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Message from the Chair

The present is bewildering and disorienting. There is so much craziness and hyperbole in politics today that it is hard to appreciate and understand how the reality-TV version of contemporary politics is actually an important rupture that presents people with a fork-in-the-road choice. Yet with white supremacists marching in Charlottesville Virginia, using slogans from the Nazis like “Sieg Heil” and “blood and soil,” it is impossible not to connect historical events to the present.

Now more than ever scholars who understand how international history affects international politics have an important role to play. We can draw on history to identify the choice before us, but the harder challenge is to speak to those whose choices matter. How do we reach beyond the echo chamber of like-minded people, so that the participants—our political leaders, the protesters on the street, and the people attracted to dangerous messages—can appreciate the stakes of what they are doing? What have you done to reach out to citizens who are not part of our echo-chamber community?

This is a conversation that the current times demand. I would like our International History and Politics community to be a place to discuss and share insights into these questions. We can do this through the new APSA Connect website, which now allows direct posting that will be shared with all members. After you log into the APSA website, just go to APSA Connect and then to the “Forums” link on the left. If you scroll down the list of forums, clicking on our International History and Politics section, you will see the window below (see next page).

Any APSA member can now directly post on a topic, and reply to a conversation. This is a new and powerful capability, which I hope that we will use to have conversations with each other. I will try to initiate this conversation after our APSA meeting.

Yet I imagine that you also share a concern of mine: we all suffer from over-burdened in-boxes. I hope that we can use this new medium to have conversations our members value, retaining Facebook and Twitter as the mediums through which we amplify voices by posting interesting links that others might want to read. If you want fewer emails, the website creates a daily digest, and you can choose to make it instead a weekly digest.
A few business items before I close:

*New Website:* APSA seems to finally be providing sections with websites. Right now, our website is empty ([http://web.apsanet.org/ihap/](http://web.apsanet.org/ihap/)). I welcome a volunteer to set up this website for our section. Please write to me (kalter@northwestern.edu) if you might be able to help.

*Dues:* At our business meeting, we will be discussing raising our dues to $10 and extending free membership to graduate students. We hope that you will weigh in on this decision.

*New Newsletter Editors:* This is the first newsletter by our new editorial team: Peter Harris, Tom Le, and Hyeyoon Park. We thank them for agreeing to help craft our newsletter. Please reach out to them with items to include in our newsletter.

The rest of this newsletter engages a great set of contributors who reflect on the role of leaders in international politics—an important question today especially! I hope you enjoy the contributors’ thoughts on this matter!

Karen J. Alter, Northwestern University
IHAP Section Chair

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**Roundtable**

**Leaders in International Politics, Past and Present**

**Introduction: Leaders in International Politics, Past and Present**

*By Peter Harris, Colorado State University, Tom Le, Pomona College, and Hyeyoon Park, Colorado State University*

At its core, political science is the analysis of people and power. Perhaps nowhere do these twin themes intersect more obviously than with the study of leaders. The questions of whether, how much, and in what ways leaders “matter” in the study of international politics are longstanding ones, of course. Yet as the contributors to this roundtable point out, they seem to take on particular relevance today.

According to Robert Jervis (“Leadership, Perception, and Policy”), it is clear from international history that individual leaders are capable of effecting profound international outcomes. Yet Jervis cautions that leaders—even “great men”—are nevertheless nested inside domestic- and international-level political processes, which must usually be considered alongside individual traits and cognition. Understanding the relationship between individuals and the other two levels-of-analysis is perhaps the most vexing task facing students of leadership, something that Jervis says the presidency of Donald J. Trump might, in due course, help with answers to.

Juliet Kaarbo (“World Leaders’ Personalities and Foreign Policies”) agrees that the Trump presidency is “a gift” to political science—or, at least, to political scientists interested in the study of individuals. Drawing on her wealth of expertise on the topic, Kaarbo introduces Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) as a “reliable, systematic, and comparative method for assessing leader characteristics” and connecting leaders’ traits with foreign-policy outcomes. Contra the notion that individual leaders are intractable subjects of social and political inquiry, Kaarbo offers LTA as a method of not just bringing into focus the “importance of personality in international relations in different contexts” but also for explaining leaders’ actions—past, present, and future.

This discussion of methodology continues with Adriana Boersner (“The Role of Latin American Presidents in Foreign Policy Decision-Making”), who provides an overview of foreign policy-making in Latin America, a region where executives have great sway over their nations’ external relations. Boersner discusses some of the particular methodological challenges that face students of this region and of non-English speaking countries more generally. She echoes Jervis’s injunction that leaders—however omnipotent they might seem—in fact depend upon a particular relationship with other domestic-level actors and the international context for their power and influence.

Cali Mortenson Ellis (“The Role of Childhood Exposure to Trauma on Adult Leader Decision-Making”) takes a novel approach to the study of leaders by focusing on the personal histories of individual decision-makers, suggesting that leaders’ childhood experiences might profoundly shape their future decisions as statespeople. Ellis discusses new data that promise to shed light on how traumatic experiences might influence foreign policy outcomes (especially the initiation of militarized interstate disputes), thus allowing researchers to study leaders from a new and exciting—indeed, groundbreaking—perspective.

Mark Ledwidge (“Marcus Garvey, Racial Redemption and the Awakening of the African Diaspora”) focuses on one specific leader—Marcus Garvey, whose “ideological thrust laid the basis for the trans-national liberation movement for Africans at home and abroad.” Ledwidge argues that Garvey has been overlooked by much International Relations scholarship not because of an analytic choice to privilege another level of analysis, nor because of any methodological stumbling blocks to studying individual leaders, but because of successful attempts by powerful actors to marginalize Garvey’s work and ideas, which threatened “global white supremacy.”

