Message from the Chair

Dear IHAP Members,

We look forward to seeing you next week at the APSA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. Our Division Chair, Stephen Nelson, has put together a terrific slate of panels – see his message on page 4 of this newsletter for details!

This issue of our Section newsletter, put together once again by the incomparable Peter Harris and Tom Le, with the assistance of Lucy Gold and Hyeoyoon Park, addresses a critical historical event in international politics – the 1919 Treaty (or, more precisely, Treaties) of Versailles. Versailles, of course, ushered in or concretized a number of extremely significant debates and changes to international politics – the advent of global international organization, “minority rights” in some places, the exclusion of the rights of majorities in many others (i.e., African and Asian colonies), and the increasingly vocal demands of citizen groups (including women’s groups) in foreign policy. Whether one considers Versailles to be a success or failure, the question of the disintegration of 20th century world order is staring us in the face every day. Moreover, Versailles’s creation and failure in the U.S. concretized issues of “populism and privilege” – the theme of this year’s APSA meeting – in ways that continue to be controversial. Our first-rate contributors to our assessment of Versailles’ hundredth anniversary – Molly Cochran, Tuomas Forsberg, Jeremy Smith, Jane Cowan, Laura Robson, Sandra Fahy and Peter Harris – address these issues in innovative ways. Focusing on themes of “publicness,” rights and law, empire, the state and colonialism, inclusion and exclusion, and racism and “noblesse oblige,” they provide important interpretations of the intersecting tendencies that produced Versailles, so aptly captured in Sandra Fahy’s opening description of the “Hall of Mirrors” at the palace itself. Most also return us to the maze-like and trauma-inducing “house of mirrors” (my language) of our current political context.
In addition to the newsletter, I note that several critical themes regarding this 100 year anniversary will also be taken up in IHAP-sponsored panels at the conference itself: panels on “Deep Histories,” “Historical Processes and Turning Points in International Relations” and the roundtable on my Beyond Appeasement after 20 years (in which I have the opportunity to reflect with a terrific group of scholars on what the book did NOT say about race and IR), provide additional ways of understanding the forerunners and implications of Versailles. The latter panel in addition to those on Deep Histories and Migration States also turn the focus to historical-political developments in the Global South, while panels on US Intervention and Restraint, and Law, Power and Governance return to enduring aspects of the liberal order instantiated by Versailles (among other developments), primarily among “great” powers, Transformations in Regional and Global Orders assesses historical and contemporary processes in East Asia, and our poster session provides analyses that connect issues of order in different world regions. Finally, Text-as-Data, Archives, and Diplomacy comes to grips with fascinating methodological issues raised by archives in the digital age, and a special panel on Stephanie Mudge’s new book, Leftism Reinvented, puts resistance to populism and struggles with privilege conference front and center in recent historical analysis.

As if these panels are not enough to keep you busy, please also attend our IHAP Section Business Meeting from 12-1:30 at the Omni (Director’s Room) – light refreshments will be available! And of course our Reception, co-sponsored with Politics and History, on Thursday evening at 7.30pm (after the Presidential Address), at the Marriott, Washington 6.

We are also delighted to announce in this newsletter our award winners for the Outstanding Article in International History and Politics, and the Jervis-Schroeder Book Prize! Our winners will be given their prizes at the Business Meeting and honored at the Reception as well.

And last but not least, we will vote at the Business Meeting on three new members for the Executive Committee (listed in this newsletter), to replace the three members transitioning off. Please join us in thanking them for their service, welcoming new members, and honoring our prize winners.

See you next week.

Cecelia Lynch
Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine

Board Members:
Narendra Subramanian (McGill University)
Joseph M. Parent (University of Notre Dame)
Philip J. Howe (Adrian College)
Jeff Colgan (Brown University)
Fiona Adamson (SOAS, University of London)
Bridgett Coggins (University of California, Santa Barbara)
IHAP at APSA

The 115th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition will be held August 29th–September 1st in Washington, DC, and is themed “Populism and Privilege.”

Announcements

IHAP Business Meeting
Thursday August 29 at 12:00 to 1:30pm
Location: Omni, Director’s Room

IHAP Reception
Thursday August 29 at 7:30 to 9:00pm
Location: Marriott, Washington 6
* Co-hosted with Politics & History Section

Slate of New IHAP Officers:

We will vote on this slate at our Business Meeting (day, time, and location noted above).

1. Executive Committee Member — Adria Lawrence, Associate Professor of Political Science and International and Area Studies at Yale University.

2. Executive Committee Member — Paul MacDonald, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College

3. Executive Committee Member — Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Program at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University

This slate of candidates was created by the IHAP Nominations Committee (Stacie Goddard, Joseph Parent, and Bridget Coggins).
Report of IHAP-APSA Section Submissions
By Stephen Nelson, 2019 Program Chair

• IHAP received 80 total submissions from APSA members. The division’s allocation went up from 6 to 9 panels as well as one poster session.

• At the upcoming APSA conference, the division will put on 8 paper panels (one of which will be co-sponsored with Division 52: Migration and Citizenship), 1 poster session (featuring 2 presenters), 1 roundtable (on division chair Cecelia Lynch’s Beyond Appeasement) and 1 author-meets-critics event (on Stephanie Mudge’s Leftism Reinvented).

• Across all of the division-sponsored events at the APSA conference there are 67 individual roles, comprising presenters of papers and posters, chairs, discussants, and roundtable participants. Of these, 26 individual participants (39%) are women. All of the division’s paper panels include at least one female presenter.

