“The International Dimension of Authoritarianism”

The resilience of authoritarian rule has been a major concern for comparativists in recent years, and attention has increasingly been focused on the role of external actors and their efforts to bolster authoritarian regimes that might otherwise collapse. Many incumbent autocrats have benefited from the support and backing of international allies, and have been able to survive in power as a result. Earlier this year, Russia gave Cuba an economic lifeline and reduced fears that economic decline might threaten the stability of its regime by forgiving 30 billion U.S. dollars in debt and expanding economic relations. The trajectory of the Arab Spring protests were shaped in part by the willingness of international actors to support beleaguered incumbents, with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime and the royal family of Bahrain among those who benefited from robust external assistance. Serial human rights violators like Presidents al-Bashir of Sudan and Mugabe of Zimbabwe have been shielded from international sanctions by regional allies and veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council. A wide array of countries, including Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, have been identified as crucial sponsors of these and other authoritarian rulers.

From the Editorial Board

From the editorial board of the APSA-CD newsletter, we wish you all a happy and productive 2015. As we celebrate a new year, we also want to celebrate this section: It is so rewarding to do service like this with such a generous membership contributing content and expressing appreciation. In conjunction with this, we would like to remind you that we welcome suggestions for themes and volunteers to be guest editors for coming issues.

Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism

Recently, scholars of democratization and autocratic rule have started to more systematically investigate the international dimension of authoritarianism. In particular, works on the democracy-preventing or outright autocracy-promoting interventions of external actors are proliferating in these years. However, our knowledge of why, how, and with what impact external actors push for the destabilization of democracies or the bolstering of autocracies remains embryonic. In this essay, I argue that in particular two obstacles stand in the way of deepening our understanding of this truly important phenomenon. First, the discipline is short on conceptual clarity in terms of both terminology and definitions. Second, the field is lacking recognition and discussion of the challenges surrounding observing and assessing the impact of anti-democratic external actors. Below I discuss these challenges and offer some possible solutions that will hopefully help advance the literature on anti-democratic influences beyond its early accomplishments.
**Democratic Black Knights**  
*Thomas Ambrosio, North Dakota State University*

In her seminal article, “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” Jeane Kirkpatrick, who would later serve as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under Ronald Reagan, outlined the strategic and moral arguments for American support of authoritarian governments. Although the article was criticized as justifying American complicity in human rights abuses, it represented an attempt to grapple with a serious dilemma for democratic countries: Under what circumstances should democracies support and sustain autocratic regimes?

The identification of factors that influence the survival of authoritarian regimes has been a central concern of comparative politics for decades. The initial focus was on democratic transitions and the internal dynamics that lead to them. Later, this expanded to the search for international factors. As the global democratization wave stalled and a growing number of autocratic regimes appeared secure, greater attention was concentrated on the sources of authoritarian stability. Like the democratization literature, this originally focused on internal factors, and later turned toward the international level.

One international aspect that has drawn increasing attention is the phenomenon of the *black knights* – external actors supporting the survival of authoritarian regimes or undermining democratically-elected governments. The primary focus in this regard has been on authoritarian black knights, such as China and (especially) Russia, and expanded to include countries such as Venezuela and Iran, as well as international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although a relatively new field of study, we are beginning to have a much better understanding of the motivations behind these actors and the means to achieve


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**Hybrid Regimes and International Aggression**  
*Valerie Bunce, Cornell University*  
*Aida Hozic, University of Florida*

The international impasse over Ukraine presents us with two related puzzles. First, why did Vladimir Putin decide to intervene in Ukraine when it should have been obvious, even to him, that an intervention was bound to invite international reprisals? Second, what explains the particular repertoire of Putin’s actions in Ukraine, which simultaneously mimic and violate international norms – a stealth invasion of Crimea, followed by a referendum and then formal annexation of the territory; covert support for uprisings in eastern Ukraine and then creation of statelets in Donetsk and Lugansk; rhetorical gesturing to international law, minority rights, responsibility to protect (R2P) and the principle of self-determination? Wouldn’t destabilizing a neighboring country pose threats to Putin’s own government? Couldn’t such fomenting of unrest inspire minorities both within Russia and in its neighborhood to take a cue from eastern Ukraine and demand secession themselves?

The purpose of this brief article is to explore why and how leaders of hybrid regimes – that is, regimes that feature authoritarian political practices in combination with democratic “decorations” such as competitive elections – carry out aggression against neighboring countries. In order to do so, our analysis of Russian aggression against Ukraine is at times augmented with a comparison to the case of Serbian interventions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s. In particular, we argue that, because hybrid regimes straddle democracy and dictatorship, their rulers must actively court public support – above and beyond the familiar demobilization strategies that all authoritarian regimes use against opposition groups. International aggression can help rulers of hybrid regimes achieve both of these objectives when the repertoire of intervention is designed to boost their domestic popularity - by legitimizing repression at home, dividing and discrediting opponents both at home and abroad, and minimizing the international fallout from intervention. In other words, we propose, the *why* and *how* of international aggression are politically inseparable in hybrid regimes: the much discussed “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine is part and parcel of the Russian regime’s survival strategy at home.
Diffusion of China’s Authoritarian Model and the 2014 Student Movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong

Yi-feng Tao, National Taiwan University

Democracy has been in recession for eight consecutive years, according to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country report on global political rights and civil liberties. In this ‘reverse wave’ of democratization, some countries seem to have slid back due to domestic problems, such as rampant corruption (the Philippines), weak governance (Pakistan), intensified ethnic conflicts (Kenya), deteriorating social inequality (Mexico), and the abuse of constitutionalism (Thailand). Others were probably affected more by international diffusion of authoritarianism, such as the effects of Putin’s Russia in Eurasia and Chavez’s Venezuela in Latin America.

This is not a new phenomenon. In the long and torturing process through which modern democracies gradually took hold in continental Europe, the Holy Alliance in the early nineteenth century and the Third Reich in the early twentieth century were notorious precedents for the international diffusion of authoritarianism. Authoritarian great powers, just like their democratic counterparts, have incentives to encourage the development of like-minded regimes in small neighboring countries in order to extend their influence abroad and isolate.


From the Editorial Board, continued

The current issue is devoted to the topic of the international dimension of authoritarianism. Since it became evident that the “third wave” of democratization was receding, the resilience of authoritarianism has become a focus of examination for both scholars and practitioners. In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the influence of external actors on the survival of authoritarian regimes and on democratic reversals. Analyses have pointed to the effects of authoritarian great powers on the regime trajectory of neighboring countries and the possibilities of “authoritarian diffusion.”

However, many aspects of the international factors that reinforce authoritarian rule have remained largely under-theorized. The contributors to this issue of the newsletter provide insights into these dynamics and suggest directions for future research.

With regard to the conceptual aspect, three of our contributors touch upon the issues of definition and classification. Through a comparison with the concept of democracy promotion, Oisin Tansey emphasizes the deficiency of the concept of “authoritarian promotion.” He shows that external actors support authoritarian incumbents for various reasons, and that purporting a unity of purpose to promote authoritarian rule worldwide is analytically misleading. Relatedly, Jakob Tolstrup proposes a typology to classify different types of international diffusion of authoritarian practices. In addition, Tolstrup discusses the difficulty in observing and estimating the authoritarian influence of external actors and suggest some ways to overcome these challenges. Thomas Ambrosio shows that not only authoritarian regimes, but also democracies, can act as “black knights” who support the survival of authoritarianism or undermine democratically-elected governments.

Focusing on the case of the United States, Ambrosio examines why and how democracies act as black knights and the conditions under which they change their strategies and become democracy promoters instead.

Similarly, Yi-feng Tao explores how China influenced the democratic development in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and how civil society in both places has tried to defy such influence. Her piece sheds light on topics that have been scarcely investigated systematically, that is, the various strategies used by authoritarian great powers and the reactions of civil society in the influenced countries.

Taken together, these articles encompass large swaths of the most recent literature on the international dimension of authoritarianism. We hope you will find the pieces in the issue as exciting and important as we do. For the upcoming issue, we plan another set of pieces on the topic of authoritarianism. We find it important to highlight the study of “democracy’s enemies,” to borrow Robert Dahl’s phrase. This topic is particularly timely as democracy faces opposition in diverse contexts worldwide, and is threatened both from the outside and from within.

On Behalf of the Editorial Team,

Yi-ting Wang
These patterns of international support for authoritarian regimes have come under increasing scrutiny, and the idea of ‘autocratic promotion’ has gained considerable academic currency. This concept suggests a set of activities that parallel those of democracy promotion, and its proponents seek to bracket diverse efforts to support authoritarian elites abroad as a coherent form of regime promotion. I argue, however, that these efforts are flawed, and that the concept of ‘autocracy promotion’ suffers from a number of critical problems that severely limit its analytical utility. While the literature on autocracy promotion has identified some clear patterns of external support for autocratic incumbents, it has so far failed to demonstrate that these efforts can best be understood as a unified, coherent set of foreign policies that constitute efforts to promote a particular regime type abroad. International influences on authoritarianism are real and important, but conceptualising them as efforts at autocracy promotion obscures rather than clarifies these dynamics.