What is clear from each of these contributions is that the past inheres in individual leaders. Transformative leaders and international history are co-constituted: influential women and men can be important agents of change, yet they are also products of their individual, national, and international histories. Studying the individual and the historical in tandem can be difficult, perhaps, but the following contributions make clear that it can be done in rigorous, systematic, and illuminating ways.
Leadership, Perception, and Policy
By Robert Jervis, Columbia University

A recent special issue of International Organization on the “behavioral revolution” in international politics touts as one of the main findings the heterogeneity of human and national behavior.¹ For some scholars, this does come as a revelation. Not only do some rational choice theories treat individuals as though they were interchangeable, but more substantively a central issue in the study of international politics is the level of analysis question. In his seminal Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz talked about three images of the causes of war and, more generally, the drivers of international politics: the individual, the nature of the state, and the international system.² In a useful review, J. David Singer talked about these as levels of analysis, and this nomenclature stuck.³ This typology formalized what scholars going back to Thucydides realized: that we can usefully divide the sources of international behavior into those arising from outside the state and those stemming from internal forces, and that the latter in turn can be divided into the broad categories of domestic politics and the role of the individual. For Waltz, the individual largely meant human nature, and more recently this has taken the form of the study of cognitive and affective biases.⁴ At least as much attention has been focused on individual differences, however.

The basic questions are two-fold. First, to what extent do individuals, or perhaps individuals who rise to power, differ from each other in their values, beliefs about how the world works, and images of others and, second, how much freedom of maneuver do they have?⁵ Does this bring us back to the “great man”—or at least the “great person”—theory of history? In part, it does.⁶ Would the history of the 20th century really have been the same without figures like Wilson, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, and FDR? To give one small but telling example, the British cabinet was ready to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace in the wake of the fall of France in May 1940, a move that would likely have been disastrous. Churchill, newly made Prime Minister but still without strong support in the government or country, vehemently opposed this, and after several days of heated debate prevailed. It is unlikely that any other leader would have sought this outcome or would have been able to produce it. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Churchill carried his colleagues along through his passions and heartfelt convictions, not his logic or evidence, which were in fact fallacious. One of those who was very doubtful described the situation quite accurately in his diary: “I thought Winston talked the most frightful rot…. It drives one to despair when he works himself up into a passion of emotion when he ought to make his brain think and reason.”⁷

We must return to the levels of analysis, however, for two reasons. Leaders with distinct skills and views are put in power by domestic political processes which in turn respond at least in part to the external environment. Churchill did make a big difference, but the British elite never would have put him in a position to do so had the situation not been desperate. The correlation between the leader’s outlook and the resulting behavior may then be spurious in their both reflecting deeper domestic and international forces. A second objection is that no matter what a leader believes when coming to power, she is likely to find herself constrained by the world around her. For example, every successful Presidential candidate starting with Bill Clinton said during the campaign that he would pursue a harder line against China than did the current administration. Once in office, however, he pretty much maintained the policy. To put this in broader, if somewhat hackneyed, terms, the course of foreign policy, at least in the US, displays more continuity than change, or at least the changes are hard to associate with new Presidents. For example, while the Presidency of George W. Bush did display sharp change, this came about not with his election but after September 11, 2001. Furthermore, by his last three years he had returned to a more “normal” foreign policy, one that by and large was continued by Barack Obama, much as the critics and proponents of both men would have us believe otherwise.

Overall, however, it is hard to believe that leaders are completely constrained, although they often do complain that they have less leeway than they would

¹ International Organization 71, no. S1, 2017.
² Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
like. To see the men mentioned earlier to be only tools of circumstance seems unreasonable. The incumbency of Donald Trump as President may supply a test.8 Whatever else he is, Trump is a gift to political science. With his unusual background, beliefs, and mode of behavior, he not only challenges our institutions, but prevailing theories about their power. Two questions arise. First, will Trump actually be able to enact the policies he espoused during the campaign? Second, even if he does, does this represent the interests and beliefs of the coalition that put him in power, in which case he himself would be at the epiphenomenal? In terms of foreign policy, I think the second question is relatively easily dealt with. Contrary to a great deal of chatter, most of his supporters, although perhaps not the most vocal ones, are standard Republicans of the type that elected the two previous Republican Presidents. To the extent that “populism” was an important impulse, this concentrated on only two issues: trade and immigration. These are clearly important, but the point here is that if there are changes in other areas, such as policy toward Russia, China, and America’s general role in the world, we cannot attribute this to the domestic level of analysis.

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Although Trump’s policy is still in flux, it is clear that his view of the world is unusual. Perhaps reflecting deeper personality traits, three characteristics stand out. First is the perception of politics as zero-sum, which comes out most strongly in his analysis of foreign trade but appears throughout. If an arrangement is good for others, it must be bad for the US and the only way to improve a situation for the US is to make it worse for others. Politics, and perhaps all of social life, is not only competitive, it is conflictual. To put this another way, his view of the national interest is extremely narrow. In principle, few foreign policy analysts would disagree with putting the American interest first, but they would say both that there is room for the interests of others and that in many areas the US gains when others do and when we have strong institutions that can facilitate the production of public goods. Indeed, the whole concept of public goods that can make everyone better off seems foreign to him. Second, Trump denies American exceptionalism—the view that the US has a unique mission or because of its geographic position, social composition, or political system is uniquely benign. Although Realists welcome the corrective to the common American self-serving hypocrisy that has so often distorted perception and policy, they shudder at the abdication of international leadership that results. A third view follows from—or perhaps underpins—these two. This is that Uncle Sam has been Uncle Sucker. Others have not only been exploiting us, they have been laughing at us. Indeed, from long before he ran for President, Trump has seemingly been preoccupied with the perception that others are laughing at us. Perhaps a reflection of his deep-seated insecurities being projected onto the international stage, this fear, coupled with the belief that others see the world as he does, produces a strong drive to get a deal that is better for the US than for others.

