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Message from the Chair

This is a challenging time for us all. For members of APSA’s International History and Politics Section, it is especially hard not to read utterances, phrases, and political actions without reflecting on past, mostly dark, moments in world history. As I write, American officials are arresting immigrant ‘criminals’, an elastic term that can include immigrants paying taxes and living peaceably—and it can include visiting scholars accused of lacking ‘correct’ immigration documents. Mexico is proposing legislation that would vastly expand the power of the state to arrest, hold for years and more easily prosecute citizens. And in Turkey, where there will be a referendum in April to change the constitution, Constitutional law scholars are ominously silent because a number of famous scholars have been forced to undergo disciplinary hearings—some have been fired and some have had their passports seized. Kemal Gözler explains the chilling effect on scholars in Turkey:

Everyone has come to a stage where they fear their own shadows. Scientists are afraid of their own writing. Authors censor their own work. Those who are supposed to write, out of fear, either write nothing at all or publish their work in a roundabout and self-censored way. Never mind writing an article criticizing the government, people have come to a point where they even fear writing one or two sentences expressing their genuine thoughts on Facebook or Twitter.

With this current climate in mind, I draw your attention to Yale Historian Timothy Snyder’s Facebook post and now short book titled Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. Snyder’s lessons are those of a historian of Central and Eastern Europe; they identify what individuals did and what we can now do to protest, hinder and survive moments of fascist rule and threats to democracy.

This newsletter includes political science investigations of specific historical parallels to today. Deborah Boucouyannis examines parallels between past elite taxation scheme and those of today; Thomas Pepinsky draws insight from a study of how crises in the West have historically reverberated in Southeast Asia; Margaret Peters explores when and why businesses challenge or accept xenophobic immigration bills, drawing parallels between the Chinese Exclusion Act and current discussions of a Muslim ban; Stefanie Walter compares the Brexit vote to earlier referenda on disintegration proposals.
Message from the Chair Continued

This newsletter also includes interviews with the authors of International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean and Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security, which were awarded the Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award for 2016.

In my opening letter for the last newsletter, where the theme was Women and International Politics, I promised that our IHAP program chair would report back on the submissions to APSA, and in particular on all-male panel submissions. Here are the overall figures. Our original allotment was for 10 IHAP section panels. Jelena Subotic was able to increase overall IHAP participation by creating an “innovative panel of 30-minute presentations” which gave us an extra panel to assign. A total of 49 papers and 12 panels were submitted to the IHAP section. Of these, 37 papers and 11 panels were accepted. One submission was for an all-male panel. Jelana returned to the organizers, who then found two women to include on the panel. By adding women as chairs and discussants, Jelena was able to create a distribution of 31 male and 21 female IHAP APSA participants. The distribution of submissions was 62% male, 37% female. The distribution of acceptances is 61% male, and 39% female, with the higher acceptance rates for females reflecting Jelena’s efforts to create gender diversity on panels. These figures may change once people accept or decline the acceptances.

This is James A. Morrison and Joanne Yao’s last IHAP newsletter. We thank them for creating the newsletter and for organizing and editing roundtables on Reconceptualizing Empire (Issue 1); an intense discussion of DA-RT (Issue 2); Women in International History and Politics (Issue 3); and now this Roundtable on drawing on history to think about the present. The newsletter is an important platform for the IHAP section to communicate with its members. Peter Harris and Tom Le will be the new co-editors of the newsletter, filling the big shoes left by James and Joanne.

Wishing you all a wonderful spring. I hope to see many of you at APSA. We will once again share our reception with the Politics and History section. Please plan to stop by!

Karen J. Alter
IHAP Chair

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Roundtable
Drawing on History as We Think About the Present: 2016

2016 has been an eventful year. From Brexit to the U.S. Presidential elections to events in Turkey, these whirlwinds have provided much intellectual fodder for scholars of international history and politics. To what extent are these events unprecedented? And to what extent have we seen this all before? This roundtable grapples with these questions in a variety of contexts, from medieval populism to late-19th Century U.S. immigration, from the turbulent 1930s in Southeast Asia to the numerous referendums on the European project. Together, the following contributions demonstrate what historical parallels can reveal about the global dynamics of recent events. They both flesh out the assumptions that underpin these developments and highlight their unintended and unexpected consequences.

Populism, Taxation of Elites, and the Origins of Constitutional Governance
By Deborah Boucoyannis, University of Virginia

Perhaps the most used and abused term, not only in the U.S. Presidential election but in Europe and beyond in 2016, has been “populism.” Invariably used pejoratively, the term typically denotes a pathology of extremes—as in right-wing and left-wing populism—where Donald Trump is juxtaposed to Bernie Sanders and Spain’s Podemos to Hungary’s Fidesz. So it joins together different
phenomena: grievances due to economic conditions, tax exemptions for the rich, and power concentration in elites, with those that stem from resentments of different kinds, about loss of status, of ethnic homogeneity, and of power. And by doing so, it homologizes them. The unifying element in these classifications is that “populism” mobilizes an artificial construct of “the people” poised against the “elites”—an opposition deemed to threaten the very foundations of liberal democracy.¹

However, liberal democracy is a political regime formed to give voice and representation to “the people” and to erect devices and institutions that block power concentration in the hands of “the few.” So it is ironic that it now appears “menaced” by political movements some of which, nominally at least, demand just that. I will argue that the historical origins of constitutional governance suggest that joining grievances about power and inequality with those about status and identity is deeply misguided; in fact, it is itself an ideological position that threatens liberal democracy. It does this by discrediting the type of protest and mobilization that is necessary to keep liberal democracy alive, since tax exemptions of elites produce the inequality and concentration of power that threaten it.² Populism consists of exploiting this pathology, but liberal democracy depends upon fixing it.

I demonstrate in Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? how constitutional governance emerged in polities that successfully burdened “elites” with regular and high taxation.³ Where that tax framework failed or never emerged, absolutism prevailed. One implication is that when economic and power elites escape state control and when popular demands that this be reversed are discredited as “extreme,” we weaken a necessary condition for the preservation of liberal democracy.

¹ This is the common element in definitions proposed by two illuminating books on the topic: John B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2016) and Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). The latter specifies that the term also has “an exclusionary form of identity politics” that endangers democracy, a characteristic of right-wing versions.

Status competitions, by contrast, weaken the liberal democratic compact, although, as much scholarship suggests, they are endogenous to the economic and political failures I am prioritizing.

Much theoretical and empirical confusion reigns on this topic, which has only started to receive in-depth scholarly treatment in the light of recent trends.⁴ This “confusion” stems from the belief that complaints about inequality and power concentration, when framed in ways described as “extreme,” are instead another instance of status resentment, of citizens unwilling to come to terms with reality.