In the sections that follow, I identify a number of key problems with recent work in this area. Efforts to define the concept have been beset by conceptual ambiguity, and few scholars offer a clear definition that delimits precisely what counts, and does not count, as autocracy promotion. Partly as a result, efforts to classify cases of autocracy promotion have often been misguided, and have grouped together disparate forms of behaviour that do not appear to share the core features that the label of ‘autocracy promotion’ implies, namely the intentional promotion of a particular type of regime abroad. Through a critical comparison with the concept of democracy promotion, which accurately captures a coherent set of international activities, I show that the concept of autocracy promotion does not offer the kind of analytical leverage that the term itself suggests. In reality, foreign powers engage with and support autocratic incumbents for many reasons, and framing them as a common effort to promote a particular form of regime type abroad does little to contribute to our understanding of these activities.

The Conceptual Ambiguity of Autocracy Promotion

Peter Burnell was an early contributor to the literature on autocracy promotion, and helped focus attention on this form of activity. However, Burnell defines the concept so widely that it appears to encompass multiple distinct forms of international influence that do not all include active regime promotion. Burnell offers both an inclusive and exclusive definition of autocracy promotion. The former is defined as ‘all the international forces that move [a] political regime away from democracy and towards semi or fully authoritarian rule’, a definition so broad that it appears to encompass any form of international influence. The latter, exclusive, definition is focused on the agenda and intentions of actors, and includes direct efforts to export autocracy, direct efforts to influence policies where a by-product is a shift toward authoritarianism, continuing trade and diplomatic relations with authoritarian regimes even as others seek to isolate them, and the process of authoritarian promotion


2. Burnell, Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?.
of the promotion of some other goal. Many of Vanderhill’s examples, such as Russia’s energy deals with Belarus, Venezuelan economic aid to Nicaragua, and Iran’s influence on Hezbollah’s military strategy towards Israel, seem to constitute strategically-driven support for valuable allies abroad, rather than instances of a common policy to promote authoritarianism as a form of rule.

Melnykovska et al. also describe autocracy promotion as a number of external influences that appear to be driven by motives other than support for a particular regime type. They show, for example, that Chinese and Russian economic engagement in Central Asia has had the effect of reinforcing the status quo within the region’s authoritarian regimes, but it does not follow that it is appropriate to conceptualise this type of external influence as a form of regime promotion. The authors seek to ‘look at effects rather than intentions’ (p.77), but in framing their enquiry as one that concerns autocracy promotion, they make intentions inseparable from the study. This becomes problematic when the authors refer to Russian intentions that appear unrelated to the promotion of authoritarianism as a regime type, including securing a monopoly over energy supplies in the region, and keeping Central Asian elites, the effort to conceptualise such dynamics in similar terms to democracy promotion risks mislabelling a set of international influences on authoritarianism. In order to properly categorise a distinct form of autocracy promotion, the concept itself would need clear boundaries that relate to the role of actors and their intentions. In particular, ‘genuine’ autocracy promotion would need to involve a commitment on the part of external actors to promote authoritarianism itself as a form of political regime. Yet too much of the discussion about autocracy promotion involves forms of support from outside actors that are driven by intentions unrelated to regime type. A contrast with the concept and practice of democracy promotion further highlight the issues at play.

**Democracy Versus Autocracy Promotion**

Not all professed democracy promoters always promote democracy, and many powerful democratic states have been shown to support autocratic regimes. Yet democracy promotion exists as a relatively coherent set of foreign policies pursued by a diverse array of international actors, and there are a number of important reasons to question whether ‘autocracy promotion’ as a concept provides a meaningful corollary to analyse foreign policy activities that have the effect of bolstering authoritarian states. Democracy promotion has certain characteristics that the practices associated with autocracy promotion appear to lack.

First, there is a well-developed and expansive network of international actors who are explicit in their dedication to the supporting democracy abroad. Early democracy promotion efforts were carried out in Europe and the US in the latter stages of the Cold War, and the rhetorical and operational commitment to promoting democracy abroad mushroomed after 1990. Today, a multitude of governmental and non-governmental democracy promotion actors operate across the world, including major international organizations such as the European Union and smaller, issue-driven organizations and agencies that are dedicated solely to promotion democracy abroad.

Second, common to these disparate efforts is an explicit commitment to promote democracy as a particular regime type. A core feature of the rise of democracy promotion has been an over-arching ideological commitment to democracy itself as a superior form of rule. Although pursued by various means, some of them often flawed, the objectives behind these efforts have rested on a shared belief in the value of democracy and a desire to strengthen its footing in the developing world. Democracy promotion thus rests on a firm normative content related to regime type that distinguishes this form of activity from other types of international assistance, such as development or military aid.

Finally, democracy promotion activities in practice are tailored towards developing the constituent elements of democracy as a regime type, rather than simply supporting democratic political incumbents through wider and generic assistance efforts. Early democracy promotion efforts focused in particular on elections, but were soon supplemented with a wide array of projects targeting different arenas of...
the democratic, including civil society, the rule of law, and political parties. Diverse efforts, such as the training of political party officers, logistical support to electoral administration bodies, or financial aid to state authorities coupled with democratic conditionality clauses, are all underpinned by the notion that each specific project will make some contribution towards the development of a constituent element of democracy itself. The tools of democracy promotion have thus been directed clearly and visibly towards the stated aim of democracy promotion.6

Yet the types of activities that have been identified as falling within the rubric of ‘autocracy promotion’ do not share these key features. At the most basic rhetorical level, there are no actors that explicitly promote authoritarianism or any openly non-democratic forms of government. Since the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, democracy became widely seen as the only legitimate form of government in the world, to the extent that even blatantly authoritarian actors have appropriated the rhetoric of democratic rule. Even where some political leaders, such as Russia’s President Vladimir Putin or Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, openly challenge Western or liberal values, they stop short of any explicit commitment to promoting autocracy at home or abroad. Consequently, there is no network of international autocracy promoters that exists in the same way as the network of international democracy promoters.

Furthermore, while these normative concerns have contributed to external support for autocratic elites in a number of cases, including Russia’s support for illiberal incumbents in Belarus, Ukraine and in numerous countries in Central Asia, many of the practices associated with autocracy promotion are driven by other goals. When international actors promote autocratic regimes, it is frequently due to a range of strategic and instrumental concerns rather than a value-based commitment to the promotion of a particular form of regime. Democracy promotion may be a world value in contemporary international relations, but autocracy promotion is not.

Finally, the tools and strategies associated with autocracy promotion differ in important ways from those associated with democracy promotion. As outlined above, democracy promotion activities are generally concerned with promoting the constituent elements of democratic rule – elections, civil society, and the rule of law. Yet the activities that have been linked to autocracy promotion are much more generic forms of support for particular governments, and include diplomatic, economic and military support. While studies of autocracy promotion have identified some external efforts to promote activities that might be viewed as constituent elements of authoritarianism (e.g. election fraud, repression) they have also pointed to a range of other generally supportive policies such as trade, development assistance, energy subsidies and military support that appear unrelated to the promotion of any particular type of system of government. While such policies may indeed strengthen authoritarian regimes, together they do not resemble a corollary to the democracy promotion template. They are not designed to support particular elements of authoritarianism itself, but rather to bolster authoritarian elites more generally.

**Promoting Security and Stability, Not Autocracy**

In seeking to understand international efforts to sponsor and support authoritarian regimes abroad, ideology and values are certainly not irrelevant. Yet many of the states that have been identified as autocracy promoters are driven to support autocratic elites abroad for strategic and instrumental reasons rather than normative and ideological ones.

One set of motivations concerns international security, and especially balance of power considerations. In the context of balance of power politics, supporting autocratic regimes abroad helps facilitate regional dominance through the maintenance of regional alliances and spheres of influence. Dictators are viewed as more reliable partners as they are less likely to be ousted due to genuine electoral competition, and foreign policy alignment is thus more likely to be stable over time. During the Cold War, both superpowers sponsored and aided authoritarian elites for purely strategic reasons related to their own international struggle. Since the end of the Cold War the strategic priorities of the major powers have shifted, but the logic of supporting compliant allies has not. Saudi Arabia, for example, has engaged in a long-running rivalry with Iran in the Middle East, and has pursued its foreign policy accordingly. Although its response to the Arab Spring, and particularly its military intervention in Bahrain to support the incumbent regime, have been interpreted as a form of autocracy promotion, its policies have primarily been governed by balance of power considerations with a view to containing Iran’s influence in the region. As Gause observed, Riyadh’s focus in Bahrain was ‘on checking and rolling back Iranian influence in the Arab world. That is what [drove] their policy, not some imagined notion of anti-revolutionary

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dictatorial solidarity.”

States are also willing to intervene in domestic politics abroad out of a desire to maintain regional stability. States have strong reason to fear instability in neighbouring countries or further afield because political turmoil can have a range of spillover effects that threaten national security interests and domestic peace and prosperity. Regime collapse and transition can frequently give rise to violence and instability, especially in less developed countries, and states may thus have an incentive to support authoritarian regimes to avoid uncertain and costly political transitions. China has long been a staunch supporter of the despotic one-party regime in North Korea, but its sponsorship is driven less by an ideological commitment to bolstering communism or autocracy abroad than it is with a concern about the regional disorder that might accompany any political transition. Aside from the geo-strategic damage that might be done to China’s position in the region if North Korea became more closely tied to South Korea, and thus joined the US sphere of influence, China would be the likely destination for potentially massive refugee flows that an unstable transition in North Korea might produce. China thus has a strong strategic motivation to promote political stability and regime continuity in Pyongyang.

