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Letter from the Co-Presidents

Elizabeth Cohen  
Syracuse University

Antje Ellermann  
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June 10, 2020

As we are writing this letter in our homes during the Covid-19 lockdown, we are witnessing anti-racism solidarity protests spread across the globe in response to the killing of George Floyd, as the latest of the many Black and Indigenous persons who have long been unjustly targeted by state violence. Racism is not an American phenomenon. Regardless of where we live and work, we all can list names of those who were killed by law enforcement officers in our communities as a result of institutionalized racism. As scholars who study processes of inclusion and exclusion, power and hierarchy, and policy responses to diversity, we understand the power of state institutions to perpetuate racism and other forms of oppression. We also understand the power of protest and activism to disrupt the status quo and to make the unthinkable thinkable! Today, legislators in both chambers of the U.S. Congress and several municipal governments are discussing far-reaching proposals for police reform that would have been considered utopian just a week ago. Many of us have had conversations within our own institutions about the need for personal and institutional accountability when it comes to race and power in the academy.

Some of us are also grieving the loss of loved ones whose lives were taken by Covid-19. We stand in solidarity with those among us who have been subjected to anti-Asian racism and antisemitism as a result of pandemic scapegoating. Our undergraduate and graduate students, and those among us who are on time-limited teaching contracts, feel the stress of heightened economic insecurity. Many of us feel disoriented. As a profession that is so much on the move, we are struggling to adjust to a new normal where international travel seems out of reach for now and even domestic travel is far from straightforward. We have also just learnt that we will not be seeing each other in person in San Francisco in September. While we hope to see many of you during virtual panels and a virtual business meeting, we will miss the usual catching up and networking that usually takes place between panels and at our reception. We regret to let you know that we will not be going ahead with the planned pre-conference, organized by Matthew Wright, Antje Ellermann, and Irene Bloemraad and sponsored by the UBC Migration Research

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Excellence Cluster. We hope to be able to hold the pre-conference at the 2021 APSA meeting in Seattle instead.

We all realize that these are extraordinary times. We are all in the same storm, but in different boats. We wish you the strength you need to take care of yourselves and those around you – and also to reach out to those whose boat is in worse shape than yours.

To contact the Co-Presidents, email Elizabeth F Cohen (efcohen@maxwell.syr.edu) and Antje Ellermann (antje.ellermann@ubc.ca).
Letter from the Co-Editors

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Victoria University of Wellington  

Ruxandra Paul  
Amherst College

Since COVID-19 lockdowns began, we have seen abrupt and dramatic changes to the way we teach, research, and connect with colleagues. Conferences were canceled, students had to leave campus at short notice, colleagues lost access to offices, and many have been balancing the multiple challenges of teaching online while managing care for family members or schooling for children. Suspension of travel has particular consequences for our graduate student members and early-career scholars in the midst of data collection and fieldwork.

We now write from our homes where we reflect on the current and future impacts of COVID-19 for the global politics of migration and citizenship. Before COVID-19 we worried about liberal democratic backsliding in many countries, but few among us had contemplated the effects of indefinitely extended state of emergency, confinement or shelter-in-place orders on democratic politics and societies. Even as some countries are now opening up, the virus continues to spread globally, and recession is hitting hard. Consumer demand is contracting and unemployment is set to reach record levels in many countries, which could shift political discourse around migrant workers, especially those on temporary work visas.

International travel remains severely restricted. Governments have variously limited travel abroad to essential journeys, imposed self-isolation or quarantine measures on arrivals, or temporarily closed land borders. A few countries, like Australia and New Zealand, shut the border entirely to all but returning citizens and permanent residents, except for rare economic exceptions that raise important questions about how different types of migrant workers and skills are valued. In other countries, exceptions to travel restrictions at the height of the pandemic exposed the profound dependence of some advanced economies on migrant workers. In April, when asparagus crops started rotting in the fields, unemployed Germans did not flock to take seasonal jobs as agricultural workers. Instead, the German government recalled Romanian and Polish migrant workers it had previously expelled due to the pandemic; dozens of charter flights rushed back thousands of temporary migrants. While Romanians faced heavy fines if they left their houses without good reason or failed to self-distance, crowds of Romanian migrant workers waited from morning to evening in local airports to board flights to Germany, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands, and Austria. Flights continued to bring much-needed
workforce into Western and Southern Europe, despite transportation arrangements and work conditions not respecting social-distancing rules.

The current situation has given some insight into what a world of closed borders would look like and reminded us how untenable that is when movement within and across borders is so central to contemporary lives. Our economies depend on migration, and this dependence persists even during a pandemic. Migrants such as foreign seasonal workers, seeking to provide for their families, remain essential and assume risks that non-migrants avoid at all costs. By harvesting fruit and vegetables they alleviate workforce shortages in agricultural sectors in the affluent West and help sustain food production. Regardless of political rhetoric, migration is not a luxury, but a necessity for migrants and non-migrants alike.

Amidst the current turbulence, uncertainty about the domestic and international politics of mobility and of migration regimes seems likely to grow further. Yet, migration trends of the past two decades show the increasing need for international cooperation. Comparing 2000 with 2020 shows that the number of international migrants rose from 150 to 272 million, and the proportion of migrants in the world has increased from 2.8% to 3.5%. Refugee numbers grew from 14 to 25.9 million, and there are now 41.3 million internally displaced people (compared to 21 million in 2000). Over the same period, global remittances also rose, from 126 to 689 billion dollars (the main sending-country remittance receivers remain India, China, and Mexico, which are also the main countries of origin of international migrants).

Retreat from international cooperation on migration continues to raise concerns and tackling transnational challenges with unilateral or isolationist solutions is bound to be ineffective. History and past heavy-handed attempts at migration management show us that restrictive policies often result in higher numbers of people abandoning temporary migratory projects in favor of permanent migration. To highlight progress on counter-trend initiatives, this issue’s symposium highlights the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the Academic Council on Global Migration, with an introductory essay by Rey Koslowski and contributions from scholars with expertise on the GCM. This issue also reports back from the inaugural Migration & Citizenship pre-conference in 2019 that brought together new and established scholars at George Mason University’s DC campus. That event focused on helping migration scholars navigate career trajectories and methodological challenges specific to our field, and we are delighted to include here edited highlights from a panel discussion on Research Methods in the Study of Migration and Citizenship. While the planned 2020 pre-conference is unable to take place due to the shift to a virtual APSA meeting, we look forward to the next time when scholars can come together and stimulate new conversations in the field.

We hope you enjoy this issue and we thank the authors for their valuable contributions. The next issue will offer an opportunity to reflect on how COVID-19 is impacting the politics of migration and citizenship, but also how we go about studying it. We look forward to hearing about silver linings in the research and teaching ideas that emerge from this difficult time. Stay safe, stay strong!

To contact the Co-Editors, email Fiona Barker (fiona.barker@vuw.ac.nz) and Ruxandra Paul (r paul@amherst.edu)
2019 Section Business Meeting

The 2019 Section Business Meeting minutes are posted to the Migration and Citizenship Section website should you want to review them. http://bit.ly/2vGFrm9

Syllabus Bank

As many of you know, the Migration and Citizenship Section maintains a syllabus bank on the Section website as a service to the field. Migration policy and politics has changed rapidly in recent years, and will continue to do so into the future, so we are always looking to update the syllabus bank. Please consider sharing one of your recent syllabi with Section members via the syllabus bank!

Send your post-2015 syllabi to Abigail.Williamson@trincoll.edu.

Please name your PDF file(s) as follows:

Last Name, First Name – Name of Course, Semester Year.

All recent syllabi would add value, but particularly syllabi on the topics of: Gender and Migration; Emigration, Transnationalism, and Diaspora studies; Human Rights, Security, and Migration; and Political Economy, Development, and Migration.

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/syllabus-bank/

SYMPOSIUM:
A GLOBAL COMPACT FOR MIGRATION

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Introduction to the Symposium on the Global Compact for Migration

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Newspaper headlines appearing throughout 2015 of capsizing boats in the Mediterranean drowning hundreds of asylum seekers at a time captured the attention of policymakers worldwide and led the General Assembly to unanimously adopt the New York Declaration on Migrants and Refugees in September 2016. The New York Declaration initiated a series of intergovernmental conferences tasked to produce a Global Compact on Refugees and a UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which became the first intergovernmentally negotiated agreement prepared under the auspices of the United Nations to address international migration in a comprehensive manner.

The process of developing the Global Compact for Migration started in April 2017 and continued through July 2018. Preparatory events gathered input and recommendations to inform drafting of the Compact led by Mexico and Switzerland. This included six informal thematic sessions on facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration, five United Nations Regional Commission meetings (Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe), seven regional civil society consultations and five informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearings with representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, parliaments, diasporas, migrants, migrant organizations and the private sector. The February 2018 "Zero Draft" was revised through six rounds of monthly intergovernmental negotiations among participating UN member states. The final intergovernmentally negotiated and agreed outcome document of July 13, 2018 sets out a "cooperative framework" comprised of 23 objectives for the achievement of safe, orderly and regular migration, each of which contains one or more commitments "followed by a range of actions considered to be relevant policy instruments and best practices (para 16)."

The Global Compact for Migration is very much a synthetic document that pulls together commitments that are similar to provisions in international conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, technical standards, regional accords and other international agreements adopted by various subsets of UN member states (e.g., the European Union and participants in regional consultative processes, such as the Colombo Process) and had been extensively discussed by UN member states during a decade’s worth of meetings on international cooperation at the global level, including High-Level Dialogues of the UN General Assembly, the Global Forum on Migration and Development and meetings sponsored by the International Organization for Migration.

In that many, if not most, commitments made in the Global Compact for Migration can be found in previous agreements and the Global Compact itself is a non-binding agreement, the Compact is something of a lowest common denominator that, like the New York Declaration, could plausibly receive the assent of all 193 UN member states. Moreover, the objective of making a greater share of the world’s migration "safe, orderly and regular" appeals to major migration destination states, none of whom had signed

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onto previous agreements like the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Nevertheless, the United States pulled out of the intergovernmental process toward the Global Compact for Migration and was followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel. Moreover, the Global Compact for Migration became increasing politically contentious in many other countries, perhaps most poignantly in Belgium, where coalition government of Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel collapsed over his decision to adopt the Compact as the right-wing New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) party pulled out of the coalition on the eve of the December 2018 Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakech, Morocco. Although the withdrawal of these five states and such political contestation dominated media coverage, in the end, the Compact was endorsed by a vote of 152 Member States in favor (79% of UN members) with an additional 12 abstentions and 24 not present for the vote.

This symposium brings together migration scholars who can be found on the membership list of the Academic Council on the Global Compact for Migration (ACGCM), which began with the 2019 APSA Migration and Citizenship Section business meeting and reception where I recruited six other section members to join me in establishing the Council. Symposium contributors examine several dimensions of the Global Compact for Migration with respect to its development, implementation and broader implications generally speaking and from regional perspectives. Hopefully, our essays will generate more interest in the Global Compact among section members and possibly encourage some of you to add it to your research agenda and join the ACGCM as well.

Please direct inquiries about the Symposium’s Introductory Article to Rey Koslowski (rkoslowski@albany.edu).
Assessing the Global Compact for Migration: a ‘Milestone’ on the Long Pathway to Greater International Cooperation?

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The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was formally launched at the end of 2018, now a little over one year ago. The process leading to the GCM was directly precipitated by the earlier New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, amidst a growing sense of urgency arising from the EU ‘refugee crisis’ and unparalleled levels of forced displacement across the globe. However, the creation of the Compact also represented the culmination of a much longer period—more than a decade—of prior efforts at fostering coordination among states, including the UN High Level Dialogues and Global Forum on Migration and Development. Participants in the Compact negotiations presented the outcome of the GCM as an unprecedented achievement for the UN system, representing the first holistic engagement with migration as a global issue.

Will the GCM prove an effective vehicle for achieving substantive international cooperation on, and governance of, migration? The most honest answer for the moment may be that it is too soon to tell. As an essentially state-led initiative, much of the future potential of the GCM lies in how, and to what extent, governments decide to take up and concretely implement its varying elements. This process is largely under-determined due to the non-binding nature of the Compact, as well as the variability of the actions and commitments open to supportive states in the service of core GCM objectives, wherein considerable discretion is apparent (Guild, Basaran and Allinson 2019). At the end of the day, states that have backed the GCM are presented with a diverse set of options for advancing its objectives and are not obliged to pursue any particular actions other than those stemming from legal obligations they have already entered into in the past. How this may play out in the long term therefore greatly depends on a larger global context and the ongoing interest of states to support and consolidate broader efforts of international cooperation.