This is the antithesis of leadership as we have come to understand it in that it views everything transactionally, lacks vision of a world that serves shared values, and sees no rule for the common interest. But this is because we tend to equate leadership with benign leadership. For better or for worse, Trump’s perceptions of the American interest and how the world works leads him to assert strong leadership over American policy and international politics. The coming years will test whether such an outlook can be implemented.

World Leaders’ Personalities and Foreign Policies
By Juliet Kaarbo, University of Edinburgh

Trump is a gift. He is a gift to scholars who have long argued that individuals matter in world politics. It is hard to watch the foreign policy of the United States under Trump and Trump’s style, rhetoric, and relationships with those close and with other countries and not see his distinct personality and its effects. Less stark but nevertheless important are the styles and personalities of UK Prime Ministers Cameron and May who led the United Kingdom to significant foreign policy change, in the form of Brexit, with potential global consequences. These leaders are not alone; on the world stage stand others—Putin, Erdoğan, and Trudeau—who have notable and distinct styles of governing and interacting with other countries. And one does not have to subscribe to a ‘great man’ theoretical perspective to see the influence the personality of past leaders has had in the history of international relations.

This observation is not new. As former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once noted: “as a professor, I tended to think of history as run by imperial forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the differences personalities make.” Yet international relations scholarship remains dominated by structural and systemic explanations, although there are signs that this is changing. Many scholars and students of international relations now recognise that leaders have incredible potential to impact foreign policy, in both democracies and authoritarian states. Leaders shape the intentions and strategies of their states and are themselves an important part of their countries’ diplomatic capabilities. Leaders and their characteristics are more significant to their states’ foreign policies under certain conditions, such as when contexts are ambiguous and complex and when the leader sits in a strategic position in the policy making process.

Current scholarship goes beyond the debate over whether leaders matter and instead concentrates on how leadership and leaders’ characteristics shape states’ foreign policies. Extant research offers numerous possibilities, including leaders’ risk orientations, various neuroses in leaders’ psyches, and leaders’ cognitive biases, motivations, and emotions. My focus here is on personalities, or individual differences, of leaders. Personality can be defined as a patterned relationship among cognition, affect, motivations and orientations toward interpersonal relationships. Leaders’ personalities vary and their responses to constraints are contingent on their individual characteristics. Within the study of leaders’ personalities, my focus is on the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) approach.

The LTA framework offers a number of advantages for the study of leaders in international politics. First, as a robust area of research, LTA work has demonstrated the importance of personality in international relations in many different contexts, including historical and contemporary periods. Second, it is a composite, or multi-factor approach, incorporating beliefs, traits, and style and thus a broader picture of leadership differences than single trait or beliefs-oriented approaches. Third, LTA provides specific expectations regarding which characteristics of leaders matter and how. Leaders with different traits are expected to relate to their context, institutional setting, costs and benefits of various policy options, and other agents in theoretically meaningful and predictable ways. Fourth, LTA is particularly useful for investigating agent-structure relations, with its focus on constraint challengers versus constraint resisters. Finally, the LTA approach provides a reliable, systematic, and comparative method for assessing leader characteristics.

Developed by Margaret Hermann, LTA has been used to study the personality and style of many world leaders. LTA research demonstrates that seven personality traits—belief in ability to control events,
conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation—systematically link to leaders’ propensities to challenge or respect constraints in their environments, their openness to information and advice, the structure of their advisory systems, the quality of the decision making process, and the policies leaders choose for their country or organization. According to Hermann, the seven traits combine in particular ways to produce specific behaviours by leaders. Leaders who have a high belief in their ability to control events and a high need for power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence are related to and predict leaders’ openness to information from and about their environments.

Indeed, LTA research has demonstrated that a key characteristic that varies across political leaders is their openness to constraints and information. Some confront structural barriers and pressures; others defer to or work within them. Leaders’ orientations to structures get at the heart of agent-structure debates in scholarship on international relations, as differences in leaders themselves shapes the relationship between agents and structures. Leaders who recognise structural constraints are more likely to have foreign policies reflecting those constraints; leaders who challenge them will more likely have policies reflecting their agency—their beliefs, perceptions, and other personality characteristics.

The LTA approach has been used to study the personalities of many contemporary and historical leaders, including U.S. presidents and presidential advisors, European Prime Ministers, sub-Saharan African, Iranian, Israeli and Turkish leaders, Soviet Politburo members, and heads of international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations. This research has shown that leaders’ personality traits do indeed vary and that its seven personality traits systematically link to policies leaders choose for their country or organization. Leaders who were high in their need for power, for example, are less likely to be multilateral and more likely to be aggressive in their foreign policies. Many LTA studies focus on the impact of a leader’s traits in a particular foreign policy decision. Dyson, for example, after careful consideration of alternative explanations, concludes that Prime Minister Tony ‘Blair’s personality is a crucial factor in understanding why the British went to war’ in Iraq in 2003. Beyond the effect on policies, LTA research demonstrates profound effects of personalities on the decision making process, with some traits more associated with poor, groupthink-like processes and foreign policy fiascos.

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LTA research relies on an ‘at-a-distance’ method, inferring leaders’ characteristics from their words. This is done reliably and systematically, with standard coding rules and a computer program to process speeches into leader profiles. LTA assumes that the more frequently leaders use certain words and phrases and the way in which their speech is structure reflects underlying personality traits. Coding is quantitative and generates frequency counts taking the word or phrase as the unit of analysis. LTA profiles are produced with automated machine-
coding using ProfilerPlus, a software program developed by Social Science Automation. The scores for any leader can be compared to those of more than 250 world political leaders and subsets of leaders from particular countries and regions.