“Instead, elite taxation means the state both possesses the power to compel the most powerful actors under its jurisdiction and creates the incentives that force those elites to become more deeply involved and committed to the better functioning of the state.”

Most accounts agree that the link between inequality, excessive elite privileges and wealth, and recession is crucial. Nonetheless, these are often treated as background causes which become pathologies only when exploited by populist leaders through illegitimate methods. Hence, for instance, the notion that mainstream leaders need to sustain a “difficult balance between responsiveness and responsibility,” where populist demands are presumed to be irrational and “responsibility” is identified with compliance with austerity.⁵ But the assumption that, after some basic structural realignment, austerity is the responsible route for countries like Greece for instance is roundly rejected even by the IMF itself. This is a false dichotomy. The fundamental problem is too narrow a tax base, both through the inadequate taxation of wage earners, as the IMF points out, but more importantly of elites, whether of the middle class (especially professionals) and of the highest economic tier.⁶

⁶ Nikolaos T. Artavanis, Adair Morse, and Margarita Tsoutsoura, “Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank
Effective taxation of elites is not simply a question of fairness. It is certainly not a question of socialist ideology and hostility to the free market. It is also not simply a question of inequality and its effects on economic development and growth—though this is surely central; it is not an accident after all that the two most devastating economic recessions, of 1929 and 2008, followed the highest recorded levels of inequality.

Instead, elite taxation means the state both possesses the power to compel the most powerful actors under its jurisdiction and creates the incentives that force those elites to become more deeply involved and committed to the better functioning of the state. Absent these conditions, constitutional governance begins to unravel.

The hallowed motto, “No taxation without representation,” suggests a model whereby representation is predicated on social actors being powerful enough to withhold taxes and to thus limit them. But the first such “bargain” to generate a parliament was in medieval England and the power balance there was directly inverted: English kings were exceptional in being able to both tax and extract military service from their elites, compared, for instance, to French kings who could only do the latter. The brief decline in royal power during Magna Carta obscured the overall advantage the English crown retained before and after.

It was this state capacity that incentivized the elites to become a regular presence in Parliament. This capacity also meant that the state was able to impose a uniform jurisdiction, by establishing royal courts throughout the territory—whilst French and other European kings had to tolerate powerful jurisdictional immunities held by their nobilities. Without such centralization, constitutional governance could not materialize: for the regime to operate, one needs an obligatory institutional framework to implement central decisions in the periphery.

Representative assemblies were able to consolidate only where the most powerful social actors were regular attendees. Where the nobility was not taxed, as in France or Castile, it had few incentives to sustain central collective bargaining, and the Estates eventually withered. This pattern is observed across cases, such as Catalonia, Flanders, Holland, the Italian city-states, Hungary (and others where evidence is scarcer); it also offers new insights on different developments occurring in medieval Russia and the early Ottoman period.

This relative capacity over the most powerful had an important flipside: taxation of the poorest elements of English society was lightest, certainly in the period of parliamentary emergence (1270s-1330s). Until the 1370s, the poorest were exempt from taxation. When higher social strata gained greater power and attempted to increase the peasantry’s burden through Poll Taxes, the Peasants’ Revolt broke out. In the turbulent decades ahead, the constitutional practices that were developed in the 1300s slowly eroded, resulting in Tudor and Stuart “absolutism;” this can be directly linked to the increasing power of the aristocracy, not least through enhanced property tax exemptions. Yet in the 1770s, Adam Smith still praised English higher per capita taxation because it was not “possible to say that any particular order is oppressed,” whereas the French were “much more oppressed by taxes than the people of Great Britain.” What we describe instead as “absolutist” and “predatory” in the French regime was its imposition of an unequal tax burden on the weakest social strata, whilst elites were lightly taxed.

Although only suggestive evidence can be given in such a short piece, the historical record implies that taxation, especially of elites, is an integral part of constitutional regimes, not simply for the fairness of...
and economic effects it has, but because taxation ties the most powerful actors to the strengthening of government. Protests seeking to redress fiscal imbalances and inequality are not the flipside of exclusionary movements based on identity. That populists exploit both does not mean that analysts should accept their terms. Opposition to the concentration of power and the fiscal immunities of elites is a necessary condition for the preservation of liberal democracy. Moreover, as many scholars have pointed out, where this necessary condition is fulfilled, status-based concerns can also be contained so that they don’t threaten the regime itself.

The Long Arm of Western Crises
By Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University

The events of 2016 represent no less than a crisis of democracy and capitalism in the West. Not since the 1970s have the fundamental pillars of the post-war global economic order been so contested, and the future course of democracy so uncertain. A particular version of nativist populism that combines economic grievances with deep suspicion of regional institutions is now ascendant from the U.S. to Poland and Hungary. The parallels with the 1930s—also a time of economic hardship, challenges to democracy, and skepticism of international institutions—are all too evident.¹

At present, the focus of debate is mostly local: what are the consequences of Donald Trump’s presidency for U.S. politics; of Brexit for the U.K. economy; of Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Heinz-Christian Strache, Frauke Petry, and Viktor Orbán for the European project? What remains is geostrategic: what is the future of NATO; of U.S.-China relations; and of Russia as a Eurasian power? From the perspective of global history and politics, what interests me are the as-yet unanticipated consequences of this crisis beyond the borders of Europe, North America, and their great power rivals. The West’s political and economic crises tend to have long arms; witness, for example, the Latin American debt crises that followed from economic slowdowns in the U.S. and Europe in the early 1980s. In the context of the current crisis, what does the future hold beyond the borders of the North Atlantic community, in particular for the global South?

Although 2016 is hardly an exact parallel to 1933, the interwar years and their aftermath offer pointed lessons for international politics today. To draw out comparative and historical insights on just how far the long arm of Western crises can reach, consider Southeast Asia, a region far beyond the borders of Europe and North America where politics was utterly transformed during the interwar years anyway. Three features of Southeast Asia in the 1930s warrant attention: its economic openness; its deep engagement with global political ideas; and the sometimes peculiar ways in which the 1930s crisis resonated with local concerns.

The Downsides of Economic Integration

By the 1930s, Southeast Asian economies were deeply integrated into the world economy as exporters of commodities from rice and sugar to rubber and teak. As export earnings slumped during the Great Depression, so too did the flow of resources into the region, with dramatic effects on politics in the region. James C. Scott’s Moral Economy of the Peasant, for example, describes the particular conditions of peasant vulnerability in colonial economies, and uses these insights to make sense of peasant rebellions in the 1930s in colonial Burma and Vietnam.² Viewed in international perspective, Scott’s peasants were part of a global economic system that depended on Western markets for export goods, and which suffered intensely from the failure of that system.