I therefore abjure from offering any concrete predictions of the GCM’s direct impact and significance for the advancement of more concrete forms of global migration governance. While agreeing with others that it may take years before such assessments can realistically be advanced (Ferris and Martin 2019; Solomon and Sheldon 2018), I suggest that our current moment may provide reasons for both caution and tempered optimism about the potential role of the GCM in supporting further inter-state cooperation in the long-term. To do so, I outline some of the major features of the Compact relevant to its role in shaping the future of international coordination on migration, address the potential challenges and opportunities that may shape these future possibilities, and then speak to what might be required to achieve a truly robust form of global migration governance. By way of conclusion I offer some modest reflections on what may be necessary to build upon and make further progress along the pathway set by the GCM.
Although the GCM emerged from a set of parallel and distinct negotiations to the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), there are a number of shared features between the outcomes of the two processes initiated by the New York Declaration. The most important similarity concerns their status – as ‘Compacts’ these agreements did not require state ratification, nor do they enjoy the status of multilateral treaties. Both the GCM and GCR are non-binding, and explicitly recognize and affirm state sovereignty throughout. Where they do invoke international law it is mostly by way of existing commitments to human rights or the global refugee regime. There are also crucial differences: while the GCR draws on the ongoing (and at this point well established) role of the UNHCR in overseeing refugee protection, the issue areas covered by the GCM do not benefit from the same degree of institutionalization. Indeed, while other recognized spheres of global cooperation—from security and trade to development and environmental policy—have been previously taken up by the UN, nothing comparable exists in terms of providing an international framework for addressing migration as a whole.

In assessing the import of the GCM, it is helpful to start by addressing two sets of opposed criticisms that gained considerable traction even well before negotiations had concluded. From the standpoint of scholars, policy-makers, and civil society activists who would have wished to see a more robust and substantive framework for migration governance, the GCM’s non-binding status seemed to offer too little by way of addressing the increasingly manifest need for greater state coordination in this area. In the eyes of these observers, the New York Declaration represented a unique moment of international solidarity and an opportunity to truly rethink global migration; against that hope, the final form of the GCM appears to fall short. Not only does the GCM lack any effective enforcement mechanisms, let alone explicit institutional elements comparable to those found in the refugee regime, but the ambiguous status of the Compact as merely a ‘non-legally binding, cooperative framework’ (GCM §7) appears excessively modest as a response to the current realities and challenges of migration.

At the same time, throughout its development and launch the GCM attracted vocal criticism from several states on the grounds that it posed an apparent threat to sovereignty. Most notably, the then-new US administration went so far as to withdraw entirely from participating in the negotiations and continued to raise objections to the entire process. This position was justified on the basis of the accurate, though puzzling, complaint that the GCM would commit states to "strengthening global governance" (Population and Development Review 2019, 258).1 Although only a few other countries followed this line, many observers at the time focused on American resistance as greatly undermining the current import and future promise of the GCM. Indeed, it is important to remember that, in 2018 government leaders even across a number of participating states faced considerable domestic opposition to the GCM.2 From this perspective, one might

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1 I characterize such objections by states as puzzling because migration is an explicitly transnational phenomenon for which the need for greater inter-state cooperation has become more than obvious; to view such efforts as an impediment to sovereignty seems tantamount to objecting to the existence of traffic lights and road regulations because of the apparent imposition on a person’s ability to drive entirely as they wish, while somehow ignoring the manifest benefits provided by coordination.

2 This ranged from the now former leader of a major opposition party in Canada attempting to turn the supposed threat of the GCM into a major election issue, to Belgian PM Michel having to form a minority government following the departure of a collation partner opposed to supporting the compact.
not expect the Global Compact on Migration to effect substantial concrete change when it has so far been unable to garner a level of endorsement comparable to that enjoyed by the New York Declaration.

These sets of concerns are not without merit: many onlookers had originally hoped that a more concrete and comprehensive governance platform commanding global support would emerge from the Compact processes. But to judge the GCM against such expectations would be unrealistic in light of the dramatic changes that unfolded in the international landscape in the closing years of the last decade. From the sobering standpoint of 2020, the political circumstances of the New York Declaration look radically different within our present context. Not only did that initiative appear to command widespread support across states from both the global south and global north, amidst a broader commitment to sustaining and improving multilateral cooperation, but anti-migration rhetoric had yet to be fully weaponized and brought into the mainstream of public discourse by far right parties and populist movements across Europe and North America. Amidst heightened interstate tensions, a dramatic shrinking of global support for refugee resettlement in parallel to increasingly restrictive and inhumane asylum policies, and doubts over the integrity of the EU as well as the post-Breton Woods system, even the most basic commitments of our international rule-based order can no longer be taken for granted. Given this formidable context, expecting a mature international regime, complete with binding obligations on states or even compliance mechanisms, to arise from such circumstances seems to ignore the undeniable political constraints of the current situation.3

When viewed through the prism of the present, the GCM arguably represents the current limits of international coordination around migration. However, when considered from a more hopeful view of the future, it may come to represent an important stage in consensus building, opening up opportunities that could provide pathways to further progress, a point I briefly return to below. Moreover, emphasis on the handful of states that explicitly opposed the GCM ignores the 164 countries that did approve the GCM in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, as well as the resounding majority that voted in favor of GA Resolution 73/195 to endorse the undertaking. Indeed, the decision of states hostile to the baseline assumptions of the GCM—that international cooperation and global governance are in fact beneficial to all states—to exclude themselves from the Compact might have in fact substantially improved the outcomes of the negotiations. These conditions may have permitted discussion and consensus on issues that could otherwise have been de-railed by states more interested in undermining the process. To take one clear example, it is unclear whether climate-induced migration, which is discussed in terms of both long-term and short-term displacement, would have received any mention at all had circumstances not played out as such.4

3 Indeed, not only did the GCM emerge against the backdrop of Brexit and increasingly explicit American hostility toward multilateralism, but, even as I write this, the WTO’s dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms are actively being undermined by the US government. Given that the post-war consensus on supporting the free movement of goods has always greatly exceeded that toward the free movement of people, this is clearly not a hospitable moment for deepening global migration governance.

4 See GCM, § 18, 21, 23 for the Compact’s discussions of climate change mitigation and displacement arising from environmental degradation, amidst debate about other precarious situations that might compel migrants to leave their countries of origin.
With these broader considerations in mind, it is worth acknowledging what the process did accomplish: declaring states’ shared goal of facilitating safe, orderly, and legal migration. The GCM also does re-assert important international priorities surrounding global migration, in particular, the principle that migrant rights are human rights and that states have both moral and legal obligations to realize and uphold the rights of migrants.\(^6\) It also opens up pathways for future progress by way of creating structures for further conversation at the global level. For instance, the GCM (§ 45) called for creating forums for stakeholder participation, such as the UN Migration network, with important emphasis on the role of civil society, as well as a broad range of other actors. Perhaps equally important, the GCM places significant emphasis on data collection and facilitating the generation of reliable information on migration, in order to support the construction of a ‘global knowledge platform’ in the form of an open data repository and to broadly inform the development of evidence-based policy at both the domestic and international level. Taken together, these substantive elements of the GCM are far from insignificant, even if they appear modest in comparison to what a different set of political circumstances might have produced. Finally, the Compact notably consolidates the role of the IOM within the UN system, essentially identifying it as responsible for overseeing the GCM and further implementation efforts arising from it. This is by no means inconsequential: the IOM only recently gained status as a related UN organization and its role in the GCM promises to further advance its capacity as the lead institutional actor for migration at the global level. In turn, this could do much to advance coordination amongst UN agencies on migration, which have for some time competed against each other and often worked at cross-purposes. Given the still nascent state of migration governance in contrast to the global refugee regime, whose development and consolidation was importantly advanced by the stewardship of the UNHCR, we can remain hopeful that IOM’s organization leadership may open up similar opportunities for advancement in the long term.\(^6\)

In some ways, the GCM’s overarching success is in mapping out and affirming the collective nature of effective migration governance, that no country ‘can address the challenges and opportunities of this global phenomenon on its own’ (GCM § 11). At the same time, however, only the most panglossian view is capable of ignoring the limitations of this achievement. In itself, the GCM falls well short of providing any of the collective action mechanisms necessary for overcoming the very challenges it brings to our attention: the need for a creating a shared ‘framework’ capable of securing ‘safe, orderly and regular migration for the benefit of all’, and which entails providing the robust global migration regime that our international order truly requires (GCM § 13). Such a governance regime would instantiate a comprehensive and institutionalized approach

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\(^5\) This includes limiting the use of detention as a measure of last resort and, when applied, to ensure that its application “follows due process, is non-arbitrary, based on law, necessity, proportionality and individual assessments, is carried out by authorized officials, and for the shortest possible period of time.” See GCM § 29.

\(^6\) Although much consternation has been raised regarding the IOM’s supposed non-normative status and what this may mean for its role in the UN system, it is worth noting that international organizations can and do change, especially when provided with the opportunity to expand their competencies beyond the original mandate to address a wider range of global challenges and issues. Recall that the UNHCR, arguably the world’s largest humanitarian organization today, itself began as a highly constrained institutional actor, created with a short-term mandate focused on legal protection and intended to address retrospective issues related to displacement in post-war Europe.
that explicitly and holistically incorporates the various dimensions of contemporary mobility within a singular framework. Far from imperilling the sovereignty of states, this approach is simply the correlative of the reality that migration is an inherently transnational phenomenon and can only be addressed through deepened international coordination. At the same time, the GCM provides important venues for policy-makers, civil society organizations, as well as scholars (such as those involved in the Academic Council on Global Migration) for informing and advancing future possibilities for reforming our current context.

The GCM itself rightly notes that the agreement represents a ‘milestone in global dialog over international cooperation on migration (GCM §6). Although falling short of a formal multilateral treaty or convention that firmly creates the institutional groundwork for the governance mechanisms necessary for equitably and effectively facilitating international mobility, the GCM does consolidate two decades of prior inter-state engagement on migration and lays the foundations for further conversations. I have sought to suggest that the latter may be productively advanced by the coordinating role accorded to the IOM in guiding the UN system’s broader approach and the GCM’s emphasis on the inclusion of diverse stake-holders in the development of evidence-based migration policies, paving the way for deeper cooperation and coordination at the international and regional level. However, as the metaphor of a ‘milestone’ itself indicates, the outcome of the GCM is ‘not the end to our efforts’ as the signatories of the Compact explicitly acknowledged (GCM § 14). Any prospects for further progress rely, of course, on the re-emergence of a broader global context in which states collectively reaffirm their strong commitment to supporting an international rules-based order. This development is by no means assured to be immediate, but one for which we may at the very least hope.

References


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7 One vision of what this could resemble in practice is well represented by the Model International Mobility Convention, a recent project undertaken by academic and policy experts to address these issues. See for instance, Doyle and Borgnäs (2018) and Doyle (2017).


Please direct inquiries about “Assessing the Global Compact on Migration: a ‘Milestone’ on the long pathway to greater International Cooperation?” to Kiran Banerjee ([kiran.banerjee@dal.ca](mailto:kiran.banerjee@dal.ca)).
A Global Compact for Migration from below? The Role of Migrant Civil Society

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Migrant civil society has played an influential role in the deliberations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Setbacks notwithstanding, this influence can be found in the final document regarding the language used as well as the inclusion of civil society’s agenda and policy goals. The challenge for migrant civil society now is to get access to and eventually influence the complex process of monitoring and implementation of the GCM goals. This complexity is just one of several obstacles for meaningful civil society involvement. Besides limited resources, another major obstacle is uncertainty: more than one and a half years after the GCM was agreed upon in Marrakesh and New York, several modalities are still not clearly defined, and the process is running markedly behind schedule. As Jonathan Prentice, Head of Secretariat of the United Nations Network on Migration, put it during a consultation with civil society representatives on the GCM in relation to the regional review process: “The modality resolution is wonderful in its carte blanche aspect, but not very wonderful in its guidance and direction as to how these might take place and to what purpose. For those of you out there who are confused, if it is any consolation: I am confused as well.”

With the GCM process thus being very much a work-in-progress, this contribution focuses on a number of central questions.

1. What is migrant civil society?

Obviously, one cannot speak of “the” migrant civil society – just as there exists not one but rather a multitude of civil societies at large. This may seem self-evident, but when it comes to organizing and strategizing in the field of migration, one can often hear calls for “unity of all migrants” or that “all migrants should speak with one voice”. These calls make sense from the perspective of bargaining power and when dealing with more resourceful actors such as states or international organizations. However, migrants are naturally highly heterogeneous groups in terms of factors such as socio-economic status, form of employment, legal status and, last but not least, political views.

Nonetheless, there are umbrella organizations or so-called “networks of networks” which aim to represent the interests of migrants at the regional and global level. One of them is the NGO Committee on Migration (CoM), which was constituted as a Committee of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO) in Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It

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1 Statement made at the Informal Exchange with the UN Network, Civil Society and Stakeholders and the GFMD Dialogue on the GCM, Quito, Ecuador January 24, 2020.

