frames used to discuss refugee resettlement. Using original survey-experiments, she examines whether exposure to frames popular in the media, including those emphasizing different types of threat and those focused on humanitarianism, influence individuals’ attitudes toward refugee resettlement. Her work has been supported by Indiana University’s Center on American Politics.

Her research interests include immigration, race and ethnicity, public opinion, and political communication.

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Reflections on the Job Market:

For many graduate students, the job market feels like the great unknown. Having consulted with colleagues, we would like to offer some of advice they have shared with us.

The primary goal, reiterated by many, is to get to the job market having had experience publishing journal articles. Both the quality and the quantity of publications matter, though having publications in reputable journals should be prioritized.

A few months before applying for jobs, set up a professional website and ensure that your research and CV can easily be found online.

For those who have started the interview process, having a polished job market paper should be a priority. Most people will, at the very least, read the abstract and the introduction, which should be as polished as possible. Presenting the paper often and revising it multiple times will ensure that the paper is as ready as it can be by the time of the interviews. Prepare a one-minute and a five-minute explanation of what your dissertation is about and why it matters; these brief explanations can be useful when meeting other colleagues.

Departments tend to organize job talks for students who will soon be on the job market. Attending others’ practice job talks early on and holding your own practice job talk a few months before going on the market can be helpful in understanding what those talks entail. The Q&A session following these talks often makes job candidates feel defensive. Instead they should be thought of as a dialogue regarding the ideas you are putting forth. If your department does not organize practice job talks, consider asking for one or have other graduate students and colleagues give you feedback.

Finally, being on the job market tends to be tedious and unpredictable. Practice self-care and always trust yourself and your work!

To gain further insights into the current and future state of the Migration and Citizenship field, as well as to get advice on issues such as the job market, publishing strategies and communicating your research to broader audiences, we encourage you to attend the APSA Migration and Citizenship Pre-Conference, to be held on Wednesday, 28 August 2019 at George Mason University. In addition to attending panels you will have an option of participating in a Mentorship Lunch and you will benefit from other networking opportunities with senior scholars from around North America and Europe. We are happy to let you know that a limited number of travel stipends for the Pre-Conference will be available for graduate students.

To contact the Co-Presidents, email Beyza Ekin Büyüker (bbuyuk2@uic.edu) and Rita Nassar (rnassar@iu.edu)

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APSA Migration & Citizenship Pre-Conference

Wed, August 28, 2019
8:30 AM – 5:00 PM EDT

George Mason University, Arlington Campus, Founders Hall
3351 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201

Convener: Justin Gest
Hosted by the Schar School of Policy and Government

A 15-minute ride from APSA’s meeting site, the inaugural APSA Migration & Citizenship Section Pre-Conference brings together world-class young and senior scholars to confront questions unaddressed at the main event:

- What will be the state of the field in ten years?
- How do we address new methodological challenges?
- How can migration and citizenship research change public debate?

No fees to attend. Breakfast, lunch, and snacks included!
A limited number of travel stipends are available for graduate students.

PANELS INCLUDE:

CAREER ADVANCES
How can migration and citizenship scholars best prepare themselves for the job market, promotion, and tenure? How should they orient themselves in political science subfields? How should they approach journal and book publication? How should they manage interdisciplinary orientations? How much do they need to conform?

METHODS CHALLENGES
What are the emerging challenges to conducting research on migration and citizenship subjects? What are the best strategies to surmount them? How should scholars approach issues like social desirability bias or research on vulnerable and hard-to-reach constituencies? How can researchers mitigate the risks associated with studying volatile subject matters?

POLICY PRACTITIONERS ROUNDTABLE
How can migration and citizenship scholars best prepare their research findings for practical application? What are the strategies for integrating research and evaluation into government programs? What are the best ways to communicate important research findings to broader audiences?

MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 2030
What is the future of migration and citizenship studies? Which subject matters are understudied? Which are crowded or saturated? What kinds of questions persist and what kinds of questions are driving new thought?

Full program and registration details for the APSA Migration & Citizenship Pre-Conference available HERE.

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Introduction: Understanding and Responding to Populism

Fiona Barker
Victoria University of Wellington

Fifteen years on from Cas Mudde’s (2004) observation that western democracies were in the grip of a ‘populist Zeitgeist’, populism seems, even more, to be everywhere. While left-populist manifestations, or more positive interpretations grounded in populism as majoritarianism, also exist, most current discussion centers on the nativist, right-wing and, in some cases, authoritarian brand of populism. Thus, while populism is wider than immigration, migration and associated issues (e.g. resurgent nationalism, xenophobia, insider/outside politics) are nonetheless a common thread in the populism currently in evidence on every continent.

The articles in this Symposium address a diverse set of issues related to populism, drawing in each case on contributors’ current research agendas. Some contributors explicitly address the causes of nativist populism, considering the ‘whole polemical package’ of economic, cultural and identity anxieties that motivate white working class voter support for populist politicians (Justin Gest), as well as the failure of mainstream political parties to provide persuasive responses to immigration and its associated anxieties (Anna Grzymala Busse). The sources of populism are also seen, in line with Pinelli’s (2011) arguments, to lie in the shrinking space given to democratic deliberation due to technocratic policy making on immigration (Ruxandra Paul), as well as in the very institutions of identity and belonging (e.g. citizenship rules) in liberal democracies, whose expansionary tendencies in defining the people arguably place liberalism and populism on an ‘inevitable collision course’ (Sara Wallace Goodman).

Other contributions consider dilemmas that intersect with, or flow out of, the migration-driven elements of populism. For instance, Beyza Büyüker analyzes the decline in democratic norms in Turkey, which appears to be associated with wider trends in out-group hostility. Michael Paarlberg then offers a compelling account of how some of the current migration flows towards the United States border— which are politicized and framed as a security threat by the Trump Administration— can be traced to the consequences of past and present criminal deportation policies.

The dilemmas for liberal democracies identified by the symposium articles are weighty and complex. And the authors pose important questions to which we need to find answers in any attempt to surmount populism: How should mainstream political parties respond so as to ‘pre-empt’ populists and deprive them of oxygen? (Grzymala Busse) How should liberal democracies ‘balance inclusion and boundary maintenance’ in their policies on citizenship and identity? (Wallace Goodman) How can we identify and combat the social and political dynamics that give rise to anti-democratic norms? (Büyüker) Should migration policy be re-politicized to counteract the negative consequences of depoliticization and technocratic decision making over time? (Paul)

Even if the authors do not, for the most part, seek to provide direct answers to these questions, by taking the contributions together common themes emerge that could offer suggestions for scholars, activists and politicians alike, as they reflect on how to combat the politics
of exclusion underpinning populism today. First, if immigration (and thus policy responses to migration) is at the heart of the rise and success of nativist and authoritarian populist politics, then so must creative and strong policy making on immigration and diversity be at the heart of any effective responses to populism. Migration and diversity are permanent features of contemporary societies; depoliticizing or wishing away the social, economic or cultural anxieties that drive anti-immigration sentiment has clearly not been successful. Thus, mainstream politicians need to focus on identifying which policies and institutional settings could work to build up – rather than break down – solidarity, community and shared sense of identity in liberal democracies.

Second, perhaps the most striking common element across the Symposium contributions is the importance of leadership. In some cases this comes in the form of use and abuse of positions of leadership to foment xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric or policies, which not only encourage social division and exclusion, but can also (in the case Paarlberg describes) lead to downstream consequences in the form of violence, insecurity and future migration pressure. In other cases, what is notable is the abdication of leadership by those in the political mainstream who choose the electorally expedient option of adopting the discourse and framing of the extreme-right on issues of migration. In yet other cases, problems seem to stem from the absence of political leadership in decision making on immigration. Absent democratically elected leaders in policy deliberations, technocratic decision making (for all the other advantages it might offer) arguably creates disconnects between politics and populace, which populist leaders seize upon to unite anti-immigrant and anti-elite arguments.

If poor, misused or absent leadership drives the worst types of populist politics, then we need responsible, sensitive and reflective leadership to right the liberal democratic ship. In light of the problems and sources of populism identified in this Symposium, an anti-populist leadership would need to hear and acknowledge the legitimate fears and concerns that citizens may hold, while also directly confronting and coherently developing policy and institutional responses to immigration and changing societies. In this way, anti-populist leaders could more successfully claim to be speaking ‘on behalf of’ those parts of the population who consider themselves ‘ordinary’ yet ‘unheard’ (Canovan 1999), even as they also strive to include migrant or ethnic minorities who have been structurally excluded for so long. In responding to the recent terrorist attack on the Al Noor and Linwood mosques in Christchurch by a White supremacist, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (2019) argued that humanity must be the value that informs political responses to issues such as extremism and populism. This seems fundamental to the type of leadership that would be required to build up solidarity and a shared sense of belonging in contemporary societies; it also seems to be a value in short supply at the moment. Ardern also stated that the responsibility to fight xenophobia and hate lies with everyone in society, on a daily basis. This reminds us that, of course, citizens, grass-roots movements, and whole communities also have a large part to play in demanding the right kind of leadership as our societies confront the thorny dilemmas thrown up by, and leading to, populism in the 21st Century.

References


Canovan, Margaret. 1999. ‘Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy.’ *Political Studies* 47: 2-16.


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Please direct inquiries about the Symposium's Introductory Article to Fiona Barker (fiona.barker@vuw.ac.nz)
The politics of populism is the politics of belonging. Who belongs? Who decides? Answering these questions positions liberal democrats—charged with preserving equal protection and rights, neutrality and pluralism—against a strong backlash of populist opponents, who claim to represent the interests of the authentic “we” group. In liberal democracies, the terms of “who belongs” are decided by elected governments when they pass and amend immigration and citizenship laws, i.e., the rules and procedures that allow (or not) outsiders to become insiders. It is these very rules—when they support inclusion, multiculturalism and other liberal positions—that become the focus of populist attack.

The populist threat to liberal democracy has become a topic of central concern, with explanations for its rise pointing to sociotropic factors (Ford and Goodwin 2014), economic grievances, nostalgia (Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2017), and democratic institutional erosion not as a product of populism but a cause (Howe 2017, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). This essay offers a novel perspective by inserting the politics of belonging, namely that of national citizenship, into the story. But more than just a traditional cause-effect account, where citizenship liberalization provokes a restrictive backlash, this argument looks more critically at the institution itself—what liberal democracies are required to do in terms of maintaining social boundaries, how boundaries adapt to demographic and social change, and how populist nationalists gain popularity through an illiberal democratic response.

My central argument is that institutions of identity are not only the site but the source of this contestation. Liberal democratic states are forced to adapt to their changing populations, aligning norms and actions, but this very act of boundary maintenance becomes—to the populists—an illegitimate act. The essence of populism is defining and defending the “pure people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Liberal democracy in an age of demographic change is, at root, about expanding the definition of the people. This puts populism and liberalism on an inevitable collision course: any liberal democracy that redefines citizenship opens itself to populist challenge.