LTA and other at-a-distance assessments continually face a central question of validity: do the words of leaders truly reflect their personal beliefs and personality characteristics? This question revolves around authorship, audience effects and deception, temporal stability, and language differences. Many researchers address these issues by using only interviews and other more spontaneous material and not prepared speeches. Scholars also argue that leaders do have some control over their speech acts and that LTA can capture leaders’ public personalities (if not their private ones) which matter more for explaining their decision making style and foreign policy choices. Some have also assessed the validity of LTA profiles by pairing them with case studies to see if the personality variables play out in the decision-making processes in theoretically meaningful ways—if they do, we have greater confidence that LTA is capturing what it purports to measure. At-a-distance analysts also treat these validity issues as empirical questions. As a result, Schafer argues that we now have “plenty of evidence that supports the effectiveness of using prepared speech acts as psychological indicators.”

What can LTA tell us about world leaders and international relations today? Trump’s LTA scores indicate he is particularly distrustful, compared to other leaders. We know from past research that distrustful leaders tend to be risk-prone, exaggerate threats, and use military instruments, especially to divert domestic audiences’ attention away from political or economic problems. They see any opposition or dissent as disloyalty that must be addressed. Trump also sees the world in simple terms, has a high need for power, believes he can control events, and wants people to like him. Trump’s personality makes him less likely than other political leaders to even see, much less respect, these limits on his choice in foreign policy.

The Role of Latin American Presidents in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

By Adriana Boersner, University of Missouri

For the past twenty years, presidents in Latin America have shaped and reshaped their nations’ foreign policies in fundamental—even if heterogeneous—ways. Today, one can hardly think about Venezuelan foreign policy without analyzing the ideology and beliefs of the late Hugo Chávez. The same applies to Noriega’s Panama, the Castros in Cuba, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Whether these leaders promoted radical positions towards the United States, reassorted their country’s national autonomy, and/or intensified their country’s role as a regional power, they each transformed their countries’ (and Latin America’s) strategic position in world politics.

But how exactly have these and other leaders mattered for foreign policy decision-making in Latin America? And what are some of the challenges for studying them in historical perspective? In what follows, I make a simple but often overlooked point about the role that Latin American presidential leadership has had in influencing the process of foreign policy decision-making: namely, that regardless of the domestic context—whether countries have been led by military or civilian leaders, for example—the process of foreign policy decision-making has been highly dependent upon the president in office. I offer short insights about the value of

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11 See www.socsciweb.net.
12 For recent discussion of LTA validity issues, see Schafer, “At-A-Distance Analysis.”
14 Schafer and Crichlow, Groupthink vs. High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations.


studying Latin American leaders and canvass some of the challenges associated with their study.

There is a longstanding debate over whether leaders matter more than context for explaining international politics. That debate is intrinsically related to a fundamental question about the appropriate level of analysis for studying foreign policy. On the one hand, there are those who urge that the study of foreign policy be grounded in the idea that agents’ personality and cognition shape their political behavior. On the other hand, some scholars retort that the environmental context—especially at the domestic level—will socialize leaders once they take power. To take both perspectives seriously, it is imperative to analyze the bureaucratic processes in which decision-makers are embedded.

Yet for the most part, scholarship on Latin American foreign policy has focused on regional- and international-level causal factors—not leaders or the domestic context. Such an approach is perhaps understandable given the role of external forces—especially the influence of the US in the region—in determining Latin America’s relationship with the rest of the world.1 But it is still lamentable that actor-centric approaches to stress the institutional and cognitive elements have dominated the debate about Latin American foreign policy.

The leaders in Latin America have tilted their states’ foreign policies through their distinct ideological stances, cults of personality, and shared desire to deeply involve themselves with international affairs.

Since the 1990s, and especially after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, leaders in Latin America have strengthened their foreign policy role and reformed the process of foreign policy decision-making in two main ways. First, although with substantial differences among them, leaders have by and large been able to shape domestic-political structures and thus gain more internal say over external policy. In Brazil after 2002, for example, the locus of decision-making moved from professionalized institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations towards the charismatic new president Lula da Silva (and his successors), who consolidated a new role for Brazil at the international level and made the presidency a key institution for determining the direction of Brazilian foreign affairs.2 Likewise, Chávez in Venezuela reformulated the Foreign Ministry and avoided consultations with various political and social sectors (except the military) when conducting foreign affairs.3 Chávez often governed with extraordinary powers and concentrated the decision-making process in his person—something he had in common with the Kirchners in Argentina.4

Second, leaders in Latin America have tilted their states’ foreign policies through their distinct ideological stances, cults of personality, and shared desire to deeply involve themselves with international affairs. In this sense, Fidel Castro’s prominent role during the Cold War can be considered something of a harbinger of how leftist governments in Latin America have acted in the 2000s. Brazil since da Silva has undergone a particular transformation in international engagement, from expanding relations with other South American countries and international forums to diversifying its commercial partners with other emerging powers, especially China. Meanwhile, the political turn to anti-US discourse in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela has served to promote alternative regional integration schemes such as ALBA and CELAC, and to appeal to new geopolitical allies including China, Iran, Russia and Syria. This contrasts with more pragmatic policies of presidents such as Juan Manuel Santos (Colombia), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), or José Mujica (Uruguay).

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1 Although there are substantial differences among scholars in the field, theories like dependency theory and peripheral realism have dominated the debate about Latin American foreign policies. See Rita Giacalone, “Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis: External Influences and Internal Circumstances,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 4 (2012): 335-353.


4 This experience is not universal, however. In Chile, the president is still highly constrained by domestic institutions when it comes to formulating foreign policy.
Of course, none of these leaders—however transformational—have acted in a vacuum. At the domestic level, Latin American leaders have been able to centralize political decision-making because of the exhaustion of classical political parties, the emergence of populist and non-traditional leaders, and the intensification of political polarization. At the international level, the declining role of the US in Latin America has offered elites a larger margin of maneuver in foreign policy than was available to their predecessors. Even so, recent history would seem to suggest that individual leaders remain key variables in explaining shifts in Latin American foreign policy.

