ABSTRACT:
One of the most important issues in the study of urban redevelopment is whether redevelopment led by the public sector as compared to redevelopment led by the private sector necessarily produces significantly different socio-economic consequences. This paper examines that issue by analyzing two different instances of neighborhood redevelopment in Washington, D.C. One is the Fourteenth Street corridor in the Northwest quadrant of Washington beginning just blocks from the White House. It was devastated by riots in 1968 following the assassination of a leading American civil rights leader, Martin Luther King. Its subsequent redevelopment over a decades long span was largely led by the private sector. The other is almost the whole of Washington’s Southwest quadrant. Its redevelopment over a much shorter period was largely led by the public sector in the 1950s as part of the first major federally-funded urban renewal project in the United States. A review of available data indicates that the redevelopment of these two different areas had similar socio-economic consequences that, in essence amounted to gentrification, and that those outcomes differed from what was happening in the city as a whole. The outcomes were more a product of the public sector’s goals in the case of Southwest and the inability of the public sector to affect materially the outcomes of the private sector’s activities in the Fourteenth Street corridor due to a variety of political and economic constraints. This study illustrates by way of a concrete example that the socio-economic outcomes of public versus private sector-led redevelopment are more a function of the goals pursued and applicable constraints rather than the sector that takes the lead despite the wider array of pressures to which the public sector is presumptively subject.

HIGHLIGHTS:

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2 Fellow Mossavar Rahmani Center for Business & Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. PhD, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain.
• Significant areas of Washington, D.C. were redeveloped over the 1950-1980 and 1970-2014 periods. The redevelopment in the 1950-1980 period encompassed almost the entire Southwest quadrant of the city and was part of the first major federally funded urban renewal project in the country. It was largely led by the government. The redevelopment over the 1970-2014 period was of the Fourteenth Street corridor, the area most severely affected by the 1968 riots. Its redevelopment was largely led by the private sector.

• Both areas were relatively poor, disadvantaged and predominantly African-American prior to redevelopment. After redevelopment, both areas became relatively prosperous and predominantly white. In both cases, the socio-economic changes were significantly different from the changes that occurred in the city as a whole. The outcomes of redevelopment in each case can reasonably be classed as “gentrification” despite that term’s somewhat elastic nature (Lees et al. 2008; Zuk et al. 2015).

• The similarity of outcomes between the two situations in comparison to what was happening in the city as a whole is attributable to the fact that, in each case, the redevelopment that occurred was the product of similar animating forces. The government’s principal goal in the case of Southwest was to clear the area of slums, improve the tax base and repopulate the area with middle and upper income residents. Concern for the poor and disadvantaged was not a significant element in the equation. In the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor, the government had neither the political nor economic resources to affect in a significant way the inevitable outcome of private sector redevelopment.

• The redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor, moreover, in contrast to the redevelopment of Southwest, took a relatively long time and did not even begin in a significant way until more than thirty years after the 1968 riots. The redevelopment of Southwest was virtually complete in accordance with government plans in the thirty-year period between 1950 and 1980.

• The similarity in socio-economic outcomes for the areas under review in comparison to what was happening in the city as a whole in the cases examined here raises profound questions about public sector involvement in urban redevelopment, the goals the public sector pursues, the nature of that involvement as it relates to issues of diversity, affordable housing and other public policy issues and whether the public sector can effectively leverage private sector resources to achieve public policy objectives through public-private partnerships or other collaborative efforts.

KEYWORDS:
Urban Renewal; Urban Redevelopment; Leadership; Gentrification; Diversity; Urban Governance.
1. INTRODUCTION

Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States, and dozens of other American cities were hit by riots following the assassination in 1968 of Martin Luther King, a major U.S. civil rights leader (Risen 2009). Large parts of Washington were looted and burned. The Fourteenth Street corridor, an area approximately two miles long and two blocks wide, was one of the areas most affected (District of Columbia City Council 1968). For the next thirty years or so, much of it was populated by burned-out and boarded-up buildings and plagued by drug-dealing, prostitution and other crimes. That changed when developers in the late 1990s, some thirty years later, saw opportunities for redevelopment dictated by a market that had not previously existed. The Fourteenth Street corridor was almost completely transformed in the ensuing years and by 2014 had become a neighborhood of trendy restaurants, high-end shops and luxurious apartments and single-family homes (Spinner 2007).