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was formed as a response to the first global meeting specifically dedicated to migration – the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UN-HLD) in 2006. The UN-HLD led to the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) one year later and, since 2011, the International Catholic Commission on Migration (ICMC) has been responsible for the civil society component of this gathering. Even before the September 2016 High-Level Meeting (HLM) in New York that led to the development of the two compacts on migration and refugees, these two networks joined forces with the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) to establish a self-organized Civil Society Action Committee. This committee participated in the HLM but continued to be involved in the GCM process and expanded during the process to over 30 member organizations ranging from the International Detention Coalition (IDC) and Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) to the Council of Global Unions (CGU) Migration Working Group and Save the Children (StC). The goal is to represent all major world regions, although the level of organizing differs, with Asia being characterized by a particularly high density of migrant civil society organizations.

2. Why should migrant civil society have a say in global politics?

One could deduce from this very brief overview that migrant civil society first of all consists of an impressive number of acronyms. While this is not completely inaccurate – and there are plenty more such acronyms –, more importantly, advocacy is at the heart of the process. The focus of this advocacy is to ensure a rights-based approach to migration governance. The CoM defines its main purpose accordingly as “to encourage the promotion and protection of migrants and their human rights, in accordance with the United Nations Charter” (NGO CoM 2020). Tellingly, these networks decided to self-organize their Action Committee even though the UN system had set up its own civil society steering/selection. The motivations behind this decision can be seen as striving for independence (from the state-led system), on one hand, and, on the other hand, more inclusion (of civil society voices).

Why is it relevant for migrant civil society to be part of such processes? In accordance with the “all-affected principle” (Dahl 1990), migrants (and the same can be said for refugees, for whom this constitutes even more of a challenge) should have a say in policies which directly affect them – a demand that is expressed in the common slogan “Nothing About Us Without Us!”. They often lack representation, since countries of origin might not necessarily have their interests in mind and the same goes for countries of destination. The regional and global levels might therefore provide better platforms for interest representation, not least because international conventions or compacts could be used as advocacy tools. This is by no means guaranteed, though, since the dominant discourse of “migration management” (Geiger and Pécout 2010) still tends to frame migrants as objects rather than subjects of governance (Rother 2013). A more inclusive approach beyond mere tokenism would therefore be seen as a step towards a democratization of international organizations and institutions.

3. How did migrant civil society influence the GCM process?

As indicated in the previous section, migrant civil society did not start to form global structures only as a response to the GCM process – rather, there was already a “well-oiled machine” (Rother and Steinhilper 2019, 247) in place, set up during one and a half decades of organizing. The Action Committee could therefore build upon an “inside-outside strategy” (Rother 2009) that utilized “invited” as well as “invented” spaces (Schierup et al. 2019a).

“Invited” spaces refer to the official deliberations of the GCM, but also to other fora such as the Civil Society Days of the GFMD. Starting with the 2016 GFMD in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, these civil society days were used for strategizing and information sharing on the compact (MADE Network 2017). Here, the representatives produced regular inputs and provided feedback on the various drafts of the compact. During the GFMD in Berlin in 2017, there were discussions to develop a “Global Compact from below” as an alternative document compiling the main civil society positions; this led to the issuance of “Ten Acts for the Global Compact. A civil society vision for a transformative agenda for human mobility, migration and development” which gathered more than 230 signatories.

They also formed strategic alliances with like-minded UN member states, which was a mutually beneficial approach. While these states could bring civil society advocacy points inside the government-led meetings, they could also gain increased legitimacy by showing that their positions were in line with civil society demands.

Civil Society representatives not only voiced demands and concerns but also provided expertise and background papers. Some of the passages in the GCM – most notable the zero draft, but still noticeable in the final document – can be traced directly to input from civil society organizations such as the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM).

With a reasoning similar to the creation of the action committee – i.e. independence and inclusiveness – civil society also aimed to “invent” their own spaces. These encompassed independent regional consultations and parallel events to the GFMD such as the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights (PGA). Here, a broader range of stakeholders could come together, and their input could then be included in the civil society positions expressed in the “invited” spaces. Some of these gatherings also provided space for dissenting voices; in particular during the PGA held directly before the intergovernmental conference on the GCM in Marrakesh. Here, the Chair strongly criticized the GCM as an attempt to marginalize the – legally binding - UN 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Schierup et al. 2019b, 160). This proved once more that migrant civil society by no means speaks “with one voice”, nor should it from a pluralist–democratic perspective.

4. What role for migrant civil society in the GCM implementation?

While the GCM deliberations were conducted in a fairly centralized way, the implementation has to take place on the ground, where political opportunity structures differ to large degrees. Migrant civil society organizations continue to address the issue in a multi-level manner. Regarding invited spaces, they lobbied for a “seat at the table” at the main monitoring forum, the International Migration Review starting in 2022. This review mechanism – although much more informal than the periodic review for binding conventions – could also be used as a space to exert pressure on governments to include migrant civil society in their national implementation plans; that is, if such plans exist. After the backlash to the GCM through orchestrated campaigns, country of destination governments are often reluctant to frame their policies as part of the GCM. While many open questions remain about the regional review process, there is increasing cooperation with the UN Network on Migration and migrant civil society is involved in consultations, working groups etc. Regarding global invented spaces, these are currently primarily virtual and manifest in webinars by the Action Committee on topics such as “Countering negative narratives on migration” or “COVID-19 and the Rights of Migrants”. On the latter issue, the Action Committee has also issued “A Global Civil Society Statement. First, Save Lives: Solutions for the COVID-19 Pandemic and New Solidarity with Migrants and Refugees”, including explicit references to the GCM and further guidelines and
conventions. Such references to the GCM have so far rarely been made in policies dealing with COVID-19, though.

This observation has led William Gois, the coordinator of the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), a major regional network of migrants rights organizations to come to a sobering assessment: In regard to the Asian Context, he recalled “that the GCM which was meant to be a living document is now more dead than alive in dealing with the pandemic and needs to be resuscitated” (Gois 2020).

References


Please direct inquiries about “A Global Compact for Migration from below? The Role of Migrant Civil Society” to Stefan Rother (mail@stefan-rother.de).
Values and Challenges of GCM Implementation Across Africa

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Africa shares the primary objectives and values of safe, orderly and regular migration expressed by the GCM, made significant contributions during its negotiations and will implement it. After all, its member states are committed to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. States are also committed to the implementation of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) 2018-2030 (AU 2017; AU 2018a) and the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons (AU 2018b). Migration has contributed to the continent’s contemporary demographic landscape. The socio-political and economic formations of the continent have largely been shaped by voluntary and forced migration. Migration is both an opportunity and a challenge for development in Africa. It provides an opportunity for positive economic and social impacts for countries of origin and destination, as well as for migrants themselves.

Contrary to common perceptions outside of Africa, the major challenge for Africa lies in the management of migration and mobility within the continent - most migration occurs within Africa, with about 80% of African migrants remaining in the continent. The implication is that policies and measures to address migration must be refocused to address migration inside Africa in addition to outward migration to other continents.

Most African economies are largely dominated by agriculture and the urban informal economy plus industry and services. Migrant workers inside the continent are employed mostly in these vulnerable economic settings characterized by low incomes and wages, lack of social protection, unstable workplaces, and low skill profiles. However, with Africa’s changing migratory profile to educated young men and women, who are economically active and with a propensity to migrate for work, study and family (AU 2017), migrants are increasingly found in the vital high-tech engineering and medical sectors (UNECA 2017). Effective management of migration is essential to avoid its potential detrimental effects and, if properly managed, intra-African mobility can be utilized to elevate Africa’s economic potential at a much faster pace. Poorly-managed migration, on the other hand, can significantly undermine progress towards sustainable development. The African Union (AU) understands the importance of migration in development and issues of migration and mobility have pre-occupied the minds of African leaders long before the GCM, given the centrality of human movement within Africa for continental integration. Hence, the adoption of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in 2018 as a legal framework for the management of migration and mobility on the continent (AU 2018b).1

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1 The AU Assembly by its decision Assembly/AU/Dec.676 (XXX) of January 2018 adopted the Protocol to the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons.
Herein lies the added value of the GCM to complement and give impetus to other ongoing efforts on the continent. Upon the adoption of the GCM in Marrakesh in December 2018, the AU put together a 3-year Plan of Action for the implementation of the Compact. African migration priorities, policies, Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were taken into consideration by the plan. It provides Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with comprehensive guideline to assist them in the formulation and implementation of the GCM objectives in accordance with their priorities and resources as committed during the negotiations. The draft plan has been examined by experts from the Member States and should be adopted soon.

The GCM (para. 45) welcomes the UN Secretary General’s decision to establish a UN Network on Migration to ensure effective and coherent system-wide support to implementation, capacity building mechanisms, follow up and review of the GCM. The IOM is the coordinator and secretariat of the network and is already working with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) and the AU to put in place a robust regional review mechanism using the draft 3-year plan by the AU as the basis. A similar implementation and review mechanism coordinated by the IOM needs to be put in place at the national level in member states. Several challenges remain, including:

- The IOM is working through UN Country Team (UNCT) to serve as the UN Network on Migration at national level in order to ensure an All-Society approach. It is struggling to get the GCM endorsed by UNCT in many countries as part of a work plan. Why is this?
- Due to lack of resources, there has been no strong push from the UN HQ in New York for the UNCT to interface with the UN Network on Migration.
- There has so far not been much progress towards setting up of a capacity building Fund. (UN Migration Startup Fund for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration). When this is established there will be some interest, especially from governments, UN Agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).
- In many African countries, the GCM is not well-known and there are few interlocutors for the IOM/UNCT. The lack of knowledge, together with a lack of resources, has resulted in a lack of real interest to facilitate national consultation on an implementation mechanism.
- Momentum needs to be generated at the national level, yet this is not happening, with possible exceptions of Ethiopia and Morocco where there have been some efforts at national consultations geared toward the implementation of the GCM. This happened due to the availability of discretionary funds that the IOM country offices in the two countries could use, usually from EU-funded Better Management of Migration (BMM) that predated the GCM.

Apart from the challenges identified above, views about the relationship between migration and development present a further obstacle. The current narrative that places emphasis on poverty alleviation and/or reduction of extreme poverty needs to change to wealth creation. The correlation between poverty and migration is not as linear as is often portrayed. The narrative must be linked to trade and wealth creation, which would bring a different focus and measures towards maximizing migration’s benefits and making it

Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment as a legal framework for the management of migration and mobility in the continent.

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an integral part of sustainable development. One key measure is to facilitate efforts at continental integration by supporting free movement of persons, goods and services encapsulated in the Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) that will enter into force in due course (AU 2018b).\(^2\) Trade instruments should be integrated into decisions on migration and mobility to have a fully integrated, but internally competitive, continent within which goods, services, capital and labor can move across national borders.

Europe and North America must strive not to undermine the two protocols. Trade protectionism, pressures on African countries for tougher border controls, miserable handouts in the name of development assistance, or the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) all have the potential to undermine AfCFTA. Are developed countries prepared to support free movement of persons and the creation of a free trade area in Africa? Are they prepared to give Africa preferential access to their markets as against protectionism? These are key to wealth creation and prosperity in Africa towards a meaningful implementation of the GCM and the management of migration and mobility.

References


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\(^2\) In addition to AU Assembly adoption of the Protocol to the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment as a legal framework for managing migration and mobility (AU 2018b), the extraordinary summit in 2018 formally adopted the AfCFTA protocol (also to the 1991 AEC Treaty).
International migration within, to and from the Southeast Asian sub-region is a robust and dynamic phenomenon; mainly as states of origin and destination, but with a few serving as transit countries as well. Migration in Southeast Asia is characterized by the following: most movement to, from and within the sub-region is temporary labor migration; migrant workers are often found in low to semi-skilled sectors with undocumented movements prevalent given the lack of legal pathways for work; and a little over half of all migrants in the region are women. To some degree, other forms of migration such as long-term or permanent settlement, marriage migration, and migration for educational reasons also exist. Around 6.5 million migrant workers are found in three countries: Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. This represents 96 percent of the total number of migrant workers in the sub-region (World Bank Group 2017).

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has served as a platform for the sub-region to address the challenges of international migration. In 2007, ASEAN Heads of State signed and declared their commitment on international migration as contained in the Cebu Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. This document outlines the countries’ overall commitments to the general principles and obligations of both receiving and sending States, with the expressed reservation that implementation will be in accordance and consistent with their respective national laws, regulations and policies. As enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, the principle of consultation and consensus ensures that all State parties arrive at a decision based on areas of agreement. Further progress on migrant workers’ protection took a decade before ASEAN, during its 31st Summit in November 2017 in the Philippines, came up with the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. The document expands on states’ commitments contained in the Cebu Declaration; specifically, to work towards an action plan to implement the rights outlined in the Consensus.

While both documents are non-binding, the process of developing, discussing and crafting these two sub-regional documents proved to be a good lead-in to the subsequent process of consultation, stocktaking and inter-governmental negotiations that culminated in the final version of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 2018.