What are some of the challenges for studying the modern history of Latin American presidents and their role in foreign policy? In fact, analysis of any world leader poses important challenges—whether because those leaders are not accessible for direct testing (as is usually the case) or because researchers need to rely on historical and private materials that can also be inaccessible to the public. To overcome these hurdles, Latin American scholars tend to use qualitative historical methods such as case study analysis, interviews, and measures of experts’ perceptions to approach the study of foreign policy analysis. In contrast, contemporary studies in US academia are increasingly dependent upon quantitative methods like the so-called at-a-distance measures for analyzing leaders’ individual differences. To date, this latter method has infrequently been applied to the study of Latin American political leaders.

This disconnect between Latin American and US scholars is due to two major issues. First, researchers in Latin America must overcome the use of software that incorporate English language dictionaries. Second, there is the problem of conducting analyses with primary and secondary sources that are not easily compiled in a systematic way: unlike in the US, a presidential library system and academic centers that specialize on the continent’s presidencies are largely nonexistent in Latin America. Instead, data must be found elsewhere—either in the national archives and online databases of other countries (including those of the US) or via local scholars and resources available in languages other than English such as newspapers, online archives of legislatures, foreign affairs ministries, social media, and university digital repositories.

Of course, the challenge of data-availability still affects qualitative methodologists. In particular, the condition and organization of official records differs significantly across Latin American countries. Some records have been partially digitized over time, offering virtual access to the public. For example, governments in Chile and Argentina have made available a small selection of documents about diplomatic communications during the military era. Likewise, a recently created institute in Venezuela contains an online historical archive for Hugo Chávez holding a collection of interviews, discourses, and letters both prior to and during his time in power. Equally promising are the few institutions created by or to preserve the political memory of former presidents, and the related donations of political and personal records to the universities.

Today, the foreign policies of Latin American states reflect an important interaction between global changes and the role of individual leaders. There is a pressing need to examine elites from a comparative-historical perspective. For scholars of the region, this will require the expanded use of existing methods or new combinations of them.

If Leaders Really Do Matter, Which Life Experiences Count?
A Case for the Systematic Study of Childhood
By Cali Mortenson Ellis, The Evergreen State College

In 2017, reporting on current international events is
often dominated by discussions of leaders and their

levels1, manage a bureaucracy pushing back from below2, or the need to appease a selectorate3 in order to remain in power.

“...leaders do not arrive into adulthood fully formed. They are progressively shaped over time by a series of events that brings them into situations where they must make increasingly complex decisions. Some of these events may come from the earliest years of their childhood, and can have cumulative effects on beliefs, outlook, and risk propensity that are comparable to proximate adult experiences.”

But overall, the complex formal models and rigorous testing of modern empirical international relations scholarship has implicitly left the constituent components of leadership as a “black box” variable, or at least greatly simplified it. This approach has confounded the question of leadership by giving primacy to institutional4 and systemic5 factors, to the exclusion of accounting for individual-level variation. Tautologically, some leaders are classified as resolute because, ex ante, we observe them to be so when confronted with a crisis.

While historians and biographers delve into these idiosyncrasies with careful and detailed case study work, until recently these two strains of analysis have remained separate: Positivist political scientists conducting exacting analyses of the effects of external forces on leaders, and historians selectively examining the most interesting individual cases in depth. However, recent systemic empirical research – such as the LEAD dataset that my co-authors Allan Stam and Michael Horowitz present in our book Why Leaders Fight6 – takes into account individual–level variation in leaders and strongly implies that, yes, leaders do matter.

How do Leaders Become Who They Are?
But which parts of any given personal history are the most important in a leader’s life? Which experiences matter?

So far, my co-authors and I7 have found the most statistical support for the effects of adult life experiences on the propensity of state leaders to initiate military aggression. Intuitively, this makes the most sense, as these experiences are both proximate and relevant to the time a leader is in power and making conflict decisions. Experiences like being in the military or seeing combat can have a distinctly powerful effect on shaping beliefs about how to handle these situations as a leader.

But, like all of us, leaders do not arrive into adulthood fully formed. They are progressively shaped over time by a series of events that brings them into situations where they must make increasingly complex decisions. Some of these events may come from the earliest years of their childhood, and can have cumulative effects on beliefs, outlook, and risk propensity that are comparable to proximate adult experiences. Starting the study of leaders from adulthood does not take into account the way that childhood functions as a critical development period for the individual personality, as Pynoos, Steinberg, and Wraith8 point out: “Traumatic exposures in childhood occur during critical periods of personality formation when there are ongoing revisions of the inner model of the world, self, and other. This internal model includes conscious and unconscious

To put it more directly, as Dr. Seuss once noted, “A person’s a person, no matter how small.” Most people—including most leaders in their autobiographies—acknowledge the importance of their childhood experiences to their adult lives. All leaders were once children, and, over time, a significant minority (approximately 20% in the LEAD dataset) lived through war in their home countries. How might this affect them as adults? I argue that the childhood experiences of world leaders—particularly those directly related to war—are important, and worth studying and understanding in a systematic way.

**Childhood Trauma and Adult Leadership**

An emerging literature casts wars not as abstract phenomena, but events with serious consequences for civilians. Political scientists have studied the effects of wartime rapes, the destruction of educational infrastructure, and gender differences in the experience of war. However, fewer political scientists have focused on the long-term effects of these traumatic events on children. Instead, scholars in other fields such as epidemiology and economics have studied, respectively, the long-term psychological and labor market consequences of children’s exposure to war.