States frequently also sponsor autocratic regimes abroad in order to serve their domestic political interests, especially regarding the survival of their own regime. Alliances with autocratic states do not just accrue security dividends in the international sphere, but can also facilitate stability and prosperity at home. Authoritarian incumbents often support authoritarian governments elsewhere because of a fear of the contagion that transitions from authoritarian rule might entail. As a result, they seek to bolster existing elites and frustrate efforts to introduce democracy and elections. Saudi Arabian intervention to crush Shia protests in Bahrain can also partly be understood as a move to limit the possible contagion of pro-democracy protests to its own minority Shia population in its eastern provinces.

Similarly, states can have their own economic motivation for defending and protecting incumbent autocrats abroad. China, for example, has been identified as a potent force behind the stability of many autocratic regimes in Africa, offering economic and security assistance to a wide range of dictators. However, China deals with African democracies as well as autocracies, and its policies are driven primarily by economic rather than ideological considerations. As the authors of a recent authoritative study on Chinese arms trade in the region conclude, ‘China’s economic motives in Africa do not threaten democracies. National interest, not ideology, drives US and Chinese weapons exports to Africa’.8

Conclusion
The international dimensions of authoritarian rule are diverse and complex. Autocratic elites are helped and hindered by a variety of outside influences, ranging from fluctuations in the international economy, diffusion effects from events in other parts of the world, and shifts in great power relations. Outside efforts to support or defend autocratic elites constitute an important source of these international influences on authoritarian politics. Yet framing these efforts as forms of ‘autocracy promotion’ suggests they represent the flip side of the coin of democracy promotion in ways that are analytically misleading. A key issue here is actor intention, and the presence or absence of an over-arching motivation to promote a particular form of regime type abroad. In order for the idea of autocracy promotion to be useful, it must apply only to those cases where the predominant intention of external actors is to promote authoritarianism as a form of regime type. Yet current treatments of the concept group together diverse forms of international assistance that include multiple instances of external support that, while potentially helpful for autocratic elites, are driven by intentions unrelated to authoritarianism itself. We can and should talk about the international support of authoritarian regimes, and develop theories about the ways in which different forms of such support (including military aid, development assistance, economic subsidies and diplomatic backing) may or may not contribute to authoritarian stability. We should not, however, conceptualise such efforts in a way that conceals meaningful variation by assuming a common set of intentions and by raising misleading parallels with the practice of democracy promotion.

Oisin Tansey is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at King’s College London.

Apart from a few attempts to unravel the international diffusion of authoritarian practices, the literature on the international dimension of authoritarianism has focused on the anti-democratic influences of particular external actors. So far, scholars have primarily analyzed interventions of authoritarian great powers like Russia and China in their respective neighborhoods or strong regional authoritarian players like Venezuela or South Africa during Apartheid. Anti-democratic influences of regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been also brought forward as relevant examples. In addition to authoritarian regimes and international organizations, democratic states sometimes also behave as anti-democratic external actors, evident from, for example, US support to military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s or its long-time support for autocratic Egypt and Bahrain, or from French support to former colonies such as Cameroon and Gabon.

This plethora of single-case and comparative case-studies has provided us with a necessary foundation for further deepening our understanding of external actors whose actions contribute to an international push for autocracy. But before taking the next necessary step towards broader comparative analyses we must first address two fundamental issues. One is conceptual and concerns the issue of how to define and distinguish various types of external actors. The other is methodological and has to do with the problems associated with studying external actions that often are covert and therefore difficult to observe, and not least, assess the impact of.

The Conceptual Problem

Reading the above-cited studies of anti-democratic influences of external actors, it is clear that the question of terminology remains disputed. In their seminal book on competitive authoritarianism, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, with inspiration from writings on economic sanctions, refer to the influence of ‘black knights’; Thomas Ambrosio in his study of Russia calls it ‘authoritarian resistance’; Peter Burnell and Rachel Vanderhill each use the concept ‘autocracy promotion’; and I myself have in earlier works advocated for the term ‘negative external actor’.

Obviously, the discipline could benefit from more conceptual clarity and not least a clearer definition of the object under scrutiny. Recalling Giovanni Sartori’s oft-cited warning against ‘concept misformation’, only conceptual clarity can help ensure that scholars do not compare apples and oranges.

The problem is that different terms have different connotations. Using a term like ‘autocracy promoter’ obviously suggests that we are dealing with an external actor that deliberately inhibits democracy and intentionally advances autocracy. But this does not necessarily reflect how it is used in the field. To provide an example, Vanderhill, a proponent of the term ‘autocracy promoters’, writes: ‘the primary goal of their support may not be to develop authoritarian regimes, but the outcome of their support is an increase in authoritarianism in the recipient country.’ Students of democracy promotion would never term an external actor whose actions unintentionally strengthen democracy in another country a ‘democracy promoter’. The problem is, of course, that disentangling real motives behind the actions of an external actor is so tremendously difficult that we often shy away from dealing with it. The risk, however, is that we bundle together in the same category unintended and intended consequences of various external actors’ actions. Though I have argued differently in earlier writings, ignoring this distinction may prove problematic. Particularly so as we, hopefully, move towards competitive authoritarianism; 41; Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash, 11; Peter J. Burnell, Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?, Working Paper 96 (FRIDE, 2010), http://www.fride.org/descarga/WP96_Autocracy_ENG_mar10.pdf; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad, 7–9.


7. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad, 8–9.
complementing small-N studies with larger comparative analyses. Not only will it muddy estimates of the effects of external interventions, but it will also mess up attempts to isolate the factors that lead external actors to exert anti-democratic influences.

I propose that we take these different scenarios into consideration when carving out our theoretical concepts. In Table 1, I offer a fourfold typology of external actors based on two dimensions: the aim or the motives of the external actor and the actual effects of its actions. This leaves us with four ideal types of external actors, all of relevance for the study of the international dimension of regime change and stability: two main types (‘democracy promoter’ and ‘black knight’) and two subsidiary types (‘inadvertent democracy-enabler’ and ‘inadvertent democracy-constrainer’).

The main advantage of this disaggregated approach is that we avoid the conflation of what are in fact very different categories of external actors. Most important for the study of the international dimension of authoritarianism, we reserve one of the most commonly used terms ‘black knights’ solely for what seems to be intentional and if not successful then at least non-counterproductive interventions. Of course this typology does not solve the main problem of distinguishing ‘true’ autocracy promoters from the external actors who willingly accept that an obvious side effect of their interventions is bolstering of an autocratic regime or destabilization of a young democracy. But unlike ‘autocracy promoter’, I think both of these can reasonably be categorized under the concept ‘black knight’. The main thing, however, is that this conceptual exercise raises awareness to the fact that anti-democratic external actors are far from a homogenous group.

Based on this, I propose to define black knights as external actors – be they democratic or authoritarian, great powers or regional powers, states or international organizations – that in specific contexts act as guardians of autocracy or challengers of democracy. Note that this also means that acting as a black knight is not something that is intrinsic to particular international actors, but must rather be understood as a specific role that any actor might resort to towards a particular target state at a particular point in time.

In addition, we now have the language to speak of (and separately analyze) those external actors that do not fit the main types of ‘black knights’ and ‘democracy promoters’. Those external actors that seek to develop democracy but end up making things worse (from a democratic perspective) can thus be termed ‘inadvertent democracy-constrainers’. A recent example of such external influence could be the US-led military operations against the advancements of the radical Islamist group ISIS in Northern Iraq. As ISIS is also an important player in the civil war in neighboring Syria, where various groups fight to depose longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad, an undesired side-effect of the US-led operations is that Syria’s embattled ruler is strengthened vis-à-vis his domestic opponents and his chances of regaining power and reinstating absolute authoritarianism are, ceteris paribus, increased. To term the United States and its allies ‘promoters of autocracy’ in this context would of course be misleading. This is why we need a concept like ‘inadvertent democracy-constrainers’. Likewise, actors that originally aim for subverting democracy or bolstering autocracy, but whose interventions eventually prove counterproductive, as they instead end up weakening authoritarian rule and pushing democratization forward, could be labeled ‘inadvertent democracy-enablers’. Russian support for former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Maidan demonstrations may indeed have contributed to solidifying and further mobilizing anti-Yanukovych forces, and thus accelerating, not preventing, the process of authoritarian breakdown. Again, without a term like ‘inadvertent democracy-enablers’ we simply lack a category for this type of external interventions.