IHAP Panels, Posters, & Roundtables

“Navigating, Negotiating, and Governing Nukes and Space” – Panel on Thu, August 29, 8:00 to 9:30am, Marriott, Washington 4 [More info]

“Moving Beyond “Beyond Appeasement”? Race and Interwar Peace Debates Reconsidered” – Roundtable discussion on the 20th anniversary of the publication of Cecelia Lynch’s Beyond Appeasement on Thu, August 29, 10:00 to 11:30am, Marriott, Washington 4 [More info]

Poster Session for IHAP – Thu, August 29, 11:30am to 12:00pm, Marriott, Exhibit Hall B South [More info]

“Text-as-Data, Archives, and Diplomacy” – Panel on Thu, August 29, 4:00 to 5:30pm, Omni, Cabinet Room [More info]

“Transformations in Regional and Global Orders” – Panel on Fri, August 30, 8:00 to 9:30am, Marriott, Balcony A [More info]

“New Findings from Deep Histories” – Panel on Fri, August 30, 12:00 to 1:30pm, Marriott, Balcony A [More info]

“Author-Meets-Critics: Stephanie L. Mudge’s Leftism Reinvented” - Fri, August 30, 2:00 to 3:30pm, Marriott, Balcony A [More info]

“Explaining US Intervention and Restraint after the Cold War” – Panel on Sat, August 31, 8:00 to 9:30am, Omni, Cabinet Room [More info]

“Migration States in Comparative Perspective” – Panel on Sat, August 31, 8:00 to 9:30am, Marriott, Wilson B [More info]

“Historical Processes and Turning Points in International Relations” – Panel on Sat, August 31, 12:00 to 1:30pm, Marriott, Balcony A [More info]

“Law, Power, and Governance of the International” – Panel on Sun, September 1, 8:00 to 9:30am, Omni, Cabinet Room [More info]
Roundtable
On the Centenary of Versailles

Introduction: Legacies of Versailles
By Lucy Gold, Pomona College,
Peter Harris, Colorado State University,
Tom Le, Pomona College, and
Hyeyoon Park, Colorado State University

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles. The centennial coincides with a surge in concern over the future of the liberal international order, the erosion of the global human rights regime, and the rise of nationalism, all of which serves to invite critical retrospection on the impact of the Treaty. As with previous IHAP issues, it is clear again that contemporary international relations never break free from history. In this roundtable, five expert contributors examine the legacy of Versailles from distinct angles, each arriving at similar conclusions as to the imperfect and unfinished promises of the Treaty.

The roundtable begins with Molly Cochran’s essay (“Women, Publicness and the Versailles Treaty”) on the role of grass roots groups, specifically women’s organizations, in pushing cosmopolitan values at the Paris Peace Conference. She describes the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) as something of a pioneering organizing, which created the space for pro-peace, pro-equality, and humanist ideas and discourses to be fully aired. Cochran calls attention to how WILPF gave voice to the need for a new sort of diplomacy, one “committed to international law and institutions and to democratically controlled policy-making.” Most importantly, this system elevated the rights of the individual in a system previously wholly concerned with state sovereignty. Cochran concludes, however, that WILPF could not agree to endorse the League of Nations as provided for the Versailles Treaty due to its shortcomings. It continues to advocate for human rights to this day.

Sandra Fahy (“Human Rights and Peace, 100 Years on from the Treaty of Versailles”) also calls attention to the significance of civil society in fulfilling the promises of Versailles. She draws lessons for a contemporary country-case where human rights have been (and continue to be) ignored: North Korea. Fahy points to the ambitious attempt by the Versailles Treaty’s architects to redress atrocities committed during World War I. Yet, the case of North Korea shows how international efforts to protect human life and dignity continue to fall short 100 years after those attempts were made at Versailles. The Korean Peninsula lacks a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War, and as Fahy argues, any peace treaty would be weak due to the lack of mechanisms for enforcing rights. Such was the case with Versailles. Fahy contends that any attempt to produce a peace agreement would need to ensure further development of rights framework consistent with international law, something unlikely to obtain in North Korea as it would strike at the heart of the regime’s security.

Laura Dobson (“The New Discourse of ‘Rights’ in the Peace Treaties”) finds that the primary weaknesses of the Treaty of Versailles stemmed from its architects’ efforts to “appropriate an emerging language of rights for the purpose of maintaining an older imperial order.” Although the Treaty introduced new discourses of human rights, they did not always do so in good faith, and often mixed the language of rights with other logics such as colonialism and great power preeminence. If the Treaty of Versailles built a new world order, it did not do so upon terra nullius. Rather, it merely served to adapt a preexisting world order, allowing the Great Powers of 1919 to construct a system of new forms of “informal authority and friendly client states for a new postcolonial era.”

Peter Harris (“American Internationalisms: Versailles and the Birth of America’s World Rule”) brings attention to the youngest Great Power at Versailles, the United States, and how it has leveraged the system to its benefit. Harris argues, the Treaty “did more than just herald the beginnings of a new experiment in institutionalized global governance. It also marked the moment at which the United States became an activist power on a truly worldwide scale, with an expressed interest in setting global rules.” The new global system was, in many ways, a reflection of Wilsonianism as a US foreign policy creed: ambitious, Progressive, reformist, yet riddled with contradictions.

Tuomas Forsberg, Jeremy Smith, and Jane Cowan (“Versailles and Rights, a Centenary Appraisal”) conclude the roundtable with a summary of a conference analyzing the Treaty of Versailles hosted by the Collegium for Advanced Studies of the University of Helsinki, and the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland. Forsberg and Scott point to how the existence of European empires outside of the continent constrained the Treaty’s intention of building a post-imperial order. For example, they draw upon Matthias Koenig’s work on how the Great Powers’ notions of rights were derived from a concern for their own citizens, first and foremost. Efforts to construct new universal rights
were hampered by old power politics, which only seemed different due to the redrawing of previous imperial borders. The conference participants also revealed the Treaty played out differently in different parts of the world, demonstrating that it was inconsistently applied and challenged.

All of the contributions make clear that the legacy of the Treaty of Versailles is still being contested—a reflection, perhaps, of the vigorous debate that took place in Paris, 1919. The Treaty created new international actors, language, laws, and rules, but was brought forth into the world by established powers who had a clear vested interest in balancing radical change with the preservation of some cornerstone international institutions.

internationalism was unique for its feminism and radical social ethics.

The organization that became WILPF was convened in April 1915 by internationally-networked suffrage campaigners, whose work had been hampered by the formidable impasse of world war. WILPF formed the first international women’s peace organization. The resolutions of its 1915 Hague Congress protested not only against the madness of war generally, but also the “odious wrongs of which women are the victims in times of war.” The Congress concluded that women “have a special point of view” on the subject of war and can contribute to “the work and ideals of constructive peace.” Thus, the Hague report asserted that it was “essential, both nationally and internationally to put into practice the principle that women should share in all civil and political rights and responsibilities on the same terms as men.” In calling for the establishment of a “Society of Nations” in one of its Hague resolutions, the Congress demanded that women take part.