Almost twenty years before, another part of the District of Columbia experienced a similar transformation, but not because of rioters. The government instead wielded the wrecking ball and set the process in motion. In the first significant federally-funded urban renewal project in the country, the government in the early 1950s acquired almost all existing properties in the southwest quadrant of the city, bulldozed most of its existing structures and forced virtually all who lived there to move elsewhere. It did so largely through the exercise of eminent domain, the forced taking of property from private owners. The redevelopment that ensued was largely a product of government planning supported by government subsidy (National Park Service 2004). Like the Fourteenth Street corridor, Southwest was transformed, albeit over a much shorter period, into a largely middle and upper-income neighborhood (Gutheim and Lee 2006; Russello 2009).

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the largely public sector led redevelopment of Southwest and the largely private sector led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor several decades later had significantly different socio-economic outcomes and, if not, why not. Questions of this kind are an important part of the academic debate about leadership in the urban transformation process and the outcomes that different leadership arrangements and styles can produce (see Section 3 for details). Our examination of the historical record, together with our interviews of key actors and our analysis of the available data pertaining to outcomes (See section 2 for details), reveal in concrete terms which sector led the way (see Sections 4 and 5 for details) and why the socio-economic outcomes were what they were (see Section 6 for details.) As such, it reveals the importance of understanding the goals, incentives and constraints that undergird redevelopment regardless of whether redevelopment is led by the private or public sectors and the nature of the applicable governance construct.

2. MATERIAL AND METHODS

The city of Washington, D.C., is to a large extent a product of planning. Its shape and texture reflect the comprehensive plans for the city first developed by Pierre L’Enfant in 1791. Those and subsequent plans were revised and expanded a little more than a hundred years later by the McMillan Commission. The McMillan Commission’s Plan continues to this day to guide Washington’s development in important ways (National Capital Planning Commission 1950; Gutheim and Lee 2006).
This article is the product of extensive research relating to the redevelopment of two different parts of Washington, D.C: the Fourteenth Street corridor, whose redevelopment was largely led by the private sector, and Southwest, whose redevelopment was largely led by the public sector as part of the first major federally-funded urban renewal product in the country. The redevelopment of Southwest was in the tradition of comprehensive planning for the city dating back to Pierre L’Enfant. The redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor was a departure from that tradition. In both instances, however, gentrification was the result. (Camp 1978; Mintz 1988; Ault 2006; Black 2009; Abrams 2012; Wetzel & Southwest Neighborhood Assembly 2012; Abrams 2015; Milloy 2015; O’ Connell 2016). There is much in the way of meaningful learning about public and private sector leadership and its results that can be gleaned from the analysis.

The research that undergirds this paper is both qualitative and quantitative. It includes a thorough analysis of primary and secondary documentary sources, in-depth interviews of thirty-three knowledgeable individuals and a careful analysis of numerical data.

• The documentary materials reviewed for these purposes consist of materials from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, the D.C. Office of Public Records, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the D.C. Public Library; all official maps and documents approved by the D.C. Zoning Commission from 1950 to 2016; and more than 5,000 pages of books, academic journals, newspapers, magazines, websites and other materials pertinent to the general subject of urban renewal and the activities that took place in the areas under review.

• The individuals interviewed were involved in or otherwise knowledgeable about the matters under review. They included twelve public officials, a local business owner, two stage theatre personnel, six major developers, five non-profit and social service organization personnel, three urban planners, two academics, a journalist and a Neighborhood Advisory Commissioner. In selecting individuals to be interviewed, we used a non-random, opportunistic sampling methodology (Patton 1990) based, in part, on those the documentary record identified as relevant to the redevelopment projects under review. We also used snowball sampling, an approach that is particularly valuable in identifying hard-to-identify individuals relevant to the matter being researched (Sadler et al. 2010). The literature

3 For purposes of this study, the Fourteenth Street corridor begins at Thomas Circle in the south and runs for a distance of approximately two miles to Columbia Heights in the north. It is bounded on the west by Fifteenth Street; on the east, by Thirteenth Street; on the south, by Massachusetts Avenue; and on the north, by Irving Street at Columbia Heights. Fourteenth Street is its spine. Geographical boundaries were identified in accordance with planning documents and verified through interviews.

4 For purposes of this study, Southwest is bounded in the north by Independence Avenue between Twelfth Street and Washington Avenue (formerly Canal Street); on the northeast by Washington Avenue between Independence Avenue and D Street; on the east by South Capitol Street between D and M streets; on the southeast by Canal Street between M and P streets; on the south by P Street between Canal Street and Maine Avenue; on the southwest by Maine Avenue and the Washington Channel between P and Fourteenth streets; on the west by Fourteenth Street between D and F streets; on the northwest by D Street between Fourteenth and Twelfth streets; and Twelfth Street, between D Street and Independence Avenue. Geographical boundaries were identified in accordance with planning documents and verified through interviews.
indicates that data saturation is reached after interviews of twelve knowledgeable individuals if they, as they did here, convey convergent views (Guest, Bunce and Johnson 2006). Our thirty-three interviews exceeded that number by far. Careful notes were taken on each of the in-depth interviews.