But what are the political implications of these childhood experiences? The LEAD dataset includes such histories in a large cross-national political expectations about others and one’s own behavior, and forecasts about the future.”

Child Development and the Psychological Effects of War Trauma

From infancy through adolescence and adulthood, children advance through developmental stages that influence their later personality characteristics. Individuals have different developmental pathways based on a combination of genetics and environmental factors, including the effects of family and society. Researchers in other fields offer various mechanisms to explain the connection between childhood trauma and the observation of aggressive behavior in adults.

Witnessing or experiencing the violence of war at a young age is a formative event that can change the direction of one’s life or have significant impacts on later thinking and behavior. As Marans, Berkman and Cohen observe, childhood exposure to violence

19 Steven Marans, Miriam Berkman and Donald Cohen, “Child Development and Adaptation to Catastrophic Circumstances” in Roberta J. Apfel and Bennett Simon, eds., *Minefields in Their...
occurs, “…in the context of developmentally shifting modes of expressing their own aggressive impulses and feelings.” Some economists suspect that such early exposure can change an individual’s fundamental economic preferences, as expressed in measurable proclivities towards risk. Others suggest that changes in risk preferences are a function of limited access to schooling and nutrition during the formative years, which result in stunted long-term labor market outcomes. Recent experimental research has found that exposure to violence – either directly or at the community level – is associated with greater risk taking behaviors and attitudes. This is distinct from exposure to other traumatic events (such as natural disasters), which tend to produce risk-aversion instead, at least in adults.

Studies from psychiatry and epidemiology have found that war exerts a powerful negative influence on mental health in the general population. Living through war as a civilian is repeatedly significantly associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression, which are likely to persist over long periods of time or even an entire lifetime. Long-term depression, including that triggered by early PTSD, has numerous negative consequences over the course of a lifetime, and can profoundly influence cognitive decision making processes.

Exposure to war violence at a young age can also have a normalization effect manifesting in a desire for violent revenge. Gächter and Maercker suggest that the motivation for revenge comes from the combination of initial trauma and PTSD symptoms and individual attributes. Cardozo et al. argue that, “the psychological wounds of civilians who have suffered war-related traumatic events do not resolve spontaneously, but may linger for many years, and may even have multigenerational effects.” This may be particularly acute in cases where a child witnessed family members being injured or killed, which some studies have shown to be the most predictive of severe trauma.

Moving Forward with a Systematic Understanding of Leader’s Childhoods

Research that systematically links traumatic childhood experiences to adult behavior with political consequences is limited in political science. Although the experience of living through war as a child is only one aspect of personality development in world leaders, it nonetheless provides a rich area for future scholarship. Conflict researchers interested in the systematic study of leader characteristics and political behavioralists interested in the revival of political socialization can use both this dataset and findings to explore new research questions.

In a preliminary analysis of the LEAD data, my co-authors and I hypothesized that leaders who experienced wars as children may be more willing to start military interventions and less willing to seek peaceful alternatives to disputes. For example, while there is generally a positive relationship between childhood war exposure and later MID initiation, the descriptive statistics also suggest a positive correlation between total lack of exposure to war and

Hearts: The Mental Health of Children in War and Communal Violence


during childhood and propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes. Neither Hitler, Stalin nor Mussolini had any exposure to war during their childhood and adolescence, yet initiated numerous MIDs with severe consequences. This invites a closer examination of political socialization of youth in peaceful societies.

As new social science datasets are developed that more accurately capture the intensity of wars by their effect on civilians, we can begin to understand how past conflicts may have affected current and future leaders. Datasets like the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which begins in 1946, are important for capturing the intensity of war and, particularly, the effects on civilians, who are counted in the battle related-deaths estimates. Currently, we know very little from the empirical data about how war intensity, as measured by battle-related deaths, is correlated with leader behavior with respect to militarized interstate disputes. As new leaders “age in” to the dataset, however, we will eventually be able to construct more thorough estimates of the correlation between childhood experiences with war and later actions as leaders.

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Marcus Garvey: Racial Redemption and the Awakening of the African Diaspora
By Mark Ledwidge, Canterbury Christ Church University

This essay will not provide a historical legitimisation of the race first philosophy advocated by Marcus Garvey, nor will it attempt to legitimise the Pan-Africanist and Black Nationalist philosophies advocated by Garvey. The essay situates Garvey as the forerunner of the Black Nationalist leaders that came to prominence in Africa and the African diaspora during the mid-20th Century. That is, Garvey unleashed an African world view which challenged global white supremacy. In short, Garvey’s ideological thrust laid the basis for the trans-national liberation movement for Africans at home and abroad; Garvey influenced leaders such as Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Malcolm X and a cadre of Nationalist’s, reformist’s and revolutionaries. A key facet of Garvey’s leadership was countering the negative racial propaganda that Europeans and Euro-Americans had fastened onto the image of black people.

Unlike Du Bois, and the elite faction of the African American talented tenth, Garvey spoke to lay persons and the black masses across the globe by articulating his message of liberation in the *Negro World* and later the *Black Man* magazine.8 Garvey’s conflict with some members of the African American elite included issues related to colour, class9 and the double consciousness that Du Bois had identified in *The Souls of Black Folk*. Garvey theorised that centuries of racial oppression and colonialism had encouraged disunity among black people and deep suspicions regarding the legitimacy of black leadership. Ultimately Garvey’s activism forced black people to confront the externally induced self-loathing that hindered their efforts to meet their collective interests.10 Significantly Garvey argued that black liberation was dependent on self-knowledge bolstered by an appreciation of African peoples’ historical achievements.11 Henceforth Garvey played a pivotal role in intellectualizing and internationalising Pan-Africanism, along with Du Bois and George Padmore12 but prior to Nkrumah, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and others. In short, Garvey understood that the principal battlefield exists within the mind of both the oppressed and the oppressor, and that liberation or behaviour modification requires the restructuring of a group’s political and intellectual consciousness.