WILPF also acted on the basis of a humanist belief system. Their own struggles for equality and protection from violence generated a sense of responsibility to what they called the “human claim”. The touchstone for their activism was a commitment to equal respect for persons - irrespective of race, religion, gender or class – and the belief that this principle was crucial to foster international peace. WILPF’s concept of peace was linked to an expansive idea of justice. Peace for WILPF was grounded in cosmopolitan claims of justice for individuals, not only in relation to civil and political democratic entitlements, but with respect to economic, social, and cultural requirements too.”

Women, Publicness, and the Versailles Treaty
By Molly Cochran, Oxford Brookes University

Few people today realize that a women’s peace organization was the first public body to offer commentary on the Treaty of Versailles. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) convened as an international congress in Zurich just five days after Germany was presented with the draft treaty on 7 May 1919. Jane Addams, WILPF’s International President, obtained a copy of the draft treaty en route to Zurich from Paris, and its terms were at the center of WILPF’s congress agenda. The women of WILPF contributed to the international politics of the Versailles Treaty, engaging in public criticism of both the treaty and draft Covenant of the League of Nations and they participated in critique that flowed from many quarters, ranging from those who thought the treaty too harsh to those who believed it was not harsh enough. Among the former, WILPF’s liberal

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2 The International Committee of Women for a Permanent Peace was the international organization created from the 1915 International Congress of Women at The Hague, which became WILPF in 1919.

4 The 1915 Congress Report says it has no “original theory” to offer as to why women are hit “with particular emphasis” by the waste of human life in war, yet the will summoned by over 1000 women to meet as they did in wartime is noteworthy.
5 *International Congress of Women at the Hague*, p. 20.
6 Helena Swanwick, British Section President wrote that it is a shame “humanism” had already been appropriated for general purposes since it would “far more properly connote the women’s movement than the word feminist”. See Helena Maria Swanwick, *The Future of the Women’s Movement* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1913), p. xii
and cultural requirements, too. Their peace politics was a politics of recognition in relation to both the equality of persons and the economic redistribution necessary to meet basic human needs globally. WILPF reconfigured 20th century liberal internationalism as a transnationalism that understood individuals - not merely states - to be subjects of global justice. WILPF’s international advocacy over the inter-war years would go on to challenge the hegemony of sovereign state discourse, and its privileging of the principle of national self-determination over the democratic autonomy of individuals. The substance of WILPF’s critique of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations was democratically exacting, and at more than one level.

Along with liberal internationalists, WILPF voiced the need for a new diplomacy, one committed to international law and institutions and to democratically controlled international policymaking. However, WILPF’s idea of post-war international diplomacy was distinctive for its unstinting commitment to transnational relations inclusive of individuals. WILPF’s advocacy promoted “publicness” – a generalized and equal concern for persons – as an alternative inter-societal value to that of state sovereignty and the dominance of a state-based normative order.

WILPF’s agenda was not without political foundation. The practice of sovereignty was undergoing a process of re-invention during the Paris peace conference.7 The principle of ethnic national self-determination did important work in the peace settlement, but so did a second principle articulated in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of January 1918: “justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.”8 Publicness was invoked in the establishment of both an internationally governed Mandates system with responsibility for the “well-being and development” of the peoples living in mandated territories, and in an internationally governed Minorities system that guaranteed the civil and political rights of minorities living in the new and expanded states of Central and Eastern Europe created by the Versailles Treaty. The invocation of ideas of self-determination, popular sovereignty and the equality of persons are all expressions of a moral concern for the democratic autonomy of individuals. However, the relationship between the three was under-specified in the Treaty and further undermined by their application in a normative order of states whose leaders continued to hold racist beliefs and economic, strategic and imperial designs. The counter-posing of publicness as a basis of international peace and order gave WILPF’s critique of the Versailles Treaty the quality of an emancipatory politics, setting their post-war international activism apart from like-minded, voluntary international organizations.

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A delegation of Addams and five other WILPF members made direct representations to the Paris Conference, reporting their Zurich Congress Resolutions to Colonel House (among others). The Congress Resolutions focused mainly on the draft Covenant of the League of Nations, understanding peace to be best secured when “the common interests of humanity” were prioritized and believing a League of Nations to be the most likely forum for generating this potential. In the WILPF delegation’s view, however, the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations was disappointing for omitting elements critical to publicness as an inter-societal value, and they urged far-reaching democratic amendments.

The Congress resolutions pressed for radical forms of political and economic inclusion at the international level to be realized through the League of Nations. Like many liberal internationalists, they advocated adherence to the principles of self-determination unfettered by secret treaties and the strategic interests of Allied and Associated Powers, as well as protection of the civil and political rights of minorities and the promotion of the development of “all backward races.” However, WILPF went a step further in demanding a “right of direct presentation to the League of Nationalities and Dependencies within any government of their desires as to self-

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8 Nearly three years earlier at the Hague Congress, WILPF called for the institutionalization of “principles of justice, equity and good will” in a Society of Nations such that “the struggles of subject communities could be more fully realized and the interests and rights not only of the great Powers and small nations but also those of weaker countries and primitive peoples” could be met.
government”. They also argued that democratic inclusion should be extended to women too, with the establishment of full equal suffrage and the adoption of a Women’s Charter acknowledging the ways in which the status of women “is of supreme international importance” . More generally, conditions for transnational democratic inclusion facilitated through the League of Nations required that the executive power of the League be democratically elected and that the national ratification of treaties be performed by an elected legislative body. Economic inclusion required that the League should promote universal free trade as well as free access to raw materials for all nations on equal terms. WILPF also wanted to see a plan for the production and distribution of the necessities of life at the smallest cost, and for the League to seek the abolition of the protection of investments of one country’s capitalists in the resources of another state. Finally, WILPF appealed for amendment of the Covenant to be made easier.

The New Discourse of “Rights” in the Peace Treaties
By Laura Robson, Portland State University

The treaties of Versailles, Sèvres, San Remo, and Lausanne are sometimes conceived of as the beginnings of a new kind of international rights regime, prefiguring the legal edifice of “human rights” that began to emerge after 1945 and eventually became a central aspect of Cold War internationalism. And indeed, the treaty arrangements of the postwar period did collectively produce a new language of international diplomacy that replaced a nineteenth century imperial discourse of “civilization” and “race” with a twentieth century discourse of rights: the rights of minorities, the right to self-determination, the right to protection. But this rhetoric of rights did not symbolize a new political edifice; rather, it served as a kind of code, intended to veil the old-fashioned militarism of this new form of extractive empire and to put in place procedures for reinforcing, without acknowledging, the racial hierarchies that underlay the system’s careful differentiation of sovereign rights across the globe. In other words, the peace agreements of 1919-1923 represented an attempt to appropriate an emerging language of rights for the purpose of maintaining an older imperial order.