### Table 1: Typology of External Actors

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<th>Aim of external intervention</th>
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<tr>
<td>Developing democracy</td>
<td>Subverting democracy/bolstering autocracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developing democracy</td>
<td>Inadvertent democracy-constrainer</td>
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<td>Subverting democracy</td>
<td>Inadvertent democracy-enabler</td>
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<td>Black Knight</td>
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Finally, we can more easily deal with the problem of time. Often the interventions of an external actor produce antidemocratic effects in the short term but spur pro-democratic processes in the longer term, or vice versa. Again Russian actions in the post-Soviet region provide a telling example. There is no doubt that Russia’s covert warfare in Eastern Ukraine is causing economic and political instability and thereby it is hindering or at least stalling democratic progress in the short term. In the longer term, however, the intervention may prove counterproductive, as Russian aggression seems to lead Ukrainian voters to increasingly demand European integration, thus putting more domestic pressure on Ukraine’s political leaders to abide by the European Union’s democratic conditionality. The result of the latest parliamentary elections in end-October 2014 certainly points in that direction. In case this backfire-scenario continues, we can rightfully term Russia a ‘black knight’ in the short run and an ‘inadvertent democracy-enabler’ in the longer run. The important thing is not how scholars delineate between the short- and the long-term effects, but merely that we are aware of the challenge that time constitutes and start thinking more systematically about how different types of external interventions may have different consequences in the short and the long run. The conceptual categories presented in Table 1 constitute the first necessary step towards such an endeavor.

**The Problem of Observing and Estimating the Unobservable**

Conceptual ambiguity, however, is not the only, and certainly not the greatest, challenge we face. Much more worrying is our constrained ability to observe black knight interventions in the first place, say estimate its effects. The challenge is that many facets of support for autocracies are provided covertly: promises of support are given in closed bilateral meetings; cash-transfers and non-transparent loans are transferred off-the-record; and military advisors, troops or personnel are dispatched in secrecy, for instance. All these examples of black knight support are likely to affect both the capabilities and the strategies of an authoritarian regime and thus change its ability to maintain and consolidate power. But if we have no solid documentation of what has really happened between the external actor and the leadership of the target state, are we then capable of saying anything about the importance of the external sponsorship? I think we are. But we need to be more honest about the data constraints we are facing. Much of the empirical evidence brought forward in recent publications on black knight interferences is simply of too dubious a quality to support the sweeping conclusions made. We must attune our conclusions to the available empirical evidence and even be ready to accept the fact that sometimes we do not know for sure what exactly happened in a specific case.

Even if we can observe black knight support, we still face the daunting challenge of estimating the effects of particular interventions on the regime level of the target state. To explain, let me briefly turn to the subfield of democracy promotion, where scholars have long struggled with the problem of assessing regime-level effects of particular democracy promotion strategies. Usually, researchers in the discipline proceed in the following way: First, they present evidence on the type and scale of the external intervention in a given country (e.g., what kind, and how much, support was given to particular pro-democratic NGOs?). Next, the regime-stabilizing or regime-destabilizing role played by exactly those actors or institutions targeted by this external intervention is analyzed (e.g., did the targeted pro-democratic NGO play an important role in bringing down autocracy?). Finally, based on these two observations, conclusions about the overall impact of democracy promotion are drawn. Most often, however, all that is available is a figure for the amount of money transferred to a particular domestic actor, such as the exemplified pro-democratic NGO, the number and type of programs offered to it, etc. But this does not tell us much about whether the capacity or the intentions of the NGO have really changed, which is crucial in order to understand why, for instance, authoritarian breakdown suddenly happen? Without such evidence, assessments of the impact of the external intervention really come down to, at best, well-considered counterfactuals and, at worst, outright unfounded conclusions. In an attempt to come closer to the real effects of democracy promotion, the use of field experiments has recently entered the discipline, allowing researchers to randomly assign democracy promotion treatments to otherwise similar subjects and thus effectively controlling for potential confounders. Though this is a step in the right direction, it is clear that there is still a long way to go before we are able to say anything about which democracy promotion strategies are most effective.

Methodologically, the literature on the international dimension of authoritarianism has by and large adopted the traditional approach used in democracy promotion research. Not

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surprisingly, this has left the discipline with many of the same problems. In fact, the challenges seem even bigger due to the severe data constraints discussed above. So what to do? For obvious ethical reasons, we cannot resort to constructed field experiments and randomly assign autocracy promotion treatments to different subjects. What we should strive for, however, is to make much better use of the experimental logic in comparative analyses of black knight interventions. One way to do this is to design studies in a way that not only focus on positive cases, but includes negative cases as well. Ideally, we should compare the effects of anti-democratic interventions in country A to how a relatively similar country B facing a parallel domestic context without, or at least with a different level of, external support develops. For instance, one could focus on particular regime-threatening events such as mass demonstrations. Contrasting the case of Bahrain during the Arab Spring, where both Saudi Arabia and the United States provided ample support to the monarch, to similar cases with popular mobilization but with different values on the external dimension and the outcome of the uprising (such as Yemen in the same period or the Iranian Pahlavi regime right before the revolution in 1979) is likely to bring illuminating insights on the way in which and the degree to which black knight support can help embattled dictators survive.

Even when researchers do not engage in comparative case studies, empirical analyses can be improved by, a priori, identifying the ‘empirical footprints’ that either supports or contradicts theoretical propositions. Take the case of a black knight that through public statements grants political support to a dictatorial regime under siege by mass demonstrations. What we should do is to ask ourselves, what we would expect to see, if we are right that such black knight support does indeed solidify the regime and make it more capable of resisting pressure. Do we see evidence that the dictator acts with more confidence and suddenly decisively clamps down on protesters out of the expectation that the black knight will come to his rescue should he fail? Do elite supporters now rally behind him more decisively and more vocally voice their support for the status quo? Were we not to see any evidence of such scenarios playing out, it seems fair to write off the black knight factor as an important explanation for regime survival. Though this advice may sound obvious and banal, it can be tremendously difficult to comply with in practice. Nevertheless, it is a necessary next step for researchers in the field.

All the methodological challenges pointed to will probably continue to haunt research on external actors and their anti-democratic influences for many years to come. Simply downplaying or, what is worse, ignoring them will not make them go away. Instead we must tackle them head on. Here I have offered some initial thoughts on how to actually do this. I hope that others will follow suit.

Jakob Tolstrup is assistant professor of political science at Aarhus University, Denmark.
their goals.

There has been far less attention paid to democratic black knights, despite an evident historical record. For example, the United States acted as such during the Cold War and afterwards, particularly in the Middle East. Britain and France have acted similarly in relation to their former colonies. Nonetheless, studies of authoritarian stability and survival woefully underexplore democratic black knights. This essay seeks to begin a conversation to correct this deficit. While its scope prevents any definitive answers, it aims to provide an overview of the current state of our knowledge regarding the following questions: Why do democracies act as black knights? What are the methods they use? And, under what circumstances will a democracy withdraw its black knight support from an autocracy and instead promote democratization? The empirical focus is on the United States, the chief democratic black knight from the twentieth century to the present.

Democratic Black Knight Motivations

The logics behind authoritarian states’ policies either in defense of like-minded regimes or to undermine democracy are potentially wide-ranging. For democracies, however, engaging in black knight policies is more problematic since these states generally have a normative commitment to human rights and democracy. This is especially true for the United States, given its origins and the connections between its national identity and form of government. Nonetheless, the U.S. and others have repeatedly supported regimes whose political and civil values are antithetical to their own.

Not surprisingly, the primary motivation for democratic black knight behavior is national security interests. Boix argued that this tendency is especially strong in highly competitive international environments. During the Cold War, this was particularly evident as fears of communism led the U.S. to back friendly autocrats and to support the overthrow of leftist democratically-elected governments. After the Cold War, the U.S. has acted more as an active democracy promoter. The wider Middle East is the main exception where anti-Islamism has replaced anti-communism as a motivating force for supporting authoritarian regimes, especially after 9-11. There are also more specific security issues sometimes contributing to the justification for black knight policies, such as the desire to guarantee the stability of bilateral alliances, demonstrate that America’s autocratic allies can rely on Washington to aid them, ensure that these states maintain a commitment to American security interests, and secure immutable and irreplaceable security or intelligence assets.

A related line of reasoning has to do with the consequences for the people in these societies in the absence of the current autocratic rulers. The central argument in Kirkpatrick’s article was that that right-wing dictatorship repressed their populations less than their totalitarian, communist counterparts. It, therefore, was a moral act to support these autocrats and prod them toward democracy, rather than undermining them and risking a far worse regime taking power. In the context of contemporary Muslim autocrats, one can detect a similar tone underlying U.S. concerns that the fall of these regimes could lead to the installation of Islamic fundamentalist governments – an outcome seen as worse for their populations than the...
countries to launch a coup or by signaling that they would not be punished for doing so. This was also done through other, covert means including funding friendly oppositions (including supplying arms) or seeking to discredit these governments politically and diplomatically. In the case of Chile, the U.S. also utilized political and economic pressure to prevent the Allende government from coming to power. Nonetheless, these types of black knight activities were relatively rare, even during the Cold War, since directly or indirectly causing the fall of a democratic government was widely seen as such a betrayal of America’s core values. Instead, American policy focused on strengthening autocratic allies.