The under-acknowledgement of Garvey’s leadership credentials pertaining to international relations and black liberation are derived from three factors:
1. The successful covert counter-intelligence operations of British and American government intelligence apparatus.13
2. Garvey’s quest for African liberation was antithetical to the racial politics and interests of state actors in America and in the colonies.14
3. Despite exceptions, the academy’s tendency to construct, maintain, or perpetuate the Euro-centric and racial mores of Western society has created tensions in evaluating black freedom fighters like Garvey, whose activities threatened to destabilise the dominant social order.15

The fact that the UNIA was destabilised by British, American and colonial governments is indicative of the threat Garvey’s movement posed to Western interests. In America J. Edgar Hoover’s General Intelligence Division (the forerunner of the FBI) and other organs of the American State, willingly bypassed their own racism and utilised black informants and agent provocateurs to disrupt Garvey’s business and political ventures.16 Hoover, the US State Department, and the US Justice Department pursued Garvey with a vengeance. Hoover ordered his subordinates to find or manufacture illegal activities in order to destroy

“…Garvey understood that the principal battlefield exists within the mind of both the oppressed and the oppressor, and that liberation or behaviour modification requires the restructuring of a group's political and intellectual consciousness.”

Garvey.17 In brief, persecution from the State coupled with the collaboration of African American leaders like Du Bois and members of the NAACP led to Garvey’s imprisonment and deportation from America.18 Suffice to say Garvey’s plans stimulated the significant opposition he faced.

The fact that Garvey travelled widely in the Caribbean, parts of South and North America and London provided him with insight into the international dimensions of white hegemony.19 Ironically European Americans rejected Garvey’s

11 Hill, Marcus Garvey.
19 Lewis, *Marcus Garvey*.  

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revolutionary spirit despite their reverence of the American Revolution and Patrick Henry’s cry of “give me liberty or give me death”. Here racism, self-interest, and cognitive dissonance prevented the white collective from supporting the UNIA’s global agenda. It is conceivable that whites rejected the UNIA and its so-called militant tendencies. However historiographers must recognise that the brutality of racial oppression and colonialism undoubtedly fuelled the rise of Marcus Garvey.

Marcus Mosiah Garvey was born in St Ann’s Bay on August 17th 1887, on the island of Jamaica in the Caribbean. The history of the Caribbean was rudely interrupted by the rise of Europe, particularly Spain as a result of the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1492. The emergence of Spain and Portugal and the Voyages of Christopher Columbus stimulated European expansionism and had a cataclysmic impact on Europe, Africa, the Americas, and the world.

European expansionism and the profiteering of commissioned and semi-commissioned adventurers like Sir Francis Drake and his cousin Sir John Hawkins, who was financed by the Virgin Queen to enslave, commoditise and sell Africans, helped fund the (so called) triangular trade, which Eric Williams maintains in the book, Capitalism and Slavery, assisted in financing Britain’s imperialist thrust into the Caribbean islands and America. The profiteering of European Nation States led to the legalised enslavement of millions of Africans and the genocide of millions of the indigenous people of the Caribbean. Note the Catholic cleric Bartholomeo de las Casas estimated that 12 to 15 million Caribs were wiped out as a result of European imperialism. In addition, Europe’s conquests caused the construction of a hegemonic racial power paradigm.

Garvey recognised that for centuries racism had impoverished the lives of Africans across the globe from a material, psychological, spiritual, cultural, and historical perspective. Clearly the descendants of enslaved Africans and Africans in general had inherited notions of inferiority that had damaged the African psyche.

Garvey realised before Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, and Joy Leary that white supremacy had left a legacy of psycho-cultural trauma which had distorted the political consciousness of Africans. In retrospect an unlettered man born in Jamaica pierced the veil of centuries of mis-education by identifying the so-called Negro’s African heritage. It is noteworthy that when Garvey was born there were no major texts that identified the existence of ancient African civilisations or an abundance of literary texts that exalted the virtues of an African identity, as Africans in Africa were viewed as savages and the descendants of enslaved Africans in the diaspora had been taught to reject Africa and their blackness. Consider also that in Garvey’s lifetime only Haiti, Ethiopia and Liberia had any semblance of political sovereignty.

Conclusion
To conclude, Garvey made errors but became a leader of international stature because he spoke in a bold manner that began to address the damage that centuries of racial propaganda had wrought on the minds of Africans at home and abroad. Garvey recognised that his constituency had been taught to despise their features and made to believe that they had no legitimate history or corresponding culture. Marcus Garvey was an international leader, the intellectual black Moses, who reconstructed race relations internationally by spawning a greater awareness of Africa, African identity, and Africa’s role in politics, economics, and history. Finally, Garvey inspired generations of black and African people even beyond the grave. Clearly Garvey was one of the Fathers of Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism in addition to despite the odds becoming a leader in both international and intellectual power politics.

20 Hill, Marcus Garvey, p. lxxiii.
22 Clarke, Christopher Columbus and the Afrikan Holocaust.
23 The Captain of the Jesus of Lubeck, the slaveing ship given him to Queen Elizabeth the first.
Announcement

The International History and Politics section Business Meeting will take place on

Friday September 1st

at

6:30-7:30 pm

in

the Victorian Room of the Westin St. Francis hotel (second floor)
This year’s IHAP award winners are as follows:

The Robert L. Jervis and Paul Schroeder Best Book Award

This award is for the best book on International History and Politics. The award may be granted to a single-authored or multi-authored book, or to an edited volume, and will be given to works published in the calendar year prior to the year of the APSA meeting at which the award is presented. The copyright date of a book will establish the relevant year.