First, liberal democratic nation-states—like states more generally—have a requirement to maintain boundaries. This is true territorially (in the form of borders, to establish and identify the bounds of sovereignty) and socially, through citizenship (Brubaker 1992). States do not draw lines between “us” and “them” for their own sake: they need political boundaries for administrative purposes, like allocating and extracting resources. Liberal democratic states face additional constrains in establishing boundedness. Political theorists mostly take as a given that liberal principles like personal autonomy, state impartiality and tolerance, can only be realized in bounded settings (Kymlicka 1991, Cf. Benhabib 2002). And democracies require clear definition of whom they represent and who can vote. Put together, then, the boundedness of liberal democracy—a core state power that also establishes democratic legitimacy—is vulnerable to demographic
Regulating “insiders” and “outsiders” is a democratic imperative, but defining just terms for exclusion is a liberal one.¹

My argument holds that it is not just how states respond to immigrant-related demographic change, but that they respond. The second step of this argument is that liberal democracies are drawn by normative mandates to expand or shift social boundaries. This can be accomplished many ways: citizenship liberalization; expansion of the franchise, where non-citizens get local voting rights; inclusion through entitlements; multicultural policies; adjustments to immigration rules, etc. When this happens, national populists mobilize against perceived national displacement. These inclusionary steps—made to adjust the national boundary to preserve pluralism without compromising democratic principles—become institutions of identity that populist claim to defend.

Finally, I develop an argument that describes why we see populist backlashes in some advanced industrialized democracies and not others as a function of the timing of boundary consolidation. Canada and Japan both represent models where boundaries were codified early on (the former, locking in linguistic and cultural diversity to its federal DNA; the latter, delaying immigration and inclusion in preserving ethnic homogeneity). Where consolidation was drawn out or iterative, in the case of shrinking empire (Great Britain), large-scale immigration and reunification (Germany), negotiation of belonging became part of the identity itself.

So how do liberal democratic states balance inclusion and boundary maintenance? It is a problem that hearkens back to James Hollifield’s (1992) observation of the liberal paradox over three decades ago, where states balance economic openness (immigration) with political closure (negative public opinion and restrictions rhetoric). Today, however, mainstream populists have taken up the cause. How can liberal democratic states move forward, when exclusion is not an option? Make identity too monocultural and narrow, and it either becomes rejected by the public at large or becomes ethnocultural, exposing immigrants, ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable populations to real harm and forsaking liberalism itself. Make identity too multicultural, and it is subject to derision and populist capture. Make identity too thin, and it becomes nothing at all.

Whether governments are able to navigate these dilemmas of policy design has direct implications for social cohesion, minority rights and recognition, immigrant accommodation and, the very fate of the modern liberal democratic state.

References


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¹ This challenge echoes Habermas’ (1998: 115) “Janus face of the modern nation,” where states act in the name of universal principles but within the boundaries of particularistic national communities

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Please direct inquiries about “Institutions of Identity and National Populism” to Sara Wallace Goodman (swgood@uci.edu)
Democracy and the “Other”

Beyza Ekin Büyüker
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Illinois Chicago

In recent years, we have increasingly felt the vulnerability of democratic norms not only in the US but also in many other countries across the world. The pattern of populist leaders going after the courts, the media, universities, and any opposition is increasingly seen in Europe; specifically, in Hungary, Poland, Austria, and Turkey.

Since the end of WWII, scholars have assumed that once democracy is consolidated, it persists (Linz & Stephan 1996). The current political environment, however, begs the following question: Can democracies break down? Recent studies caution that erosion of public support for key democratic norms and institutions has been developing in the US and Europe with scholars finding an unexpected degree of openness to nondemocratic alternatives (Foa & Mounk 2016, 2017; Howe 2017; Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). Research shows that twenty-four percent of young Americans consider democracy to be a “very bad” or “bad” way of running a government (Foa & Mounk 2017). In Europe, the percentage of millennials who believe it essential to live in a democratically governed country is thirty percent lower compared to the generation born before WWII (Foa & Mounk 2017). In Turkey, only thirty-seven percent of millennials believe it essential to live in a democratically governed country (WVS 2012). Even though overall support for democracy is still considerably high, these patterns suggest a deep vulnerability for democratic norms and institutions. What causes people’s cynicism towards democracy?

Erosion of democratic norms and institutions comes at a time when these societies have become more diverse and there is an increasing anti-immigrant and anti-minority sentiment, particularly on the right. In Turkey, the influx of Syrian refugees and ongoing Kurdish conflict creates tension with native Turks. A recent survey found sixty-six per cent of Turks believe moral values and traditions in Turkey are in danger because of the increasing Syrian population. Of those surveyed, eighty-seven percent were opposed to their daughters marrying a Syrian, while seventy-four percent did not accept their children making friends with their Syrian peers (Erdogan & Semerci 2017).

As I argued in my previous work (Buyuker 2018), this parallel suggests that a broader pattern of out-group hostility among a subsection of the Turkish public could be an important force behind the rising disregard for democratic norms. While Erdogan jails his opponents and controls the media outlets to consolidate his power, his divisive rhetoric about Turkish superiority compared to other ethnic groups appears to be fostering negative attitudes towards Syrians and Kurds among a significant portion of native Turks. Data from the 2012 World Values Survey signaled this years ago. Among Turks who expressed high levels of ethnic prejudice, sixty-two percent believed “having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections” is a good or very good way of running the government. Of those who score high on prejudice, fifty-six percent endorsed having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. These numbers are likely conservative estimates for Turkey since the timing of the survey was only a year after the start of the Syrian war. Further analysis with more recent data would probably reveal increasing support for anti-democratic norms, given the current state
of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the ongoing Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Since these recent studies forewarn the possible erosion of democratic norms and institutions, it becomes crucial for political scientists to understand the dynamics that give rise to such sentiments. This is also the case here at home, in an environment where Americans witness daily violations of political norms coupled with anti-racial and anti-immigrant rhetoric, it would not be surprising if the support for anti-democratic norms in the United States also increases in the near future.

References


Please direct inquiries about “Democracy and the “Other”” to Beyza Ekin Büyüker (bbuyuk2@uic.edu)
Why is immigration so pivotal to populist and white working class voters?

Justin Gest
George Mason University


Vote-switching is rather rare in the United States and Europe. However, populist parties and candidates have recently attracted new voters who previously supported the Center-Left, Center-Right, or did not vote at all. In my own research on white working class people in the United States and Britain (Gest 2016; Gest et al. 2018), I have traced support for the Radical Right to “nostalgic deprivation”—a sense of lost political power and status to newly ascendant immigrant-origin minorities. More directly, Loren Collingwood, Tyler Reny, and Ali Valenzuela (2019) have found that the principal driver for such vote-switching among Americans is backlash against immigration among white working-class people. Inversely, they found that individuals with positive views about immigration were most likely to switch from the Republican Party to vote for Hillary Clinton. All this was affirmed by John Sides, Michael Tesler, Lynn Vavreck (2018), who find that such American vote-switchers were motivated by a desire to preserve the Christian faith, deport undocumented immigrants, reduce immigration, and that they scored high on metrics of racial resentment. But why?

Immigration offers the whole polemical package. It features the politics of job creation. Do immigrants create new jobs with all the businesses they start and products they innovate? Do they accept and perform unwanted jobs? Or do they compete with natives for jobs? It features the politics of trade. Do immigrants undermine unions or bolster them? Do immigrants keep companies from offshoring work? Do companies exploit temporary labor visas to replace the native-born? It features the politics of welfare. Are immigrants net recipients of or contributors to the welfare state? It features the politics of criminal justice. Is immigration enforcement deporting valuable contributors to society and destroying families? Are we letting criminals stay? It features the politics of foreign affairs. Do countries have a humanitarian obligation to welcome refugees? Are immigrants a source of international terrorism?

Most of all, immigration features the politics of identity. The fire of nationalism is stoked by immigration because the arrival of newcomers raises broad, existential questions about how a nation should be defined and what its future ought to be. Based on what criteria should we select immigrants? What predicts or prepares people for integration? According to what standards should we integrate newcomers? What are the qualifications for being an American? What are British values? There are no easy answers to such questions, particularly when these countries are already quite diverse, and narrow understandings would alienate large numbers of citizens. Modernity has seen the questioning, reinterpretation, and evolution of orthodoxies in every regard. This has revived efforts to reinforce (and re-create) national understandings of heritage, but it also has fostered a recognition that there is strength in diversity.

The native-born—not merely white people—always understand their national identity with more complexity and nuance than they understand the identity of newcomers. Consequently, immigrants’ culture and attributes always appear far more strident and unified than one’s own. This truth was inadvertently expressed by Financial Times columnist Christopher Caldwell in his alarmist 2009 book about the threat Muslims pose to European democracies, Reflections on the...
Revolution in Europe. In it, he referred to European societies as “hospitable,” “insecure,” and “malleable.” In contrast, he depicted Islam as “anchored,” “confident,” and “adversarial.” However, Islam is a religion with dozens of sects, thousands of traditions, and a cacophony of beliefs that has left it irreconcilably splintered. Imagine how “anchored,” “confident,” and “adversarial” European states appear when they are able to align into a 27-country supranational union.

Of course, those inside the European Union perceive a thin consensus and threats to national sovereignty. For many white working-class people there, the EU and its open internal borders represent precisely the threat that globalization poses. Many Americans are similarly perturbed by how the movement of people, money, and culture blurs national distinctions—cheapening them by endowing newcomers with membership, bending to accommodate their differences, and importing commercial and cultural products from overseas. This is a far greater threat both to people who do not have the resources to make use of these products and opportunities and to people who derive their self-worth from their sense of heritage.

According to the survey data presented in Figures 1 and 2, white working-class people place greater value in heritage-based attributes than all others when defining the American and British identities. More than the general American population, white people without university degrees believe that, to be truly American, people need to have American ancestry, American traditions, an American birth, and fluency in English. More than the general British population, white working-class respondents believed that, to be truly British, people needed to have British ancestry, a British birth, and, in some cases, a Christian faith. These factors don’t accord with official qualifications for American and British citizenship. While immigrant admissions were once explicitly or implicitly dictated by race and ethnic heritage, the requirements since the 1960s have focused on length of residency and good conduct. As the ranks of North American and European citizens swell with people from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, heritage is perceived to be devalued.

Ultimately, any country that offers the possibility of naturalization must recognize that the composition of their society will change with immigration—that there is no such thing as “full assimilation.” However, this truth has been hard to accept for many in Europe, where national identities can theoretically be traced back to antiquity. It has also been controversial in settler states like the United States and Australia. In a precursor to Caldwell’s Muslim panic, Samuel Huntington published a book (2004) that similarly warned Americans of the threat posed by Latinos—Mexicans in particular. Huntington argued that the United States was defined by an “Anglo-Protestant creed” throughout its history, and that all immigrants assimilated into this creed until it fell “under assault by diversity.” Mexicans, he argued, had the capacity to alter that creed because of their size, concentration, proximity, and refusal to integrate. Subsequent research has demonstrated that Mexicans and other Latinos integrate into the United States very well, particularly considering that most arrive with fewer resources than other immigrants (inter alia, Citrin, et al. 2007). Yet Huntington’s book exemplified the types of concerns raised by demographic change that have inspired today’s populist wave. It was very aptly titled: Who Are We?
Figure 1: The distribution of responses to “To be truly American how important is it to ___?” among the white working class and everyone else.
Source: 2016 ANES

Figure 2: The distribution of responses to “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly British. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?” among the white working class and everyone else.
Source: 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey.