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In 1919, the architects of the peace agreements who came together at Versailles faced a fundamental problem. They had spent the last four years fighting a war that was essentially in defense of more or less permanent imperial expansion, but whose trajectory had inadvertently led to a considerable strengthening of anti-imperialism across the globe. This was particularly apparent in the Bolshevik sphere, where Lenin was making declarations of withdrawal from Russia’s imperial commitments as a way of winning adherents to his cause. So the question for the peacemakers – particularly representatives of Britain and France, who were absolutely determined to make their brutal four years pay dividends – was how to reconcile the anti-colonial feeling of the day with international law against slavery and traffic in women; access to education and professional training; rights of women to earnings, property, guardianship of children, and to retain and change nationality; adequate economic provision for the service of motherhood and recognition of responsibility for children born out of wedlock on fathers as well as mothers.

9 This anticipates criticisms that will disturb the veil of legitimacy the League Secretariat and Council wished to lend the Minorities and Mandates systems in creating a petitioning mechanism to air individual grievances with the League’s oversight. Grounds for self-governance were not petitionable.

10 International problems requiring the attention of the League according to the Women’s Charter include: protections within
their undiminished imperial ambitions. Facing this difficulty, the political and diplomatic leaders of the old “Great Powers” began envisioning a new global order comprised of self-consciously modern, theoretically sovereign states under the continued economic and political authority of the old imperial powers.

The treaties of the postwar era put in place three basic modes of creating such an order, all of which were theoretically premised on the new discourse of rights but whose real purpose was to maintain imperial authority over far-flung territory. The first “rights” frameworks to emerged were the multiple minorities treaties signed with the new states emerging out of the shatterzones of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires. All modeled after the first treaty signed with Poland at Versailles in 1919, they called for equal rights for all citizens, the free exercise of religion and cultural practice, and some mechanisms for protecting cultural distinctiveness. Though they agreed on little else, representatives of the United States, France, and Britain all concurred that the League must not guarantee universal protections for minorities that would apply in their own metropoles; and so the treaties, were limited to the “new or immature states of Eastern Europe or Western Asia” - thereby deliberately enshrining the idea that minority communities represented a legitimate site of external intervention into the affairs of theoretically sovereign but less civilized nations. In other words, they deployed the emerging concept of “minority” as a new legitimization of an old practice: Great Power political, economic, and military intervention in the Balkans and beyond.

The second “rights” frame that emerged was the mandate system established by the treaties of Sèvres and San Remo in 1920, which established a discursive, rights-based rationale for the more-or-less permanent Allied occupation of some of the territorial holdings of the defeated Central Powers. The mandatory system established a hierarchy of colonial holdings delineated by degrees of race and civilization, with the European-adjacent Middle Eastern territories receiving a “Class A” categorization that put them theoretically closer to future self-rule than the more distant Pacific and African territories in classes B and C. In the Middle East – perhaps the space where the mandates system had the greatest and longest-term impact – the mandate treaties carved out five new nation-states (Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, and Palestine) to be governed for an unspecified period of time by British and French mandatory administrations overseen by the League of Nations.

“The appearance of a new discourse of rights in the post-WWI treaties ... was not to create a new global rights regime but to smooth the path for imperial powers to create new forms of informal authority and friendly client states for a new postcolonial era.”

The mandate system rested on two different discourses of “rights”: first the rights of minorities, whose protection became a stated rationale for the establishment and continuation of the system; and the right to national self-determination, which could only be accomplished via the creation of a new regional order in which state borders would reflect ethnic and national identities in newer and neater ways than in the messy recent past. Both these tasks – determining the shape of “nations” and protecting the “minorities” who complicated them – served to legitimize the long-term European occupation of the old Ottoman Arab provinces via a new postwar discourse of rights.

Finally, and relatedly, the Allied architects of the peace treaties declared that the post-war project of drawing new maps would reflect national interests – thus hopefully appeasing nationalist sentiment while reserving the right to construct new states in ways that

1 Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

2 And fitting into a much longer practice of international diplomacy that sought to formalize relations among the “three elements of the international legal order” identified by legal historian Nathaniel Berman: “(1) a substantively grounded international community ..., (2) sovereigns, whose ‘potency’ and ‘serenity’ are periodically reimagined; (3) those viewed as not full participants in the community of sovereigns, those ‘Vassals, Subjects, People.’” See Nathaniel Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International Law (Leiden: Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), p. 58.

3 Technically, these new mandate states were supposed to be moving towards eventual sovereignty under European supervision and guidance; in practice, they were largely governed as additions to the British and French colonial empires. See particularly Peter Sluglett and Nadine Meouchy, eds., The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2004), and Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates (Abingdon and New York, 2015).
would support ongoing imperial ambitions. While arguments over the shape and demographic makeup of Poland, Hungary, and Romania – among many others – were cloaked in a rights-based language about self-determination and nationhood, they actually represented Allied efforts to isolate Germany and construct a *cordon sanitaire* between themselves and the Bolsheviks. In the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, this imperially sponsored construction of nationality was taken to a new level. Lausanne formalized what was euphemistically called a “population exchange” between the new revolutionary Turkish government of Mustafa Kemal and Eleftherios Venizelos’ Greek administration, forcibly denationalizing approximately 1.2 million Anatolian “Greeks” and 350,000 Muslim “Turks” under the aegis of the League of Nations. This 1923 exchange confirmed the post-war Allied commitment to deploying a language of “national rights” to support the political and, especially, economic interests of their own empires. Fridtjof Nansen expressed the combination of these criteria precisely in a statement to the Commission in 1922, saying that the “Great Powers” supported the exchange because “to unmix the populations of the Near East … is the quickest and most efficacious way of dealing with the grave economic results [of the war].”

In other words, the appearance of a new discourse of rights in the post-WWI treaties was almost entirely instrumentalist. Its primary rationale was not to create a new global rights regime but to smooth the path for imperial powers to create new forms of informal authority and friendly client states for a new postcolonial era. As Mark Sykes – co-author of the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 – wrote during the 1919 peace conference, “Imperialism, annexation, military triumph, prestige, White man’s burdens, have been expunged from the popular political vocabulary, consequently Protectorates, spheres of interest or influence, annexations, bases etc., have to be consigned to the Diplomatic lumber-room.” Luckily for the framers of the treaties, the rhetoric of “rights” that was gaining such currency around the globe would substitute nicely.