In cases where an authoritarian regime already exists, a democratic black knight’s policies focus on reinforcing the government’s position in power. A central argument made in explaining autocratic survival is the quality and expansiveness of a government’s coercive capacity. Democratic states have provided direct military assistance through arms transfers, training foreign officers, or providing military and internal security advisors. Military aid is often accompanied by general financial assistance utilized by regimes to strengthen their rule by enhancing macroeconomic stability, maintaining patron-client relationships, and providing public goods to the people. Since elite and military defections are an established contributor to authoritarian collapse, external aid can be very important in preventing this by providing additional funds to ensure regime legitimacy. However, this aid is not only material, but also psychological and political. Having a democracy providing an autocratic regime with support gives that regime some degree of legitimacy. This can serve as a powerful statement, which can act to undermine the morale of democratic opposition and attempt to discredit pro-democracy movements.

Democratic governments can also protect authoritarian regimes from negative consequences. This includes providing diplomatic cover for the government internationally and preventing the imposition of economic and other types of sanctions. More commonly it includes a policy of omission – not imposing costs on an autocratic government for its violations of human rights and civil liberties. According to Levitsky and Way, the differing trajectories of democracy and authoritarianism in the post-Cold War period can be in part explained by the linkage of states to the democratic powers and the amount of leverage that these have over the target states. States that are more vulnerable to such pressure are more likely to move toward democracy, and vice versa. However, such leverage must be exercised to be effective. In the case of democratic black knights, they decide not to exercise that leverage and thus permit their authoritarian ally to act without consequences. An excellent example of this is the U.S.-Egyptian relationship in which, “there is no autocracy more linked to and more leveraged by the United States than that of Egypt. Rather than siding with the opposition, however, America backed the ruling coalition of an authoritarian regime.” This will be similar for other U.S. allies in which there are extensive economic and intergovernmental linkages that are not utilized and therefore help to preserve the non-democratic status quo, such as throughout the Persian Gulf.

Democratic Black Knight Reversals

There are times that a democratic black knight reverses its policy by withdrawing its support and possibly pressuring its former autocratic client to democratize.


Such changes occurred during the late Cold War period when the U.S. played a significant role in the democratic transitions in the Philippines, South Korea, and Chile. While the decision to reverse course might appear at first to be as obvious as deciding in favor of values over interests, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, the ultimate goal seems to remain the same: the pursuit of national security interests.

In several of these cases, there was serious concern that the policy of regime support was counterproductive and that there was a risk of an even worse outcome due to a possible broadening and radicalizing the opposition. One feared that this could lead to the regime's downfall and a government inimical to the United States. By pushing for a managed transition, rather than allowing things to potentially lead to a revolution, the U.S. sought to be an enabler of democratization in order to prevent this outcome and to better secure its interests in a post-authoritarian environment. This was especially true after specific acts of repression, such as after the assassination of Benigno Aquino and the blatant attempt to steal the 1986 election in the Philippines, and after the increasingly violent crackdowns in response to popular protests in Chile. Being seen as a friend to the people, rather than of their oppressive government, was thought to pay dividends after democratization. Thus, once American security interests seemed secured or were seen as being served better by advancing a democracy promotion agenda, a change in policy was more likely to occur.

This change was facilitated by a changing security environment.

Returning to Boix's observation cited above, a democracy is more likely to act as a black knight in a more highly competitive environment than in a less competitive one. Accordingly, the turn in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy promotion occurred towards the end of the Cold War period. After the Cold War ended, democracy promotion assumed an even larger role in U.S. foreign policy. The same logic can explain why American policy in the Middle East has remained largely the same despite the end of the Cold War: concerns over Iranian influence in the region and the possibility of anti-American, Islamic governments replacing these regimes means that Washington continues to see the security environment in the Middle East as competitive.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that support for authoritarianism can be reassessed even in highly competitive international environments. Adesnik and McFaul cited the ideational change in the Reagan administration's foreign policy represented by his Westminster Speech of 1982, in which the U.S. would maintain relations with its autocratic allies, but begin to actively push them toward democratic change. Despite the reenergizing of the Cold War at this time, this demonstrated that the seeds for a change from black knight to white knight behavior may occur despite a security environment incentivizing policymakers to maintain the current policy. If so, the question of democratic support for authoritarian regimes is perhaps more open-ended than the focus on security issues would suggest.

Conclusion

This returns us to the question raised in the very beginning of this piece and should prompt us to more deeply examine the phenomenon of democratic black knights. For example, other than the U.S., how have other democratic states and institutions acted as black knights? Both Levitsky and Way, as well as Seeberg and Tolstrup, cited other democratic states and even the European Union acting in this capacity, but there has been nowhere near the same amount of research on this topic as with the United States. We also need to better understand the motivations behind democratic support for authoritarian regimes. Are there specific types of security interests that make this more likely? Can we (or even should we) distinguish between aid which actively supports an autocratic government and that which has other purposes, such as development or humanitarian assistance, but has the same effect? In terms of black knight policies, there are a host of specific questions, including: Which are more likely to be used in certain circumstances? Whether and how they differ between democratic and authoritarian black knights? How effective are these policies at actually facilitating regime survival? Answering these will likely require a broader and explicitly comparative (and likely quantitative) research agenda, as opposed to the case-driven or historically-focused research heretofore produced. Finally, what are the conditions under which policy change is most likely to occur? This will be useful for predicting future policies, as well as whether the same policy goals can be achieved without supporting the authoritarian status quo. In short, additional research into democratic black knights is important for providing a richer understanding of the international influences reinforcing autocracy and promoting democracy.

Thomas Ambrosio is a Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University. His current research interests include the sources of stability of authoritarian regimes, strategies to counter democratic diffusion, and the international spread of authoritarianism.
High Stakes
Most analyses of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have argued that international concerns drove Russia to invade Ukraine—for example, Putin’s anger about Western support of an independent Kosovo, his desire to restore the international influence of Russia, and his growing fears by early 2014 that Ukraine would try to follow in the footsteps of twelve other postcommunist countries in the region and join the EU and especially NATO.√7 While these factors no doubt played a role, just as important—and we would suggest even more important—were the domestic influences on Putin’s actions in Ukraine.√8 In particular, Putin feared that Ukrainian unrest itself and what prompted it—widespread public anger about the economy and corruption and public support for a change in government—would spread quickly and easily to Russia as a result of the long border these two countries shared, their historical and cultural ties to one another, and their similar profile of extensive corruption. Central to the perceptions of similar problems and significant potential for the cross-national diffusion of unrest and governmental, if not regime, change was the fact that Russia and Ukraine had once been members of the same state. The entwined domestic and international space was also characteristic of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia in the 1990s, and it helps account for the similarities between Putin’s reading of developments in Ukraine and Milosevic’s understanding of the threats and opportunities posed by political changes in other former Yugoslav republics.

Putin first seemingly made the connection between Ukrainian unrest and his fears of popular uprisings in Russia in 2004. Putin had devoted considerable resources to supporting the election of Viktor Yanukovych in the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004 and even publicly congratulated him on his victory before the votes were counted (!), only to witness soon thereafter the outbreak of significant popular protests in response to the widespread public concerns that Viktor Yanukovych had stolen the election. These protests led in turn to another election that produced a victory for Viktor Yanukovych’s competitor, Viktor Yushchenko, who supported democratic and economic reforms, as well as a more pro-West foreign policy.

If Yushchenko’s policies were threatening to Russia, so was the fact that his victory came about as a result of the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution was part of a cross-national wave of election-based popular mobilizations that had led to the unexpected removal from power of authoritarian rulers in other competitive authoritarian regimes in the postcommunist region: Slovakia in 1998, Croatia and Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003.√3 Putin coded these color revolutions as the work of the West (as he more recently has argued with respect to the protests in Hong Kong); recognized the many similarities between these hybrid regimes and his own; and noticed as well that closer relations with the West had invariably followed in the wake of these opposition victories. As a result, Putin saw the Orange Revolution as a conjoined threat—to Russian security and his personal power.

While Putin made change in Ukraine a high priority, starting in 2004, his fears about his neighbor were somewhat assuaged by two subsequent developments: Yushchenko was not very successful in dealing with the many economic and political problems of Ukraine; and he was succeeded in a subsequent election by the loser in the 2004 elections and a close ally of Putin, Yanukovych. However, Putin’s sense of control over developments in Ukraine was not to last. Beginning in the late fall, 2013, Yanukovych’s decision to not sign a partnership agreement with the European Union (a decision aided by Russian promises of significant economic support) led to the eruption of widespread protests that called for an end to corruption, the introduction of ambitious political and economic reforms and, for many of the protesters, the forging of closer political-military and economic ties with Europe. What made these protests even more disturbing to the Kremlin was how long they lasted, despite a violent crackdown, and Yanukovych’s decision to leave office and flee the country four months after the demonstrations began. As a result, precisely at the moment when he needed more influence in Ukraine Putin had lost his man in Kyiv.

Also important were three other factors that made intervention in Ukraine a necessity from Putin’s perspective. His popularity, while still substantial on the eve of the crisis in Ukraine, had never fully recovered from a downturn in 2011. Of equal concern was the fact that Russian gains from high energy prices on the world market, which had buoyed the Russian economy during Putin’s rule and supported his popularity, had come to an end. Finally, public protests had broken out in the major cities of Russia in response to the fraudulent 2011 parliamentary elections. Putin, in short, felt vulnerable.