Approval and Implementation of the GCM in Southeast Asia:
A majority of countries in Southeast Asia—Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam—voted in
favor of the adoption of the GCM during the UN General Assembly 73rd session on December 19, 2018. Singapore abstained despite participating actively and constructively in the intergovernmental process to negotiate the final version of the GCM. Brunei was not present, and therefore did not cast a vote in favor or against the adoption of the GCM.

Countries that voted for the adoption of the GCM are taking steps to implement the GCM, although progress on implementation is uneven across states. Further, some states that are working on the implementation of the GCM nonetheless remain tight-lipped about what progress they have made thus far.

The Philippines, the leading state in terms of migration policies, governance and realities in the region, is taking serious steps towards implementation of the GCM. With the Department of Foreign Affairs taking the lead, it has convened several consultations to draft the GCM National Implementation Plan, espousing a whole of government and whole of society approach. One concrete articulation of GCM implementation in the Philippines is the alignment of the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017 – 2022 Midterm Review process to reflect that Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration is a development outcome. This same principle guides the local governments in the crafting of their respective development plans.

Thailand, which was actively engaged in the process of drafting the GCM from the beginning and throughout the open negotiations, voted for adoption of the GCM in recognition of its value and importance as a global document on migration. In line with its commitment to the principles of the GCM, it came up with the Memorandum of Understanding on the Determination of Measures and Approaches Alternative to Detention of Children in Immigration Detention Centers signed by Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, representatives of the Royal Thai Police, the Ministries of Social Development and Human Security, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Health, Education, and Labour.

Indonesia has also taken concrete steps towards implementation of the GCM. Led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), it has convened several workshops with various stakeholders’ cooperation and participation. It is interesting to note that the sites of these workshops were deliberately chosen on the part of the Government. For instance, the second workshop was held at Mataram, which is the third largest city of origin of Indonesian migrant workers. Designing the workshops in this way enabled MoFA to engage with local governments to identify their needs and get input from them on migration policies in order to ensure that national migration policies articulate and respond to the challenges and realities of international migration on the ground.

Vietnam’s efforts to implement the GCM see its Ministry of Foreign Affairs partnering with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to organize an introductory meeting with twelve localities in the central highlands of Vietnam to discuss the importance of the GCM and to raise awareness about the country’s international commitments to protect the rights of migrants. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, in line with the implementation of the GCM, came together during a trilateral technical-level meeting in Siem Reap in October 2019. This joint initiative is due to the fact that these three countries share strong similarities in their cultures, as well as sharing a border with Thailand. The meeting was aimed at addressing and ensuring the protection of their migrant workers crossing into Thailand, given their perspective as sending countries.

While ASEAN member States begin the implementation of the GCM at varying levels and capacities, the sub-regional mechanism offers a way for the Global Compact to be integrated into discussions on international migration. Taking the GCM into
consideration in sub-regional discussions helps provide a framework for international migration within, to and from Southeast Asia to be regular, orderly and safe.

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Please direct inquiries about “A Year After: Implementation in Southeast Asia of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” to Imelda Nicolas (melynicolas@gmail.com).
Almost 272 million persons are reported to be migrants at the end of 2019 (IOM 2019: 2). This figure shows the increase in the number of migrants and is one aspect that demonstrates the continuing relevance of migration as a human strategy for economical, personal, survival or other reasons. However, while migration is an increasing reality and need for individuals, the will of states to accept migrants has not followed the same pattern. Migration has become politicized, with ideological bias overcoming humanitarian aspects, which led to several recent examples of hardline practices against migrants, such as criminalization of both migrants and humanitarian workers, decreases in regular pathways for migration, building of physical barriers at borders, and violations of migrants’ rights. Political actors justify these practices on security grounds (demonstrating, thus, the securitization of migration), and use them for strategic reasons in domestic political environments prone to nationalism and populism.

In light of this complex scenario, the governance of migration and protection of migrants have become key global issues and attempts to balance states’ interests and migrants’ needs (and rights) have been at play even in a climate unfavorable to migration. In 2016, a breakthrough occurred with the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (NYD), which gave rise to commitments that applied to refugees, to other migrants, or to both, and established the goal of negotiating and enacting two Global Compacts. In late 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) were adopted, establishing new international norms for the governance of migration, and new state approaches to migration and migrants.

As a region with countries of origin, transit and destination (Jubilut and Lopes 2018) for both intra and extra-regional migration, Latin America is a microcosm of the contrasting scenarios and political contestation of migration that exist at the global level (Jubilut and Lopes 2018; Jubilut, Vera Espinoza and Mezzanotti 2019). These complex circumstances can be seen in terms of international norms, and in the coexistence of practices that, on the one hand, are against migrants and migration and, on the other, demonstrate good practices in this regard, thus affecting both governance in general and the GCM. In terms of international norms, one can see this trend in the fact that, if in 2016 the States of the region were part of the unanimous acclamation of the NYD (OHCHR n.d.), by the time of the 2018 adoption of the GCM, by 152 votes, there were dissenting

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1 On this topic see, for instance, Jubilut, Vera Espinoza and Mezzanotti (2019) and Yates (2019).
voices among Latin American States—Chile abstained, and Panama and Paraguay did not vote (Rush 2018). Moreover, although Brazil voted for the GCM at the time (Rush 2018), it informed the international community in January of 2019 that it was withdrawing its commitment, due to the then newly inaugurated government’s stance on migration (see for instance Paris 2019).

Regarding practices against migrants and migration, it is possible to observe in Latin America the detention of migrants, violations of the International Refugee Law principle of non-refoulement, deals between States to externalize migration control and attempt to diminish migratory flows (such as safe-third country and offshoring agreements), the decrease in regular pathways for migration, and the choice of reducing protection by applying complementary protection instead of Refugee Law.

On this latter point, it is relevant to note that, on the one hand, all refugees are forced migrants, but not all forced migrants are refugees (Carling 2015; Jubilut and Casagrande 2019a: 142); and, on the other hand, that complementary protection is meant for migrants that fall outside the scope of International Refugee Law (Mandal 2005), which means that it is supposed to enhance protection and not replace the recognition of refugee status. In this sense, complementary protection can be a good practice, as long as it does not prevent refugees being recognized and protected as such.

With this caveat, measures of complementary protection can be said to be a positive practice in Latin America, especially as a way to facilitate migrants’ entry and stay in the countries (Jubilut, Andrade and Madureira 2016) and to protect migrants who are not refugees, such as environmentally displaced persons, victims of trafficking and other humanitarian migrants. They have taken the form of humanitarian entry visas, humanitarian residency permits, regional residency permits, and the proposal of regional citizenship (Jubilut 2017).

The widespread adoption of complementary protection in Latin America can be said to find its roots in the regional commitment to a humanitarian space which derives from the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, and the “spirit of Cartagena” (or humanitarian spirit) that it imbued in the States of the region. This “spirit” encompasses “1) a human rights approach to refugee protection, […], 2) an expanded humanitarian space and 3) a constant effort to assess the region’s needs and challenges in refugee protection” (Jubilut, Vera Espinoza and Mezzanotti 2019), and is key in implementing protection to refugees and other migrants in Latin America.

Another positive aspect of migrants’ protection in Latin America is that, even with some current challenges (Brumat, Acosta and Vera Espinoza 2018), its States have migration laws that are seen as positive and part of a liberal shift (Cantor, Freier and Gauci 2015), as well as specific protection for refugees. This, alongside, the humanitarian spirit in the region and practices of complementary protection show there are relevant migration structures at play in Latin America.

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2 Chile did not attend the Marrakesh Conference just prior to the General Assembly vote (Laing 2018).

3 If the broader region of Latin America and the Caribbean is taken into consideration, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago also did not vote (Rush 2018).

4 As, for instance, in Mexico (Alfaro and Guthrie 2019), which is said to be one of the “most active detaining countries in the world” (Global Detention Project 2019).

5 As in the cases of Honduras (Long and Spagat 2019) and Guatemala (Jefferies 2019).

6 In this sense see, for instance, Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (2019).
In light of all of this, it can be perceived that, despite recent concerning setbacks towards migration, which that seems contextual and that were also reflected in the region’s relationship to the GCM thus far, Latin America has some interesting good practices and structural arrangements towards migrants that should both be protected and enhanced. Even more, these can pave the way for GCM implementation in the region. The GCM should take advantage of the existing regional structures and build on them. It should also, on the other hand, assess current shortcomings in the region and see how the Compact and existing regional practices can aid in overcoming them. In this sense, in the current contrasting Latin American migration context, the GCM should both assist in developing protection and use already developed protection measures to facilitate its implementation⁷. This approach can benefit not only the implementation of the GCM, but also migrants’ protection as a whole, in Latin America.

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⁷ A similar approach has been proposed by the author alongside Melissa Martins Casagrande regarding the implementation of the GCR (Jubilut and Casagrande 2019b).


Please direct inquiries about “Latin America and the Global Compact on Migration: early perceptions” to Liliana Lyra Jubilut (lljubilut@gmail.com).
The EU and the Information Systems on Migration within the Global Compacts

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During the negotiations of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and especially of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM), the mass media focused its attention primarily on the opposition of certain national governments to the Compacts, contrary to the common European position. However, much less attention has been paid to the existence and importance of these common European Union (EU) positions and policies in defining the objectives of the agreements. The EU, as a supranational institution, has directly and indirectly influenced many areas of both Global Compacts. One area in which it has exerted influence is in the identification of information systems on migration as a main objective.

The construction of information systems on migration implies: (a) the creation of new databases and the inclusion of specific data (such as biometric data or fingerprint data) in existing databases; (b) the use of ‘big data’ technologies to take maximum advantage of this type of database; (c) an emphasis on the need to harmonize the parameters of these databases to allow interoperability among them.

The focus on information systems on migration has a long tradition within EU policies. It can be traced back to the year 2000, with the creation of the Eurodac System (European Union 2000; European Union 2013), and even ten years earlier with the launch of the Schengen Information System. Another fundamental instrument was the creation of the Visa Information System (VIS) (European Union 2004), which became operational at the EU’s external borders in February 2016 (European Union 2016). This range of EU policies is also linked to the most current developments of the ETIAS–European Travel Information and Authorization System (Schengen Visa Info 2018), which has been under development since 2016 and has finally been approved for implementation from 2021 (European Union 2018).

As part of its external action, the EU has sought to strengthen the capacity and functions of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in relation to the generation of information on migration. Collaboration between the EU and IOM has been established with the direct aim of standardizing and disseminating the collection and management techniques of information systems on migration. An operational alliance between the EU and IOM has been built, to ‘create a Big Data for Migration Alliance (BD4M) [in order] to address the challenges of having and exploiting migration data and to increase investments into data innovation in the field of migration’. In line with this, the EU has been funding several IOM projects to lay the foundations for this Big Data system,
including a series of special bulletins (IOM DATA Bulletin) published since November 2017 to 'summarize in an accurate and accessible fashion existing evidence on migration to support the discussions and any follow-up activities of a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration' (Global Data Migration Portal 2020). This responds to a dual interest. The EU, in close collaboration with the IOM, seeks to build a solid information system for better management of migration flows and to counter anti-immigration discourses that have spread among various political parties within Member States.

The EU has been a pioneer in the development of projects of this type in the international sphere, favoring the inclusion of objectives related to information systems in the GCs. All this is reflected in Objective 1 of the GCM. At the same time, one of the missions of the information gathered is for it to be presented as evidence for the development of more precise and efficient public policies, and as a basis for dissemination publications to counteract the anti-immigration narratives providing information for a well-informed debate. These secondary objectives were also reflected in the GCM, in Objectives 3 and 17 respectively.

Among the 23 objectives of the GCM, three of them respond directly to the use of data collection systems for different purposes, namely Objective 1 (Collect and use accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies), Objective 12 (Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral), and Objective 17 (Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration). In addition, Objective 3 (Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration) is based on the need to build a series of interoperable recording and measurement systems that allow the construction of ‘on-time’ information. These objectives are also included in the GCR. Although the specific weight given to building information systems in the GCR has been considerably less than in the GCM, there has nonetheless been important interest in incorporating information exchange as a fundamental practice to improve the global governance of asylum and refuge. Specific references to the need to improve information collection and exchange have been incorporated into paragraphs 26 (Support Platforms), 32 (Funding an effective and efficient use of resources), 53 (Early warning, preparedness and contingency planning), 82 (Civil registries), and 89 (Support for countries of origin and voluntary repatriation).

This focus on the development of information systems on migration, promoted by the EU within the framework of the Global Compacts and in the IOM projects, has received little attention from scholars. If, according to Torpey (2000), the invention of the passport was a mechanism of the nation-state to monopolize the control over the mobility of the people, then the creation of new information systems that serve as a real basis for the governance of migration could raise the prospect of a loss of this monopoly and a profound change in the actors involved in the determination of migratory control.

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It’s Time for a Migrants Bill of Rights.