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**Human Rights and Peace, 100 Years on from the Treaty of Versailles**

*By Sandra Fahy, Sophia University/Harvard Law*

A certain poetics can be read in the naming of rooms in the Palace of Versailles. The Hall of Mirrors, where the Treaty was signed, can be accessed by way of either the War Room or the Peace Room; politicians tasked with formulating the Treaty in 1919 needed to reflect on the recent past, identify the wrongs, account for damages, and move towards reconciliation. Thus, a Hall of Mirrors seems apt, not only for reflection, but also to capture the horror, confusion, and disorientation the world was crawling out from at the end of the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles was about reconciling those horrors and ensuring a peaceful world. In the wake of enormous trauma, in the wreckage of four collapsed empires, with petitioners wrangling for their views to be heard, the victorious Allied powers endeavored to settle a peace. After six months, involving delegations from more than thirty-two countries, the Treaty was signed. Controversy was in place even before the signing was complete.

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The same war artist who painted the dead and wounded of World War I would be commissioned to paint the signing of the Treaty. In William Orpen’s *Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, 28th June 1919* we see a long table surrounded by soldiers, diplomats and politicians facing the barrel-vaulted windows, their backs to the mirrors. Johannes Bell, a German Centre Party politician, sits in the middle, leaning into his signature with his back to us, diminutive. Hermann Müller, a German Foreign Minister, stands over him. The Allied delegation had one view of the Treaty, the Germans another one entirely. The mirrors in the image fill most of the painting, reflecting an outside world both bright and dark at points. The points of brightness seem set to topple. From the vantage of 2019, the flaws can be seen.

"Any attempt to produce a Peace Agreement with North Korea must contain a clause stating that provision for specific rights commitments does not preclude further development of rights frameworks consistent with international law."

Many of the 440 articles of the Treaty aimed to sort out borders, territory, the rights and interests of colonies and concessions, armament, POWs and war graves, the trial of criminals, and the question of war reparation costs. From the perspective of human rights, the Treaty strove for something unusual. Internationally, it was the first attempt to redress atrocities. It sought a transition to justice and reconciliation, amidst smoldering resentments. At the end of the Great War, values such as trust in national leaders were called into question in ways that resonate with us today: “Progress was a myth, rationality a veneer, industry a mistake. No one in authority was to be trusted; politicians and generals had turned lying into an art form […] Nothing in the newspapers was true; it was all propaganda, all facts were invented.”¹ These issues remain with us today, as do the smoldering resentments. From Asia to the Americas, and gathering Europe along the way, waves of autocracy, ultra-right nationalism, xenophobia and protectionism are growing. 1919 is feeling more familiar than ever.

And so I turn to a war that has yet to officially end through a peace treaty, in a part of the world that is in the news for its nuclear tests, but also for the changeable bromance between Trump and Kim: the Korean peninsula. The Korean Armistice Agreement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command has not been replaced with a peace treaty that would call and end to the Korean War (1950-53). While the ramifications of this armistice and absence of a peace treaty are uncountable, the question of peace and human rights is timely. In July 2019, the U.S House of Representatives passed an amendment to a bill (H. Res. 152) calling for a formal end to the Korean War. The amendment acknowledges that diplomacy between North Korea and the U.S is vital for denuclearizing the peninsula: a goal understood as attainable through a formal end to the war. Meanwhile, mediation is underway between the other parties involved such as China and South Korea.

The development of a Peace Treaty ending the Korean War faces many judicial obstacles. As such, the United States has favored a “declaration” ending the Korean War as a symbolic diplomatic gesture that would open the way for denuclearizing the peninsula. But the U.S and others should engage this matter cautiously. North Korea’s state news agency KCNA has repeatedly stated that an end to the Korean War or a peace treaty would not be sufficient for denuclearization. Yet, discussion regarding this issue, replete with varied terminology (peace treaty, peace agreement, and so on), is heightening in the United States. If an agreement is developed, it must be carefully calibrated to include robust protections for human rights, a program of redistributive justice for the Korean War, and a means of morally accounting for the violations committed by both North and South Korea in the decades following the armistice, as well as the crimes against humanity committed by North Korea since its founding – as identified by the UN Commission of Inquiry Report of 2014.

When a Peace Agreement is implemented, parties always try to renegotiate or interpret it according to their own interests. Rights mechanisms aimed at accountability for violations are likely to be disputed repeatedly. Any attempt to produce a Peace Agreement with North Korea must contain a clause stating that provision for specific rights commitments does not preclude further development of rights

frameworks consistent with international law. Furthermore, Peace Agreements are weak when it comes to mechanisms for enforcing rights. An agreement with North Korea needs mechanisms for enforcement. For example, rather than being a core cause of the conflict, rule of law deficits provide a framework that sustain human rights violations in the wake of the Korean War. Rule of law reform, which is particularly necessary in North Korea, will be a challenging feature for any peace agreement. Without rule of law, fulfillment of the commitments of a peace agreement cannot be guaranteed within North Korea. Perhaps North and South Korea would be open to hybrid institutional structures, or institutions shared with neutral states. The difficulty comes in that the peace agreement would need to ensure that institutions which are part of the rights violation system undergo reform such that they are no longer committing violations. Amnesty for past crimes can be an option, but the North Korean state has already been found accountable by the United Nations for committing crimes against humanity that are so serious that amnesty must be considered impermissible. Accountability is needed.

With implementation of human rights through a peace agreement, core issues which precipitate violations will likely not be dealt with, leading to ongoing rights violations that could be used as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Legitimacy of human rights as a concept with local credibility will depend on the strength of civil society. The strength of civil society will determine the successful implementation of human rights.

Part of the failure of the Treaty of Versailles was that it had no mechanism for public moral accounting for the war. In the case of the Korean peninsula, this basic feature needs to be engaged. So as the U.S. moves in the direction of declaring the end of the Korean War as a way to promote denuclearization, they would do well to reflect on the necessity of building a robust Peace Agreement that incorporates the spectrum of rights issues (past, present and on-going) on the peninsula today.