In Serbia in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Milosevic also faced significant challenges to his rule. Like Putin, he was confronted with waves of political transformations in Eastern Europe and with large-scale protests and secessionist movements in other former Yugoslav republics and provinces, both of which threatened to spread to Serbia. However, he was more embattled than Putin, given the significant size of the Serbian opposition and their propensity to launch protests; the disastrous state of the Serbian economy; and periodic defections from his ruling circle. These threats led him to embrace the cause of Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s and to launch a series of successive wars. By the mid-1990s, opposition to Milosevic grew and consolidated, as did the size, cohesion and ambitions of public protests. Milosevic’s electoral victories came to rest on a political formula that included low turnout, cooptation and even execution of certain opposition leaders, ballot-stuffing, and, where necessary, a refusal to abide by the negative verdicts of the voters.

Thus, Putin and, we would argue, especially Milosevic, engaged in acts of international aggression when they were increasingly vulnerable at home. They could no longer project an “image of invincibility” that is so vital in all, but especially competitive authoritarian regimes for keeping domino networks in place, dividing the opposition and, more generally, preempting credible domestic challenges to their power. They were, in short, in search of a boost to their popularity, and Ukraine in the case of Putin (as earlier with the second war in Chechnya) and Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo in the case of Milosevic provided it.

The Repertoire of Intervention

The remarkable similarities between Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Milosevic’s earlier actions in Bosnia and Croatia (and Kosovo) have led one analyst to comment that: “If Milosevic were alive today, he would sue Putin for plagiarism.” In particular, both repertoires of intervention were based upon a similar logic of committing aggression against a neighboring state in ways that reduced the threats posed by that state, contributed to their popular support at home, justified growing repression and minimized the risks associated with international intervention. In practice, achieving all these objectives meant proceeding on four fronts.

First, Putin and Milosevic used instability abroad to justify growing repression at home as a necessary response to combatting the “enemy at the gates” and, at the same time, rallying local citizens around the flag—and, not incidentally, the leader himself. For example, both Milosevic and Putin took steps in the first half of the 1990s in the first case and in 2013-2014 to significantly expand state control over non-governmental organizations and the media and to skillfully use the media to present themselves as “saviors of the nation” against revisionist historical forces. Putin, in particular, was able to use state-controlled Russian TV (which was also beamed to eastern Ukraine) and social media — to depict the Euromaidan protesters as fascists; (thereby playing to historical tropes); Yanukovych’s departure from Ukraine as a coup d’état engineered by those “fascists;” and the rebels in eastern Ukraine as Russian brethren who had been victimized by the fascists and, later, the indiscriminate violence committed by the Ukrainian military. At the same time, he also used the media to extol the legitimacy of Crimea’s “rightful” return to Russia—a return that was publicly portrayed as evidence that Russia as a country was growing, not contracting, and playing a more powerful role in the international system.

As a result of these efforts, Putin’s popularity approached stratospheric levels, beginning with the annexation of Crimea in March, 2014 (though interventions in eastern Ukraine were less popular). By appealing to Russian nationalism, Putin did not just mobilize existing popular support; he also added on to his political base by extending his appeal to two constituencies that had been critical of him, that is, extreme nationalists within Russia and many members of the liberal opposition that put patriotism ahead of their demands for reform. These were precisely the benefits that Milosevic had reaped when he discovered the mobilizing and demobilizing benefits of appealing to Serbian nationalism.7

Second, a major purpose of Russian actions in eastern Ukraine, as with Milosevic’s actions in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, was to substitute one form of instability with another that was far better designed to serve the domestic interests of Putin and Milosevic. For instance, Russian annexation of Crimea and its support of rebellion in eastern Ukraine, together with the economic and political turmoil of the country and the inability of the Ukrainian government and military to secure the borders of the state all made it clear that Ukraine had a very poor case indeed for joining Europe.8 Moreover, Moscow had the benefit in these developments of applying a model in Ukraine that it had successfully applied elsewhere, such as in Georgia and Moldova — the creation of a statelet on its


8. As per Putin’s script, after Ukrainian Parliament’s vote to abandon its nonaligned status on December 23rd, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told Norwegian media that Ukraine’s bid to NATO “membership would be hampered by territorial disputes — a reference to the Crimean Peninsula and the simmering conflict with Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s southeast.” See Andrew Roth, “Ukraine Briefly Cuts Power to Crimea Amid Feud with Russia Over NATO,” http://nyti.ms/1x4CN1b


This leads to the third component of the repertoire of intervention - the mimicking, yet violation of international norms. Thus, in the case of the annexation of Crimea, Moscow made it hard for the West to forcefully respond to the Russian violation of the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine by arguing, despite evidence to the contrary, that: 1) Russia did not invade the Crimea; 2) the Russian population there and Moscow’s Black Sea fleet were threatened by the formation of a hostile and illegitimate government in Ukraine, and; 3) the population voted in support of annexation (though the vote was taken with the Russian military on the ground, and the inflated figures on both ciout for the referendum and the “yes” votes were subsequently disputed by Moscow’s own Civil Society and Human Rights Council). To these claims, Putin also added, repeatedly, that Crimea was an historical - and, indeed, “sacred”- part of Russia. With respect to their support of rebellion in eastern Ukraine, Moscow denied that they provided soldiers and weaponry, while arguing that the government in Kyiv was threatening the Russian minority and that the region in any event had strong historical connections to Russia. In these ways, Moscow masked its violations of the norm of state sovereignty, while embracing other, important international norms, including minority rights, the rights of all nations to self-determination and, especially, R2P (though Moscow’s interpretation of the R2P, in particular, was at considerable variance with how this norm has been defined). This strategic use of international norms has made it harder for the West to coalesce around a common and forceful response to Russian aggression. What also divided the West and undermined its ability to stand up to Russia was Europeans’ uneven dependence on Russian oil and gas.

Precisely the same game of manipulating international norms in order to rally domestic support and divide the international community had been played by Milosevic during the 1990s when he intervened in neighboring countries while embracing the cause of all those Serbs who lived in Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Kosovo. The consequences of this game, moreover, were somewhat similar. Just as the West for some time tolerated Milosevic’s interventions in neighboring republics, in part because the wars of Yugoslav dissolution masked Serbia’s role in the process and in part because the West was fixated on the disintegration of the Soviet Union, so Western reactions to the annexation of Crimea were surprisingly muted. A war of aggression, for example, was dubbed an incursion by the White House while prominent European politicians suggested Russia’s “annexation of Crimea be retroactively recognised by international law, so that it be acceptable for all.”


Conclusions

Putin invaded Ukraine because developments there threatened his domestic hold on power, and he used a repertoire of intervention that...


13. As mentioned above, the Ukrainian Parliament’s vote on December 23, 2014, which revoked its non-aligned status (which had been formally declared while Yanukovych was President), has heightened tensions between Moscow and Kyiv. On December 26, 2014, Putin announced Russia’s new military doctrine which singles out NATO as its top military threat.
boosted his popularity at home, legitimated growing repression and reduced the usual costs associated with international aggression. A virtually identical explanation can be provided, moreover, for how and why Slobodan Milosevic intervened in Croatia and Bosnia, along with Kosovo, in the 1990s.

A word of caution, though - looking at Ukraine with an eye to Serbia and the Yugoslav frozen conflicts might also infuse some undue optimism into this analysis. After all, regime change – and even international justice – eventually caught up with Slobodan Milosevic. But, there are several reasons why the Russian case should give us pause. First, unlike Serbia, Russia is a resource-rich nuclear power whose political reach goes well beyond its immediate neighborhood. Production and support of statelets has become somewhat of a specialty of the Putin regime (and builds on some actions of Yeltsin as well) – whether it is South Ossetia in Georgia, Transdniestr in Moldova, or the newly established Donets and Lugansk People’s Republics in Ukraine. Russia’s influence now extends even to Milosevic’s former strongholds - Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the area around Kosovska Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo. These political netherlands act as permanent destabilizers in their regions and can be easily mobilized to produce further chaos even by quasi democratic means such as referenda. Second, just as in Serbia, economic sanctions are likely to have a lasting criminalizing effect, reproducing a stigmatized elite ambivalent towards the West yet perfectly adept at playing the game of capitalism to its advantage. Finally, both the emphasis on covert operations in the Russian repertoire of interventions and the criminalizing effects of Western sanctions may enhance rather than weaken the security apparatus of the Russian state – locking in the regime in a way that would be even less susceptible to electoral change than it has been thus far.

Nonetheless, there are several implications that we can draw from this admittedly skeletal analysis of two hybrid regimes and their decisions to commit aggression against neighboring countries. First, most studies of the strategic foundations of authoritarian rule (whether of the competitive or non-competitive types) have treated the issue of the maximization of power of authoritarian rulers as a domestic game. As this study suggests, most authoritarian leaders are international, as well as domestic, actors. Precisely because the international system provides these leaders with both threats to their powers and opportunities to defend and expand them, rational authoritarian rulers must craft both international and domestic strategies to achieve their political objectives. Indeed, this generalization would seem to be particularly relevant for hybrid regimes, such as Serbia under Milosevic and Russia under Putin, because the popularity of the leader is tested to some degree in competitive elections and because this form of authoritarian regime—in contrast to at least some non-competitive authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea—is invariably embedded in international politics.