• The data analyzed for purposes of this study consisted of U.S. Census Bureau data (Decennial Census of Population and Housing and the American Community Survey – Five Year Estimates) pertaining to the socio-economic factors identified in Section 6 and covering the Census tracts and years identified in Footnotes 7 and 8. We used the “Social Explorer” online tool to explore the data.

Extensive documentary review, historical reconstruction, interviews of key public and private sector actors and knowledgeable individuals and extensive data analysis made it possible for us to triangulate relevant information, reach an information saturation point and validate our conclusions. Doing so is especially useful in the study of urban transformation because it creates an empirical foundation against which theoretical constructs can be assessed.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a virtually limitless literature on the roles played by the public and private sectors in urban redevelopment (Dahl 1974; Levy and Levy 2000; Pierce and Peters 2000; John 2001; Goode 2003; Fainstein 2005; Jouve 2005; Gutheim and Lee 2006; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Borraz and Le Gales 2010; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011; Glaeser 2011; Levy 2011; Logan 2012; Hymowitz 2016). Much of the literature revolves around the term “urban governance,” described as “the formulation and pursuit of collective goals at the local level (Pierce and Peters 2000, p. 71). The term reflects something of a shift from government to governance in thinking about how cities develop. It is based on a recognition that cities are enmeshed in a network of economic and political constraints and opportunities that profoundly affect the governing and development process and involve a wide variety of actors of which the government itself is but one (Pierre and Peters 2000; Ward 2000; Clarke 2001; Kjaer 2009). The literature suggests that many public institutions are migrating from a hierarchical, top-down approach to governance to the idea of shared authority across horizontal meta-sector networks (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Ruffin 2010).

Stoker (1998) argues that the term governance, as it relates to urban responsibilities, involves a blurring of the boundaries between the public and private sectors. Cook (2009) describes the existence of a substantial gray zone in which Flinders (2006, p. 225) contends, “the public-private distinction becomes opaque and the established framework for ensuring legitimacy, accountability and control becomes less clear.” The widespread emergence of public-private partnerships, including those that follow the Business Improvement District model, to deal with

5 https://www.socialexplorer.com

6 Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are created to promote the redevelopment and maintenance needs of a designated business area and have taxing authority to finance their operations (Cook 2009).
governance, development and maintenance issues is a manifestation of the blurring of boundaries (Mitchell 2008; Morcol and Zimmerman 2008; Grossman 2010; Ruffin 2010).

So far as leadership is concerned, it is obvious that urban redevelopment, whether in the United States or abroad, can be led by either the public or private sectors or both, either alone or in collaboration. While recognizing the significant roles that idiosyncratic political, economic, social and cultural factors can play in the approaches taken, existing literature tends to concentrate on four dimensions:

• Leadership styles and how different leadership styles affect the development of policies (Dahl 1974; John and Cole 1999; Virtanen and Verlaat 1999; Hambleton and Sweeting 2004; Louwaars 2011);

• Whether a top-down or bottom-up approach is taken and whether the approach taken adequately captures locally significant factors that can affect the outcome (Purdue 2001; Cooksey and Kikula 2005; Roy et al. 2009; Barber and Pareja 2010; Yael and Kallus 2010);

• The role of regulation and public investment in affecting the activities of the private sector (Smith 1979; Hambleton and Sweeting 2004; Adams and Tiesdell 2010; Louwaars 2011; Heurkens 2012); and

• The growing role of the private sector in urban development as a consequence of the decline of the Welfare State model (Giddens 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Borraz and John 2004).

Research on issues like these tends to deal with theoretical issues of governance and leadership, not actual outcomes. The closest existing research about outcomes that parallels our own examines gentrification, defined as “the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential or commercial use” (Lees et al. 2008, p. XV), but does not clearly differentiate between gentrification caused by activities of the private versus the public sector.

Following decades of public and private initiatives to regenerate the inner city, scholars have also extensively studied the causes and consequences of neighborhood renewal (Zuk et al. 2015). Here again, existing literature does not clearly tackle data relating to differences in neighborhood renewal outcomes based on whether the renewal is a consequence of activities of the private versus the public sector.

A second body of literature that looks at outcomes is focused on diversity. As a reaction to how gentrification is experienced by local residents who, on many occasions, are forced to move, diversity, understood as the “right to the city” (Fainstein 2005, p. 3), has become a new orthodoxy in city planning as one of the main factors justifying public intervention (Fainstein 2005; Fincher and Kurt 2008; Landry 2012; Zuk et al. 2015).