American Internationalisms: Versailles and the Birth of America’s World Role

By Peter Harris, Colorado State University

For most scholars of International Relations, the centenary of the Treaty of Versailles is an opportunity to cogitate upon how world leaders ultimately failed in 1919 to put in place a stable world order in the wake of one of the bloodiest conflagrations in human history. And of course, the question of why the Versailles settlement did not usher in a lasting era of unbridled peace (but rather left open the door to revanchism, conquest, genocide, and a second devastating world war) remains an important one to unpack. But the signing ceremony in Louis XIV’s Hall of Mirrors did more than just herald the beginnings of a new experiment in institutionalized global governance. It also marked the moment at which the United States became an activist power on a truly worldwide scale, with an expressed interest in setting global rules. This was an event of world-historical importance, the complex legacies of which continue to shape international politics in profound ways.

1 This article is an expanded version of Peter Harris, “100 Years After Versailles: America’s Century of Internationalism,” The National Interest, 3 July 2019.
All contemporary forms of US internationalism share a common ancestor: Woodrow Wilson. Paris, 1919 was the first time in modern history that a non-European power had exerted decisive influence over such a wide-ranging international settlement as the Versailles Treaty, and Wilson’s tireless work to establish himself as the de facto leader of the victorious Allies (and, by extension, the entire world) laid the foundation of all subsequent varieties of US overseas activism. America’s president took on the role of world leader with boundless energy and enthusiasm, but his vision for world order—and America’s place in it—was as contradictory as it was ambitious. On the one hand, Wilson was a moralist and an idealist. He argued vociferously for the rights of Central and Eastern European nations to determine their own futures and displayed enormous faith in the power of international law to regulate relations between states. Wilson championed the new League of Nations as a dispute-resolution forum and openly imagined a future free from war. Yet Wilson also supported the rights of Europeans and the Japanese (and, of course, the United States) to remain in possession of their overseas empires, a standpoint that was painfully commensurate with Wilson’s well-known racist views and support for segregationist policies at home. Nor was Wilson a stranger to the use of force. As well as taking the United States into World War I, his administration approved numerous military interventions and occupations in the Western Hemisphere, launched an unprovoked invasion of Bolshevik Russia in 1918, and authorized the occupation of the Rhineland in order to keep post-war Germany subjugated (US troops would remain in Germany until 1923).

In sum, Wilson’s internationalism was an incongruously varied mix of attitudes, sensibilities, and policies: liberalism, imperialism, democracy promotion, militarism, institutionalism, legalism, interventionism, racism, and much more besides. Perhaps all that held “Wilsonianism” together as a political philosophy was an eminently Progressive belief that international affairs did not have to be an amoral and anarchic realm of political action; that world governments—and especially the United States—could and should conjure a world polity capable of delivering “order” for all the world’s peoples.

The standard telling is that the American people rejected Wilson’s zeal for international reform when they chose Warren G. Harding as their president in November 1920, a man who promised a “return to normalcy” in place of the tumult of Wilson’s second term. But this conventional wisdom overlooks the ways in which every US president of the past 100 years—including the supposedly circumspect interwar presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover—has embraced some strands of Wilsonian internationalism even as they rejected others. For example, while the United States declined to join the League of Nations, it remained an active participant in a broad range of international institutions throughout the 1920s and 1930s—not least of all the Treaty of Versailles framework, which both Coolidge and Hoover worked hard to preserve by proposing schemes (the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, respectively) to allow Germany the breathing space to keep paying the financial reparations that were, in many respects, the settlement’s lifeblood in Europe. In 1921, Harding convened the Washington Naval Conference to regulate the size of the world’s navies, in hopes of reducing the risk of another catastrophic war. In 1925, Coolidge oversaw the ratification of another arms control agreement, the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons. And three years later, his administration signed up to the Kellogg-Briand Pact to formally outlaw the use of force as a tool of diplomacy and a means of territorial acquisition. These were genuine and ambitious attempts to use US leadership of international institutions to foster a more hospitable world order.

In 1941, Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor served as a powerful reminder that international law alone would never be enough to keep the world tranquil and the United States safe. The arms control and peaceful dispute-resolution initiatives of the interwar period had failed. Just as the sinking of the Lusitania and the interception of the Zimmerman Telegram had convinced Americans to support entry into World War I, so too did the experience of Pearl Harbor seem to make clear that events overseas could not be held at arm’s length forever. As president, FDR realized that what was needed was a US-led world system capable of maintaining international order far beyond America’s shores—a system, in other words, like that which Wilson had proposed two decades earlier. Truman agreed, especially in the face of communist aggression in Europe and Northeast Asia. Like Wilson, both presidents acknowledged that hard military power would be required to bring about such a grand design: overseas garrisons, military interventions, and a willingness to uphold rules via the use of force. For better or worse, this belief in the importance of “deep engagement” continued to orient US foreign policy for the remainder of the Cold War and beyond.

To be sure, the 17 presidents since Woodrow Wilson have each had their own approach to international
engagement, which is why it perhaps makes more
sense to talk about US internationalisms rather than
internationalism in the singular, but each of Wilson’s
successors have been committed to overseas activism
and global rulemaking in one form or another. This
point—that the competing varieties of US
internationalism each share a common genealogy—is
often overlooked in the International Relations
literature but is brought into stark when relief when
considering America’s role in the run-up to, midst of,
and aftermath of Versailles. Prior to World War I, the
United States had been actively engaged in the
Western Hemisphere and East Asia—it was, in fact, a
literal empire—but rarely recognized as a world
power interested in global rulemaking. It was during
the Paris Peace Conference that the country
ineluctably moved from hemispheric hegemon to
occupying the center stage in international affairs.

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As Wilson would have wanted, the United States
since 1919 (and especially since 1945) has invested
enormous amounts of blood and treasure to build and
maintain the sort of “liberal” world order that he
envisioned, one characterized by multilateral
institutions but underpinned by the use (or threat) of
military force. It has been an order that has tolerated
empire, both in its original form and its neo-colonial
guises, and in which political ideals such as
democracy and universal human rights have been
applied unevenly. Commerce has expanded, even if
some have shared in its benefits much more than
others, and war been regulated in some important
ways even if it has not been eradicated entirely. Just
as in 1919, a global color line remains firmly in
place. But it has been an international order
nonetheless—one that the United States has done
more than any other country to support. Some
presidents have emulated Wilson’s unilateral
impulses, while others have tended towards collective
approaches. All have demonstrated a Wilsonian level
of faith in America’s ability to shape an order that, in
turn, can make the world, its constituent states, and
their respective peoples “better off” in some way.