What effects might a new economic nationalism in Europe and North America have on a region like Southeast Asia? A West that retreats from global economic integration—for instance, with the U.S. withdrawing from international agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership—will have reneged on half a century of advocacy of economic openness in the global South. Southeast Asian economies are once again deeply enmeshed in global economic networks and stand to suffer disproportionally from a West that turns away from overseas trade and investment.

¹ See Adam Plowright, “Back to 1930s nationalism? Historians battle over comparison,” AFP, November 22, 2016; Isabel Best, “Should we even go there? Historians on comparing fascism to Trumpism,” The Guardian, December 1, 2016; Paul Knott, “Europe’s peace and democracy can be broken - Brexit is one of the cracks,” The New European, December 7, 2016.

Aspiring politicians in Southeast Asia in the 1930s were closely engaged with global political currents. Sukarno had attended Dutch schools in Java and was literate in half a dozen languages, Ho Chi Minh was active in Paris and Moscow, and Thailand’s Phibun Songkhram and Pridi Phanomyong studied in France (Thailand’s last absolute monarch, King Prajadhipok, attended Eton). Such experiences exposed Southeast Asian elites to ideas that were current in the West amidst a time of economic and political crisis—about liberalism and its many critics, about socialism and communism, about race and peoplehood and nationalism. Although historians such as John Smail have encouraged students of modern Southeast Asian history to embrace an “autonomous” history of the region, political currents in late colonial Southeast Asia were inextricably intertwined with those in the West. They were likewise informed by the growing assertiveness of Imperial Japan.

Today, the rise of mass literacy, the rapidity of global communication, and the ubiquity of social media together means that Southeast Asians participate in the West’s political discourse as well. Politicians such as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte listen to politicians such as President Trump, as do citizens in Manila, Davao City, Singapore, and Hanoi. Discourses about economic nationalism and national greatness will resonate with many Southeast Asians. So too will messages about immigration and Islam, although Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia will hear this message very differently than will countries with restive Muslim minorities such as Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand.

And much like expansionary Imperial Japan provided an alternative political and economic model to an inward-looking West, so too will an assertive China. Already, Duterte has announced that he will seek stronger relations with China, telling Chinese leaders that he had “realigned myself in your ideological flow” (whatever that means). This will mean seeking his own solution to simmering tensions over the West Philippine/South China Sea and reaching out to investors from China who have little interest in even paying lip service to good governance. More quietly, China has been instrumental in supporting Najib Razak’s increasingly illiberal regime in Malaysia.4 Myanmar’s opening saw the country’s ruling junta turn away from China and towards the U.S. Would the Trump administration prove an interested partner for the National League for Democracy, and would China see an opening that would allow for reengagement with military interests that retain significant power?

“From the perspective of global history and politics, what interests me are the as-yet unanticipated consequences of this crisis beyond the borders of Europe, North America, and their great power rivals. The West’s political and economic crises tend to have long arms…”

Local Inflections

For students of global history, the most interesting observation about the 1930s is the unexpected ways in which global events and ideas were refracted through local social and political concerns. Chinese nationalism facing Japanese imperialism would, in Southeast Asia, catalyze the emergence of a new “local Chinese” identity vis-à-vis titular nationalities such as Thai, Vietnamese, and Malay. The prospect of economic hardship in a time of trade restrictions actually led Filipinos to vote against independence from the U.S.5 Ideologies that in the Western context seemed clearly in opposition would prove to be far less so in Southeast Asia: Burma’s Aung San helped to found the Communist Party of Burma, what would become the Socialist Party of Burma, and a nationalist organization that united students, monks, and farmers, all in the span of one decade.

Although the current crisis of democracy and capitalism will have long arms, local context will still matter, with results that may be surprising. How

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will a strategic partner like Vietnam respond to an administration that heightens U.S.-Chinese tensions without a strong commitment to its regional allies? How will a great emphasis on national interests resonate in illiberal regimes where the idea of the nation itself remains contested? What does anti-Muslim rhetoric in the West signify for religious minorities in plural societies? The answers to these questions must remain speculative, but what is certain is that local concerns will transform the West’s political and economic crisis in unexpected ways.

The lesson of the 1930s in Southeast Asia is that a crisis in the West affected politics everywhere. Similarly, what happens today matters everywhere. For scholars of international history and politics, the implications are clear. At precisely the time when we must ask hard questions about democracy and capitalism in the West, where national moods have turned inward-looking, we must be ever more prepared to look beyond our own borders.

Back to the Future: The Muslim ban and the Chinese Exclusion Act
By Margaret E. Peters, UCLA

On January 27th, President Trump signed an executive order suspending entry of “aliens” from countries in which “a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence,” including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Given Trump’s previous rhetoric on Islam, most commentators have agreed that this order amounts to the first step in a Muslim ban even though it does not explicitly include a religious test nor does it apply to all Muslim majority nations. In this way, Trump’s Muslim ban mirrors another shameful episode in U.S. history, the Chinese Exclusion Act.

“It is not the case that anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiment has increased but instead that pro-business support for immigration has declined …”

How is it possible that such an unconstitutional and discriminatory act could be enacted in modern America? Is this simply a sign of an increasingly anti-immigrant and xenophobic public? In this article, as I argue in my forthcoming book, Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization, it is not the case that anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiment has increased but instead that pro-business support for immigration has declined. Increased trade openness with other nations, especially with developing nations, has led to the closure of firms in many industries that require low-skilled workers—for example, textiles or simple manufacturing—that once employed large numbers of immigrant workers. The ability to move production overseas has allowed other firms to take their capital to labor instead of bringing labor to capital. Finally, the increased use of productivity-enhancing technologies has allowed many firms to do more with fewer workers. Together, these changes in the global economy have decreased the number of businesses that support low-skilled immigration and decreased the incentive for other firms to support it as well. As businesses no longer care as much about low-skilled immigration (and to some extent immigration in general), politicians, especially those on the right that usually cater to business interests, have been free to indulge their anti-immigration constituents. Here, I will describe how a similar process led to the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and what my argument implies for Brexit, Trump’s policies, and the rise of the Far Right in places like France and the Netherlands.