The literature on urban redevelopment thus tends to describe the redevelopment process, the gentrification phenomenon and the trade-offs between diversity and gentrification in theoretical terms. It does not typically attempt to identify in concrete settings whether the public or private sectors or a collaborative organization involving both actually assumes the lead and, if so, to what the resulting outcomes might be attributable. Our analysis adds to the existing literature by analyzing the socio-economic outcomes of two important redevelopment projects in Washington,
D.C., determining whether the public or private sector should be viewed as the leader of those projects and analyzing why each project resulted in substantially similar outcomes despite being led by different sectors.

4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH STREET CORRIDOR

4.1 Background

The Fourteenth Street corridor before 1950 was mainly a white neighborhood. Things began to change in the 1950s, however, as whites began leaving for the suburbs. By 1960, the neighborhood was predominantly African-American and, until the riots in 1968, a center of African-American culture and commerce, home to one of America’s largest African-American urban communities, a sort of “city within a city” for D.C.’s African-American middle class. It was known as “Black Broadway,” filled with theaters, jazz clubs and restaurants, as well as a variety of other businesses owned and operated by African-Americans (Roberts 1952; Spinner 2007; Black 2009; Ruble 2010; Abrams 2012; Logan 2012; Abrams 2015; Freeman 2016). In an article in The Washington Post, Williams (1988), a reporter, wrote that “there was a time when just being there meant being somebody in black Washington, a time when U Street itself [in the Fourteenth Street corridor] was known as ‘the colored man’s Connecticut Avenue [a major thoroughfare to the west].’” “There was a time,” he wrote, “when gangsters and presidents’ wives and soul singers could be seen in the same nightclub at the same time.”

4.2 The 1968 Riots

The 1968 riots began in the heart of Black Broadway at the corner of 14th and U streets. In just a few days, 4,000 homes and structures housing 270 businesses, approximately 80% of the total operating in the Fourteenth Street corridor, were destroyed (14th Street Project Area Committee – undated; National Capital Planning Commission 1964; District of Columbia City Council 1968; D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency 2001; National Park Service 2004; Spinner 2007; Ruble 2010; D.C. Office of Planning 2012).

4.3 A City Unable to Help

The city was significantly handicapped in its ability to deal effectively with the aftermath of the riots in large part because it was a city in decline. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, its population, which stood at a little over 800,000 in 1950, fell by 38,000 to 764,000 in the ten ensuing years. The decline continued for the next forty years. By 2000, D.C.’s population had fallen to 572,000, an almost 30% decline in the space of fifty years. The population of the Fourteenth Street corridor, in turn shrank from nearly 47,000 in 1960 to 33,000 by 1990, or nearly 30%, as those who could afford to leave the neighborhood did so. By the early 1990s, the city was also in a financial crisis. Declining tax revenues and overspending were the main culprits. According to a 1994 federal government analysis, the city’s access to the financial markets to meet its obligations at that time was in serious jeopardy (Comptroller General of the United States 1976).

The U.S. Congress then stepped in and created a financial control board to oversee the city’s affairs. As reported by The New York Times, “the five member financial control panel would have vast authority over municipal spending, financial planning, borrowing, hiring and
contracts” (Janofsky 1950). The financial control board thus held a tight rein on the city’s expenditures and other financial affairs from 1995 through most of 2001. Compounding the city’s problems were the corruption scandals that plagued the city for most of the eighties and nineties with its mayor serving time in jail in 1990 after a conviction for the illegal use of drugs (The Washington Post 2017).

4.4 The Private Sector Fills a Vacuum

The city’s financial problems and corrupt political leadership significantly impaired the city’s ability to affect the renewal of the Fourteenth Street corridor. The Fourteenth Street corridor, thus, largely remained in its immediate post-riot state for thirty years or so despite the construction of a city office building and a metro, or underground, station in its midst in the interim. It was not until the late 1990s and early 2000s that the private sector began to fill the vacuum (Camp 1978; Mintz 1988; Ault 2006; Black 2009; Abrams 2010; Abrams 2015; Milloy 2015; O’Connell 2016).

5. THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHWEST

5.1 Background

Before the federal government’s urban renewal program came to the Southwest quadrant of the city, the area was poor and overcrowded. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 64% of its population in 1950 was African-American; 36% was white. Southwest contained approximately 6,000 dwelling units for a population of 25,000, or 4.2 individuals per dwelling unit as compared to 3.5 individuals per dwelling unit for the city as a whole. The housing, moreover, was largely of poor quality and often lacked basic amenities such as electricity and indoor plumbing. Many of its residents worked as domestics or in a variety of other low-paying jobs (Levy, Bob and Jane 2000; Gutheim and Lee 2006). It was a city within a city, much like the Fourteenth Street corridor, but significantly isolated. Unlike the Fourteenth Street corridor, there were no nightclubs, theatres, other cultural attractions or businesses that enticed people from other parts of the city to visit. It was widely regarded as a slum (National Park Service 2004).