We received 40 books for consideration this year. Given that the award honors the work of both Jervis and Schroeder, we were particularly interested in books that provided theoretical insight, as well as historical understanding, for central debates in international history and politics. Many books rose to the top of our lists, but two in particular stood out for all three of us. The winning book is Rosella Capella Zielinski’s How States Pay for Wars (Cornell, 2016), and the honorable mention is Debra Thompson’s The Schematic State: Race, Transnationalism, and the Politics of the Census (Cambridge, 2016).

Most of the books we reviewed focused on fairly standard topics of war or cooperation in international relations and international history. Our honorable mention book stood out as an exception. Debra Thompson’s The Schematic State: Race, Transnationalism, and the Politics of the Census is a path-breaking study of role of racial classifications and liberal state development. She asks: “Why do states make and manipulate racial classification schemas, and with what effects?” While this question appears to be one that could be answered mainly by domestic-level variables in comparative politics, Thompson also looks to international normative effects on decision-making. She thus builds on theoretical debates about trans-national influences on policy-making, while exploring an under-studied phenomenon in international relations and history: the causes and consequences of racial categorizations in national censuses. Thompson reminds readers that while censuses today often serve to offset imbalances pertaining to racial discrimination and marginalization, in the past, they tended to be used as a tool of systemic racial discrimination. Thompson compares crucial decisions over nearly 200 years of census designs in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, to argue that “the census does not simply reflect an objective demographic reality, but instead plays a constitutive role in its construction.” We expect that this book will launch new debates about the role of race in liberal state formation, as well as the reverse: the role of the state in the construction of race.

Committee members:
Lise Howard, Georgetown University, Chair
Ian Chong, National University of Singapore
Brian Burgoon, University of Amsterdam

Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics

The Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics recognizes exceptional peer-reviewed journal articles representing the mission of the International History and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, including innovative work that brings new light to events and processes in international politics, encourages interdisciplinary conversations between political scientists and historians, and advances historiographical methods. The Outstanding Article Award is given to a published article that appeared in print in the calendar year preceding the APSA meeting at which the award is presented.

This year, our committee selected “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe,” by Lisa Blaydes and Christopher Paik (International Organization 70, no. 3).
This article makes a highly original contribution to our understanding of the timing of state formation processes in Europe, a topic that is of fundamental importance to both historians and political scientists. It uses an innovative research design to further our understanding of how the rise of Muslim military and political power impacted on European institutional development. Using two original data sets—of the geographic origins of crusaders and the location of medieval cathedrals—Blaydes and Paik discover that areas of Europe that contributed the largest number of crusaders enjoyed increased political stability, more parliamentary institutions, and greater urbanization in the centuries that followed. The paper by Blaydes and Paik is impressive in its empirical analysis, rigorous in its methodological approach, and ambitious in its sweep.

Committee members:
Daryl Press, Dartmouth College, Chair
Fiona Adamson, University of London, SOAS
Ryan Griffiths, University of Sydney
Upcoming Events and Workshops

August 2017

113th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition
August 31st – September 3rd, 2017, San Francisco, USA
More Information

September 2017

ECPR General Conference
September 6th – 9th, 2017, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
More Information

11th Pan-European Conference on International Relations
September 13th – 16th, 2017, Barcelona, Spain
More Information

ISA-West Conference 2017
September 22nd – 23rd, 2017, Pasadena, California, USA
More Information

The European Union at a Crossroads: Problems and Prospects
September 23th – 24th, 2017, Oxford, United Kingdom
More Information

October 2017

15th Annual Association for Political Theory (APT) Conference
October 12th – 14th, 2017, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
More Information

The annual meeting of Great Plains Political Science Association
October 12th – 13th, 2017, Maryville, Missouri, USA
More Information

ISSS-ISAC Conference 2017
October 13th – 14th, 2017, Washington, D.C., USA.
More Information

Istanbul Human Security Conference
October 18th – 20th, 2017, Istanbul, Turkey
More Information

ISA-South Conference 2017
October 20th – 21th, 2017, Orlando, Florida, USA
More Information

6th EISA Exploratory Symposia
October 25th – 28th, 2017, Rapallo, Italy
More Information

November 2017

ISA-Northeast Conference 2017
November 3rd – 4th, 2017, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
More Information

3rd Biennial Ideas in Politics Conference
Republicanism in the History of Political Philosophy and Today
November 3rd – 4th, 2017, Prague, Czech Republic
More Information

ISA-Midwest Conference 2017
November 17th – 19th, 2017, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
More Information

49th Annual Meeting (NPSA) Northeastern Political Science Association
November 9th – 11th, 2017, Philadelphia, USA
More Information

Workshop on Political Economy & Political Science
November 30th – December 2nd, 2017, Santiago, Chile
More Information

December 2017

IPSA/AISP 2017 International Conference
Political Science in the Digital Age
December 4th – 6th, 2017, Hannover, Germany
More Information

January 2018

American Politics Group (UK) Annual Meeting
January 4th – 6th, 2018, Oxford, United Kingdom
More Information
2018 International Adam Smith Society Conference
January 12th–13th, 2018, Vino del Mar, Chile
More Information

February 2018

15th Annual Teaching & Learning Conference
February 2nd – 4th, 2018, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
More Information

11th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations
February 8th – 10th, 2018, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
More Information

March 2018

Veterans in Society 2018: Veterans and Their Societies in International Context
March 26th – 28th, 2018, Roanoke, Virginia, USA
More Information

April 2018

ISA 59th Annual Convention
April 4th – 7th, 2018, San Francisco, California, USA
More Information

Midwest Political Science Association
April 5th – 8th, 2018, Chicago, Illinois, USA
More Information

ECPR’s Joint Sessions of Workshops
April 10th – 14th, 2018, University of Nicosia, Cyprus
More Information