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Please direct inquiries about "Why is Immigration so Important to Populist and White Working Class Voters?” to Justin Gest (jgest@gmu.edu)
The controversies over immigration have been a godsend for European populist parties: immigration defines populist constituencies; it poses a perceived threat to their supporters’ welfare; and it shows the feebleness of the mainstream parties. Already, the increase in immigration in the 1960s is strongly correlated to the rise in support for populist parties. If they started out with less than 5% average electoral support in the 1960s, they now top over 20% (and in the newer democracies of East Central Europe, the average vote for populist parties is now over 30%).

Populist parties make two claims: that the establishment elites are malign and corrupt, and that, as a result, the good and decent people need to be better represented (Mudde 2004, Stanley 2008). These claims are illiberal, in that they view formal institutions such as the rule of law as the creatures of the corrupt elite. Yet populist parties are not inherently authoritarian; they support popular democracy and seek electoral victories rather than coups. (That said, once they are in government, their illiberalism leads these parties to undermine formal democratic institutions, as they have in Poland and in Hungary).

Populist parties are as diverse as they are ubiquitous in Europe. They range from the conservative and culturally very traditional Law and Justice Party in Poland, to the Swedish Democrats in the former social-democratic stronghold of Sweden, to the Alternative for Germany, which traveled a surprisingly quick path from a pro-austerity party to electoral success as an anti-immigrant and right-wing populist party, polling nearly 13% in 2017. Populist parties also include the governing Cinque Stelle, an ideologically amorphous but strongly anti-immigrant party in Italy, or the left-wing Syriza in Greece, which rose to power on the basis of its critique of EU-imposed austerity after the economic crises that began in 2009 (and continue a decade later.) And in all these cases, anti-immigrant sentiment is one of the biggest predictors of support for all the populist parties in Europe, on both the Left and the Right (Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico 2017).

So how does immigration feed into these parties’ rise and support? First, it helps to define the “people” the parties claim to represent. Here, immigrants and other marginalized and vulnerable groups provide a convenient Other, the boundary where the “people” end. As a result, while populism is distinct from xenophobia or nativism, it marries with these sentiments all too well. Populist parties in Europe have stoked nativism and nationalism in an attempt to represent and protect what they see as the “real” nation of native-born citizens. The scapegoats are often Muslim immigrants from Africa and the Middle East—but Polish immigrants who moved to the United Kingdom have also been a target, especially in the run up to the Brexit vote.

Second, populist parties have successfully portrayed immigration as a threat to the most treasured and most vulnerable aspects of European society—the dense network of public services and welfare provisions established after World War II. Many voters already see this
safety net as fraying—only to be strained to breaking point by waves of new potential claimants to education, training, health services, housing, and welfare provisions. Accordingly, welfare chauvinism has been a powerful rallying cry of the populists, combining both cultural anxieties over diluting national identities, and economic fears. As a result, explanations for the populist wave that try to isolate either “cultural” or “economic” drivers miss the point—immigration is both.

Third, the failure of mainstream parties to address immigration, among other issues, has been a powerful force in the rise of populist parties. Populist parties criticize the existing mainstream political parties as both collusive, offering similar (and similarly ineffective) policy solutions, and as self-serving, relying on state resources to survive and entrench themselves. And there is some credibility to these critiques: as scholars of European political cleavages have pointed out, the center-Left has moved far closer to the Right, through ideological compromises and “Third Way” solutions that abandoned traditional trade unions and state-driven public investment and redistribution policies (Berman 2016). The result was the perception of an undifferentiated political elite, uninterested in articulating policy alternatives. In the newer post-communist democracies, similar elite consensus in the run up to the 2004 accessions to the European Union further meant that the only critics of the EU projects would be the populist parties—who then capitalized on this criticism once these countries entered the EU (Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). The center-Right, for its part, has flirted with the xenophobia and nativism of the right-wing populists, fearing electoral competition on the right that would undermine the mainstream conservative parties. The result is both a perception of a general consensus on policy—and the rise of populists as the main critics of immigration, articulating the fears and anxieties other parties fail to address adequately, much less resolve.

The perception that the mainstream parties have failed to seriously address immigration and other issues drives populist support. It is not economics: populist parties have succeeded both where the economic crisis brought about a near-collapse of the economy (Greece) and in countries untouched by the crises (Poland.) It is not simply levels of existing immigration—populist parties have won votes where immigration soared recently (Germany) and where it is nearly entirely absent (Czech Republic). Rather, populists articulate popular threats and anxieties about immigration, and credibly criticize the mainstream consensus for its failure to address these.

What kind of policy solutions could pre-empt the populists? Popular support for immigration appears to increase when there is perceived equity among countries in receiving immigrants (immigrants are allocated proportionally among countries, according to their carrying capacity: its GDP, unemployment rates, population density, etc. (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2017). Yet the recent history of the EU immigrant allocation scheme, which strove to follow proportionality, calls this into question. More robust integration efforts, and the insistence on enforcing existing national immigration laws, may help (Fukuyama 2018). These are tall orders: they require the kind of elite debate and coordination that has eluded Europe so far.

Until then, perceived threats of immigration foment populist support. Yet is it not enough to simply criticize populist parties as threats to democracy, or dismiss their supporters as biased or racist. Without a serious, coherent, and systematic consideration of immigration by mainstream political actors, populist parties will steadily move from the margins to governments.

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How Depoliticizing Migration Led to Populism: Lessons from Europe

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Is it possible to take politics out of migration policy? If so, to what extent and at what cost for democracy? Interventions that depoliticize immigration policy by insulating it from democratic processes and deliberation carry considerable risks. When mainstream political parties seek to depoliticize migration, populist anti-immigration parties gain ground by claiming to restore “the people’s right” to have a say.

The current surge of populism draws strength from its readiness to put immigration at the top of electoral agendas. For decades, the political mainstream has often avoided talking about immigration during election season to avoid hyper-politicization. For the mainstream center left (socialist and social democratic parties), immigration is toxic (Bale et al 2010; Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen 2004). When social democrats shift right to gain votes on immigration, they become vulnerable to left-wing and/or extreme left challengers who claim ownership over issues like human rights, migrant integration, solidarity and equality, i.e. the pillars of left-wing ideology (Kitschelt 1994). When social democrats come across as lax on migration, they are challenged by opponents on the right, who frame immigration within the broader themes of security and public order (for center-right parties) or threats to national sovereignty and the perils of European integration (for extreme right parties), issues traditionally owned by the right. Restrictive immigration policies hold broad appeal for working-class voters and trade unions who fear the impact of foreign workers on wages, work conditions, the welfare state, and labor market competition, as well as on trade unions’ bargaining power in general (Penninx and Roosblad 2000). The failure of the mainstream left to talk coherently about immigration generated a window of opportunity that populists have used in Europe since the late 1970s.

To avoid politicizing, the mainstream pushed for evidence-based approaches, to manage migration in a neutral, rational, and scientific way. The “technocratic mode of settlement” expects that political debates around immigration can be settled by recourse to expert knowledge or research (Boswell 2009). The implications are highly problematic: politicians are portrayed as incapable of creating sound, coherent policies under electoral pressure. The ‘solution’ is for technocracy to replace politics (Oelgemöller 2017).

At the national level, a depoliticized migration policy approach might rely on technocrats insulated from public opinion (imagine an immigration-policy equivalent of the Fed). Alternatively, it might simply reflect a belief among policy-makers that reforms ought to be fact-driven and rely on expert evidence. At the international level, depoliticizing involves new regimes for mobility management based on recommendations from intergovernmental or supranational organizations (bodies of specialists that provide ‘scientific’, ‘technical’ or ‘managerial’ expertise). Several institutions assist governments in migration management: the International...
Organization for Migration (motto: “Managing migration for the benefit of all”); the International Center for Migration Policy Development; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Migration and Refugees. These institutions have been criticized for being de-democratizing (secrecy and insulation from popular participation); allowing governments to make policy-making even less transparent; claiming that the decisions implemented are those that any intelligent person in a position of authority would make when confronted with accurate information, and assuming that there is such a thing as uncontested and accurate information (Oelgemöller 2017). Critics point out that knowledge presented as ‘factual’, ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ often reflects political orientations. Migration management negates the existence of divergent interests, asymmetries of power, and conflicts (between and within countries), to produce a façade of consensus (after all, who is in favor of disorderly migration, human trafficking or non-respect of migrants’ rights?) (Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

In the EU, the European Commission serves as a repository of knowledge and expertise, mandated to act in the general European interest, as an impartial and independent body (Nugent 2001). The Commission is “a technocratic body. The individuals working there are selected based on their expertise rather than their political savviness” (Kostadinova 2017: 20). The Commission provides expertise to depoliticize policy-making, to facilitate economic integration and prevent international conflict.

In 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis, the so-called Dublin system that EU countries use for managing refugee migration came under severe pressure. According to European legislation, asylum seekers have to apply for refugee status in the country that constitutes their first point of entry on EU territory. That member state then accepts or rejects the claim. To prevent asylum shopping, migrants cannot simultaneously apply in multiple member states or restart the process in another jurisdiction. As migrant inflow from the Middle East and Africa rose to unprecedented levels (2 million irregular entries in 2015), member states on the EU’s external border – Italy, Greece, Croatia and Hungary – were overwhelmed. Not only did they not have the capacity and resources to process so many migrant arrivals, but they also faced resistance as migrants hoping to transit these countries’ territory did everything they could to escape authorities trying to register them at the point of entry. Asylum seekers had no intention of staying in Eastern or Southern Europe: instead, they wanted to reach Western Europe or Scandinavia where they had better chances of receiving refugee status and benefiting from generous integration programs and social services. In Hungarian train stations, migrants chanted “Hungary no! Germany yes!” when local police tried to prevent them from boarding trains towards the West.

The Schengen system – the agreement to dismantle internal border controls between member states to allow freedom of movement on EU territory – was breaking down. Austria and Germany initially opened their borders to refugees and migrants, only to reinstitute border controls when they realized the magnitude of migrant flows (De Genova 2017). Several countries imposed temporary border checks (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden); others built fences (e.g. along the Austrian-Slovenian and Hungarian-Serbian borders).

The Commission stepped in to protect free movement in the EU and coordinate responses to the migration crisis. It proposed a Common European Asylum System to develop common procedures and uniform status across the EU for refugees. It advocated the relocation to other EU member states of asylum seekers, centralizing decision-making at the EU level. The proposal was justified as a “fairness mechanism” based on compulsory relocation quotas that would kick in when a country was seen as having to manage a disproportionate number of asylum applications. The plan, adopted in 2015 by a majority of EU interior ministers, works as follows: if the number of asylum-seekers in a member state reaches over 150% of a predetermined
reference number, all further new applicants in that country are relocated across the EU until the number of applications is back below the reference number. If a member state refuses to take part in the relocation scheme, it must make a ‘solidarity contribution’ of 250,000 euro for each applicant for whom it would otherwise have been responsible to the member state that receives the person.