5.2 No Riots but Destroyed Nonetheless

Southwest’s slums prior to the advent of urban renewal were within eyesight of D.C.’s monumental core, including the Capitol building itself. Congress and the executive branch, both of which essentially governed the city at the time, believed the slums had to be eliminated because, among other things, they were an embarrassment and that the best way to do so was to remove existing residents and completely recreate the area (National Capital Planning Commission 1955; Lewis 1963; The Washington Post editorial 1963). The government’s principal goal was also improve the tax base and repopulate the area with middle and upper income residents (Lewis 1963). The government gave those who were displaced a small sum of money to help them relocate and razed almost the entire area to make way for new buildings and an entirely new mix of inhabitants (Levy Bob and Jane 2000; Gutheim and Lee 2006).
5.3 The Absence of Political Constraints

Little political groundwork needed to be laid for the federal government’s plans for Southwest because the District of Columbia lacked home rule at the time. The city, moreover, had (and still has) no representative in Congress with voting rights. The consequence was that the government was able to proceed without serious concern for the effect on Southwest’s existing inhabitants. The government proceeded to compel existing owners to turn their properties over to the government and price the land for resale at levels that made redevelopment possible. There was no need, as there was years later in the Fourteenth Street corridor, to wait for normal market forces to make redevelopment possible. (D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency 1952).

6. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

The table at the end of this section summarizes in great detail the most important socio-economic outcomes of the Fourteenth Street corridor’s and the area redevelopment. Included in the table for purposes of comparison are data pertaining to the same measures of population and social welfare for the city as a whole. Comparisons with the city as a whole are the relevant points of comparison because the activities in question relate to different starting and ending points and different socio-economic conditions at each starting and ending point. They thus lack a common foundation for comparison directly with each other.

The starting point for the Fourteenth Street corridor is 1970, the earliest date following the riots for which Census data are available. There is no completely satisfactory ending date for the Fourteenth Street corridor because its redevelopment, although largely complete, is still ongoing. We, therefore, used 2014 as the ending point because that is the latest date as of this writing for which the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey data are available.

The starting point for Southwest is 1950, the earliest date for which Census data are available prior to implementation of the government’s urban renewal plan for Southwest. We used two ending points for Southwest: One is 1980 because that is the date by which there seems to be a consensus that the redevelopment of Southwest in accordance with the government’s plan was essentially complete (National Park Service 2004). The other ending date is 2014 because the data available as of that date provide an indication of whether the situation as of 1980 was reflective of what occurred thereafter. For simplicity’s sake, we describe in the narrative below only the situation as of 2014 because there is no material difference between the situation in Southwest as of 1980 and 2014.

As described in detail below, it is clear that the private sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor and the public sector-led redevelopment of Southwest had similar socio-economic outcomes. The outcomes in each case, moreover, can reasonably be classified as “gentrification” despite that term’s somewhat elastic nature (Lees et al. 2008; Zuk et al. 2015). Both areas were relatively poor, disadvantaged and predominantly African-American prior to redevelopment. After redevelopment, both areas became relatively prosperous and predominantly white.

In both cases, moreover, the socio-economic changes were significantly different from the changes that occurred in the city as a whole. In both the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, for example, in comparison to what was happening in the city as a whole, (a)
population levels remained steady, (b) the proportion of the African-American population declined, (c) average family incomes increased or were ultimately higher, (d) the proportion of those living below the poverty line was lower, (e) residential property values increased, (f) residential rents increased, (g) educational attainments increased, (h) the percentage who were part of the labor force increased, (i) family household formations declined or were ultimately lower and (j) the working age population increased.

The key observations are as follows:

Population:

The population of the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1970, just after the riots, stood at 42,439. In 2014, it stood at 41,904, essentially the same level it was in 1970. The population of the city as a whole, meanwhile, suffered a 16.2% decline over the 1970-2014 period.

The population of Southwest prior to the start of urban renewal in 1950 was 25,000. It declined dramatically to 8,575 by 1980 as a consequence of deliberate government removal policy but experienced no further declines over the period from 1980 to 2014. The city as a whole, meanwhile, suffered a 21% decline in its population over the 1950-2014 period.