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Are human rights also migrant rights? Only when we recognize that all migrants are human. And what could be more human than the ambition of an engineer pursuing a career abroad, than the vulnerability of a family fleeing armed conflict to a neighboring land, than reuniting with a partner, children or grandparents after years of long-distance calls?

Migrants work, they fear, they love. Yet, governments do not always recognize that migrants are protected by the same human rights enjoyed by people who live in the country of their birth. When people leave their country behind, too often they are also forced to leave behind any hope of enjoying basic legal rights. It is this contradiction which allows states—including liberal democracies—to justify detaining migrants in prison cells indefinitely, separating children from their parents, and denying migrants access to basic necessities like health care and education. It is as if the norms and treaties that protect human beings must be rewritten and declared to protect migrants too.

Well, now they have. In the last hours of 2019, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – the human rights arm of the world’s oldest regional organization, the 35-member Organization of American States – issued the Inter-American Principles on the Human Rights of all Migrants, Refugees and Victims of Trafficking. It is not binding but, in 80 Principles, it catalogues both areas of longstanding consensus, like the right to liberty and security and to be free from arbitrary detention, and areas where recent abuses have underscored the need to affirm rights with specificity, like the prohibition on family separation.

The document’s provisions address the special rights of children and vulnerable migrants, but also general rights pertaining to family, health, work, education, and speech. It also incorporates core rules such as the right to life; the prohibition on torture and cruel treatment; and non-refoulement, the ban on expelling someone to a country where their right to life, personal integrity, and other human rights are at risk. These are rights well-settled in international law, but too often states flout them when placed in proximity to the word “migrants.” The Principles are a blueprint for how countries in the Americas and around the world can and must protect the human rights of migrants. They are, in effect, a Migrants’ Bill of Rights.

Support for a declaration like those adopted in the Americas can achieve two goals: creating a simple, common language of rights that declares how the existing human rights framework applies to all migrants, and then marking this as a line in the sand. Border and immigration decision-making takes place in relative secrecy, where rights are often ignored. Starting with a basic set of principles, such a charter could help foster stronger transnational social movements, accountability for abuses by
governments, and activists armed with a common legal vocabulary affirming the rights of all migrants—regardless of why they cross an international border.

The international community has long struggled to articulate these rights in the context of migration. While important progress was made with the Migrant Workers Convention in 1990, a truly comprehensive articulation of the rights of migrants has often seemed out of reach. This is especially true in recent years, as immigration has increasingly been treated as a topic too politically volatile to touch. In 2018, the non-binding Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, negotiated through the United Nations, made new progress but ultimately shied away from a robust articulation of migrants’ rights, in part out of concern that a new agreement might actually depart from clearly-established protections. Some governments also were reluctant to make commitments to migrants—the target of today’s pervasive populism, nativism, and xenophobia.

In this challenging environment, the Inter-American Commission has taken the pragmatic and innovative approach of reminding states of their existing obligations by drawing on current law and developing norms, rather than asking states to sign onto a new treaty. Words on paper will never right the wrongs of the world overnight, but a bill of rights can be a path to compliance, accountability and reform. By formalizing states’ obligation to protect migrant rights, we can pressure governments to fit their policies within the strictures of international law and socialize the next generation to the equal humanity of newcomers.

After all, we have all been newcomers before—when we enter a new job or school or neighborhood. The Inter-American Commission has made a bold statement that all we are all human. And maybe it will eventually help us realize that, in some way, we are all migrants too.

Please direct inquiries about “It’s Time for a Migrants Bill of Rights” to Justin Gest (jgest@gmu.edu).
The UN member states that adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration agreed to “implement the Global Compact, within our own countries and at the regional and global levels, taking into account different national realities, capacities, and levels of development, and respecting national policies and priorities” (para. 41). To further support implementation, the Compact also establishes a capacity-building mechanism to support states in their implementation efforts, an IOM-coordinated “United Nations network on migration” tasked to report to the General Assembly on implementation efforts and a quadrennial “International Migration Review Forum” that will include participation of relevant stakeholders (including academia) to review the progress made in implementing the Compact. There is, however, no clear expectation that all signatory states will compile reports on progress made in implementing each of the Compact’s 23 objectives for the International Migration Review Forum. Given the lack of such specificity, how will we know implementation of the Global Compact when we see it? What are the indicators of implementation? What are the metrics for these indicators?

If we think of implementation in terms of doing what the Global Compact recommends, one might look for indicators in the “actions considered to be relevant policy instruments and best practices (para 16)” that are listed under each of the Compact’s objectives and commitments. In terms of the number of words, these “actions” comprise most (61 percent) of the Compact’s entire text. These actions, however, are not really recommendations that states are expected to implement but rather suggestions. As articulated in the “explanation of position” in Denmark’s plenary statement at the Marrakesh Intergovernmental Conference, “the list of actions under each commitment constitute examples which may contribute to the implementation of the Compact. But it will be up to each State to decide how and whether to draw from these examples (Government of Denmark 2018).” Indeed, the Compact’s reaffirmation of state sovereignty over immigration policy (para. 15) and the non-binding nature of the Global Compact means that states may pick and choose which commitments and suggested actions to implement and which to ignore.

As I have explained elsewhere (Koslowski 2019), given that about a third of the Compact’s commitments are related to securing international travel, the Compact actually gives states an opportunity to pursue intensified international cooperation to secure borders while simultaneously failing to take actions that would realize commitments to improve the conditions of migrant workers. Hence the ultimate impact of the Compact will depend on which parts of it are implemented by which states.

International cooperation is generally associated with the liberal world order and liberal outcomes, such as increasing international trade and monetary flows. In contrast,
international cooperation on migration, at least on the regional level, has often led to outcomes that, in effect, restrict cross-border flows of migrants and asylum seekers (Koslowski 2000:157-169). The Global Compact for Migration may contribute to a similar outcome. While the Global Compact may achieve its stated goals and increase the percentage of the world’s migrants and refugees who cross borders in a safe, orderly and regular manner, the total number of migrants and refugees may simultaneously be lower than if the Global Compact did not come into being.

Uneven implementation of commitments within the Global Compact for Migration (e.g. focusing exclusively on those commitments to better secure travel), combined with uneven implementation between the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, may have the most serious adverse consequences. By increasing international cooperation to secure travel through improved border controls, the Global Compact for Migration may hinder the escape from violence and persecution. Asylum applications on a state’s territory are largely a function of weak or careless border controls and/or the lack of international cooperation, particularly with neighboring states. Given that the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers arriving in economically developed countries have been smuggled or committed travel document fraud, international cooperation to secure international travel and improve border controls reduces the opportunities for successful spontaneous arrival asylum seeking by those with a well-founded fear of individual persecution (see Koslowski 2011: 70). Looking toward a future of more technologies applied to border controls, more secure travel documents, more information sharing, international cooperation among growing ranks of border guards and more effective inspection processes, all of which are advanced by the Global Compact’s travel security objectives, we can anticipate declines in spontaneous arrival asylum applications. Some of these asylum-seekers may have bogus applications, but many may truly be in peril from individual persecution by their own governments and some may even face the threat of genocide. If those with well-founded fears of persecution are to be protected, increasing international cooperation on border controls must be complemented with realization of the Global Compact on Refugee’s objectives to increase refugee resettlement, increase funding for humanitarian assistance and provide protection to persons displaced within their own countries.

The ultimate impact of the Global Compact for Migration on migration and asylum seeking will depend on whether, how and what parts of it will be implemented. As has been the case with previous international agreements, implementation often depends upon the hard work of the NGOs that monitor what states actually do or do not do. Other stakeholders, such as academics, may also help monitor and evaluate implementation. Those academics who are interested in monitoring implementation should consider using the Academic Council on the Global Compact for Migration as a platform to connect with other academics who have common interests in this regard in order to help realize the positive vision of the Global Compact and while helping to avoid some of its potential negative side effects.

References

RESEARCH CENTER PROFILE

The U.S. Immigration Policy Center (USIPC), UC San Diego

The U.S. Immigration Policy Center (USIPC) at UC San Diego formally launched in April 2019. The USIPC is led by founding director Tom K. Wong. Wong is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego and co-led the immigration portfolio at the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (WHIAAPI) under the Obama administration. During his time in federal government, Wong observed the disconnect between the questions academics were researching and the questions that decision makers needed answers to in order to make policy decisions in real time. The USIPC thus emerged, in part, to bridge this disconnect.

The mission of the USIPC is to conduct and support rigorous social science research that advances our understanding of the foundations and consequences of U.S. immigration policy, and to do so in “real time” as important policy debates unfold. Immigration has played an integral role in American history and is sure to feature prominently in America’s future. But what should the immigration policies of our nation of immigrants be? The USIPC brings together leading academics, policy analysts, immigrant-rights leaders, and policymakers across all levels of government to conceptualize, debate, and design a new U.S. immigration policy agenda that meets the demands of the 21st century.

The USIPC, housed on the UCSD campus, currently has four faculty affiliates, an immigrant rights and justice fellow, a civic engagement fellow, support for graduate research assistants, and year-round support for twelve undergraduate research assistants. Our USIPC fellows are intended to be non-academics who have government, non-profit, or political or policy backgrounds. The inclusion of non-academics with such experience is critical for ensuring that the work the USIPC undertakes has value beyond academia. USIPC fellows are paid. For those interested in becoming a USIPC fellow or a faculty affiliate, email Wong directly at tomkwong@ucsd.edu.

The substantive research of the USIPC is divided into four main pillars: U.S. immigration policy; our “Undocumented in America” project; immigrant civic engagement; and a diversity lab. Research is currently underway in all four of our main pillars. The USIPC receives core operating support from our funders, while additional project-specific grants help us take on new work when federal immigration policies change.

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U.S. Immigration Policy

In an attempt to overhaul and modernize the U.S. immigration system, the U.S. Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, or S. 744, in 2013. Despite optimism that it would become law, S.744 ultimately died when the U.S. House failed to vote on the bill. As the need for comprehensive immigration reform persists, and as immigration policy continues to be a highly salient political issue, the USIPC aims to be at the center of conversations about how to create a new U.S. immigration policy system that meets the demands of the 21st century. To do this, the USIPC will undertake and support research across the four main pillars of U.S. immigration policy: admissions; border security, interior immigration enforcement, and immigrant integration. USIPC reports already published in this area include: *The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy*, published in partnership with the Center for American Progress; *Rural DACA by the Numbers*, published in partnership with the U.S. Senate Joint Economic Committee (JEC); and *Do Family Separation and Detention Deter Immigration?*, published in partnership with the Center for American Progress. This also includes two reports in our *Seeking Asylum* series.

Undocumented in America

What does it mean to be an undocumented immigrant in America? How do the experiences of undocumented immigrants change as immigration policies and the broader political context surrounding immigration shift? Approximately one-quarter of all immigrants in the U.S. are undocumented, yet there remain significant research gaps when it comes to understanding the day-to-day experiences of undocumented immigrants, as well as their attitudes and preferences towards the policies and politics that so directly impact their lives. The USIPC will collect and analyze original survey data on undocumented populations, which includes large-scale, probability-based samples of undocumented immigrants, five consecutive years of surveying DACA recipients, and other projects. USIPC reports in this area include: *The Impact of Interior Immigration Enforcement on the Day-to-Day Behaviors of Undocumented Immigrants; How Interior Immigration Enforcement Affects Trust in Law Enforcement;* and *The Impact of Changes to the Public Charge Rule on Undocumented Immigrants Living in the U.S.*
**Immigrant Civic Engagement**

Why are some immigrants more civically and politically engaged than others? What can be done to increase immigrant civic and political participation, including naturalization, registering to vote, and voting and non-voting forms of political participation, among other indicators? In addition to ongoing analyses of voter files, survey data, and field observations, the USIPC will design, implement, and evaluate voter mobilization experiments targeted at naturalized citizen voters, voters who live with naturalized citizen voters, and voters who live in mixed-immigration status households. This includes a multi-state, multi-year voter engagement field program in Florida, Arizona, and Georgia targeting “New American Voters.”

**Diversity Lab**

There is a growing literature in the social sciences on the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, existing academic research is not often designed with interventions in mind that can be applied in the real world. What can be done to attenuate the cultural and economic anxieties that, for some, have become synonymous with the issue of immigration? The USIPC’s Diversity Lab will use survey, field, lab, and other experimental methods to better understand not only the causes and consequences of anti-immigrant sentiment, but also what we can do about it. This includes a recent \( n = 2,750 \) poll of border state residents on border-specific policy issues.

For more information about the USIPC, visit [https://usipc.ucsd.edu/](https://usipc.ucsd.edu/). Since launching, we have produced several reports, including research on the impact of interior immigration enforcement, public charge, conditions in immigration detention, the experiences of asylum seekers who have been returned to Mexico under the “Remain in Mexico” policy, and polling on border policies. For a list of USIPC publications, visit: [https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/index.html](https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/index.html).