The Chinese Exclusion Act

The Chinese Exclusion Act, passed in 1882, was the culmination of three decades of negative sentiments against Chinese immigrants. The act targeted Chinese laborers, who accounted for most of the immigrants from China. Anti-immigrant sentiment against the Chinese arose not long after large numbers of Chinese workers first arrived in the western United States to work in the gold fields of California and on the Transcontinental Railroad. The first major outburst of anti-Chinese sentiment occurred in 1852-1854 when miners rioted against Chinese immigrants in the gold fields. Another major outburst occurred in 1867-1869 when miners again rioted. The third wave, from 1876-1882, saw both workers and small business owners join forces to craft the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.1

I argue that the final wave of anti-Chinese sentiment was successful due to increased “trade pressure” from firms in the eastern United States after the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad in late-1869. Prior to the railroad’s completion, companies on the West Coast were relatively insulated from competition with manufacturers in the East. Goods from the East Coast had to travel via boat around Cape Horn; via boat to Panama, then across land, and finally by boat again; or via wagon overland across the United States. All three routes were extremely expensive, which protected West Coast producers from competition. West Coast producers also faced much higher labor costs. Even with increased immigration from China and internal migration from the East, wages for white workers were twice the wages white workers received in the East. Chinese laborers earned only slightly less than Eastern white workers.2

Once the railroad was completed, cheap East Coast goods flooded into the West Coast and producers simply could not compete. Some firms mechanized, but many more simply closed their doors, resulting in a recession in California.3 Workers laid off due to the closure of manufacturing firms joined former railroad workers, who had been laid off after the completion of the railroad, furthering exacerbating the already large declines in wages.4

This decline in wages likely explains native labor’s antipathy towards Chinese workers, but what explains why business did not support continued immigration from China? The conventional wisdom often assumes that firms want open immigration, but in this case, firms had little incentive to push for continued openness to Chinese immigration. Most importantly, firms on the West Coast did not need more immigrant labor; the recession and lay-offs from the railroad led to great declines in wages. Further, larger firms could afford to invest in new technology to become more profitable without as much labor. Thus, many of the firms that had used and supported Chinese labor, including the railroads, either did not need the labor any longer or were no longer in business. Business leaders, then, chose to focus their energies on other issues and ceded the playing field to anti-immigrant groups.

I find evidence for my argument in the way senators voted on immigration bills during this era (see Figure 1). In the book, I compare the position senators took on immigration bills to the percent of Chinese immigrant in their state along with an indicator for time period. For senators from states with high numbers of Chinese immigrants—those in the West—I anticipated that they would switch from supporting immigration to opposing it after the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad. The evidence supports this hypothesis and senators flips from being pro-immigration to anti-immigration in 1869 or 1870 at the completion of the railroad.

*From the Chinese Exclusion Act to Today: Increased Globalization and the Importance of Anti-Immigration Constituencies*

Similar dynamics to those that led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act have led to the increasing importance of anti-immigration constituencies in many developed countries today. Increased trade, outward FDI, and increased use of technology mean that fewer businesses need low-skilled labor. It is not that the businesses still in operation do not want more immigration, but just that it is a much less important issue for them than it once was. Nor is it the case that anti-immigration sentiment has greatly increased in the mass public; as Judith Goldstein and I have found,5 opposition to both low and high-skill immigration has decreased since its recent heights during the 2008 recession, at least in the U.S. Instead, as businesses have closed or pulled back support for immigration, policymakers, especially those on the right that often cater to business, can indulge the worst sentiments of their anti-immigration base.

It is dynamics like these that have allowed UKIP, Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, and Marine Le Pen to run on anti-immigration platforms without facing (much) backlash from business groups. It is only now, after businesses are discovering that this rhetoric hurts them in the global competition for talent, that they have voiced their opposition. Unfortunately, this dynamic is unlikely to change. As globalization leads to further deindustrialization, businesses will be even less likely to support low-skilled immigration and it is likely that we will see further limits to immigration.

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3 Boswell 1986; Saxton 1971.

4 Boswell 1986; Saxton 1971.
The Brexit Referendum and the Mass Politics of Disintegration

By Stefanie Walter, University of Zurich

On 23 June 2015, British voters plunged the European Union (EU) into its biggest crisis to date by voting in a popular referendum that Great Britain should leave the EU. Referendum-induced crises are not new to European politics. The European integration process has been challenged and at times blocked by popular referendums in the past—for example when the Danish voted against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or when France and the Netherlands dealt the death blow to a European Constitution in 2005.

The Brexit referendum is different from these earlier referendums, however, because it has challenged an existing international institution, rather than slowing down or stopping efforts to integrate further. Whereas most referendums have been called to intensify integration by ratifying international treaties that establish more cooperation, the Brexit referendum was about rolling back international cooperation. As such, the Brexit referendum is an example of a rare, but increasingly relevant type of referendum: a disintegration referendum.

Disintegration referendums either aim at withdrawing from existing international institutions (which I term “abrogation referendums”) or at not complying with elements of such an institution (“non-compliance referendums”). Examples for abrogation referendums include, not just the Brexit referendum, but also the 1975 British referendum on remaining in the European Community (EC), Greenland’s 1982 referendum on leaving the EC, the 1986 Spanish referendum on remaining a NATO member, and the 2014 Swiss ECOPOP referendum, which called for a strict limitation of immigration and the termination of any international treaties that conflicted with that goal. Non-compliance referendums include the 2000 Brazilian referendum about continuing an ongoing IMF program, the 2014 Swiss referendum on the popular initiative Against Mass Immigration, the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, and the 2016 Swiss implementation initiative. Figure 2 shows that such disintegration
referendums, although still rare, have become much more frequent in the 2010s. Five of the nine disintegration referendums held so far were held in the 2010s, and considering that populist leaders across Europe have called for more disintegration referendums, this number may continue to grow.

“Five of the nine disintegration referendums held so far were held in the 2010s, and considering that populist leaders across Europe have called for more disintegration referendums, this number may...”

Integration and disintegration referendums share many commonalities, but differ in three key respects: the outcomes of a cooperative/non-cooperative referendum vote, the costs of a non-cooperative referendum outcome to other states, and the strategic dilemma a referendum in one country creates for other countries involved.1

First, in terms of outcomes, a cooperative vote in an integration referendum establishes new forms of international cooperation along previously negotiated lines, whereas the country reverts to the status quo in the case of a non-cooperative referendum outcome. In a disintegration referendum, however, a cooperative vote preserves the status quo, whereas the outcome of a non-cooperative vote is rather uncertain, because it strongly depends on whether the other members of the international institution accommodate or punish the referendum country’s unilateral wish to leave or change the institution. In the Brexit referendum, for example, a vote to remain in the EU would have led to a continuation of Britain’s membership in the EU (the status quo). The non-cooperative “pro-leave” vote, however, has opened a vast range of potential outcomes including everything from a UK freed from EU contributions, regulations, and interventions, but with continued access to the single market, to a UK trading with the EU only on WTO terms. Contrasting this with the 2005 No in the French and Dutch referendums on the EU Constitution, for example, it is clear that the range of possible outcomes was much smaller in those instances than in the Brexit case.