Racial composition:

84.3% of the population in the Fourteenth Street corridor was African-American in 1970. By 2014, that number had dropped to 26.3%, a 68.8% decline. In 1970, 71.1% of the population of the city as a whole was African-American. By 2014, it was 49.6%, a 30.2% decline, less than half the decline in the Fourteenth Street corridor.

In Southwest, the situation was even more dramatic. In 1950, 63.8% of the population there was African-American. By 2014, it had declined to 37.6%, a 41.1% decline. In the city as a whole, by contrast, 35% of the population was African-American in 1950. By 2014, it had grown to 49.6%, an increase of 41.7% over 1950.

Average family incomes:

In 2013 dollars, average family incomes in 1970 in the Fourteenth Street corridor were $43,982. By 2014, they had grown to $127,739, an increase of 190.4%. For the city as a whole, by contrast, average family incomes were $68,469 in 1970 and had grown to $128,837 by 2014, an increase of only 88.2% over 1970.

Average family incomes in 2013 dollars in Southwest in 1970, the first year for which Census data on family income are available, were $106,001. By 2014, they had grown to $142,667, an increase of 34.6%. For the city as a whole, the 88.2% increase over the 1970-2014 period was higher, but it is unclear what the increase over the over the 1950-2014 period was because the data for 1950 are not available. It is likely, however, that the increase was considerably higher because of the extreme poverty in Southwest in 1950. In any event, average family incomes in Southwest in 2014 at $142,667 were almost 10% above average family incomes of $128,837 in the city as a whole at that time.
Poverty line:

The increases in family incomes for the two areas under review were accompanied, not surprisingly, by a decline in the percentage of families with incomes below the poverty line.

In the Fourteenth Street corridor, for example, 49.7% of the families living there in 1970 had incomes below the poverty line. By 2014, that number had declined to 27.9%, a 43.9% decrease. For the city as a whole, by contrast, 19.6% of the families living in the city had incomes below the poverty line in 1970. By 2014, that number had grown to 31.9%, an increase of 62.7%.

In Southwest, 14.9% of the families living there in 1970, the first year for which these data are available, had incomes below the poverty line. By 2014, that number had declined to 12.9%, a 13.4% drop. This compares with the 31.9% increase over the same period for the city as a whole.

Residential property values:

Accompanying these changes were significant changes in property values, expressed in 2013 dollars, in the areas under review.

The median value of owner-occupied housing in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1970 was $96,792. By 2014, it had risen to $534,926, or 452.7% higher than it was in 1970. For the city as a whole by contrast, the median value of owner-occupied housing in 1970 was $142,868. By 2014, it had risen to $448,616, or only 214% higher than it was in 1970.

The median value of owner-occupied housing in Southwest in 2013 dollars in 1950 was $63,153. By 2014, it had risen to $316,699, an increase of 401.5% over 1950. For the city as a whole, the median value of owner-occupied housing in 1950 was $120,588. The increase to $488,616 in 2014 represented an increase of only 272.1%.

Rents:

Changes in median rent levels for residential property, also expressed in 2013 dollars, were consistent with the changes in the value of owner-occupied housing for the areas under review.

Median rents in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1980, the first year for which data are available, were $580 per month. By 2014, they had risen to $1,534, an increase of 164.5%. For the city as a whole, median residential rents in 1980 were $999 per month. By 2014, they had risen to $1,211 per month, an increase of only 21.2%.

In Southwest, median residential rents in 2013 dollars were $274 per month in 1950. By 2014, they had risen to $1,474 per month, an increase of 438% over 1950. For the city as a whole by contrast, median residential rents in 1950 were $459 per month. Their increase to $1,211 per month by 2014 represents an increase of only 163.8% over 1950.
Educational attainment:

In 1970, 17.4% of those over 25 years of age living in the Fourteenth Street corridor had attended college. By 2014, that number had risen to 67.1%, an increase of 285.6% over 1970. For the city as a whole, 29% of those over 25 had attended college in 1970. By 2014, that number had risen to 70.3%, an increase of only 142.4%.

In Southwest, only 2.8% of those over 25 years of age living there in 1950 had attended college. By 2014, that number had risen to 75.4%, an increase of 2,593%. For the city as a whole by contrast, 13% of those over the age of 25 had attended college in 1950. By 2014, that number had risen to 70.3%, an increase of only 440.8%.

Labor force participation:

In 1970, 64.7% of those over 16 years of age living in the Fourteenth Street corridor were in the labor force. By 2014, that number had risen to 82.6%, a 27.7% increase. For the city as a whole by contrast, 64.2% of the population as a whole was in the workforce in 1970. By 2014, that number had risen to 68.5%, an increase of only 6.7%.