Second, scholars who work on ethnofederalism and specialists in international relations who focus on international conflict need to pay more attention to the longer-term consequences of state dissolution. It is not just that the largest successor states have significant diaspora populations and can easily find reasons, as a result, to intervene in their neighborhoods, as we saw in the cases of both Russia and Serbia. It is also that the international community can divide over how to respond to these actions, because changes in state boundaries have recent precedents; the dominant state to emerge from dissolution has some claims about establishing a zone of influence based upon the boundaries of the original state; and aggression takes place under the banners of protecting minority rights and responsibility to protect. These points recognized, however, it is important to note that, while Serbia and Russia can be “matched” in terms of their history as the largest successor states to emerge from a dissolved ethnofederation, that similarity might very well put limits on how typical their behavior is for other hybrid regimes that lack such ancestry. On the other hand, there is nonetheless an undeniable logic, as we have developed in this paper, for leaders of hybrid regimes to use, if not construct international threats and to carry out aggressive responses to those threats in order to mobilize domestic political support.

Finally, the constraints on state behavior produced by international norms can work in ways quite opposite to what many analysts have noted. In particular, just as the manipulation of such norms can embolden states to commit aggression against neighboring states, so this manipulation can also constrain the willingness and ability of other states to defend those norms.

Valerie Bunce is the Aaron Binenkorb Chair of International Studies at Cornell University. Aida A. Hozic is an associate professor of international relations at the University of Florida. The authors thank Alexander Astrov, Mark Beissinger, Matthew Evangelista, Jonathan Kirshner, Igor Logvinenko, Bryan Moraski, Ido Oren and Jelena Subotic for their comments.


15. On international preferences of stigmatized elites, see Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned To Live With the West (Cambridge University Press, 2011); on Russia's dangerous capitalism, see Karen Dawisha's Putin's Plutocracy (Simon & Schuster 2014); and on effects of sanctions in Putin's version of capitalism, see Masha Gessen, “The Myth of the Russian Oligarchs.”http://nyti.ms/1zumbJp
their challengers at home. Despite the historical significance of this phenomenon, the role of authoritarian great powers in the diffusion of authoritarianism is still relatively under-explored in the field of comparative democratization and de-democratization.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which once appeared isolated and vulnerable amid the post-Tiananmen legitimacy crisis, has been pursuing an alternative trajectory to modernity to resist the international diffusion of democratic liberalism. Recently, the specter of a China model as an alternative modernization model has largely enhanced the normative power of autocracy over democracy in international political systems. As China has replaced the U.S. as either the largest foreign investor or the largest export market for a series of countries, especially in developing regions such as Africa and South East Asia, it has played a growing significant role in the international diffusion of authoritarianism not only through promoting China’s modernization model worldwide, but also through shaping the development of social factions in countries where it can exercise strong influence. Therefore, China will be an important case for us to understand the roles and strategies of authoritarian great powers in the international diffusion of authoritarianism.

Based upon existing literature on international diffusion of institutions in general, we probably can identify two mechanisms of the diffusion of authoritarianism: values and social organizations. For the diffusion of values, Thomas Ambrosio contends appropriateness and effectiveness as the two key dynamics for the diffusion of authoritarianism. The existence of a successful China model itself already shows the appropriateness and effectiveness of authoritarianism to countries where liberal political culture is not widely shared and their political elite and citizens value wealth accumulation more than political freedom. For the diffusion of social organizations, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that leverage and linkage are the major mechanism for great powers to affect the direction of democratization and de-democratization in small countries. Leverage, or the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external pressure, usually indicates the direct exercise of power to demand a desired consequence. Linkage, or the density of economic, political, social and cultural ties and cross-border flows of trade, investment, people, and communication, is a more profound way for external great powers to shape the development of social factions in the affected countries. To defy the diffusion of authoritarianism, besides the counter influence of democratic great powers, constant public scrutiny and monitor from the liberal-minded social groups in the civil society probably play a more important role.3

The 2014 student movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong should be understood in this context. On the surface, the “Sunflower Movement” in Taiwan and the “Umbrella Revolution” in Hong Kong were two social movements independent of each other with different issues of contention. Participants of the “Sunflower Movement” occupied Taiwan’s parliament for three weeks in March 2014 to protest the passing of a trade pact with China by the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), in the parliament without a clause-by-clause review. In September 2014, participants of the “Umbrella Revolution” protested outside the Hong Kong government headquarters and occupied several major city intersections to demand real universal suffrage to replace the constrained electoral reform implemented by Beijing. Both movements received surprisingly wide support from society and thus seem to be reflective of people’s deep anxiety that the diffusion of China’s authoritarian model will destroy the liberal values and institutions they hold.

**Authoritarianism 2.0**

China’s authoritarian model is defined here as an economic globalization model based upon illiberal state-market relations and illiberal state-society relations.4 It is referred to as Authoritarianism 2.0 because, with a market economy actively participating in globalization and a political system operated according to rule by law, it looks less brutal than traditional authoritarianism and, some may believe, compatible with liberal international norms.5 In practice, it is illiberal because its market economy operates based upon a hierarchical particularistic pecking order rather than the universal rules of competition, and its political system works according to rule by law to maintain public order and regime stability, rather than rule of law to protect political rights and civil liberties.

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic liberalism has become the dominant ideology in large swaths of the world. Taiwan represents a successful story of

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peaceful democratic transition during the “third wave” of democratization. Hong Kong is an enviable model of laissez-faire economy in the neoliberal global market. In both places, the people evidently have strong identities and pride in their own institutions and statuses in this liberal world order. Nevertheless, sitting on the frontline of America’s engagement policy towards China, both have been the big external contributors to, and beneficiaries of, China’s economic rise.\(^6\) Deeply integrated in the rising Chinese economy, their liberal political and economic institutions have gradually eroded by the influence of China’s authoritarian model.

Despite Taiwan’s successful experiences of democratic transition and Hong Kong’s impressive history of laissez-faire economy, liberal political culture is not yet deeply rooted in these two societies. It is common for the more conservative opinion leaders in Taiwan and Hong Kong to praise the appropriateness and effectiveness of the China model in pursuing economic growth through authoritarian means. The advocates include business tycoons, politicians, journalists, and even scholars. As both the economies have been deeply integrated with China, they advocate the values of China’s authoritarian model not simply out of admiration, but also because they have substantial interests at stake. In this way, the influence of China’s authoritarian model has gradually gained forceful leverage and linkage over political factions in these societies.

Since Taiwan held its first presidential election in 1996, China has tried to influence the election results. Military exercises combined with verbal attacks from the CCP’s newspaper caused its unfavorable candidate, Lee Teng-hui, to win, rather than lose, the presidential election with a big margin. The counterproductive result prompted CCP leaders to change their strategy. Since 2000, the CCP has had prominent Taiwanese businessmen issue statements right before election day warning voters of the catastrophic economic consequences if the election result was not in Beijing’s favor. Yet, the strategy has not worked fully as intended, as evidenced by that Taiwan’s presidential election results have always been more related to domestic issues rather than to Beijing’s attitudes. However, as China’s attitude grew bolder after the 2008 financial crisis, Beijing’s influence in the 2012 presidential election was more blunt and explicit. In the final day before the election, Taiwanese voters were bombarded by business leaders’ statements and press conferences, and even a formal U.S. diplomat’s comments, to endorse Beijing’s favored candidate, the incumbent Ma Ying-jeou. Scholars, pundits, and even opposition leaders agree that a “China factor” played an unprecedentedly significant role in the 2012 presidential elections.

In the international diffusion of democracy and autocracy, linkage, through the proliferation of social organizations dependent upon economic, political, social, and cultural ties with the external influential power, is the real battlefield for determining the direction of diffusion. The Chinese government, wary of “peaceful evolution,” has always closely watched this battlefield, making efforts to ensure that democracy does not diffuse into the mainland. Although China has made itself wide open for investment, trade, and people flows from Hong Kong and Taiwan, political communications must proceed on its term, and social and cultural exchanges have been severely scrutinized and forbidden in sensitive areas. Media and culture-related industries are still closed to foreign investment, and the cross-border interaction of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia is still under official supervision. To be sure, Hong Kong and Taiwan have long been China’s largest sources of foreign direct investment (FDI). Taiwan and Hong Kong clearly enjoy the “soft power” in China’s emerging consumption culture through Chinese urban youth’s emulation of their pop singers, movie stars, and cosmopolitan lifestyles. Nevertheless, individualistic consumption culture is not equal to liberal-democratic values. With close supervision and control, the linkages of cross-border flows of investment, trade, and people have not really posed a threat to the Chinese authoritarian regime.