Second, in terms of costs, what both integration and disintegration referendums have in common is that the consequences of a non-cooperative popular vote are not limited to domestic voters, but also have negative ramifications for other countries. The main costs of failed integration referendums are that potential gains from cooperation cannot be realized. In contrast, a successful disintegration referendum, i.e. a unilateral decision not to comply or to withdraw from international cooperation, not only destroys existing gains from cooperation, but also carries political contagion risks that can put the long-run viability of the entire international institution at risk. All this means that the stakes are particularly high in disintegration referendums not only for domestic voters, but also for foreign voters and governments. The costs of Brexit to the other member states, for example, include, among many other things, the loss of London’s contributions to the EU budget, a potential loss in exports and economic ties between the UK and EU countries, loss of free access to Europe’s financial center, the loss of free movement of people to the UK, and uncertainty about the future of EU residents living in the UK. In addition to these economic costs come political ones, such as the reduced geopolitical power of an EU-sans-UK and the fear that the Brexit example may encourage other countries to call referendums on their EU membership as well, leading to an unravelling of the EU.

Third, in deciding how to respond to a successful disintegration referendum, other countries face a dilemma between accommodating and punishing the referendum country for wishing to selectively not comply or to exit an existing international institution.2 Accommodation means that they grant the referendum country exceptions from certain rules or try to keep the ties as close as possible even after a formal exit of the referendum country, in the process salvaging as many of the cooperation gains from the existing arrangement as possible. But this strategy carries the risk of creating moral hazard and political contagion. The alternative is punishment, such as the termination of the entire cooperative...

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1 Stefanie Walter, Elias Dinas, Ingnacio Jurado, and Nikitas Konstantinidis, Non-cooperation by Popular Vote. Expectations, Foreign Intervention and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum (Bern: PEIO Conference, 2017).
2 To be sure, failed integration referendums in the past have also presented the other countries with the dilemma of whether to accommodate (i.e. renegotiate the agreement in question with better terms for the referendum country) or to punish (i.e., move ahead without the referendum country). But the dilemma is much more pronounced in the case of disintegration referendums.
arrangement in the case of a non-compliance referendum or a hard line of no compromises in negotiations about the terms of exit in the case of an abrogation referendum. The advantage of the punishment strategy is that they make non-compliance and exit costly and hence are likely to discourage similar referendums in the future amongst other member states, but the downside is that it is costly for everyone involved because many gains from cooperation are destroyed. Once more, the Brexit example illustrates this dilemma nicely. While granting the UK continued access to the EU’s single market would maintain existing economic ties and hence preserve many cooperation gains for the other member states, the remaining EU-27 member states are weary that such a strategic response might put the entire European project at risk in the long run by creating incentives for other countries to defect as well. In contrast, the punishment strategy might dampen others’ incentives to defect, but would come at a high economic price for both Britain and the remaining member states. Which route the remaining EU members will take continues to be a hotly debated issue in the UK to this day.

Although the role of mass publics has been acknowledged with regard to the creation of international agreements, voters’ ability to shape or terminate international cooperation once an agreement has been signed has traditionally been limited. Only recently have voters begun to challenge existing international institutions at the ballot box. The potential of domestic voters to terminate international agreements unilaterally poses new challenges and questions for international cooperation. Reflecting the increasing dilemmas domestic voters face between the gains from international cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty, popular movements aimed at disintegration are likely to keep the world occupied for some time to come.

The 2016 IHAP Award Winners

Every year the IHAP section awards The Robert L Jervis and Paul W Schroeder Best Book Award and the Outstanding Article Award. In 2016, the award committee (Jonathan Kirshner (chair), Stacie Goddard, Eric Grynaviski) struggled to pick a winner. They decided to award the prize to two books: *International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean* by Andrew Phillips and Jason Sharman and *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security* by Ronald R. Krebs.


The IHAP newsletter team interviewed the authors to investigate the processes which led to these award winning books.

Andrew Phillips and Jason Sharman are joint authors of *International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean* which shares the 2016 IHAP Best Book Award. Their joint article based on the book also won the 2016 IHAP Best Article Award.

Andrew received his doctorate at Cornell University and is an Associate Professor at the University of Queensland’s School of Political Science and International Studies. Jason received his PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently at the University of Cambridge as the Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International Relations. A summary of their book is available on the publisher’s website.

**1. How did you become interested in the intersection between international history and politics? How did you become interested in your particular project?**

Jason: My undergraduate honors thesis and Ph.D. dissertation were at the intersection of comparative politics and history, looking at state-society relations in the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe. For me, it was a tough decision whether to do my graduate studies in political science or history. In line with trends in the field, I moved away from the study of Eastern Europe and history more generally towards contemporary international political economy and IR theory, but I always had a side project or two on the go with a more historical bent. Teaming up with Andrew and benefiting from his experience in writing macro-history enabled me to foreground historical work.

Relating to our project on the international system stretching from East Africa to East Asia in the early modern period, the opportunity to study this history was just too tempting to pass up, both in terms of the history itself, and the larger implications for IR theory. This was especially so given that the greater Indian Ocean region has been almost completely ignored by IR. But without a theoretical rationale for the study, in this case largely provided by Andrew's thoughts on international systems comprised of diverse rather than like units, there would not have been a point of entry.

Andrew: I actually started off my undergraduate degree aiming to be a history major! Fatefuly, however, I took Chris Reus-Smit’s course on International Political Economy halfway through the second year of my degree. Misleadingly badged, the course was actually an introduction to the literature on state formation, international systems and historical change. From that point on, I was hooked on studying International Relations through a historical lens and have been ever since.

I came to this particular project in part as a natural progression of my existing research program on the comparative study of international systems, and partially as a result of the opportunity to collaborate with Jason in an area where our interests intersected. Following my first book, *War, Religion and Empire*, I had a decent understanding of international orders’
historical evolution in East Asia and Western Europe. But I was intrigued with what must have been happening in the area ‘in between’, especially in the era preceding Western colonial dominance. Fortunately, Jason was also interested in studying international relations in the Indian Ocean, so the project naturally evolved from that starting point.

2. How did you navigate the tension between detailed historical research and macro-theoretical claims; between contingency and generalizability?

Jason: During my Ph.D., I was fortunate enough to do a couple of graduate history courses (again Soviet history), which really brought home to me the differences between history and political science as academic disciplines. My language skills were nowhere near good enough for proper historical research, and I couldn't see myself spending sufficient time in the archives to succeed as a historian. More positively, political science gives more freedom to roam around and wrestle with different big questions, as the sunk costs of any one research program are lower.