Several countries opposed the quotas from the start (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania): their objections were dismissed without serious consideration, and the system implemented without modification. While meant to promote solidarity among EU members, the quota system further divided Europe without providing much-needed relief to countries on the EU border. By 2018, 43,700 refugees were relocated through different EU resettlement programs (European Commission, 2018); the initial target had been 160,000 but got subsequently revised down, despite the fact that it was a small proportion of overall arrivals. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, criticized refugee quotas as “divisive and ineffective,” a characterization that the Commission has resisted. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have supported the quotas’ continuation. Anti-immigration, Eurosceptic political parties (the Rassemblement National in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Lega in Italy, the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Finns Party in Finland, the Dutch Freedom Party, UKIP) gained ground in national elections across Europe. While Europeans remain generally supportive of the EU, the upcoming European Parliament elections (a direct continent-wide vote on May 23-26) may give these Eurosceptic, anti-immigration parties a chance to win enough seats to disrupt European integration (Stearns 2019). The poor management of the migration crisis coupled with the EU-imposed quotas revived Eurosceptic platforms among voters in new Eastern European member states that were previously more EU-enthusiastic than their Western counterparts. This spring, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz government have led a vast anti-immigration campaign (including billboards, TV ads and a letter from PM Orban sent to every Hungarian citizen) blaming the EU for encouraging mass migration.

Much frustration came from the fact that, in setting reference numbers and calibrating its “fairness mechanism,” the Commission ignored member states’ attempts to inform the EU about their respective resources and circumstances. Romania estimated its refugee-receiving capacity at 1,330. The EU insisted that the country should accept 6,205 refugees over 2 years, instead. Romania eventually agreed to the quota, despite the fact that it is one of Europe’s poorest countries where resources for integrating refugees are scant. Refugees themselves avoid the country: only 463 migrants have relocated to Romania. Refugees enroll in the EU relocation program hoping for country assignments to Western or Northern Europe, where many of them have friends and families. Romania has yet to join Schengen, which makes it difficult for refugees assigned to Romania to move to other EU countries. In Romania, refugees receive between six and twelve months of government support for expenses, transportation and rent; after that, they must find a job and support themselves. Most jobs involve language requirements and evidence of qualifications, employment and degrees (documents that most refugees do not have). If refugees leave for other European countries, they lose support; even so, many think about leaving Romania to seek a better life elsewhere. Despite pushback, the EU has continued its move towards centralization of asylum policy on the grounds of fairness and superior expertise.

Research on previous evidence-based interventions in European immigration policymaking also shows that reliance on expert knowledge does not guarantee consensus. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, despite the fact that UK debates focused on the economic effect of migration, both sides drew on expert knowledge and right-wing media used it to challenge the government’s record on migration management. Research became politicized: expert knowledge was strategically and selectively deployed to support different sides of the debate.
This generated skepticism about scientific objectivity. As research on immigration became discredited, and policy-making predicated on it was portrayed as out of touch and elitist, demands for shifting back to a “democratic mode of settlement” brought the technocratic turn to an end (Boswell 2016). In Germany, the debates on the immigration reform of 2000-2003 saw the government focus on economic considerations, while opposition parties and mass media emphasized societal interests and values instead, with little coverage of expert knowledge in the press (Boswell 2009).

Technocracy cannot replace democracy. Immigration policy is deeply connected with sovereignty, solidarity, and national identity. Disconnecting migration policy-making from democratic deliberation can backfire, creating fertile ground for anti-immigration, populist, isolationist backlash, and discrediting expert knowledge and the mainstream parties using it as out of touch with average citizens. It creates a political climate in which anti-immigration populism thrives, pointing fingers at non-transparent decision-making and denying the value of expertise as out-of-touch with the concerns of average citizens. Immigration policy should not be depoliticized; if anything, it needs to be re-politicized after addressing knowledge deficits by providing access to reliable information and opportunities to discuss about international migration and its effects. Germany provides an example: when the Social Democrats tried to liberalize labor migration in the 2000s, reform was blocked. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder set up a cross-party commission on immigration, that included representatives from the main political parties, trade unions, business, religious groups and NGOS. It invited a range of witnesses and experts to provide evidence. It triggered debates that allowed Germans to air concerns, feel they are being taken seriously, and put migration-associated anxieties in context. This, rather than top-down, elite-led efforts to “educate” the public, ultimately paved the way for liberalization from the late 2000s onwards (Boswell 2009).

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Please direct inquiries about “How Depoliticizing Migration Led to Populism: Lessons from Europe” to Ruxandra Paul (rnpaul@amherst.edu)
Demagogues the world over know few issues reliably stoke nationalist anxieties as effectively as immigration and crime, and linking the two in the public’s minds can pay rich political dividends. In the U.S. today, talk of a border “crisis” by the current administration continues, unperturbed by reality (Campbell 2014). Migration, including unauthorized migration, to the U.S. has been on a steady general decline since the Great Recession, while rates of violent crime that President Trump blames on immigrants have been dropping sharply since the 1990s (Paarlberg 2017). As Kimberly Gross and John Sides note, polls show the proposed border wall has provoked deep partisan divides, and images of child migrant detentions have driven anguish and activism (Gross and Sides 2019).

Yet there are immigration issues around which there has been broad bipartisan consensus, among them criminal deportation policy. Among the most popular features of both “tough on crime” and “strengthening border security” policies, deportations of unauthorized immigrants with criminal records first exploded under President Clinton, were the cornerstone of President Obama’s immigration policy, and have been aggressively pursued by Republican and Democratic administrations for two decades. Criminal deportations have also been among the most harmful of all US immigration policies for the security of migrant-sending countries in Central America, and, ultimately, the border.

As I’ve written about some of my research in the Guardian, criminal deportations also help explain the rise of the greatest of Trump’s personal bogeymen, Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 (Paarlberg 2014). Officially designated a “transnational criminal gang,” MS-13 did not start out that way. Born in Los Angeles along with its longtime rival, Barrio 18, the two gangs presently behind the world’s highest homicide rates outside of war zones were brought to Central America’s Northern Triangle by U.S. deportation policy. While some gangs predated the arrival of MS-13 and Barrio 18 to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Central America did not have a gang crisis until the U.S. exported one to them.

Both MS-13 and Barrio 18, an older gang whose U.S. name – 18th Street – reflects its origins in L.A.’s Pico-Union neighborhood, came to accept migrants fleeing Central America’s civil wars beginning in the 1970s. Newer migrants settling into poorer neighborhoods were soon persecuted by established, largely Mexican-American gangs, and formed or joined gangs in self-defense. They were originally far more benign entities than they became: MS was originally known as the Mara Salvatrucha Stoners, whose teenage members were then involved in petty criminal activity, being more concerned with getting high and listening to heavy metal; their devil horns hand signs to this day trace back to the band Judas Priest. Then, an anti-gang sweep by the LAPD ahead of the 1984 Summer Olympics landed many of them in jail, where they were inducted into the gang culture of California’s prison system, and became far more violent. This
including paying tribute to older, stronger gangs—the “13” was adopted as tribute to the Mexican Mafia.

Yet Barrio 18 and the newly branded MS-13 did not become a problem for Central American countries until the 1990s, when President Bill Clinton initiated the current wave of mass deportations which brought planeloads of deportees, and those L.A.-based gangs, to countries too poor to deal with the influx. Part of Clinton’s own mano dura approach to crime which included the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the policy of mass criminal deportations came into being with a pair of laws that facilitated the deportation of immigrants with criminal records—including legal residents—by making things such as drunk driving and petty theft deportable offenses.

The results was a fivefold increase in annual deportations to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala between 1995 and 2013, from under 2,000 to over 100,000. Criminal deportations hit a high under the Obama administration, reflecting the popularity of the policy for Democrats and Republicans alike. Many of those deportees have weak ties to their “home” countries, having migrated at a young age. Some do not speak Spanish well, are poorly socialized into living in Central America, and all face the stigma of being deportees, which many in Central America assume means gang members (Burgi-Palomino 2018). This makes deportees largely unemployable (with some exceptions—the call center industry is one), and easy prey for gangs for forced recruitment (Dingeman-Cerda and Kennedy 2015).

In response to this influx of deportees and growth of gangs, governments in Central America have responded with variations of zero tolerance policing—dubbed with increasingly hyperbolic names: “mano dura,” succeeded by “super mano dura”—which mask their ineffectualness. Gang leaders locked up now direct their gangs from overcrowded prisons which they control. Despite a brief truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18 in El Salvador brokered by the Catholic Church, the Salvadoran government has returned to a gloves-off approach which saw the creation of vigilante death squads which have killed entire families of accused gang members, with gangs targeting families of security forces in response (Martinez 2017). Both gangs have fractured, and gang violence has evolved inter-gang warfare from to war between gangs and the state.

The result of this cycle of violence, fueled by unceasing planeloads of deportees, has created a security crisis that hundreds of thousands of civilians are seeking to flee. As the gangs are far poorer and decentralized than the cartels with which they sometimes partner, their main sources of revenue are not large scale trafficking but extortion, and their victims are poor people in the neighborhoods in which they operate, particularly bus drivers, street vendors, and citizens with known sources of outside income including remittances from relatives in the U.S. These are the migrants who have been forming caravans and coming north, seeking asylum, victims of the gangs which the current administration has characterized as security threats and gang members themselves.

In addition to processing the asylum requests for which those migrants are entitled to apply, and which the administration has sought to block, a rational immigration policy would put an end to the mass criminal deportations which have caused such instability in those countries in the first place. But deporting away undesirables, even for wealthy countries far better resourced to deal with them than those on the receiving end, will likely remain a popular policy that will outlast the current administration.

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Please direct inquiries about “Criminal deportations and their contribution to the migration crisis” to Michael Ahn Paarlberg (*mapaarlberg@vcu.edu*)
RESEARCH CENTRE PROFILE

The Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc), Istanbul, Turkey

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The Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc) aims to advance the state of the art in migration research through original and innovative scholarship, academic collaboration, and dialogue between researchers, policy makers, international organizations, and civil society actors. Based in Istanbul, MiReKoc was founded as a grant-giving program in 2004, providing funding for research on migration issues in Turkey and beyond, through a joint-initiative of Koç University (Istanbul) and the Foundation for Population, Migration and Environment (Zurich). Over the past years, MiReKoc has become a hub for systematic research on migration in Turkey and its neighborhood, including the Mediterranean Basin, Europe, and the Middle East. Celebrating its 15-year anniversary in 2019, MiReKoc is a multi-disciplinary research institute on migration studies that seeks to promote scholarly work and collaboration in the field through research seminars, summer schools and workshops, projects, publications, and other activities.

MiReKoc research projects and programs are intended to contribute to research innovation within field of migration studies. It actively develops and participates in research projects with national and international research partners, providing opportunities for researchers at all levels. MiReKoc also organizes international conferences, workshops, and seminars to discuss various research agendas in the field of migration. With the objective of connecting the migration debate in Turkey to ongoing debates and research in different contexts and settings, MiReKoc endeavors to develop collaboration between migration scholars, civil society organizations, and policy makers to stimulate dialogue on new and existing research. To this end, since 2011 MiReKoc has organized the annual International Summer School, a flagship program bringing together migration experts from all over the world.

The MiReKoc Executive Council is comprised of renowned scholars in migration research, including Ayşen Üstübici (Sociology and International Relations), Çetin Çelik (Sociology), Sedef Turper (International Relations) and Şebnem Köşer Akçapar (Sociology). The MiReKoc administrative team consists of Damla Bayraktar-Aksel (postdoc researcher, administrative coordinator), Birce Demiryontar (postdoc researcher, scientific coordinator), and Birce Altıok

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(Ph.D. researcher, coordinator), working with a research team of MiReKoc-affiliated M.A. and Ph.D. researchers, along with well-known scholars and experts from the scientific advisory board.