In many ways, the current world order is a perfectly
Wilsonian project: ambitious in scope, intolerant of
dissent from its reformist strictures, riddled with
contradictions, and essentially an outgrowth of
American power. In the United States, support for US
participation in this world order comes from a vast
array of domestic groups—liberals, neoconservatives,
Christian internationalists, militarists, progressives,
capitalists, environmentalists, humanitarian
interventionists, and others—each of whom find
something irresistibly attractive about the institution
of US global leadership, viewing it as a skeleton key
that provides access to limitless power and influence
to make the world in their own image. For scholars of
US foreign policy, this is perhaps the greatest legacy
of the Versailles moment: a revolving door of
internationalists to staff administrations of both
Democratic and Republican presidents, who have
alternately pushed the country in the direction of
multilateralism or unilateralism, militarism or
restraint, but always internationalism and order-
building of one sort or another.

Over the past 100 years, it has become almost
impossible to imagine anything other than American
leadership of world affairs. Wilson won, and the
implications for the rest of the world have been
nothing short of epoch-defining. Today, even the
staunchest advocates of “America First” must trace
some of their most prominent ideas back to their
Wilsonian progenitor. Unilateralism, militarism,
race-based diagnoses of international conflict,
restrictionist immigration laws—all of these views
of world politics were present in the Wilsonian
formulation of international engagement, even if they
were complicated and sometimes diluted by the
presence of other strands of political thought. Of
course, Trump is not committed to US global
leadership in the same way as Wilson. But he is no
isolationist, nor a retrencher. He is in large part a
Wilsonian, just like every other president of the last
100 years.

2 Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds., *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting

3 Harris, “Why Trump Won’t Retrench: The Militarist Redoubt in American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 133,
Versailles and Rights, a Centenary Appraisal
By Tuomas Forsberg, University of Helsinki; Jeremy Smith, University of Eastern Finland; and Jane Cowan, University of Sussex

For many scholarly communities around the world, the 100th anniversary of the Versailles peace treaty has led to new analysis of the legacy of the peace that ended the Great War. One of these conferences was organised by the Collegium for Advanced Studies of the University of Helsinki, and the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland (see https://blogs.helsinki.fi/versailles-and-rights/).

Besides celebrating the 100th anniversary, there are three more substantial and interrelated reasons why it is important to revisit the Versailles process 100 years later, all of which remain valid 101 or 107 years after the conference.

First, we are currently facing mounting concern over the collapse of the liberal world order. It is instructive to examine the diplomatic negotiations and other political and social processes that created a revised world order after the Great War in order to comprehend how international orders are created and upheld. Historical research into the process itself of peace-making and the arguments upon which its legitimacy rested is needed because it would be a fallacy to think that the legitimacy of an order can be directly inferred from its durability. Second, a century on there is a much greater opportunity to discuss the longue durée legacies of the treaty of Versailles. Although orders change, there are often more continuities than discontinuities. The minority issues discussed at Versailles are among them. Third, the Versailles Peace Treaty has occupied an important place in many national, transnational and global narratives of the past century. By focusing on these changing narratives, the “history of lessons” of Versailles rather than the lessons of history, we can thus increase our understanding not necessarily of the Treaty of Versailles as such, but of the political context and dominant cultural undercurrents in which politicians and scholars have been advancing certain interpretations.

The focus of the Helsinki conference was on the idea of rights: where did they emerge from, how were they perceived and constituted at Versailles, and what were the impacts of these ideas in a larger historical context? Different principles of national rights – self-determination, territorial or personal autonomy, federalism – were brought to the table and debated. The process borrowed from pre-existing international legal discourses and fed into broader discussions about rights at a time when women’s rights, minority rights and broader human rights were also achieving significant progress. However, as Miia Halme-Tuomisaari pointed out in her presentation, the textbook narratives of a ‘Big Bang’ origin of human rights or ‘the Tale of Imagined Antiquity’ are not able to capture the many contingencies, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the historical development of rights. The discourses about Rights established under the Versailles process set the tone for the policies of the League of Nations, and went on to inform discussions about Rights ever since. The present day understanding of the status of national minorities owes much to Versailles, as do some very concrete settlements of minority questions, such as the German-Danish border and the Åland islands.

“The Versailles process to some extent was intended to mark the beginning of a post-imperial order in Europe. However, this aspiration was constrained from the beginning by the fact that the great empires spreading across the globe beyond Europe remained very much alive.”

German-Danish border and the Åland islands. The Versailles process to some extent was intended to mark the beginning of a post-imperial order in Europe, at least in the territories of the former Habsburg and Ottoman empires. However, this aspiration was constrained from the beginning, first, by the fact that great colonial empires spreading across the globe remained very much alive. Two of the major imperial centers, Great Britain and France, were among the most important moving forces of the Versailles settlement, and had interests in not only maintaining their empires, but in spreading their influence into the Middle East and elsewhere. As Matthias Koenig showed in Helsinki referring to the example of religious freedom, notions of rights promoted during the Versailles process derived from long-standing trajectories of state sovereignty, minority protection and civilizational hierarchies underlying imperial expansion. Second, the collapse of the Russian Empire initially opened up new areas for imperial competition, but by 1921 most of these regions had been reincorporated into the Soviet Union, which advanced a different imaginary of ethno-territorial organization, based on federalism, the promotion of local socialist elites into the self-governing republics and regions, and the advancement of different languages and cultures.
Thus, while notions of universal personal and group rights were seen by many activists as providing a similar national order across the world, the project was immediately hampered by the contrary interests of the surviving imperial powers and the challenge of the new Soviet model.