In our particular work on the early modern Indian Ocean, neither of us ever laboured under the delusion that we were going to out-historian the historians. We were never going to learn Portuguese or Dutch, let alone Mughal Persian or other Asian languages, for example. But we thought we could certainly make a contribution to IR scholarship, which seems to have strangely neglected the initial centuries in which the Europeans and the powers of the Indian Ocean littoral interacted on a basis of rough equality, in terms of how international systems comprised of diverse units work. Furthermore, though historians come at them in a different way, they are also interested in big, comparative questions, and so it's possible that our study may make some modest contribution to the history of the region also.

Generalizability is largely in the eye of the beholder. If we were studying U.S. Congressional mid-term elections from 1994 to 2014, I doubt we would have faced the generalizability questions we did, even though this just is one country over two decades. But studying a huge region comprising dozens of polities over three centuries is regarded as a very niche, obscure topic. This double-standard is unscientific, and the fact that it persists in the field shows the triumph of aesthetics and parochialism over objective, scientific principles in political science.

Andrew: With great difficulty!

The challenge of navigating between macro-theoretical claims and detailed historical research is inescapable when studying the evolution of international systems over time, indeed arguably for all historically-informed IR research.

To reinforce Jason’s observations, one of the ways we sought to navigate this was by always ensuring that the larger theoretical puzzle of the project (in our case, explaining durably diverse international systems) remained our lodestar. Correspondingly, we were quite ruthless in ensuring that we engaged the historical material with this overarching goal in mind.

It is always tempting to read as deeply as possible into historians’ debates, and indeed one of the most exciting challenges of doing historical IR is the intellectual stretching that comes with striking out into the unfamiliar territory of specialist historiography. With that said, neither Jason nor I are trained historians. We lacked both the language skills and ready access to archives that would be required to make precision-guided interventions into historical debates on the basis of exhaustive primary historical research. And in any case, the kind of argument that we were trying to make—in the realm of IR theory and the macro-historical study of international systems—is intellectually distinct from the kinds of puzzles historians are focused on, and requires a different balance between the general and the specific.

Ultimately, I don’t think there is a one-size-fits-all answer to the question of balancing contingency and generalizability, and balancing theoretical and historical considerations. It depends in the last instance on the kind of puzzle you are asking and the audience you hope to engage. Some of the best historically-informed IR work of course does involve exhaustive immersion in primary material, whereas other projects lend themselves to a different approach. The adage that you should ensure the method/approach serves the question rather than vice versa remains as true in historical IR as elsewhere.

3. What was the most challenging aspect of working with the historical material?

Jason: For me, I had almost no knowledge of the history of the Indian Ocean region when we started (despite having grown up and done my undergraduate degree in Western Australia, i.e. on
the shores of the Indian Ocean). I had a vague idea that the Mughals had something to do with the Taj Mahal. Though I had read a lot of history, it was very focused on Europe. It took a couple of years of reading to get a basic familiarity with hitherto unknown polities, though this process was definitely fascinating and very enjoyable. It’s a privilege to have a job that lets me decide that I want to stop working on money laundering and tax havens for a while (my other research focus), and follow my interests to research something completely different. How many other jobs let you do something like that?

Andrew: For me, the most challenging part of working with historical material is knowing when to stop reading and when to start writing!

As I have found for my other historical IR projects, the initial engagement with new historical material always induces a powerful (at times almost overwhelming) sense of intellectual vertigo. This was especially the case for this project, given that Jason and I were both relative neophytes when it came to studying the Indian Ocean region.

While we were always clear on our puzzle and our preferred temporal scope for the project (roughly 1500-1900CE), this still left a great deal of material to cover, and a range of important historiographical debates within which we had to orientate ourselves.

One great advantage of collaboration is that you can (to a degree) engage in an intellectual division of labor to manage the immersion process, at least in the initial theory formation and rough drafting phase.

With that said, I’ve always found it challenging to determine at what point I am sufficiently familiar with the historical material to risk venturing a rough first draft. For this project, I found the discipline internal to the project itself (a clearly bounded theoretical puzzle) and the discipline inherent in working with a collaborator as super-productive as Jason to be supremely valuable in ensuring that immersion in the historical material did not become paralyzing submersion.

4. What was the most unexpected thing you found in conducting your historical research?

Jason: Knowing in the abstract that IR and the social sciences more broadly are Eurocentric is one thing, but actually carefully studying non-Western histories really brought home to me how warped the field has been, and largely remains, conceptually and empirically. I was stunned by how puny the European powers were in the early modern period compared to polities like the Ottomans, Mughals, and Ming and Qing Chinese. For a field that claims to be all about the great powers, the continuing neglect of non-Western great powers, and non-Western international politics in general, speaks volumes about the field's real priorities.

Andrew: Echoing Jason’s thoughts, this project dramatized for me the late and limited character of Western dominance in Asia, and the extraordinary magnitude of Asian Great Powers relative to their comparatively puny Western counterparts, at least up until the 19th Century.

In Australia especially, pundits and policy-makers are currently transfixed by the decline of Western dominance and the supposed advent of the “Asian century.” For me, a great take-away from this project is that Western observers (especially at the popular but to a degree at the academic level too) falsely exaggerate the degree and duration of Western dominance in world politics. This means our historical base-line for what is the ‘normal’ state of affairs in IR is often seriously distorted. Many of the supposedly novel features about the emerging world order—its multi-centric character, the prominence of Afro-Asian agency, the existence of plural, hybrid and partially overlapping world-views and institutions—were clearly present albeit in different forms throughout the early modern period. In considering relations in the Indian Ocean before Western dominance, I hope our research will prompt greater scholarly interest in engaging with historical instances of diverse international systems to make sense of today’s resurgent complexity.

5. Few scholars who work in international history and politics work collaboratively. What are some of the positives and negatives of collaboration? Would you recommend that more scholars pursue collaborative work?

Jason: Certainly the collaboration with Andrew has been fantastic; I definitely could not have done the project alone, both in terms of the big theory ideas but also the sheer volume of reading and historical material. I also had a similarly productive collaboration with John Hobson on another historical piece when we were both at the University of Sydney.

Of course collaboration is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, and certainly one hears horror stories of collaborations gone wrong. People have
different styles of work, and of course these may complement each other or clash. But in the context of the increasing marginalization of qualitative work in IR, including historical IR, I think scholars working in the area of international history and politics need to think harder about collaboration and do more joint and co-authored work.