**MiReKoc pursues the following objectives:**

- generating new research on migration;
- expanding the spectrum of research and encouraging collaboration between researchers;
- integrating research on migration in Turkey with global studies, as well as those from nearby regions;
- studying migration in the “larger geo-political region” including European, Asian and African countries; and
- promoting dialogue between researchers, policy makers, and civil society activists.

While MiReKoc research initially focused exclusively on the Turkish context, this scope has steadily widened to other countries and regions over the years with theoretical and empirical contributions to the larger migration literature. The Center advocates for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on various aspects of migration. Past projects have considered the causes and consequences of international migration, transnationalism, integration of migrants, transit migration—including the mobility of irregular migrants and refugees, human smuggling and trafficking—migration policies, migration and security, and the migration-citizenship nexus.

The Center is currently involved in 11 projects; the research topics vary from migration policies and governance to international and national migration systems, from refugee studies to the migration-development linkage, and from integration and social cohesion to transit migration and borders. In addition to the basic organizational support provided by Koç University, MiReKoc projects are supported through funding provided by national and international organizations. These have included the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), European Commission, International Organization for Migration, World Bank, Open Society, Research Councils UK, and Research Council of Norway. Ongoing projects include:

- “Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development CEASAVEL” Horizon 2020—the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020). (Coordinated by Technische Universität Chemnitz, Germany, managed by Birgit Glorius; MiReKoc is a partner institution).
- “Aligning Migration Management and the Migration-Development Nexus MIGNEX” Horizon 2020—the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020). (Coordinated by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway, managed by Jørgen Carling; MiReKoc is a partner institution).
- “Advancing Alternative Migration Governance ADMIGOV” Horizon 2020—the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020). (Coordinated by the University of Amsterdam, managed by Anja van Heelsum; MiReKoc is a partner institution).
- “Integration and Well-being of Syrian Youth in Turkey” TÜBITAK-RCUK. (Funded by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey & Research Councils UK; coordinated by MiReKoc).
MiReKoc Main Research Areas

Turkey-Related Migration Research

MiReKoc intensively, but not exclusively, works on Turkey-related migration research. The geostrategic location of Turkey partly explains the country’s status as a sending country vis-à-vis Europe and receiving/transit country vis-à-vis neighboring regions. These multiple migration roles—as a country of emigration, immigration and transit—over time also contribute to the ongoing flows of emigration and immigration, involving various stages of a migration cycle. The issue areas of concern to Turkey therefore led to research and projects covering micro- and macro-level analyses, including varying sub-themes in economics, politicization, policy making and its implications, and sociological and political transformations with focuses on the state, society, civil society, governance, integration and development.

Turkey, the European Union and the Mediterranean Migration Regimes

Another MiReKoc research area covers EU-Turkey relations and the migration governance issue, both in the EU and neighboring countries, with a particular focus on the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. Two of the most influential ideas in migration research and policy are “migration management” and “the migration–development nexus.” MiReKoc is highly motivated in its work on the themes of governance, management and development and forms part of the international consortium Advancing Alternative Migration Governance (ADMIGOV), investigating the conformity of European migration policy in practice with the basic principles of the United Nations. This project has received a subsidy of €3 million under the Horizon 2020 program of the European Commission and has a duration of four years.

MiReKoc is similarly involved in projects related to the interconnected issues of migration and development. The project “Aligning Migration Management and the Migration-Development Nexus MIGNEX” the largest European-funded research project on migration, will run for five years and began September 2018. Primary field research will take place in 10 countries of origin and transit: Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Focusing on migration from (or through Turkey) to Europe, “Fluctuations in Migration Flows on the Balkan Route,” funded by the WODC (Research and Documentation Centre) of the Ministry of Justice and Security in Netherlands, aims to unpack the changing dynamics of migration flows on the Western Balkans route, including: the policy environment regarding the migration context on the Western Balkans route; the decision making of migrants whether to take this route; and the overall aspirations and destination choices of migrants on this route. The project aims to address the interplay of policy dynamics, migrants’ decision making, and migration flows and to ascertain how different interventions, including potential future interventions, may impact migration flows. The MiReKoc team is responsible for data collection and analysis in Turkey.

Additionally, Turkey’s geographical proximity to Europe, in the context of the so-called “migration crisis” has led to collaborative research on the EU asylum and migration system. This https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
project, “Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development (CEASEVAL),” undertakes a comprehensive analysis of harmonization that goes beyond the formal institutional setting and takes into account the complex formal and informal relations among the actors engaged at different levels.

**Syrian Refugees**

Because Turkey has the largest number of refugees in the world, MiReKoc work also specifically deals with the Syrian refugee flow and the protracted nature of the refugee issue on a wider scale, including refugees’ access to rights and services, policy making, decision making processes, urban-level governance, and, last but not least, integration as a key challenge. In a highly-dynamic research atmosphere, MiReKoc conducts research activities on better integration, working with governmental and non-governmental institutions. In a TÜBİTAK-funded project entitled “Interactive Social Integration Model for Improving Migration Governance in Turkey,” researchers assess the results of increasing migration movements in Turkey over the medium- and long-term, including the case of Syrian refugees, discussing the governance issues of migration in Turkey. The study examines the relevant regulations introduced by the central government, as well as how these regulations are implemented by different actors at the local level. In addition, the findings obtained from this study are based on a historical framework and examines the reasons why and how migration governance affects our cities at different periods, and different kinds of immigration movements during different periods since the 1990s.

As part of the challenges to integration, the youth component of forced refugee groups requires certain academic and policy attention. In this context, “Integration and Well-Being of Syrian Youth in Turkey” research project, funded by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) and the Research Council UK (RCUK), is a joint effort between the European Institute and the Institute of Global Affairs at the London School of Economics and the Migration Research Center at Koç University. The project aims to assess the needs of youth whose status is shifting from refugee to immigrant as a result of the prolonged conflict and at developing concrete organizational and policy suggestions for social and economic integration.

**MiReKoc Forced Migration Resource Center (FMRC)**

The Forced Migration Resource Center at Koç University (FMRC) is an online platform established by MiReKoc in partnership with the Vehbi Koç Foundation (VKV). The platform draws together a diverse collection of reliable and accurate resources concerning forced migration, in general, and Syrian refugees in particular. The center provides free online access to anyone—that is, individual researchers, universities, civil society organizations, international organizations, policy makers, the media, and displaced persons themselves seeking information into issues related to forced migration and asylum. The primary aim of the FMRC is to increase the research capacity of all state and non-state actors working in the field and enhance inter-institutional communication among civil society, academia, policy makers and international organizations addressing the issue of forced migration. It also aims to prevent information pollution and regulate the overload of information in the field.

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MiReKoc International Summer School and Additional MiReKoc Activities

MiReKoc organizes an annual international summer school program on selected topics. The International Summer School is composed of two weeks of lectures and discussions led by distinguished faculty members, policy makers and experts; participants additionally have multiple opportunities to share their studies and thoughts with these scholars in an interactive environment. The Summer School is conducted in English. The Summer School program is designed for graduate and post-graduates and junior experts in the field. In 2018, the Summer School theme was “Prospects for Good Governance of Refugee Situations: The Local-Global Nexus,” which was a highly successful two-week event; one part of the summer school took place in Gaziantep.

This year, MiReKoc will host the 9th annual MiReKoc International Summer School—June 30 to July 12, 2019 in Istanbul—on the theme of high-skilled and student migration. Academic research on the inter- and cross-border mobility of students and highly-skilled people is multidisciplinary, incorporating knowledge from various fields, such as sociology, political economy, public policy, education, development studies, international law, and migration studies. Providing a multidisciplinary perspective for comprehensive understanding, the MiReKoc International Summer School of 2019 aims to elucidate different theoretical and empirical debates on the cross-border mobility of students and highly-skilled people. More information regarding past and current summer school programs can be found at the MiReKoc Summer School Website. Applications for the 2019 International Summer School are due by 28 April 2019.

Every two weeks, MiReKoc also emails an International Press Reader. The press reader provides an overview of migration news from that period, as well as academic opportunities, recent publications, and local events in the field of migration, all of which can be found at the Center’s website with a subscription option to the International Press Reader. The Center’s website attracts many migration researchers and provides additional information regarding ongoing projects. Updates can also be followed on social media (Facebook, Twitter and Instagram).

Please direct inquiries about the Migration Research Center at Koç University to MiReKoc Director, Ahmet İçduygu (aicduygu@ku.edu.tr) or Coordinator Birce Altıok (baltiok@ku.edu.tr).
How do we move migration policy datasets and indices further? A proposal to address persisting lacunae and major research imperatives

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Abstract
Over the last decade, the scholarly interest on migration policies has increased exponentially. A significant part of research has focused on case studies (e.g. Délano 2011) or comparative case studies (e.g. Lafleur 2011) while other researchers have compiled migration policy datasets with the goal of constructing indices quantitatively and allowing large-n comparisons (e.g. Gamlen 2006; Vink and Bauböck 2013; Ruhs 2013). This research note deals primarily with the latter kind of effort, not with the main aim of summarizing them (for that see Scipioni and Urso 2017) or of assessing their quality (for that see for instance Helbling et al. 2013; Goodman 2015; Koopmans 2013; Ellermann 2013). Our goal in this paper is rather to propose concrete paths to move our field forward by reflecting on the information that is still missing in the current and past efforts of data collection and proposing new standards of transparency for the collection of data on migration policy to allow our field to flourish with both scientific rigor and a collaborative spirit.

1. Introduction
Migration policy and datasets have mushroomed over the last decade (Helbling and Michalowski 2017). Data collection efforts vary significantly in methodologies, substantive foci, geographical and temporal coverage. However, it seems that this proliferation of datasets has also been carried out with a lack of coordination and collaboration between scholars, leading sometimes to overlapping research outputs (Helbling and Bauböck 2011). Overlaps and repeated iterations have been

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2 This paper was originally prepared for the workshop “Further data proliferation or better chances for data integration and sharing? Proposals to improve our research community around migration policy indices (and datasets)”, which we convened at IMISCOE 2018 in Barcelona. It has improved significantly thanks to the comments shared by the participants during the workshop on migration data held at the IMISCOE Annual Conference in 2018. Especially, we want to thank to Elena Sánchez-Montijano, Maarten P. Vink, Katharina Natter, Lorenzo Piccoli, Marc Helbling, and Daniela Vintila for their thoughtful insights. Nevertheless, the authors are the solely responsible of the content and the shortcomings of this research note.
of measurements do not need to be seen negatively; they are a natural part of the genesis and development of any incipient research field. In fact, it is probably due to this rich academic conversation that we have reached a point of sophistication in conceptualization and measurements that was not imaginable 20 years ago. There is still plenty to learn and coordinate regarding methodology, but what we focus on in this research note are the ways to move forward. We will propose that the academic community working on migration datasets should start mapping the scope of the datasets and indices available and proposing ways to increase the geographic and temporal coverage, as well as the level of specificity and detail of measurements.