Even within Europe, the introduction of various facets of self-determination and a minority rights order based on Woodrow Wilson’s principles revealed tensions. In the two cases that were seen as most successful outcomes of Versailles, the Danish-German borderland and the Åland Islands, discussed in Helsinki by Steen Bo Frandsen and Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark respectively, there were strong dissenting opinions, the solutions were seen as unsatisfactory by many local communities, and the small states involved objected to efforts of imposition, while Germany had no voice. Denmark used the treaty in order to internationalize a settlement to which Germany objected, while Finland insisted the Åland Islands were an internal matter, which could not be settled within the framework of Versailles. In a similar vein, as Wiktor Marzec demonstrated, the Polish parliament objected not so much to the principles of the Versailles minority rights regime, but to the fact that it was being imposed by outsiders in violation of Poland’s sovereignty. Moreover, recent historical research on ‘national indifference’ highlights a core problem with the notion of self-determination and national border drawing, especially in the former Habsburg territories — namely, that national self-determination was being pushed by a minority of nationalists and achieved only with the support of the Great Powers, in the face of opposition from local communities in the border regions.1

In the Middle East, the contradictions were even more glaring. Georgios Giannakopoulos discussed how British liberals justified differentiated rights regimes through a civilizational approach which argued that Europe differed from other parts of the world. The British Empire, moreover, was exceptional and was entitled to treat its minority subjects as it pleased. This reflected a kind of discourse that was widespread in Britain, and was to some extent shared by other Great Powers, and which justified interventions across the Mediterranean region throughout the nineteenth century, as discussed by Davide Rodogno and Emmanuel Dalle Mulle. Nations could be organised into a hierarchy based on race and religion, and interventions were justified by the need for stability in the Great Power order. These persisting attitudes were less openly expressed at Versailles and after, but profoundly affected the implementation of the new order, especially in the British and French mandates in the Middle East. Laura Robson illustrated vividly the consequences of this in Syria, Palestine and elsewhere, where ‘racial limits to sovereignty’ were imposed and the mandates came to be regarded as a ‘fig leaf for colonialism’.

Thus, the notion of a rights regime promoted at Versailles was limited, inconsistently applied, and challenged by both the implementers and supposed beneficiaries, as well as by a new vision advanced by the Bolsheviks. While Versailles provided a framework for discussion of rights and the development of principles later adopted by the United Nations, these weaknesses left notions of rights unstable and contested. This helps to explain, for example, the ease with which the principle of national self-determination was supplanted by the priority of territorial integrity in the 1990s. The discussion of rights at Versailles was, moreover, mostly restricted to national and minority rights. Indeed, as Jane Cowan demonstrated, the range of women’s organizations lobbying the League of Nations did not limit themselves to advocating for women’s rights, but collaborated, and sometimes clashed, around rights for minorities of language, religion and ‘race’. A more complex conception of rights encompassing other forms of belonging (including gender and sexuality) would only emerge later. As Dalia Leinarte, recently Chair of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women argued in the keynote talk at Helsinki, while Versailles may have gone some way to setting an agenda for the discussion of rights, after a hundred years there is plenty of evidence to show how lacking progress has been across the globe. ■

This year’s IHAP award winners are as follows:

The Robert L. Jervis and Paul Schroeder Best Book Award

This award is for the best book on International History and Politics. The award may be granted to a single-authored or multi-authored book, or to an edited volume, and will be given to works published in the calendar year prior to the year of the APSA meeting at which the award is presented. The copyright date of a book will establish the relevant year. We received nearly fifty books for consideration this year, most from major university presses, and covering a wide range of topics, suggesting that the International History and Politics field is both intellectually productive and substantively diverse.

We are pleased to report that from this deep pool containing many excellent monographs, we have selected *The Myth of International Order: Why Weak States Persist and Alternatives to the State Fade Away*, (Oxford University Press, 2018), by Arjun Chowdhury, as our prize winner.

*The Myth of International Order* is an original, ambitious, and provocative book that subjects the idea and ideal of international order -- as composed of centralized states with effective monopolies on violence and capacities to provide a wide range of public goods -- to historical, analytical and empirical scrutiny. In an engaging, sweeping, and rich historical analysis spanning the past two hundred years, the book reveals that contemporary evaluations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states are historically uninformed and politically unconstructive: the ‘strong’ states that developed as anomalies in nineteenth-century Europe provided far fewer public goods to their populations than do contemporary developing countries designated as ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ states. Furthermore, the book traces the development of modern, centralized states in Europe to specific socio-historical conditions involving major interstate war and imperial conquest, and shows how such war-making states were ‘self-undermining’ in producing conditions that created incentives to pursue alternatives to the centralized state. In developing an account of the modern state as a self-undermining institution that continuously provokes the search for alternatives, the book provides a fresh perspective on questions faced by anti-colonial and postcolonial political elites struggling to build political institutions and structures in very different socio-historical conditions from their European counterparts in the nineteenth century. These conditions include heightened expectations of order, including not only peace and security, but also economic growth, human rights, and public goods provision, coupled with reduced willingness of populations to sacrifice to the state.

Building a rationalist model of struggles of state formation that is historically dynamic, Chowdhury powerfully debunks the ahistorical myth of international order, and provides trenchant critiques of contemporary international and foreign policy practices of foreign aid and armed intervention pursued in the name of building ‘strong’ states.

Committee members:
Catherine Lu (Chair),
Mlada Bukovansky,
John Duffield
Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics

The Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics recognizes exceptional peer-reviewed journal articles representing the mission of the International History and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, including innovative work that brings new light to events and processes in international politics, encourages interdisciplinary conversations between political scientists and historians, and advances historiographical methods. The Outstanding Article Award is given to a published article that appeared in print in the calendar year preceding the APSA meeting at which the award is presented.

The winner of the 2019 Outstanding Article Award is “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II,” by Christopher Darnton (International Security, 42/3, Winter 2017/18). In a strong field of 10 nominated articles, Darnton’s article emerged as the committee’s consensus winner. It meets and even exceeds all the award criteria. First, through a careful selection and reading of primary sources, it brings new light to an important historical event: the U.S. entry into World War II. Second, the article constitutes a model conversation between historians and political scientists. Finally, by offering eight detailed suggestions for improving research with documentary primary sources, Darnton’s article makes a significant contribution to the advancement of historiographical methods.

Committee members:
Ido Oren (Chair)
Cheryl Shanks
Brendan Green.
Upcoming Events and Workshops

September 2019

EISA 13th Pan-European Conference on International Relations
*September 11-14, Sofia, Bulgaria*
More Information

October 2019

ISA-ISSS/IS Joint 2019 Conference
*October 18th-19th, Denver, CO, USA*
More Information

ISA-PEACE/PHS Joint Conference, Kent State University
*October 24th-26th, Kent, Ohio, USA*
More Information

March 2020

ISA Annual Convention
*March 25-28th, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA*
More Information