In 1950, 59.4% of those over 16 years of age living in Southwest were in the workforce. By 2014, that number had risen to 78.7%, an increase of 32.5% over 1950. For the city as a whole, 62.2% over the age of 16 were in the workforce in 1950. By 2014, that number had risen to 68.5%, an increase of only 10.1% over 1950.

Types of households:

In 1970, 46.7% of those living in the Fourteenth Street corridor were part of a family household, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau (2017) as “those occupying a single dwelling unit who are related by birth, marriage or adoption.” By 2014, that number had declined to 26.8%, a 42.6% decline. For the city as a whole, 62% of those living in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1970 were part of a family. By 2014, that number had declined to 42.5%, a decline of only 31.4%.

In Southwest in 1970, the first year for which data are available, 40.8% of those living there were part of a family household. By 2014, that number had declined to 29.2%, a 28.4% decrease. For the city as a whole, 62% of its residents were part of a family in 1970. By 2014, that number had declined to 42.5%, a decrease of 31.4%. While the 31.4% decrease for the city as a whole is slightly greater than for Southwest alone, the percentage of those living in Southwest in 2014 who were part of a family was still significantly lower (29.1%) than it was for the city as a whole (42.5%).

Working age:

In 1970, 64.7% of those living in the Fourteenth Street corridor were between 18 and 64 years of age, an age bracket that presumably contains the bulk of the working age population. By 2014, that number had risen to 82.8%, or by 28%. For the city as a whole, 60.9% of its residents were
between 18 and 64 years of age in 1970. By 1970, that number had risen to 71.6%, an increase of only 17.6%.

In 1950, 58.5% of those living in Southwest were between 18 and 64 years of age. By 2014, that number had risen to 77.2%, or 32% higher than it was in 1950. For the city as whole, 67.3% of the population was between 18 and 64 years of age in 1950. By 2014, that number had risen to 71.6%, an increase of only 6.4% over 1950.

Table 1. Relevant Socio-Economic Data for the Areas Under Review Before and After Redevelopment

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<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>41,904</td>
<td>633,736</td>
<td>8,575</td>
<td>638,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Decrease (1.3%)</td>
<td>Decrease (16.2%)</td>
<td>Decrease (66.4%)</td>
<td>Decrease (20.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Composition (% African-American)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Decrease (68.8%)</td>
<td>Decrease (30.2%)</td>
<td>Decrease (24.6%)</td>
<td>Increase (100.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Family Income, in 2013 dollars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>$43,982</td>
<td>$68,469</td>
<td>$106,001*</td>
<td>$68,469*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>$127,739</td>
<td>$128,837</td>
<td>$142,667</td>
<td>$77,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase (190.4%)</td>
<td>Increase (88.2%)</td>
<td>Increase (9.9%)</td>
<td>Increase (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio of Income to Poverty Level (Poor or Struggling)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>14.9%*</td>
<td>19.6%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Decrease (43.9%)</td>
<td>Increase (62.8%)</td>
<td>Increase (30.9%)</td>
<td>Increase (315.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median House Value for all Owner-Occupied Housing Units, in 2013 dollars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>$96,792</td>
<td>$142,868</td>
<td>$63,153</td>
<td>$120,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>$534,926</td>
<td>$448,616</td>
<td>$316,699</td>
<td>$448,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase (452.7%)</td>
<td>Increase (214%)</td>
<td>Increase (368.4%)</td>
<td>Increase (66.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median Contract Monthly Rent, in 2013 dollars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>$580**</td>
<td>$999**</td>
<td>$274</td>
<td>$659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>$1,534</td>
<td>$1,211</td>
<td>$1,474</td>
<td>$676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase (364.5%)</td>
<td>Increase (21.2%)</td>
<td>Increase (264.6%)</td>
<td>Increase (47.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cumulative Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (% College or More)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 U.S. Census Tracts used for the Fourteenth Street corridor: Decennial Census of Population and Housing: 1950 (28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52); 1970 (28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10); 1980 (28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10). American Community Survey (five-year estimates): 2014 (28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52.10).