Andrew: For me, collaborating with Jason was a fantastic and uniformly positive experience—and I’m not just saying that because he’s likely to read this! There are many great positives entailed in collaborative research, some general and some more specific to historical IR.

On the general front, I found collaboration an invaluable antidote to the isolation that can sometimes accompany academic research. One of the greatest things about collaboration is that you are constantly sharing and testing your ideas with your co-author at every stage of the project, rather than waiting until you have your first draft to solicit feedback from colleagues and reviewers. This means that half-baked ideas can be shot down early, rather than persisting and mutating to debilitating fully worked-up draft manuscripts. Likewise, it is much more fun going back and forth refining promising ideas with someone who is equally immersed in the project, rather than relying on more impressionistic engagements with colleagues who—however brilliant and generous—remain removed from the project itself.

I also found the collaboration process to be especially useful in divvying up the immense body of material entailed in macro-historical IR research projects. For the Indian Ocean project, Jason and I initially divided up our cases, Jason working more closely on the Portuguese and Dutch East India Companies, me focusing on the English East India Company, and the two of us giving roughly equal attention on the Mughals. This initial division did not absolve either of us from fully engaging all of the cases over the full duration of the project. But it did make the initial deep dives into the historical material more manageable, ensuring smooth early progress on the project.

I hope and anticipate that we will see greater collaborative work in historical IR in the future. There is already a great deal of terrific collaborative work out there, ranging from wonderful co-authored studies like Barry Buzan and George Lawson’s *Global Transformation*, through to great edited volumes like Joel Quirk, Shogo Suzuki and Yongjin Zhang’s volume on early modern international relations.

As the field recognizes the importance of moving towards a more global and less Eurocentric historical IR, I expect there will be even greater need and demand for collaborative historical IR projects, not least because of the value of assembling research partnerships and teams that combine specialist language skills (enabling engagement with non-English secondary and primary sources) with top-shelf theoretical innovation. I look forward to reading the resulting masterpieces!

6. What advice would you offer to more junior scholars interested in working at the intersection of international history and politics? (Consider, for instance, the best advice you received in the past or the advice you wish you might have received).

Jason: My take would be that although I find international history and politics fascinating, it is not an easy path in terms of basic milestones of professional advancement like getting a job, getting tenure and getting promoted. Outside a relatively small community, the field is really not that interested in history, or at least is only interested in history in a very instrumental, utilitarian way of asking what lessons we can draw from history to apply to politics today. In this context, it is really important to have a very strong theory rationale for a historical project. The “who cares?” question will loom large for historical projects, so my view is that the theoretical rationale has to be front and center to answer or pre-empt this objection. I foolishly ignored advice from my dissertation committee along these lines and had quite a tough time on the job market as a result.

Andrew: Keep your audience in mind! I am sometimes struck by the pessimism some scholars (both senior colleagues as well as ECRs) regarding the presumed marginality of historically informed IR within the discipline. My own view is that this pessimism is misplaced, and that there remains a strong appetite for historical IR, both in its traditional bastions (stereotypically the Commonwealth), as well as in communities (e.g. the U.S.) which are sometimes wrongly perceived as having entirely embraced quantitative approaches.

That said, this project has reinforced for me Jason’s insight—that to find a broad audience for your research through publication in prominent IR venues, it is essential that you conceive the project
from its earliest stages with a clear theoretical puzzle in mind that is likely to speak to broader concerns in the field.

The reality is that the specifics of your empirics are unlikely to resonate with more than a small community of fellow enthusiasts in the IR community, given the unfamiliarity of many in our field with (especially pre-1945) international history. That said, interesting theoretical puzzles will always engage a larger general readership, so be sure to front-end this in your research. Doing so will not only maximizes your publication chances (and thus your chances of actually having your research read), but will also assist in disciplining your reading strategy, making for a less overwhelming and more rewarding research experience overall.
Ronald R. Krebs’ book *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security* shares the 2016 IHAP Book Award. Ron received his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and is currently the Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts at the University of Minnesota’s Department of Political Science. A summary of the book is available on the publisher’s website.

1. How did you become interested in the intersection between international history and politics? How did you become interested in your particular project?

*Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security* began as an effort to make sense of the politics of the War on Terror. The September 11 attacks took place as I was completing my dissertation, and the United States invaded Iraq during my first semester teaching Introduction to Global Politics. Like most scholars of international relations, I opposed the war in Iraq, and I was particularly puzzled why it was so hard to find leading politicians forthrightly challenging the Bush administration’s march to war, why the questions even war opponents posed were commonly so narrowly formulated, and why you almost never heard deep criticism of the War on Terror itself in establishment circles. I concluded, in what I thought at the time was a one-off piece in *Security Studies*, that you could not explain the march to war in Iraq without explaining how a particular post-9/11 narrative of national security had become dominant and how, once dominant, it had set the boundaries of legitimate policy debate and tilted the tables. That, in turn, led me to wonder about when and how particular narratives of national security rise to dominance, when and how their dominance erodes and debate broadens, and what the consequences are for foreign policy. Relatively little of *Narrative* directly addresses the War on Terror, and the book examines numerous key debates over 70 years of U.S. foreign policy. But its origins lie in my struggle to make sense of the politics of our time.

In college, I had been a (rather untrained) historian of U.S. foreign policy, and I entered my doctoral program in political science with a very limited background in international relations theory and with little understanding of what I was getting myself into. So I’ve always been a bit of a frustrated diplomatic/international historian, and I’ve always been at least a bit ambivalent about the field of international relations’ aspiration to generalization across space and time. *Narrative* reflects that deep-seated ambivalence—in its aspiration to identify general mechanisms and dynamics and in its appreciation of historical contingency.

2. What was the most challenging aspect of working with the historical material?

Different kinds of engagement with historical materials involve different sorts of challenges. In the past (as well as in current research), I’ve worked with archival materials in multiple countries, and I was familiar with the peculiar challenges of crafting historical accounts based on declassified government documents. In portions of *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, I worked with historical materials in what was, for me, a brand new way and which presented new challenges.

The second half of *Narrative* explores the ups and downs of the Cold War consensus. The conventional view is that the Cold War consensus was a set of beliefs, sincerely held by the vast majority of U.S. elites and by most common citizens as well, that underpinned a militarized, unselective global containment. No surprise then that they sought to track the consensus via policy dis/agreement, congressional voting patterns, and public opinion. But I thought this had the Cold War consensus wrong. I understood it to be a dominant narrative to which U.S. elites felt compelled to adhere in their public pronouncements, regardless of their private qualms. And so I turned instead to a longitudinal content analysis of editorials on foreign affairs between the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the USSR. These editorials were drawn from two leading newspapers that inhabited opposed poles on the ideological spectrum, especially on foreign affairs: the consistently internationalist and liberal New York Times and the reliably nationalist and conservative Chicago Tribune. I had human coders complete a fourteen-point questionnaire on each editorial, with additional double-blind coding to establish intercoder reliability. In the end, the database contains nearly 9,100 editorials.