Please direct inquiries about the U.S. Immigration Policy Center at UC San Diego to USIPC Director, Tom K. Wong (tomkwong@ucsd.edu).
METHOD CORNER
Research Methods in the Study of Migration and Citizenship

We are delighted to share the edited and abridged proceedings of a panel discussion on research methods held during the Migration and Citizenship Pre-workshop at APSA 2019. The contributions below include prepared comments from each panel speaker outlining their own methodological approaches to the study of migration, the challenges they have faced, and their advice for other scholars. The second section contains extracts from the Q&A that offer speakers’ insights on particular methodological and ethical issues regarding positionality and the use of interviews in migration and citizenship research. Thank you to all the speakers for allowing us to share their contributions here!

Panel Chair: Willem Maas
Contributors:
Anna Boucher (University of Sydney)
Lauren Duquette-Rury (Wayne State University)
Kelsey Norman (Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University)
Tom Wong (UC San Diego)

Anna Boucher
I will speak both on qualitative methods and databases. With regards to qualitative research in migration studies, there are a few main approaches that can be undertaken and I would include ethnographic observations, interviews and also desk analysis. It’s the second two that I have direct experience with.

One thing I’ve observed with interviews – and I’ve done several hundred interviews in my doctorate and subsequent research – is that it’s becoming increasingly difficult to access elites. I believe that has to do with the increased controversy of migration research, and also the way that migration is moving from being a peripheral policy issue to a centre of government kind of issue. So, what I have observed is that, increasingly, for interviews often you need approval from all the way up in bureaucracies and government organisations to undertake such interviews, and sometimes even second layers of ethics approval. And, so a lot of time is required for that. That might also challenge the decision about whether to go for an off the record interview. I do on the record interviews, because I do very detailed policy analysis, but the push towards migration being a more controversial area might mean that you have to weigh up the advantages of getting an interview at all, versus having reliability of interview transcripts to observe.

With desk analysis, obviously policy documents can be a rich source of data in immigration research. One thing I have found is that immigration departments, Home Office, Department of Immigration, Border Security, often take down these documents quite quickly from their websites; so I have been getting into the habit in the last decade of always downloading, digitizing, or sometimes even printing, these documents and

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putting them in files in my office. Because if you subsequently need to create time series
data, it simply might not exist anymore; and sometimes it’s not even archived in a
library. This kind of information can be very useful and sometimes the information is
publicly available, but at times policy documents of course are subject to confidentiality
laws, and sometimes even extended cabinet rules – again, because of the controversial,
or centralised, nature of the material. So, there are limitations with desk analysis, and
that’s where I found the interviews are a really good supplement.

I’ve been involved in a few databases – IMPALA, a database with Justin Gest for Crossroads, and I was recently creating a dataset of 902 legal cases for a new project
on migrant work rights and enforcement. With the exception of the last one, all involved
teams; and even for the last one I’ve had about seven research assistants working for
me across several years. So, one thing about large data collection projects is that they’re
costly, they’re time consuming, and they often involve teams. And, so, maybe the scope
dependent level research would present too many constraints. Especially with the last
project on legal cases, I’ve had an increased appreciation of the importance of inter-
coder reliability and of codebooks. We’ve done about three different stages of inter-coder
reliability checks for the migrant worker rights project that I’m currently working on; and
the clarity of the code book is very important in this kind of work.

Lauren Duquette-Rury
I have a PhD in Political Science, and I’m now in a sociology department. That has been
beneficial to me in order to think more critically about the breadth and scope of the
methods and data collection efforts I pursue. I self-identify as a mixed method
researcher, because I use quantitative, qualitative and experiments in my work; not
always all together.

I’m going to talk about the question of accessing populations that are currently
under siege in the United States and in other parts of the world. One thing I have learned
being in sociology departments is the need for more participatory and community-based
research. For those of you who are not familiar with this jargon, what this entails is
reciprocity in the research data collection effort. I will operationalise this a little bit. My
current book is called Naturalising Under Threat and it examines the ways in which the
socio-political environment in which immigrants are embedded, and their familial
networks, shape the decision to become politically integrated into the United States.

What a participatory approach means in my study of naturalisation is that I have
set up partnerships with civil society organisations that work on the ground and on the
frontlines, working to serve immigrant populations. This means volunteering in the
organisation; so I answer phones, I file paperwork, I do anything that they need in order
to sustain the organisation. I want to de-instrumentalise this a bit; it’s not just to then
access the populations that they serve, but because we care about civil society
organisations that do the brunt of the heavy lifting in the United States in serving the
immigrant population – providing legal aid etc. But it can also be a learning opportunity
for identifying indigenous sources of knowledge that are institutionally embedded in
these organisations that then allow you to reflect on the question that you’re asking, and
subsequently answering in a way that allows you to see how you can then give back to
your organisation [whose] ... population you then draw on in order to learn and study,
and to listen to the problems that they’re encountering for your research purposes.

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What this means in practice, is thinking about how you can be a bridge to the needs of organisations in the community in which you are embedded as a scholar. One thing I have learned moving from Los Angeles to Detroit is the way the campus, situated in the heart of Detroit, has very little partnership or even knowledge of the ethnic and immigrant focused civil society organizations that serve campus populations on the ground. And, so what we have done is create a naturalisation fair, where we partner with the New Americans’ Campaign on the subject of naturalisation, and we plan to invite the faculty, their families and students who are long or permanent residents, and others, to help people who are eligible to be screened and apply for citizenship. (Note: the fair has been postponed to due to the pandemic)

Now, I’m embedding an experiment into the fair, but it gives back to the student population. It allows the New Americans’ Campaign to learn about strategic communications in their efforts to target clients that they care about; and then it also allows us to have a bridge between the public and the private, so the community can see what the university actually gives back to them and that it’s not just asking for their data as a means to an instrumental end. This is the mode of creativity that I hope that we will all strive for, myself included, in this time of studying under siege populations, namely immigrant populations.

The other thing that I wanted to mention is that, if you’re doing experiments, if you’re accessing vulnerable populations and you want to interview people who are feeling under siege, you need to be very aware of the socio-political environments in which you are conducting your work in the interior. It’s not just at the border. We know that ICE is very present in the community; sometimes to the knowledge of the populations that you serve and are studying, and are sometimes not.

And, so we need to think as researchers about the ethical obligations we have to participants; that we engage in ways that don’t require people to move through space to come and see you to do your interview; that we’re moving to the communities and have a presence there, in ways that don’t force people to navigate checkpoints, etc. It is important to be mindful of the ways in which we are asking participants to move through space and time in order to be with us and share their stories.

**Kelsey Norman**

I will talk about conducting research on the topic of migration and citizenship in difficult governance environments and securitized environments. Specifically, I’ll draw on my experience conducting research for my doctoral work, primarily in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. I spoke with elite actors and people in government positions or at the UNHCR, IOM and NGOs, as well as talking with individual migrants and refugees. I should note first of all that the time period I was doing this work was 2012-2015, and if I were doing this project now, I would think more critically about whether it was even feasible.

I’ll discuss three points. The first is about your interviewees, which is hopefully something you think about as early as when you’re planning your research in the very initial stages, through to when you are publishing things and thinking about whether names or other features need to be de-identified or made anonymous. The IRB provides a minimal standard of protection. It is important to keep in mind that when we are conducting research with global or at-risk populations you can ask not to have a signed consent form. That’s important when doing research in a more securitized environment, because you might not want a hard copy document linking interviewees to your research.
project, and you can ask for verbal consent instead. In the actual research phase, when we’re thinking about writing articles or book projects, you can think at the time when you’re conducting the research about what’s important to anonymize or de-identify, but also what could change and what might be important to de-identify later. You don’t know if an issue that wasn’t a problem before might become problematic going forward; so you need to think really critically.

There’s a push in political science to be very transparent and so I was taught that, in thinking about collecting data, writing up research and building an interview matrix, you must be as transparent as possible, and include as much information as possible, because you want to demonstrate data validity. But that can be really problematic when thinking about how much information is too much to give away. Initially, for my migrant interviewee subjects, I recorded when we made an initial contact, when I conducted the interview, and the neighbourhood in which the interview was conducted. That was probably too much information, as it was not all necessarily pertinent. If it is, then there are ways to de-identify that information. But I think you need to strike a balance between demonstrating data validity while also protecting interviewees; and the latter really needs to take precedence.

In terms of finding interviewees – for my research project looking at urban populations and migrants and refugees, a great starting point was often a local university within the community I was studying. It’s great if you can get an affiliation with the university or a research institute that looks specifically at issues of migration and refugees. You can ask to be affiliated and that might involve having desk space or library access, or even just an affiliation in name only. This can be beneficial in terms of being able to meet local researchers already working on these issues, to find out whether this issue or your specific take on this issue has already been over-sampled, and that’s something you will want to avoid; and you will find that out through connecting or through making contacts with local researchers. Also, these institutions probably have contacts at local NGOs, perhaps with migrant and refugee community-based organisations, and those can be some of your in-points through which to find other migrant and refugee interview subjects.

All I can really say about the process is that this sort of qualitative work can just take a really long time. It will depend on what your time constraints are. I was really fortunate to have a funding source that allowed me to take multiple trips to the countries in which I was working; and that can be really beneficial. It allows you to make initial points of contact and to establish a rapport over time, so that on the second or third trip, you can really get up and running. If you only have, say, two weeks, it may be more beneficial to think about just doing elite interviews; something you can arrange beforehand. Otherwise, it might be difficult to access and find these populations. In a securitized or oppressive environment, having time on your side is really important, not just for being able to conduct your research, but in terms of building rapport with interviewees, who need to trust you. That trust is only built over time by demonstrating your interest in this topic and interest in their wellbeing. You’re only going to get referrals to other interviewees and migrants through building that trust. So, while it depends on the type of funding and time constraints you have, if you hope to do qualitative interviews, you really want to have time on your side.

Regardless of whether you are doing more quantitative or more qualitative work, you can also adopt an ethnographic sensibility in your work. If you’re doing ethnography, you’re going to take field notes in your work. But, even if you’re doing a survey, or you’re doing interviews, you can still spend that hour each night recording all the little seemingly
mundane details that you observed throughout the day. Those might end up being really important in coming back to how you think about your research in the writing up phase; or also, reflecting on how were feeling that day. Were you feeling nervous, were you feeling frustrated? Or however it was, you can think about the interview that you conducted and the transcript through that lens, reflecting on how your own analysis might be affected by whatever else was going on that day.

Here is an example in terms of adopting this ethnographically sensitive approach – in Cairo, there are two UNHCR offices. One is in a very posh, bourgeois neighbourhood in central downtown Cairo. At the time I was there, only Syrians were permitted to go and seek services from that UNHCR office. The other UNHCR office was way on the outskirts and it could take anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours to get to, depending on the city’s traffic. If you don’t have your private car and you can’t afford to pay a taxi, you’re going to have to take a micro-bus there. The micro-bus is crammed with lots of people, and it can be packed, smelly, and involve all sorts of annoyances. So, taking that micro-bus ride and actually going to the other UNHCR office, which is where most African asylum seekers and refugees have to visit, is a little bit of an insight into what it would be like to have to take that bus every day, when you’re hoping to have your case addressed by the UNHCR. So, recording that—recording what it feels like, recording the frustrations you might have felt—gives you a little bit of insight into the sort of bureaucratic mess that migrants and refugees have to deal with in an urban environment like Cairo.

**Tom Wong**

I’ll talk about surveying undocumented immigrants. Let’s start with the problem. We know that there’s no sample frame; there’s no enumerated sample frame of undocumented immigrants here in the United States. If there is no enumerated sample frame for undocumented persons in the United States, and if we can’t fully trust existing survey firms to do the work in the way that we want it done, then what are the alternatives? One of the alternatives that I have relied on in my recent work is finding an institution that works with a large number of undocumented immigrants. And that institution is the Mexican Consular Network, where we’re talking about the plurality of undocumented immigrants in the United States. We haven’t talked much on this panel about how working with certain institutions or organisations inevitably leads to questions of bias that we have to address, or at least acknowledge. The need to address potential bias notwithstanding, here we have the plurality of undocumented immigrants in the United States, and each specific consulate, in the services that they provide, are able to essentially say, “Here are individuals who are undocumented.” The Mexican Consular Network is unique in that the Mexican government gives individuals *Matricula Consular*, an ID card that undocumented immigrants rely on in order to do things like open up bank accounts.

So, if you can talk to folks at the Embassy and convince them to open up the consular network for you to do work, all of a sudden you have a potentially interesting sample frame to work with. In San Diego, they have a list of 73,000 individuals who have received *Matricula Consulares*. The estimated number of undocumented Mexican nationals in San Diego County is about 80,000, almost the entire universe of undocumented Mexican nationals in San Diego. If you have that, you can do probability based sampling off the sample frame; acknowledging that there’s still some issues – the noise between the 70,000 and the total estimate, the fact that we’re talking about Mexican undocumented nationals specifically, and the fact that we’re talking about a
particular geography of San Diego County. But, all of that notwithstanding, we have the makings to do the kind of work we want to do.