Given this aim, we start from the conceptualization of migration policies as proposed by the research project Every Immigrant is an Emigrant: How Migration Policies Shape the Paths to Integration (IMISEM) This project proposes a way to understand migration as a policy field that is divided into two “sides” each with three different “stages” (Pedroza 2018; Pedroza, Palop-García, and Chang 2018). The first of the sides refers to immigrants. It includes immigration policy (policies that regulate the admission of people, such as visa policies or mobility agreements); immigrant policies (those that regulate immigrants’ rights in their state of reception, for instance their right to political participation or employment); and citizenship policies for immigrants (policies that regulate the formal inclusion of migrants into the political community of their state of reception through naturalization). The other side of migration policy refers to emigrants. It includes emigration policy (policies that regulate the exit of citizens), emigrant policies (policies that regulate the rights and obligations of nationals abroad with regard to the country of origin); and citizenship policies for emigrants (which determine how emigrants retain citizenship and nationality in their country of origin). The stages follow the “three-door” scheme delineated by Hammar (1990). We present this here because this comprehensive view of migration policies is at the core of our analysis in this research note, especially our view of the gaps to be filled. When we speak about migration policy, we mean to include the whole spectrum of migration policies, and not merely immigration policies.

This research note proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review the main indices and datasets published in the last decade, focusing on their temporal and geographical coverage. Second, we reflect on the main lacunae that remain to be covered. Third, we propose a new standard of transparency based on three dimensions: access to raw data, access to sources and access to codebooks and/or questionnaires. We conclude by proposing strategies to move data collection efforts forward.

2. Summary of main datasets and indices

The indices included in this section showcase a good range of methodologies and policy dimensions (i.e. immigration, immigrant, emigrant, emigration, and citizenship policies). We do not aim to summarize all existing works, but to provide the reader with an overview that is ample enough to consider the breadth of contributions published in the last two decades. Further, we mostly include indices that we have been able to analyze in depth by accessing their raw data (see Table 1 for a comparison of the datasets cited in this research note).

Immigration policies are generally defined as those that regulate the access of non-nationals to the state of reception. This dimension of policy has been the most investigated so far through comparative measurements. Examples are numerous—Peters (2015) analyzed immigration policy of 19 countries from 1783 to 2010, combining indicators of “border regulations” (quotas, family reunification), with “immigrant rights” (i.e. access to citizenship) and “enforcement” (i.e. deportation). Drawing upon Peters’ data and the framework, Shin (2017) created the Low-Skill Immigration Policy Dataset adding 10 more countries to the original 19
analyzed by Peters. Both authors proposed similarly aggregated measures or indices to measure the degree of restrictiveness and openness of immigration policies in the countries analyzed.

The Immigration Policies in Comparison Project (IMPIC) coded the immigration policies of 33 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010 (Helbling et al. 2016). The IMPIC is one of the most comprehensive efforts at measuring immigration policies carried out to date. It stands out for two main reasons. First, it has a finely-tuned conceptualization of “immigration policies” that delineates boundaries with neighboring fields such as citizenship and immigrant policies. Second, IMPIC discusses all methodological choices in publicly available documents. The dataset contains information about family reunification, labor migration (high-skilled and low-skilled), refugees and co-ethnics. The International Migration Policy and Law Analysis project (IMPALA) (Beine et al. 2016), has produced a dataset containing information about immigration policies adopted by OECD countries (so far, only nine countries have been coded) over the past twenty years. The policies analyzed include those related to economic migration, family reunification, asylum and refugee migration, students and citizenship. The IMPALA raw data, however, are not yet publicly available.

Other efforts to measure immigration policies have a different unit of analysis. Instead of focusing, as IMPIC or IMPALA did, on measuring how restrictive or open a policy is, they focus on identifying changes in restrictiveness (or openness). In other words, they do not measure policy absolutes, but policy changes. The DEMIG dataset, for example, registered variations in the regulation of migration for 45 countries (including states from Europe, America, Asia and Africa) (Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2014). DEMIG included information about the regulation of entry and immigrant rights, and it is one of the few projects to collect information about the regulation of exit (emigration policies). The ImPol Database (Mezger and González-Ferrer 2013) included information about the “entry dimension of immigration policies” (p. 3) from 1960 onwards in France, Italy and Spain. The indicators in the dataset were selected to reflect the regulation of short-term stays, family reunification, study and work.

Not all indices and datasets on migration policies come from academia; international organizations have also contributed to the field. With the Migration Governance Index (MGI), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) have analyzed five policy “domains”: institutional capacity to deal with migration, migrant rights, border control, labor migration management, and regional and international cooperation (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2016). Their sample contained 15 countries (including countries in Africa, Europe, America and Asia). Although their effort of building a comprehensive framework of migration governance is groundbreaking, it falls short in several aspects. For one, the operationalization of questions was too broad to guarantee valid cross-country comparisons. Second, the dataset is not publicly available and there is no detailed information about the aggregation rules. Still, the MGI framework is one of the few indices that included questions about policies towards both emigrants and immigrants. Another example of international organizations getting involved in the measurement of migration policies is that carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), including migration policies in 28 developing and developed countries (Klugman and Medalho Pereira 2009). In particular, this assessed the regulation of entry of international migrants as well as access to basic immigrant rights (e.g. health, education).

With regard to immigrant policies, two indices are worth highlighting. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) covers 38 OECD countries and has been updated regularly between 2010 and 2015 (Huddleston 2015). It includes information about policies regarding migrant access to education, healthcare, the labor market, nationality and electoral rights. MIPEX has a clear and comprehensive conceptualization, has published the raw data, and both the codebook and aggregation guidelines are publicly available online. A further significant effort

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to measure immigrant policies is Koopmans and Michalowski’s (2017) *Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI)*, which covers 29 “immigration countries” for 2008, along two dimensions of immigrant rights: “individual equality” and “cultural difference” (p. 50). Their data are available online.

Emigrant or diaspora engagement policies have been the subject of indexing efforts, too. The *EMIX Emigrant Policies* Index, for instance, measured the policies adopted by 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries to maintain, nurture or create links with their diaspora (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017). This was based on an original conceptual framework that includes twelve dimensions of policies (e.g. economic, suffrage, social). The data are available and coding and aggregation rules are published online. Gamlen (2008) and Ragazzi (2014) also measured emigrant policies. The former included in his dataset 70 countries (“emigration states”). The latter built a typology of diaspora policies based on a dataset which included 35 countries from around the world. In neither case, however, are the data publicly available yet.

Other data collection efforts, instead of focusing on groups targeted by migration policy (such as immigration or emigration), have focused on specific policy components as they apply to different groups. This is the case of the Asylum Policy Index (Hatton 2009) or the current MitSoPro Project (led by Lafleur at the University of Liège), which measures access to social protection of emigrants and immigrants.

Finally, the most comprehensive effort to record citizenship policies (for emigrants and immigrants), as well as migrant electoral rights, has been conducted by the *Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT)* hosted at the European University Institute. The project started in 2009 with a focus on the European Union, but has since expanded its geographic scope to all world regions. GLOBALCIT conceptualization is exhaustive and clear. Moreover, the data and codebooks are available online. The project also updates regularly and publishes high quality country reports as well as a summary of the sources used to answer their questionnaires. With regard to emigrant dual citizenship, the *MACIMIDE Global Dual Citizenship Database* has investigated loss of citizenship worldwide with a longitudinal perspective that covers the years between 1960 and 2015 (Vink et al. 2015). Data, as well as the codebook and sources are publicly available.³

³ Other datasets and indices published in the last decade and not covered by our summary include: Cerna (2016), Openness Index and Migrants Rights Index (Ruhs 2013), Thielemann (2004), Ortega and Peri (2009).
3. Challenges ahead
Migration policy measures have improved significantly over the last decade. However, for the research field to move forward, it is imperative to take stock of what is already available and, most importantly, be conscious about our blindspots so far. In this section, we outline some of the lacunae that we consider should be addressed in future data collection efforts.

The first is a geographic lacuna. Although some of the aforementioned data collection efforts aim at global coverage (e.g. GLOBALCIT), the majority of datasets and indices have focused on the OECD, European or “Western” countries. This is probably the consequence of three interlinked factors. First, it reflects the bias in the literature towards the study of immigration and immigrant policies. Many scholars working in Western institutions have made a distinction in their case selection, more or less explicitly, between countries of “immigration” and countries of “emigration”. Although this differentiation is perhaps helpful for research design purposes, it is also artificial and could, in our opinion, be misleading. It is obvious that at any point in time there are countries with net emigration and countries with net immigration, but we know well that such indicators give only a partial story of a country’s migration profile. On the one hand, countries with a negative migration balance can still be receiving important immigrant populations (Caribbean countries are good examples). On the other hand, countries with a positive (im)-migration balance can have an extensive diaspora (Italy or France, for instance). This is related to the differentiation between stock and flow. Most importantly, migration flows vary over time and countries of net emigration can become countries of net immigration over the years. To summarize our point: not only “immigration countries” deal with immigration and not only “emigration countries” deal with emigration. In the spirit of our current research project, we think it is important to realize that all countries regulate both immigration and emigration and the rights of both groups.

The next factors which play a role in keeping most of the datasets and indices geographically concentrated may well be the result of more practical circumstances. The second factor relates to funding structures, especially the kind needed to support the creation of large-world datasets. These are usually available in wealthier, Western countries and concrete regions, such as the European Union. Finally, a third factor is feasibility: the very exercise of data collection is more manageable when it is kept restricted to countries that have fairly harmonized, easily accessible systems for ordering their legal and policy primary sources. However, in order to have a more accurate sense of the range of variation of migration policies, our community of migration policy researchers should strive to expand the geographic coverage of datasets and indices beyond the usual suspects. Overcoming this limitation is indeed one of the greatest current challenges in our field, and might require closer collaborations with researchers in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. We think it is also important to recognize this challenge as an opportunity: not only will adding more countries in our samples lead to a different understanding of what immigration policies are and how they function, but inviting scholars from other regions will also substantively enrich our perspectives.

A second lacuna is related to the level of analysis. Most of the datasets and indices code national policies. This is a fair decision since migration policy is mostly shaped at the national level, even in highly decentralized countries (with important exceptions regarding immigrant integration policies in federal states). Nevertheless, there is still variation at subnational levels, both in centralized and decentralized states, which needs to be accounted for. The problem is that, despite some previous efforts (Pham and Pham 2012; Arrighi and Lafleur 2019), we do not have a clear methodological path to integrate subnational variation of migration policies in our measurements of national policies in a way that is comparable later. Further efforts should be

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made to address this issue. Similarly, the role of supranational institutions and bilateral and multilateral agreements is still missing in most of the datasets and indices.

A third gap in migration policy data is the lack of focus on the administrative settings in charge of managing migration policies. Some projects have included administrations as a prominent component within their frameworks (see, for instance, EMIX or MitSoPro), but the majority still does not register this key information to understand how states approach migration policies. The questions that could be addressed by having more detailed information on administration are manifold. For instance: Which migration policies are managed by which agencies? Is migration policy set by a high-level agency or is it managed by an amalgam of different administrations of varied rank? What is the role of coordination agencies to ensure a whole-of-government approach to migration policies? Does the administration setting have an impact on the implementation of migration policies?