Parts of this project felt methodologically familiar. To develop the questionnaire and coding guidelines, I had to “soak and poke”—immersing myself in debates from each era and drawing out the typical formulations that signaled, say, whether the speaker
thought the superpowers’ interests were entirely conflicting (zero-sum), largely overlapping, or somewhere in between (mixed-motive). To explain the puzzles the content analysis generated, I employed more conventional, process-tracing methods of particular episodes in the political history of U.S. foreign policy.

But it presented two challenges that, to me, were novel. First, the project was of such a large scope that there was no way I could read all the editorials myself. The archival researcher does not trust anyone else’s reading of the documents. Here, I had no choice. I could, and did, train my coders, and all went through two rounds of harmonization, in which they brought their codings of a set of “test” editorials into rough alignment. But I couldn’t prepare them, for instance, for the snarky Tribune editorials in the 1950s, whose meaning was nearly the opposite of what they said. And while I could, and did, spot check their codings, I could do that for only a very limited subset of the corpus. Second, and related, I had to accept that the codings would not fully align, that due to the interpretive demands of the coding, intercoder reliability would be lower than ideal, and that there might well be far too many disparities in the coding to resolve. This too is at odds with the archival researcher’s imperative: to get it right and to keep digging until you’ve gotten it right.

Finally, and perhaps most frustrating, all this work was merely preliminary. The content analysis recorded an empirical pattern, but it is otherwise a “dumb” method: it does not tell the analyst whether these patterns are puzzling or expected or how to make sense of the data. After three years of time-consuming, expensive work with multiple teams of research assistants, the hard intellectual lifting was still to come.

3. What was the most unexpected thing you found in conducting your historical research?

I didn’t think that scholars had in the past properly conceptualized or studied the Cold War consensus. I nevertheless started in with the presumption that they had gotten its basic propositions and periodization right. As a result, I tried at first to perform the content analysis in Part II of Narrative on the cheap—by conducting it on just a small number of years that prior scholarship had suggested marked the key moments of change. When my data in those years didn’t reflect the expected changes, I knew that (a) I was on to something and (b) I had a lot of work ahead of me, as I had no choice but to conduct the content analysis over the full span of the Cold War.

I did not embark on this project expecting that it would be historically revisionist. But I show in Part II that the Cold War consensus, or dominant Cold War narrative, was substantively narrower than previous accounts had suggested (revolving only around representations of the communist adversary), had come together later (well into the Korean War), and had eroded earlier (well before the Americanization of the Vietnam War, let alone the Tet Offensive, when most Americans turned against the war) and that a new consensus narrative had ironically taken shape in the waning days of Vietnam, in the early 1970s, revolving for the first time around representations of the self—of America’s mission in the world. This historical revisionism gave rise to theoretical revisionism—as, to make sense of these puzzling dynamics, I developed a counterintuitive account of the relationship between policy failure and success and narrative change.

4. What advice would you offer to more junior scholars interested in working at the intersection of international history and politics? (Consider, for instance, the best advice you received in the past or the advice you wish you might have received).

First, embrace the unexpected. If Narrative has an impact, it will be because the research turned up evidence that was at odds with my initial assumptions—and, perhaps too slowly (though in ways expected by cognitive psychologists), I eventually reconsidered and rejected those assumptions.

Second, remember that history is not just theory’s proving ground: it is generative of theoretical puzzles. Most theoretical insights rest on a convoluted, iterative process combining induction and deduction. Don’t be dispirited when history doesn’t fit your theory. It just means that there’s another puzzle worth your grappling with.

Finally, consider carefully if your project is tractable. Narrative is not the sort of project I could have done for my dissertation or as a junior faculty member. It required too many financial resources and took far too much time. Be ambitious—but remember that, when a discussant says your work is “ambitious,” what they are often implying is that you have failed to deliver.
Upcoming Events and Workshops

MARCH 2017

International Symposium: US-Russian Relations in Global Context
March 16th - 17th: Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, Georgia, USA
More Information

Hallsworth Conference on China and the Changing Global Order
March 23rd - 24th: University of Manchester
Manchester, UK
More Information

Society for Applied Anthropology 77th Annual Meeting: Trails, Traditions and New Directions
March 28th - April 1st: La Fonda on the Plaza Hotel
Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA
More Information

APRIL 2017

MPSA 75th Annual Conference
April 6th - 9th: Palmer House Hilton
Chicago, IL, USA
More Information

Political Studies Association 2017 Conference
Politics in Interesting Times
April 10th - 12th: University of Strathclyde
Glasgow, United Kingdom
More Information

Southwestern Social Science Association Annual Meeting: Social Science and Social Change
April 12th - 15th: Hyatt Regency
Austin, Texas, USA
More Information

(UAA) 47th Annual Conference of the Urban Affairs Association
April 19th - 22nd: Hyatt Regency Minneapolis Hotel
Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
More Information

European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting
April 19th - 22nd: Central European University
Budapest, Hungary
More Information

2017 Annual Conference New York State Political Science Association
April 21st - 22nd: Nazareth College
Rochester, NY, USA
More Information

ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops
April 25th - 30th: University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK
More Information

JUNE 2017

4th European Workshops in International Studies
June 7th - 10th: Cardiff University
Cardiff, UK
More Information

BISA 42nd Annual Conference
June 14th - 16th: Jurys Inn Brighton Waterfront
Brighton, UK
More Information

ISA International Conference 2017: The Pacific Century?
June 15th - 18th: Hong Kong University
Hong Kong, China
More Information

ISA CISS Conference: Cooperation and Contestation in World Politics
June 28th - 30th: University of Bologna
Bologna, Italy
More Information

JULY 2017

ISA GSCIS Workshop: Exploring the Local in International Relations
July 6th - 8th: University of Havana
Havana, Cuba
More Information

12th International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Science: Cross-Cultural and Global Research as Interdisciplinary Practice
July 26th - 28th: International Conference Center
Hiroshima, Japan
More Information
**SEPTEMBER 2017**

113rd APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition: The Quest for Legitimacy  
*August 31st - September 3rd: Hilton Union Square  
San Francisco, CA, USA  
More Information*

ECPR General Conference  
*September 6th-8th: University of Oslo  
Oslo, Norway  
More Information*

*September 13th-16th: Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Ciutadella Campus)  
Barcelona, Spain  
More Information*