But, as was mentioned earlier, it’s not an altruistic foreign government who says, “Yeah, go ahead, take all of our people’s information,” – it’s an exchange. And, hopefully, at least in this particular project it’s been a beneficial one. As researchers, especially as I have had more experience in government as well as working with organisations, we are a pain in the neck of a lot of people, because a lot of times we say, “Can we do this?” and then the question that they ask back is: “How does that benefit us?”. So, for this particular work, we do outreach. The first part of the questionnaire is about the research. The second part of the questionnaire is about outreach. So, as part of this work, we’re essentially able to cut up the Consular Network list. I took random draws of 5,000 each because I can’t take all of the information out at one time. And, we dial; we have a one call protocol for each of those roughly 5000 phone numbers that comprises one questionnaire out of potentially 13 that we can do. We’re on number seven right now.

But, as part of this work, what we end with is, “Here’s ‘Know your rights’ information, here’s how to contact the consulate in the event of an emergency, here’s a free immigration legal screening if you want a free immigration legal screening.” So I essentially had to create a legal screening programme so that I could continue this relationship with the Mexican Consulate, and so that the answer to the question of what they get out of it, is so vivid whereby we can say over 10,000 Mexican nationals in San Diego have at least been given an opportunity to get a free immigration legal screening, and a couple of thousand have actually gotten free immigration legal screenings. And, if you’re familiar with why these legal screenings are important, it’s because a lot of undocumented immigrants in the United States actually have a way to adjust their status, but they don’t know it, and that’s the importance of having a trusted and skilled immigration attorney to walk them through what options might be available.

So, the solution isn’t just to convince the Ambassador and Foreign Ministry to open up their books. The recommendation is to think about institutions that work with undocumented populations and use their administrative data as a sample frame, from which to then survey undocumented immigrants. The Mexican Consular Network is unique because of the Matricula Consular, but there are other institutions. You can think about states and localities and the services that they provide – e.g. California driver’s licences. I have pestered them about being able to access their data. They have rightfully said no on numerous occasions and it’s okay, because we now know that ICE is trying to similarly use those data to identify undocumented immigrants. In addition to state and county governments and agencies, one can also work with different health systems. One of the things you may also want to consider, especially if you work on the intersection between immigration enforcement and health, are that emergency rooms, especially if you’re at a university that has a medical centre, have data on emergency room visits by undocumented immigrants. That has been a huge issue for multiple decades. If you’re in a university with a medical centre, the folks that run those EDs typically are academics who are similarly interested in research. So, the conversation there is easier than, say, with a foreign minister.

This is all to say: why can’t we enumerate a sample frame of foreign born persons that is valid and give it as a public good to the discipline, and to others who are interested in using it. Then, in addition to partnering with organisations who work with undocumented immigrants on the ground, why not think about institutions, even state local governments, or even foreign governments who similarly work with undocumented immigrants, and leverage their administrative data to do the work that we want to do.

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**Willem Maas:**

A thread through all your comments relates to the researcher’s position – vis-à-vis the politicization of issues of migration, your position in relation to organizations with or within which you work and research, your position in relation to interview subjects in a securitized society. Let’s talk more about your thoughts regarding the position of the researcher...

**Kelsey Norman**

This is a very important topic, though not one I necessarily have easy answers for. In all of the countries I was doing research in, I was perceived in certain ways, but in different ways by different individuals I was speaking with. So, I am white, I am female, I hold American-Canadian nationality. All these things are not necessarily known or observed, but might come out in conversations. Certainly, I think, as much as you can in your project, you can make it very clear that even though you don’t have financial incentives to offer, you can still be perceived as someone to speak to because you’re from the US, or you might have connections, or you can maybe help interviewees with certain problems or their status. In terms of speaking with different people with different status, in the all the countries I was looking at, people would often go through different periods of having different statuses; so it’s not clear if it’s undocumented migrants I’m speaking to, or people going through their cases, or their case is closed but they’re remaining in the country, or their case is pending. These are all things you need to be aware of. It goes back to the importance of building rapport and trust, and not just being someone who comes in to gather information and then leaves. I would point to the broad swathe of literature that tries to address these difficult questions and encourages thinking about your positionality and how that might affect your research, the relationships you build, and how you can do things with organisations or NGOs, if that is something that you think is important.

**Lauren Duquette-Rury**

I’ll answer this in terms of possible solutions. One solution is to adopt a mixed-methods approach. In thinking about my positionality as researcher and liaison of exchange between civil society organisations and the university as an institution, I am thinking about what I can offer in return, but then also being aware that the interview data I am collecting is likely to suffer from some other kind of bias. And this is when I think about how to get some analytic leverage on trends that might be reflected in quantitative data that exists. So, for me, it’s really taking Jason Seawright’s integrative approach, to thinking beyond triangulation necessarily, and thinking about how to use a method for what it is best at; then employing another method to think about where the limitations might be, and to gather the different aspect of the question that may suffer from bias, or another method might be more appropriate for gaining a little bit more analytic leverage with the goal of causal inference. I use organisations in order to access populations, but this is where snowball sampling really comes in handy, because there is selection bias inherent in collecting data from only those individuals who access organisations and derive benefits from them compared to those who are more isolated or in more rural locales etc. that either choose not to access organisations or do not have access to them. We have to be rigorous methodologists first and foremost, and we have
to constantly ask ourselves the hard questions about how we’re approaching our work and getting external checks from colleagues, and proposals, funding agencies etc.

One thing for me that’s been really helpful is talking to immigrants themselves, and in these conversations asking what I can do. I experienced this when I was doing my dissertation research and I did field research in Mexico for about a year in places that I likely would not be able to revisit now. Elderly women who hadn’t seen their children in 20 years asked me to pass along a hug when I got back into the United States. So, I’m talking about the very small micro things that seem like nothing to us, that might mean the world to a woman who spends an afternoon in a knitting circle with me, telling me about the trials and tribulations of sons and daughters leaving and sending back remittances. What is meaningful to someone in the exchange relationship differs in the context of your partnership – it might mean the kind of big stuff Tom talked about in working with consulates, but it can also mean smaller things to some people, like serving as expert witness testimony in asylum case hearings, which some sociologists have been doing regularly, which all of us could do and potentially keep some people in the US. So it’s actively listening and thinking creatively about what we’re capable of, given our position, and what we’re comfortable doing as researchers.

Tom Wong

In relation to positionality, two things come to mind in relation to talking to undocumented immigrants. Every year I have a new group of undergraduate research assistants who are the enumerators making the calls. There’s a similar level of dissatisfaction when students start. They want to do so much more for each of the individuals that they talk to. They want to be the attorney, the social worker, they want to help somebody stay in the country, they want to go into a detention centre and get a son or daughter out of detention. For every new cohort of students, we’ve got to sit down and talk about the things that we want to do, because of our moral selves, but also the things we actually can do and are positioned to do. One of the things I often have to reiterate is that the reason why we have these free immigration legal screenings is because we cannot give legal advice. The worst thing we can do is give somebody advice that is wrong; practitioners know that very well. But that’s also why I have a board where every positive outcome that we learn of is posted, because we will literally have individuals who go from, ‘I thought I would have to go back to Mexico,’ to, ‘Now I’m going to file this petition and I’m on my way to getting a green card.’ And, so those are the things that are sustaining.

Another thing about positionality is that we work in the social sciences, so we are talking mostly about the science aspect of the social sciences. But, I think we should all think more about the social aspect, because we are embedded in a particular moment in our country’s history where, if you work on US immigration, I hope you want to do more. I hope that you don’t want to use those fantastic brains of your to essentially sit on the side-lines as things are happening. So, this isn’t a political left, political right type of conversation; this is about our ability to fill knowledge gaps that speak to literal life and death decisions when it comes to changes to [immigration, refugee, and asylum] policies; especially at the southern border. So, if you have the privilege of having attained a tenure-track position, or if you are post tenure, then we are able to decide the questions that we ask; as a graduate student a little less so because you have gatekeepers in your committee. But, the questions that we ask I think, if we are wanting to contribute to filling knowledge gaps that can help inform decision-making at the Federal level, or with State
and local policies, then I hope we are all positioning ourselves and the questions that we ask to help fill those knowledge gaps. Because prior to November 2016, I thought my only bar as a professional was peer review; but, I have learned over the last couple of years that it’s actually a bit higher. It’s peer review, plus, can I be convincing in my work before a Federal judge that is going to decide whether or not California still has SB54, or whether or not DACA recipients can continue renewing their DACA status, or whether the administration can continue zero tolerance or family separations at the border. It’s just on and on and on.

*What about some of the challenges of conducting interviews, for instance, in relation to privacy, reciprocity, language and the use of interpreters, emotions and the impacts of talking about trauma from the past?*

**Lauren Duquette-Rury**

One thing I’m often confronted with and think about carefully, is that people are embedded in an array of social networks. They include mixed-status legal status families; they are in communities where people are wearing ankle monitors, and sometimes even the presence of certain kinds of individuals can spook individuals, depending on the climate of the locale or the state. Michigan is very different than when I was in California, and so I have been alerted to a lot of scenarios. The sudden presence of a white van may clear out a neighbourhood in Mexican town for example. In terms of dealing with the nitty-gritty of privacy and IRB, I have gone above and beyond even what IRB would say. We use master lists. We only identify as aliases. We no longer use consent forms; it’s all verbal. It’s an iterative process with the IRB. Piloting helps with this, because then you constantly make changes to the ways in which you’re talking to populations, and learning from them about fears that you hadn’t considered, given your own research positionality. That’s the iterative nature of the research, to be listening and revising in real time what it means to be talking to people. Privacy is really important to me. I usually let the individual lead the charge, but I sometimes have more information about what could be at stake for them than they do, given what I’m researching. So, I have to adjust in real time, given the context of the situation.

I have been talking to, in Detroit, both Middle Eastern and Arab origin communities, as well as Latino, Latina and Latinx. I often have with me graduate students or undergraduates from the target population that I’m surveying. I can speak Spanish, but I’m a non-native speaker. There are idiosyncrasies in Spanish that I still do not understand. So, in that way, it’s been helpful to have a native speaker. It’s a training opportunity; the students are learning at interviews, they’re participating. But, sometimes the interviewee will be in full conversation with me and then they’ll turn to the native born speaker and say something in a different way to them. That’s been really interesting for a host of reasons. We can debrief after the interview and talk about maybe why they did that, or the ways in which language is both broker and limits the kind of data that you collect. That’s something I never did when I was doing my field work in Mexico, but something that I’ve been doing more now because of the subtleties and nuance of the way people talk about trauma; and that is to say that to express one’s self in language can be so limiting, especially when the topic is so emotional.

So, for me, reading the trauma literature and the social psychology and political sociology literature on emotions and how affective intelligence, and cognition works, has been really helpful in listening to the way people talk about threat and trauma. Sometimes
people in very real time make sense of things as they’re saying it out loud. In these conversations, I think the reason I’ve had no shortage of data collection issues is because you become sort of psychologists in a chair; not that I’m dispensing any real information or treatment, but just that I am there actively listening to someone who might be uncovering, or recovering stories of their youth, of their family or of their friends in real time. And, there is so many times you just stop and you get personal. I stop and hold the hands of someone who is telling me about a personal trauma that occurred on the border; because I think I’m a researcher, but I’m also an empathic human being and in that moment they felt an intimate connection. And it’s okay to connect with people whose stories you’re listening to, even if you also think about it as data.

The question of expectations of reciprocity is tricky. I would venture to say that was being asked of me as a female researcher was different than what is being asked of my male colleagues when I was in Mexico; at the time that I was studying Mexican migrants on both sides of the border. And, so I don’t have the answer for what that is, but don’t do anything you don’t feel comfortable with first and foremost. But, also to follow up on the things that you actually promise to do. So, I did an original survey within an NSF Dissertation Improvement Grant and I promised to give respondents the survey results. Many people that I talked to said that they never received results or what was promised of them by academics. So, follow through, because it affects the work that the next researcher and the next graduate student want to do; because we don’t want to give the impression to the populations we’re studying that academics are flakes that don’t follow up on the things that they say they’re going to do within reason.

**Kelsey Norman**

In terms of privacy, it’s difficult to come up with a blanket answer, as it depends on the context of a project. In my doctoral work, all of my interview subjects were de-identified. I used pseudonyms and I tried to limit the information about when and where the interview was conducted etc. I do understand the question of: what about people that want to participate and have their stories heard? I think privacy has to trump that, especially in certain contexts. In Morocco there is a lot of powerful migrant and refugee community activism happening, so there’s really vocal community organizations, especially the leaders of them. So, speaking with some of those, a couple of their names are public, but they still can’t be published in American research; and certain aspects of their work maybe can’t be identified as well – because you don’t know what will change down the road.