8 U.S. Census Tracts used for Southwest: Decennial Census of Population and Housing: 1950 (60; 61; 62; 63); 1970 (60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01); 1980 (60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01). American Community Survey (five-year estimates): 2014 (102; 105; 110).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas under review</th>
<th>14th Street Corridor</th>
<th>Washington D.C.</th>
<th>Southwest D.C.</th>
<th>Washington D.C.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td>285.6%</td>
<td>142.4%</td>
<td>2,721.4%</td>
<td>2,592.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation for Population 16 Years and Over (% In Labor Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Households (% Family Households)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>40.8%*</td>
<td>40.8%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td>(42.6%)</td>
<td>(31.4%)</td>
<td>(28.7%)</td>
<td>(28.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Distribution (% 18 to 64 Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending point</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Direction</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Magnitude</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1970 is the first date for which data are available. **1980 is the first data for which data are available.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

7. CONCLUSIONS

While no single sector can operate entirely alone in any significant urban redevelopment project (Pierre and Peters 2000; John, 2001; Goode 2003; Fainstein 2005), our research reveals to a virtual certainty that the public sector was the driving force in the redevelopment of Southwest and that the private sector was the driving force in the redevelopment of Fourteenth Street corridor. It is also clear from the data that the redevelopment of each area had similar socio-economic outcomes that significantly differed from the changes that occurred in the city as a whole and that both outcomes can reasonably be classified as gentrification. The evidence also strongly suggests that outcomes based solely on which sector plays a leadership role cannot be predetermined in the abstract and that a thorough understanding of goals, incentives and constraints is essential to prediction of consequences.

One might reasonably expect a priori that the consequences of government-led redevelopment would be different from private sector-led redevelopment given the differing array of social, economic and political pressures to which governments are typically subject. Our research casts any such presuppositions into doubt because of the similarity of outcomes in the situations reviewed.

The similarity of outcomes in the two situations here in comparison to what was happening in the city as a whole is attributable to the fact that, in each case, the redevelopment that occurred was the product of similar animating forces. Our research indicates that the government essentially pursued private sector goals in the case of Southwest and that it encountered little if any constraints in its ability to do so because the federal government rather than the local government was essentially in charge. The federal government’s principal goal was to clear the area of slums, improve the tax base and repopulate the area with middle and upper income residents. Concern for the poor and disadvantaged was not a significant element in the equation.
Our research also indicates that the city was unable or unwilling to impose constraints on or materially affect the private sector’s redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor because of governmental dysfunction and limited financial resources. The government had neither the political nor economic resources to affect in a significant way the redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor even if it had wanted to do so.

Our research raises profound questions about the ability to predict the outcomes of redevelopment led by one sector or the other without an understanding of the animating forces and relevant political and economic constraints. These are recurring issues in the debate about gentrification and diversity and fundamental to an understanding of the likely consequences of the leadership that governs redevelopment activities.

Existing work on the different ways in which the public and private sectors participate in urban redevelopment, either alone or in collaboration, has added immeasurably to theory and practice in the field. It has also stimulated new thinking about how to leverage scarce human and financial resources to achieve important public policy objectives. It is vital, however, that any such thinking be tested in practice by an identification in any given circumstance of the driving forces and controlling objectives in the arrangements that are made. It is too easy to assume that the public and private sectors will be animated by different interests given the different pressures under which they operate and that their development activities will, as a consequence, produce different outcomes.

A lesson to be learned from the results of our research is that public versus private sector leadership in urban redevelopment does not itself determine outcomes and that an understanding of what those outcomes are likely to be requires not only an understanding of goals and objectives but also the availability of resources and the existence of relevant legal and political constraints. The government often has significant tools at its disposal to achieve diversity or otherwise change likely private sector outcomes. These include, among others, zoning, infrastructure investment, school improvements, housing subsidies and the imposition of mandatory affordable housing requirements on developers. The government can sometimes also speed up the process of redevelopment by changing requirements pertaining to zoning, zoning variances, building permits, building codes, building inspections, public hearings, public participation development proposals and the like. Whether the government uses the tools at its disposal is less a question of whether it leads the redevelopment but more a question of whether it is present or absent in the process and, if present, the goals it seeks to achieve and the resources it brings to bear to foster their achievement.

Among the more important public policy issues raised by examining the results of our research is whether city governments can reasonably be expected to seek outcomes that are different from the outcomes produced by purely private sector redevelopment and, if so, how the financial resources and political will required to produce different outcomes can be mustered (Fincher and Kurt 2008; Zuk et al. 2015). As Kay Hymowitz (2016) argues in The New Brooklyn: What It Takes to Bring a City Back, cities often profess to decry gentrification but explicitly or implicitly pursue policies that make gentrification inevitable. If diversity, infrastructure development, fighting crime or improving social welfare are part of a city’s goals, making them explicit, mustering the necessary resources and establishing criteria for measuring their achievement are essential regardless of whether redevelopment is led by the public or private sectors.
8. REFERENCES

Books


Grossman 2010


Academic Journals and Other Research Publications


**Government Reports, Planning Documents and Maps**


News Media


Milloy, Courtland. 2015. “Yes, 14th Street may be better these days, but something vital is missing.” The Washington Post, July 21. Accessed June 27th, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/yes-14th-street-may-be-better-these-days-but-something-vital-is-m>