Finally, we have observed that most of the indices and datasets tend to portray policies as general and unitary. For instance, some projects talk about “migration policy for the high-skilled” disregarding that under such extended abstract labels (e.g. “labor migration”, “high-skilled”, “asylum seekers”) there is plenty of variation. It may be that a country disaggregates the “high-skilled” into different specific groups or professions (e.g. “medical doctors”, “migrants with higher education”, “managers”) and applies quite different regulations to each of these groups. By treating such categories as unitary, indices and datasets lose not only precision, but also the possibility of conducting valid comparisons across countries. Some indices, such as IMPIC, have identified and tried to tackle this problem. Future data collection endeavors should pursue that path further by proposing innovative ways of challenging the unitary and homogenizing view of migration policies. One creative way of doing this could be integrating the perspective of individual migrants as the subjects of the regulations as a guide for the coding of policies.

Related to the previous point, another lacuna in the data collection projects reviewed is the lack of a gender perspective in datasets and indices. Despite the great amount of literature on the so-called “feminization of migration”, in the large-n comparative literature on migration policies we have not encountered studies that considered the gendered migration patterns that are evident in many countries to inform their case selection or data collection strategies. It would be important to keep gender present in research design to be able to show, for instance, what role gender plays across the whole range of migration policies. For explanatory studies, including gender more prominently in our research designs will let us explore the relation between gendered migration patterns and state policies on migration. We think the academic community would greatly benefit from data collection and, when it comes to indices, disaggregation possibilities that allow us to observe whether, for instance, women and men have different access to immigration under different visa schemes, to family reunification, to naturalization, or to exercise dual citizenship.

4. A major imperative: new standards of transparency in migration policy data

As we mentioned in the introduction, our aim in this research note is not to analyze in depth the methodology of datasets and indices – a task that other colleagues are already doing well. After identifying some of the biggest lacunae in the existing efforts, we want to take the opportunity to highlight an area where we think all data collection efforts can – and should – improve: transparency. Transparency is a major imperative for advancement in a scholarly field, as this makes our datasets and indices traceable, replicable and amenable to re-aggregation. We think that higher transparency requires our community to improve its efforts in at least three concrete aspects that are connected to different stages of any research endeavor, but that are key to comparative research.

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The first and foremost aspect is to be found towards the conclusion of a research effort: data availability. It should be obvious that we ought to make it possible for other researchers (directly or with notification to the dataset authors) to access the data that were used for any particular published piece of research. Although it is true that a new standard is emerging (see for instance Section 6 of the Principles of Professional Conduct included in APSA’s Guide to Professional Ethics, Rights and Freedoms, 2012), some datasets and indices are still not publicly available. This is not trivial. Without having access to the data, it is impossible for the rest of the scholarly community to assess its quality and compare it to other data measuring apparently similar phenomena. Not sharing the data hinders the progress of our research field since it forces other colleagues to recollect information that others have already collected, using time and financial resources that could be better employed covering the lacunae that we have identified, or others. Some standards are readily available to maximize the availability of our data, such as the FAIR guiding principles, which ensure that the data generated are findable (by machines and humans), accessible, interoperable and reusable.\textsuperscript{4} We suggest that our research community discusses whether this is a good standard to adopt.

A second aspect of transparency is rather in the genesis of a research project and informs its whole outlook: procedural and analytical transparency. Often, researchers make their data publicly available (including the raw data), but the sources from which it comes are not available (or not in a systematic manner). To evaluate datasets, however, sourcebooks are as important as codebooks and questionnaires. Systematic lists of sources, sourcebooks, and bibliographies all reflect the quality of a data collection process, as well as allowing other researchers to build upon previous efforts, clearly find ways to expand knowledge, and understand how index-builders used the original data to assign codes (this is key when an excerpt of a law is interpreted). We encourage researchers to develop a strategy to keep track of all their information sources, from the beginning of the data collection process through all their research phases, as well as a strategy to make those sources publicly known (and if possible, facilitate their availability) when the data are published. We suggest the implementation of a similar strategy to the active citation proposed by qualitative scholars in recent years (see, for instance, Moravcsik 2014). Ideally, a rigorous transparency appendix would clearly include (1) the excerpt of the original source in which each code is based, (2) an explanation of the logic followed to assign the code, and (3) a reference (or active link) to the original source. If there are sources that cannot be cited or linked due to ethical and/or anonymity issues, this should be stated and justified. We are aware that these conditions are demanding and time-consuming for what are already very time-consuming efforts. However, we think that if scholars start designing research projects with these principles at hand from the start, then it will be much easier to carry out data collection in a manner that will allow their efforts to have a wider impact beyond individual publications, both multiplying the possibilities for collaboration between researchers and allowing readers to clearly spot the areas that can be improved and expanded on in later iterations. An added value beyond the academic field is that a research community can better organize itself and gain clout vis-à-vis actors responsible for providing primary information if it can demonstrate that orderly, public information is required for rigorous, evidence-based research.

The third aspect of transparency that we want to highlight as a basic part of a common standard in our field relates to important methodological steps in any research endeavor that aims at creating datasets on policies, such as questionnaires or other techniques and tools used for data collection, codebooks and coding rules, and reports on inter-coder reliability. It is imperative that datasets on migration policies are published together with the questionnaires,

\textsuperscript{4} For more information about the FAIR principles see Wilkinson et al. (2016). We owe the suggestion of the FAIR standards to one of the participants in the IMISCOE Workshop mentioned above.

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with a thorough report of the coding rules applied to transform the raw data into final indicators. Questionnaires and codebooks contain fundamental information about the conceptualization and operationalization of migration policies, so they should be seen not as an accessory, but as a key part of dataset creation, and certainly a cardinal element if we approach the goal of developing better datasets as a collective endeavor of our field. We think that these aspects of procedural and analytical transparency are particularly important for constructing knowledge across research projects that deal with similar policies, and to accumulate knowledge in a way that allows us to distinguish neighboring subfields of migration policies with more sharpness (e.g. transnational social policies and diasporic policies, or immigrant policies and wider integration policies). Finally, if qualitative information is transformed into quantitative indicators by means of codification, measures of inter-coder reliability should be provided.

5. Conclusions
Our research field is rife with challenges. In this research note we have argued that, despite significant advances, plenty of work remains to be done. Efforts on migration policy data collection need to broaden their geographic and temporal scope. Also, we need to find ways to tackle the challenge posed by different possible levels of analysis and units of observation for migration policies, as well as the challenge posed by our nearly total lack of information on the administrative settings and about policies targeting specific migrant groups. Furthermore, we need to keep improving our methodologies by establishing and following higher standards of transparency regarding data accessibility including the disaggregated (raw) data, sources and codebooks.

We recognize that datasets and indices are built with different goals in mind, which limits compatibility: while some are developed to identify desirable policies from a normative standpoint (e.g. Blatter, Schmid, and Blättler 2017), others, more oriented towards a scientific exchange, leave normative questions open (e.g. IMPIC) or focus on collecting only as much data as are needed to corroborate particular hypotheses (e.g. DEMIG), while others still are developed with more descriptive and exploratory aims, with the ambition of enlarging our scope of a phenomenon (e.g. EMIX). The goals to cover the lacunae we identified here will be more fit to some of these purposes than others. Yet, the standards we propose could strengthen our field as a whole. We know too, that if researchers have the incentive to collect data to achieve the publication of one article in a competitive field, it is unlikely that they will make their data available to the scholarly community before publication. We find that to make the most from any possible aim, researchers should make their datasets available in the most disaggregated units possible, and as soon as possible, at the very least, upon request. Increasingly, many are required by their institutions to make their research public, especially if they receive public funds to finance their research. We find that a way to – at least partially - solve this conundrum is to practice a proper attribution of authorship of these datasets to the individual persons involved in their making. This should also apply in the cases in which large datasets are compiled from case reports authored by many persons: proper citation thereafter should recognize their work in all publications ensuing from the dataset.

Our field has clearly benefited from the diversity of indices and datasets. While this diversity is a strength, we think that we have reached a point at which, for the field to flourish further, it is necessary to reassess our goals not only towards more rigorous knowledge expansion (instead of replications), but also to redirect our efforts to cover areas that still under-researched, and to conduct our forthcoming research according to common standards of transparency. We make these proposals in the hope of achieving deeper collaboration and coordination in our scholarly community.

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References


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Table 1. Summary of Indices Cited in the Research Note

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset</th>
<th>Coordinating authors/institutions</th>
<th>Main policy dimensions covered</th>
<th>Geographic Scope</th>
<th>Temporal Scope</th>
<th>Data availability</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low-skill immigration policy dataset</td>
<td>Margaret Peters (UCLA). Later updated by Adrian J. Shin (University of Colorado Boulder)</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and United States (Update also includes Chile, Venezuela, Spain and Botswana)</td>
<td>1783-2010 (update contains information until 2013)</td>
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<td>International Migration Policy And Law Analysis (IMPALA)</td>
<td>Michel Beine (University of Luxembourg) et al.</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Australia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG)</td>
<td>International Migration Institute (De Haas et al.)</td>
<td>Immigration, Immigrant Emigration Emigrant Citizenship</td>
<td>Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1946-2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC)</td>
<td>Helbling (Berlin Social Science Center, WZB) et al.</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, EU Directives, Estonia, EU Regulation, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New</td>
<td>1980-2010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

5 This field registers the institutional affiliation of authors at the time of constructing the dataset. In some cases, institutional affiliation may have changed.

6 Some indexes have published final scores, but not the disaggregated raw data. For the purposes of our exercise, we only register whether or not the disaggregated raw data are available.
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<td>The Temper Project (Mezger and González-Ferrer)</td>
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<td>Migration Governance Index</td>
<td>IOM and The Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Philippe, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey</td>
<td>2016 (it will be updated in the next years)</td>
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<td>Klugman and Medalho Pereira</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Emigrant Emigrant Emigration Citizenship</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States of America, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Russian Federation, Thailand, and Turkey.</td>
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<td>Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)</td>
<td>CIDOB and Migration Policy Group</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
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<td>Indicators of Citizenship Rights for</td>
<td>Koopmans and Michalowski (Berlin Social Science Center, WZB)</td>
<td>Immigrant Citizenship</td>
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<td>Immigrants (ICRI)</td>
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<td>Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship and Modes of Loss of Citizenship Conditions for Electoral Rights</td>
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<td>Immigrant, Emigrant</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>Global Dual Citizenship Database</td>
<td>MACIMIDE Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Global</td>
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<td>Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX)</td>
<td>GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies</td>
<td>Emigrant Citizenship</td>
<td>Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Engagement Policies</td>
<td>Alan Gamlen, University of Oxford</td>
<td>Emigrant</td>
<td>Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia,</td>
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<td>Diaspora Policies</td>
<td>Francesco Ragazzi, Leiden University</td>
<td>Emigrant</td>
<td>Ukraine, Uruguay, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration and Transnational Social Protection in (post) crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)</td>
<td>University of Liège (Jean-Michel Lafleur et al.)</td>
<td>Immigrant (focused on social policy)</td>
<td>Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
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<td>Openness Index and Migrant Rights Index</td>
<td>Martin Ruhs</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the Netherlands, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>Citizenship Policy Index</td>
<td>Marc Morjé Howard, Georgetown University</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>1980-2005</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX)</td>
<td>Joachim Blatter et al., University of Lucerne</td>
<td>Immigrant (electoral) inclusion</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</table>
APSA Migration and Citizenship Section  
Awards 2018

Best Book:  
Committee Members: Terri Givens, Mary McThomas, Feliz Garip  
Winner:  

Best Article:  
Committee Members: Maarten Vink, Elizabeth Cohen, Jamie Monogan  
Winner:  

Honorable Mention:  

https://connect.apsanet.org/543/
**Best Dissertation:**
*Committee Members: Jeremy Ferwerda, Katrina Burgess, Fanny Lauby*

**Winners:**


**Best Chapter:**
*Committee Members: Matthew Wright, Antje Ellermann, Anna Sampaio*

**Winner:**

Committee’s comments:
Jacqueline Stevens' close reading of immigration case histories and deconstructive (Derridian) approach produce a generative, compelling and complex analysis of the disjunctures that can (and often do) arise between official designations of status and citizenship, on the one hand, and immigrants' own biographical self-knowledge, on the other. The contrast between "epistemically privileged" status versus "concrete memories and relations" is one that demands closer scrutiny from policy makers and researchers alike, and Stevens is leading the way.