This is true even for elite interviews, including government officials, UN officials, and community organisations. This became especially important in Egypt when the NGO environment was changing a lot from 2013 onwards. NGOs became targets and you could sense that, even if what they’re saying now is alright and it’s fine that they are working on migrant and refugee rights issues, that could change going forward and then they could become a target as well, and then you’d become a target. So, you have to keep it in mind that even if it seems fine now that they’re identified, it might not be in the future. So, again, I think you have to err on the side of caution.

Regarding interpreters, I did use an interpreter in Morocco for some of my elite French language interviews because I didn’t feel sure enough in French. I felt there were a few interviews there that I wanted to have an interpreter present for. But, again, you have to be conscious, especially when doing topics related to migration or identity or citizenship, that who you have present for the interview is going to affect what people are
comfortable telling you. So, again reflecting on positionality and how that can change the dynamics – whether it’s just you, and your own positionality, but also who else you include in the process.

Anna Boucher

Privacy is an interesting question. I’ve had legal advocates share information with me that they shouldn’t have; for example, sending annexures to court material, and it’s inappropriate. So, I have to exercise care and say “This is a breach of privacy rules, so I’m sending it back to you.” On the other hand, as I’m interviewing people very high up in government and senior barristers and advocates, sometimes privacy law is used by government as a defence not to allow me to go ahead with the interview. So, for instance, there’s an issue in Toronto; it was a manslaughter case, which is concluded, so that’s why I decided to include it in the book. The government, when I was in Toronto, said “This is in breach of the Privacy Act” so we can’t talk to you. I disagreed with their analysis, but ultimately sometimes the privacy issue has blocked me from doing certain interviews. And in the increasingly controversial environments around immigration, privacy can be used as an argument to stop researchers.

Trauma is an important issue. I’m writing a separate book on the Holocaust. An ethnomusicologist and I are interviewing survivors and their families. I’m third generation Holocaust background so that helps, I think, in terms of the situationality to the research subjects. But, I would say there are certain things we have done to improve that process. The first is that myself and my co-author made access to a psychologist part of the interview process; so we’ve arranged for that for anyone who needs it after the interview. We’ve also not directly contacted people, rather we’ve used second generation survivor organisations in each country where we’re doing interviews to access the people. And, as has been mentioned, the sensitivity in the research process, bringing in your own humanity and experience, has been really important in that project.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2019 PRE-CONFERENCE WORKSHOP

In 2019, our section organized a pre-conference workshop – thank you to Justin Gest and Sara Wallace Goodman for making it happen. Here we capture some glimpses, reactions, and reflections about the event for the wider membership. We asked participants to tell us what they enjoyed, what they found most useful given their career stage, what they learned, and what they’d like to see more of in the future section preconference events. We thank Justin Gest for the photos.

“Our section pre-conference was an amazing opportunity to hear about cutting edge research, discuss methodological and ethical concerns in the field, and–my personal favorite–network with graduate students. There were so many sharp students engaged in the day’s activities, and it was a real pleasure to meet them and learn about their research interests. Facilitating networking across rank, institution, and subfield is one of the most special and unique features of our section. We get to learn from each other. I hope to see future collaborations and dialogues emerge from these interactions, as well as the exciting research contributions from our graduate and early career section members.”

Sara Wallace Goodman
Interim Co-Director, Jack W. Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine

[left] Gabriella Rosso (ROFA Galleries) giving a tour of the immigration-inspired art curated for the conference

[right] Justin Gest (George Mason University) introducing the keynote speaker, Jonathan Capehart (The Washington Post / MSNBC)

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“As a newly minted Assistant Professor, what I found most useful was the Career Advances Panel. During this first panel discussion, it was especially useful hearing from Angela Chnapko from Oxford University Press about how to approach a publisher with a book project. The ice cream social was a really beneficial time to network with scholars with similar research interests. As I’m currently at a teaching-intensive institution, I would have found it helpful to have heard from a panel discussing teaching of Migration & Citizenship.”

**Angela Ju**  
Assistant Professor of Global Studies & Political Science, St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX

“I attended the pre-conference to help me think through a sabbatical project. The event’s organization and panelists’ presentations were extremely helpful, particularly the ‘Methods Challenges’ and ‘Migration and Citizenship 2030’ panels. As a relative newcomer to migration research, the panels helped me gain a better feel for the state of current research and the methods I might engage for my project. I left with several promising ideas and approaches, some of which contributed to my sabbatical proposal, now submitted.”

**Margaret M. Commins**  
Shelton Professor, Department of Political Science and Sociology  
Queens University of Charlotte, NC
Best Book:

Committee Members:

Winner:

Committee’s comments:

This is an outstanding and path-breaking book. It offers a thoroughly researched, conceptually innovative, and highly original argument, with great scope for applications to a wide range of issues in citizenship and migration. Cohen draws on diverse range of literature to develop her argument that time is a political resource with qualities which make it uniquely valuable for resolving political disputes over issues such as rights, punishment and access to citizenship. This book contributes to our understanding of the state and modern citizenship, by showing how both of these concepts developed alongside the notion of measurable durational time. The book is full of fascinating insights, and reading its lucid prose was both an education and a pleasure.

Honorable Mentions:


Best Article:

Winner:

Committee’s comments:

One of the central contributions of Pugh’s piece is that it brings an intersectional framework and an incredibly rigorous multimethod empirical strategy to bear on a question of critical importance to the study of migration and citizenship and the politics of marginalized groups more generally: How do markers of difference such as race, class, gender, nationality, and accent, both by themselves and intersectionally, affect in-group (in this case, citizens of migrant-receiving countries) perceptions of outgroups (in this case migrants), and how do these perceptions, in turn, affect the ways in which out-groups negotiate and navigate identity and belonging? Using the case of Colombian migrants to Ecuador, he develops the concept of the “invisibility bargain,” an unwritten set of expectations in which migrant populations are expected to contribute economically to the host country but also maintain political and social invisibility. Through a careful and persuasive analysis, Pugh demonstrates that "the more visible the markers of difference that set migrants apart from the host population and contradict acceptable norms of behaviour, the more likely they will result in exclusion from the host society." Though he doesn’t really characterize it in this way, part of what this framework does is complicate ideas about "assimilation" by suggesting that it is about "fitting in" than about disappearing and making no social or political claims on societies to which they contribute economically.

Best Paper:

Winner:

Committee’s Comments:

This paper uses unique data to provide new insights. The author obtained thousands of actual bureaucratic decisions on asylum applications, coded the attributes of each application, and modelled the likelihood of success. The author found that the bureaucrats more often rejected claims submitted by Muslims, apparently because the bureaucrats found claims of threats to the lives of the applicants to be less credible. But,
after gaining experience on the job, this bureaucratic bias tended to go away. Throughout, the author is commendably clear in presenting the asylum process, the data and methods used to study it, and the implications of the findings.

Honorable Mention:


Best Dissertation:

Committee Members:
Jonathan Laurence, Prof. Lori Noora, Prof. Myra Waterbury.

Winner:

Committee’s Comments:

The award committee received thirteen nominations for Best Dissertation in the field of migration and citizenship from universities in Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This year’s recipient of the award is Dr. Stephanie Schwartz, in recognition of her Ph.D. thesis entitled Homeward Bound: Return Migration & Local Conflict After Civil War. Currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania and an Assistant Professor of International Relations University of Southern California, Professor Schwartz completed her doctoral studies at Columbia University in 2018.

Schwartz’s dissertation examines the ways in which out-migration and return affect post-conflict politics and peacebuilding. She demonstrates the effect of refugee return in the aftermath of war on social cleavages in the home country and identifies the conditions for new social cleavages between and among “returnees” (rapatriées) and “stayees” (residents). To do this, she draws on the case of Burundi’s 1993-2003 civil war to examine how refugee return created new identity divisions. Based on ethnographic evidence and fieldwork in South Sudan, Burundi, and Tanzania between 2014 and 2016, she finds new social divisions in local communities based on where individuals lived during the war.

The dynamic of those left behind in tough times and those who return, voluntarily or otherwise, to rebuild, is vividly illustrated by interviews that Schwartz conducted with
villagers and refugees, international humanitarian organization staff, government officials, and local experts. Quotations from the interviews offer windows onto larger arguments and innovative questions of how migration changes one’s relationship to territory and belonging. This has important policy implications for host countries who ponder returning refugees to post-war situations back home, because the experiences of return shaped both the character and timing of renewed refugee flight. Schwartz thereby brings new insights to the study of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-making, and to our understanding of migration and its political effects. In the words of her dissertation advisor, Professor Page Fortna (Columbia University), “Schwartz’s dissertation contributes to our theoretical understanding of the interaction between migration and peacebuilding, and to a growing research agenda on the ways in which increased mobility and globalization affect political and social dynamics at the local level.”

The award committee congratulates Dr. Schwartz for an engaging and well-written dissertation that makes innovative use of the social science literature and is solidly interdisciplinary, bridging political science with sociological theory and ethnographic techniques in a region that is underrepresented in migration and citizenship studies.
MEMBER NEWS

David Abraham (University of Miami)

- Contributed a volume of essays on migration and citizenship (in English and German) *Wer gehört zu uns—Who Belongs to ‘Us’* with the Wallstein Verlag as volume 25 in the Jena Center for 20th Century History series.

Fiona Adamson (SOAS, University of London)

- Published "Non-State Authoritarianism and Diaspora Politics." *Global Networks*. 2019. Online first: https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12246
- Continued four-year European Union Horizon 2020 research project "Migration Governance and Asylum Crises". Available at: https://www.magyc.uliege.be/

Claire Adida (UC San Diego)

- Delivered keynote speech at University of Bamberg’s "Asylum-seekers and refugees" conference in June 2019.

Irene Bloemraad (University of California, Berkeley)

- Appointed to the Class of 1951 Chair by the Chancellor in September 2019, a campus recognition for the university’s “most distinguished faculty members”.

Laura Cleton (University of Antwerp)


Emmanuel Comte (Vienna School of International Studies)

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Lauren Duquette-Rury (Wayne State University)


Sara Goodman (University of California, Irvine)

• Published with Tom Pepinsky, “Gender Representation and Strategies for Panel Diversity: Lessons from the APSA Annual Meeting.” *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 2019. Online: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096519000908
• Served as Vice Chair, European Union Studies Association (2019-21).
• Served on the Executive Committee, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research Section of the American Political Science Association (APSA), (2019-21).

Konrad Kalicki (National University of Singapore)


Serdar Kaya (Simon Fraser University, Canada)

Daniel Naujoks (Columbia University)

- Appointed director a.i. of the International Organization and UN Studies Specialization at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Floris Peters (Maastricht University)


Michael Sullivan (St. Mary’s University)


Inés Valdez (Ohio State University)

- Awarded the 2018 APSA French Politics Group Stanley Hoffman Award for the Best Article on French Politics published in the previous two years, for their piece "Non-Domination or Practices of Freedom? French Muslim Women, Foucault, and the Full Veil Ban". 2016. Available online: [https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000647](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000647)
- Appointed Director of the Latina/o Studies Program at Ohio State. Fall 2019 onwards.

Maarten Vink (Maastricht University)

Dataset has been published, extending the dataset to 2019. The MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset charts the rules that existed in near all states of the world since 1960 with regard to the loss or renunciation of citizenship after a citizen of a respective state voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another state. The latest version of the dataset, previous versions and an updated codebook, are available through the Harvard Dataverse Network https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TTMZ08


Catherine Xhardez (Concordia University)

- Published “From different paths to a similar road? Understanding the convergence of subnational immigrant integration policies in Belgium.” Regional Studies. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343040.2019.1663340

Joseph Yi (Hanyang University, Seoul)

- Published with Joe Phillips, “Queer Communities and Activism in South Korea: Center-Periphery Currents.” Journal of Homosexuality. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2019.1616432
RECENT ARTICLES

The articles are drawn from a search of over 70 disciplinary and national/area studies journals (excluding journals that focus primarily on migration, refugees or citizenship) to draw members’ attention to recent work that they might not otherwise see.

Acta Politica


African Journal of Political Science and International Relations


American Journal of Political Science


American Political Science Review


Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

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Asian Journal of Political Science


Australian Journal of International Affairs


British Journal of Politics and International Relations


Canadian Journal of Political Science


https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Comparative European Politics


Roos, C. 2019. The (de-) politicization of EU freedom of movement: political parties, opportunities, and policy framing in Germany and the UK. *Comp Eur Polit* 17, 631–650. [https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0118-1](https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0118-1)


Contemporary Italian Politics


East European Politics and Societies

Ethics and Global Politics


Ethics and International Affairs


European Journal of Political Research


European Union Politics


German Politics


Irish Political Studies


Italian Political Science Review


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**Political Psychology**


**Regional and Federal Studies**


**Scandinavian Political Studies**


**South European Society and Politics**

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APSA’s Migration and Citizenship Section Newsletter is edited by Fiona Barker and Ruxandra Paul. Susannah Elder served as this issue’s editorial assistant. Opinions do not represent the official position of APSA’s Section on Migration and Citizenship. Past issues are available to the public free of charge at https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/newsletters/.