[https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/](https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/)
Best Paper:
Committee Members: Saskia Bonjour, Charlotte Cavaille, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay

Winner:

Honorable Mentions:
Kim Voss, Fabiana Silva, and Irene Bloemraad. “The Limits of Rights: Claims-making on Behalf of Immigrants.”

Harris Mylonas and Marko Žilovića, “Foreign policy priorities and ethnic return migration policies: group-level variation in Greece and Serbia.”

Committee’s comments:
This year, fourteen papers were nominated for the Best Paper Award. Out of these, ten papers used survey experiments to analyze public attitudes on issues such as refugees, irregular migrants, Muslims, and rights activism. The four remaining papers presented qualitative analyses of governmental migration policies in Europe, the US, and the Middle East, ranging from information provision to the implementation of international law. Eleven papers were written by authors located in the US, two by authors located in Europe, and one by a team of authors from both continents.

The winning paper by Adida, Lo, and Platas examines whether and how American attitudes towards Syrian refugees can be rendered more inclusive. Based on a survey which experimentally tested the impact of information and empathy treatments, it finds that while the empathy treatment increases inclusive behavior (letter writing), the information treatment did not result in more inclusive attitudes or behavior, and may even have induced a backlash among Republicans.

The Selection Committee very much appreciates the timeliness of the question posed in this paper, which is unlikely to decline in relevance in future years. The paper’s findings will be of interest to scholars inside and outside the field of migration studies. The research design is clean, well-executed and well presented. Moreover, the research design is innovative, especially in its inclusion of not only attitudes but also behavior, i.e. the measurement item “letter writing” which measures preferences “in action” and also provides qualitative evidence that enriches the paper. Another interesting survey innovation, which hopefully will become the norm in this type of survey, is the investigation of respondents’ attitudes toward the survey itself, in particular to the “information treatment”. This contributes to an emerging literature on how people interpret “information”, which indicates that “information” is rarely interpreted as a neutral cue. The selection committee hopes that the authors follow up on this finding.

Two other papers receive an Honorable Mention from the Selection Committee. The first is “The Limits of Rights: Claims-making on Behalf of Immigrants”, written by Kim Voss, Fabiana Silva, and Irene Bloemraad, for its innovative research question which brings together law, immigration politics, and political behavior. The second is “Foreign policy priorities and ethnic return migration policies: group-level variation in Greece and Serbia” by Harris Mylonas and Marko Žilovića, for their innovative theoretical contribution.

https://connect.apsanet.org/543/
Member News

Lamis Abdelaaty (Syracuse University)

Fiona B. Adamson (SOAS University of London)
- Published “Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s).” *International Migration Review*. Online First https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918318767665
- Was awarded a European Union Horizon 2020 Research Grant on "Migration Governance and Asylum Crisis" (MAGYC) as part of a 13 institution consortium of universities from across Europe, Turkey and Lebanon. The total amount awarded to the consortium, which is led by the Hugo Observatory at University of Liège, Belgium is EUR 3 Million over 4 years. Other participants include section members Hélène Thiollet and Gerasimos Tsourapas: http://labos.ulg.ac.be/hugo/magyc/

Claire Adida (UC San Diego)
- Co-director of UCSD's Center for Comparative Immigration Studies as of July 1, 2018

Fiona Barker (Victoria University of Wellington)

Kristy A. Belton (International Studies Association)
- Served as co-Program Chair for the joint FLACSO-ISA conference, “Power Reconfigurations: Regional and Global Responses in an Age of Uncertainty,” which took place in Quito, Ecuador, July 25-27, 2018.

Rikhil Bhavnani (University of Wisconsin—Madison)

Erik Bleich (Middlebury College)
- Published with James P Callison, Georgia Grace Edwards, Mia Fichman, Erin Hoynes, Razan Jabari, and A. Maurits van der Veen, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Corpus

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918818252


**Irene Bloemraad** (UC-Berkeley)
- Was named the *International Migration Review’s* “Featured Scholar of 2018” by IMR, the Center for Migration Studies and SAGE Publishing. (October 2018)

**Anna Boucher** (University of Sydney)
- Published "How 'skill' definition affects the diversity of skilled immigration policies, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Online First. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561063

**Colin Brown** (Northeastern University)
- Began new job: Assistant Teaching Professor, Northeastern University (Political Science), July 2018.

**Ernesto Castañeda** (American University)

**Emmanuel Comte** (Vienna School of International Studies)

**Antje Ellermann** (University of British Columbia)
- Published “Human-capital Citizenship and the Changing Logic of Immigrant Admissions.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Online First. [https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561062](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561062)
- Was awarded a UBC Grant for Catalyzing Research Clusters: $100,000 awarded to UBC Migration Research Excellence Cluster

**Els de Graauw** (City University of New York)
- Awarded (with Floris Vermeulen) a seed grant from the Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Amsterdam for our project “The Urban Politics of Immigration, Integration, and Diversity in Amsterdam and New York City.”

**Alexandra Filindra** (University of Illinois at Chicago)
- Was selected as editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* (JREP), a Cambridge University Press journal. She was also appointed to the Editorial Board of *Social Science Quarterly* (SSQ). She recently

**Victoria Finn** (Universidad Diego Portales)

**Roy Germano** (New York University)

[https://connect.apsanet.org/543/](https://connect.apsanet.org/543/)
Reviewed in *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2018).
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/outsourcing-welfare-g780195862848?cc=us&lang=en#

Ron Hayduk (San Francisco State University)

Claus Hofhansel (Rhode Island College)
- Published “The decline and limited revival of citizenship deprivation: Germany and Switzerland as deviant cases?” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1526063

David Kaufmann (University of Bern, Switzerland)

Marina Kaneti (National University of Singapore)
- Joined the National University of Singapore as a Tenure Track Assistant Professor in August 2018

Leila Kawar (University of Michigan)
- Joined the faculty of the University of Michigan in January 2019 as Associate Professor in the Department of American Culture and in the Residential College.

Audie Klotz (Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University)

Bethany Lacina (University of Rochester)

Jean-Michel Lafleur (Université de Liège)

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Helen Marrow (Tufts University)

Daniel Naujoks (Columbia University)
  https://doi.org/10.1080/15512169.2018.1559066

Julija Sardelić (University of Leuven, Belgium)
  https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315164472/chapters/10.4324/9781315164472-21

Dagmar Soennecken (York University)

Sarah Song (University of California, Berkeley)

Gerasimos Tsourapas (University of Birmingham)

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Maarten Vink (Maastricht University)

- **Update MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset** (V3, 1960-2018). An updated version of the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset has been published, extending the dataset to 2018. The MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset charts the rules that existed in near all states of the world since 1960 with regard to the loss or renunciation of citizenship after a citizen of a respective state voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another state. The latest version of the dataset, previous versions and a detailed codebook, are available through the [Harvard Dataverse Network](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TTMZ08).

Beth Elise Whitaker (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

- Published with Nathaniel Cogley and John Doces. “Which immigrants should be naturalized? Which should be deported? Evidence from a survey experiment in Côte d'Ivoire.” *Political Research Quarterly*. 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918801104](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918801104)
Recent Articles

Acta Politica


American Behavioral Scientist


https://connect.apsanet.org/543/
American Journal of Political Science


American Political Science Review


Australian Journal of Political Science


British Journal of Political Science

Canadian Journal of Political Science


Comparative European Politics


Comparative Political Studies

Electoral Studies


Ethics and International Affairs


European Journal of Political Research


Government and Opposition

International Organization

International Studies Quarterly


Italian Political Science Review

Journal of Modern African Studies


Law and Society Review


Parliamentary Affairs

Party Politics


Perspectives on Politics

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/

**Political Research Quarterly**


**PS: Political Science & Politics**


**West European Politics**


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The articles are drawn from a search of 35 disciplinary and national/area studies journals (excluding journals that focus primarily on migration, refugees or citizenship) to draw members' attention to recent work that they might not otherwise see.

[https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/](https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/)
# SECTION OFFICERS

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-President</th>
<th>University/Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sara Wallace Goodman</td>
<td>University of California, Irvine, <a href="mailto:s.goodman@uci.edu">s.goodman@uci.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Cohen</td>
<td>Syracuse University, <a href="mailto:efcohen@maxwell.syr.edu">efcohen@maxwell.syr.edu</a></td>
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## Secretary:

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<tr>
<th>Secretary</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abigail Williamson</td>
<td>Trinity College, <a href="mailto:Abigail.Williamson@trincoll.edu">Abigail.Williamson@trincoll.edu</a></td>
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## Treasurer:

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<tr>
<th>Treasurer</th>
<th>University/Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gerasimos Tsourapas</td>
<td>University of Birmingham, <a href="mailto:g.tsourapas@bham.ac.uk">g.tsourapas@bham.ac.uk</a></td>
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## Council:

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<tr>
<td>2017-19</td>
<td>Justin Gest, George Mason University, Beth Whitaker, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Beyza Ekin Büyüker, University of Illinois at Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-20</td>
<td>Osman Balkan, Swarthmore College, Loren Collingwood, University of California, Riverside, Rita Nassar, Indiana University</td>
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## Newsletter Co-Editors:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-Editors</th>
<th>University/Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiona Barker</td>
<td>Victoria University of Wellington, <a href="mailto:fiona.barker@vuw.ac.nz">fiona.barker@vuw.ac.nz</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruxandra Paul</td>
<td>Amherst College, r <a href="mailto:paul@amherst.edu">paul@amherst.edu</a></td>
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## APSA 2019 Program Co-Chairs:

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<tr>
<th>Co-Chairs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Amy Liu</td>
<td>University of Texas, Austin, <a href="mailto:amy.liu@austin.utexas.edu">amy.liu@austin.utexas.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahsaan Maxwell</td>
<td>University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, <a href="mailto:rahasam@email.unc.edu">rahasam@email.unc.edu</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


APSA's Migration and Citizenship Section Newsletter is edited by Fiona Barker (fiona.barker@vuw.ac.nz) and Ruxandra Paul (rpaul@amherst.edu). Aaron Booker served as this issue's editorial assistant. Opinions do not represent the official position of APSA's Section on Migration and Citizenship. Past Newsletters are available to the public free of charge at https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/newsletters/.