On the contrary, given the asymmetry in economic size, the cross-border linkages have gradually affected the liberal values and institutions in the two small open societies. The first problem is self-censorship and adulation. Broadcast media, newspapers, publishers, and individual performers who are eager to enter China’s market, at the very least, avoid criticizing the Chinese government. Some have even enthusiastically defended the Chinese government on sensitive issues. Especially in recent years, during which the conglomeration of media has become a global trend, local business tycoons who made big fortunes in China have aggressively taken control of important local media and bluntly intervened in the operation of the media in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus, the freedom of the press has been under serious threat in both societies.\(^7\)

The more profound impact of the cross-border linkage on domestic liberal...
institutions is the proliferation of political-business networks relying upon the Chinese government’s particularistic distribution of benefits for survival in the two societies. Particularism has long been observed as the most important character of China’s state capitalism. In China’s domestic market, the state has always used its regulatory power to grant market entry selectively in exchange for political loyalty. Since China signed the Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) with Hong Kong in 2003, and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan in 2008, the Chinese government began to use this particularistic distribution of market entry and investment to cultivate political factions in the two societies. As more business firms have been relying upon political connections with Beijing rather than their own market competitiveness for survival, the illiberal state–market relations of China’s authoritarian model have been gradually eroding the existing liberal market institutions in the two societies.

Civil Society 2.0

Civil society 2.0 here refers to the increasing public scrutiny and public control over the concentration of unaccountable government power facilitated by the Internet Communication Technology (ICT). As observed by democratic theorist John Keane, in the age of monitory democracy, public scrutiny and control from the civil society has played an increasing significant role to supplement conventional representative forms of democracy. A variety of democratic organizations are innovated to monitor government authorities. It is even more so in the age of the ICT. The ICT, just like the role of printing for the Reformation in the sixteenth century, has largely reduced communication and coordination costs for the cooperation of decentralized social forces and facilitated large-scale social protests against the concentration of unaccountable power since the beginning of the twenty-first century.8

At first glance, the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong look like other flash mob movements mobilized by young students via social media. As it turns out, both movements lasted much longer than anyone (including the organizers themselves) expected, received surprisingly wide support from their respective societies as well as the international community, and caused the most serious legitimacy crisis to their respective governments to date. The spontaneous protests were able to have such astonishingly strong impacts because they successfully coordinated the collective action to express existing anxiety about the diffusion of China’s authoritarian model. This is evident in the commonalities of the two movements.

The organizers of both movements were coalitions of young students who have been particularly sensitive to the diffusion of China’s authoritarianism in their societies over the last few years. The Sunflower Movement was organized by a coalition of college students across universities nationwide. The coalition was gradually formed around 2008 when the Wild Strawberry Movement, a nationwide student sit-in movement, was launched to protest against the police’s abusive actions in protecting a Chinese high-ranking official during his visit to Taiwan. In the following years, they took part in different social movements and then set up the “anti-media monopoly youth group” in 2012 to protest a series of mergers made by a pro-China Taiwanese tycoon, Tsai Eng-ming, to gain a monopoly over a string of media properties. The Umbrella Revolution also started with student protests organized by Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students. Scholarism was a student organization founded in 2012 to protest against making Chinese patriotic education a mandatory class in primary and secondary schools. The Federation of Students was one of the organizers of the Occupy Central with Peace and Love Movement.

The participants in the movements were mostly young students who might not have agreed with the cause of the anti-China organizers in the first place but felt obligated to join the protests when they saw the abuse of human rights and disrespect of due process in police actions to suppress the protests. In both movements, the reporting of violent suppression by the police through social media greatly helped to mobilize more participants to join the protests. Various survey data shows that people under 30 tend to view democracy as related to political rights and civil liberties, whereas cohorts above 30 are inclined to relate democracy to public order and government effectiveness.

Like Occupy movements everywhere, Internet Communication Technology (ICT) has played an indispensable role in these movements. Both movements can be seen as coalitions of citizens spontaneously organized through social media and Internet platforms built by local open-source programmers. The ICT has greatly helped these movements overcome coordination costs in collective action. For example, in the Sunflower Movement, open-source platforms have been built to facilitate deliberative policy debates, dissemination of government information, citizen journalism, and grassroots fund raising.9 Netizens’ social norms, such as decentralization, transparency, spontaneous participation, and direct democracy, were given great opportunities for experiments in these movements. In turn, the great effectiveness


of these platforms on mobilization and communication has largely enhanced participants’ sense of political efficacy. Thus, many of them continued to play the roles of channeling and encouraging citizens’ participation in public affairs even after the Sunflower Movement ended. The effects of younger generation’s enthusiastic political participation were evident in the process and consequence of the election in the end of 2014. The KMT led by Ma Ying-jeou only kept 6 of 15 local governments it held in 22 cities and counties nationwide. It is the biggest defeat since the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949.

Both the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong can be seen as the answer of the Civil Society 2.0 to the diffusion of China’s authoritarian model. With the help of the Internet technology, the decentralized and open social networks of the young and cosmopolitan were mobilized at an unprecedented speed and scale to defend the two societies from the proliferation of the hierarchical and particularistic political-business linkages.

The unparalleled rise of China in the twenty-first century has made China’s authoritarian model appealing to societies with weak liberal democratic cultures. Sitting on the frontline of the diffusion of China’s authoritarianism, liberal values and institutions in Taiwan and Hong Kong have been particularly under threat. Thanks to the various possibilities unfolded by the Internet technology, liberal-minded young people in the two societies have been able to organize themselves and use their ingenuity to defy the threat.

Yi-feng Tao is associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University. Her teaching and research interests are including Chinese Politics, Comparative Political Economy, and Comparative Democratization.

Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution (September 2014)

(photo courtesy of Pasu Au Yeung/Flickr/Creative Commons)
Call for Nominations: Section Awards at APSA Annual Meeting:
The Comparative Democratization Section will present five awards for scholarly work at the 2015 APSA annual meeting in San Francisco: the Linz Prize for Best Dissertation, and the Best Book, Best Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to submit nominations (including, for several awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate committees listed below. Please also forward this information to colleagues and graduate students. We ask you to note the eligibility criteria, deadlines for submissions, and materials that must accompany nominations; direct any queries to the committee chairs.

1. Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy:
Given for the best dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy completed and accepted in the two calendar years immediately prior to the APSA Annual Meeting where the award will be presented (2013 or 2014 for the 2015 Annual Meeting). The prize can be awarded to analyses of individual country cases as long as they are clearly cast in a comparative perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, accompanied by a letter of support from a member of the dissertation committee, should be sent to each member of the prize selection committee.

Deadline: March 16, 2015

Committee Co-Chairs:
Leonid Peisakhin
New York University
Assistant Professor of Politics
19 W 4th St.
New York, NY 10012
leonid.peisakhin@nyu.edu

Paula Valeria Munoz Chirinos
Universidad del Pacífico
Professor of Political and Social Sciences
Av. Salaverry 2020 - Lima 11
Perú
p.munozchirinos@up.edu.pe

Committee Member:
Arturas Rozenas
New York University
Assistant Professor of Politics
19 W 4th St.
New York, NY 10012
ar199@nyu.edu

2. Best Book Award
Given for the best book in the field of Comparative Democratization published in 2014 (authored, co-authored or edited). Copies of the nominated book should be sent to each committee member in time to arrive by March 16, 2015. Books received after this deadline cannot be considered.

Deadline: March 16, 2015

Committee Chair:
Scott Mainwaring
Kellogg Institute
204 Hesburgh Center
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5677
smainwar@nd.edu

Committee Members:
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán
University of Pittsburgh
Associate Professor of Political Science
4616 Wesley W. Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
asp27@pitt.edu

Joseph Wright
Pennsylvania State University
Associate Professor of Political Science
505 S. State St.
5700 Haven Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
nichino@umich.edu

3. Best Article
Single-authored or co-authored articles focusing directly on the subject of democratization and published in 2014 are eligible. Nominations and self-nominations are encouraged. Copies of the article should be sent by email to each of the committee

Deadline: March 16, 2015

Committee Chair:
Lisa Blaydes
Stanford University
Associate Professor of Political Science
616 Serra Street
Encina Hall West Room 100
Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305
blaydes@stanford.edu

Committee Members:
Nahomi Ichino
University of Michigan
Assistant Professor of Political Science
505 S. State St.
5700 Haven Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
nichino@umich.edu

Joseph Wright
Pennsylvania State University
Associate Professor of Political Science
505 S. State St.
5700 Haven Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
nichino@umich.edu

4. Best Field Work:
This prize rewards dissertation students who conduct especially innovative and difficult fieldwork. Scholars who are currently writing their dissertations or who complete their dissertations in 2014 are eligible. Candidates must submit two chapters of their dissertation and a letter of nomination from the chair of their dissertation committee describing the fieldwork. The material submitted must describe the field work in detail and should provide one or two key insights from the evidence collected in the field. The chapters may be sent electronically or in hard copy directly to each committee member.

Deadline: March 16, 2015

Committee Chair:
Milli Lake
Arizona State University
Section News

Assistant Professor of Politics and Global Studies
208 W Portland St. #455
Phoenix, AZ 85003
rkennedy@uh.edu

Call for Submissions:
Electoral Integrity has issued a call for submissions for its 2015 graduate student essay competition. The award will be presented to the author (or authors) of an outstanding graduate student essay written in English, based on the paper’s significant contribution to the theory and practice of electoral integrity. The theme of the essay competition is in line with a workshop on electoral integrity to be held prior to the 2015 APSA annual meeting in San Francisco, entitled “What Works? Strengthening Electoral Integrity,” which will explore the most effective policies and strategic interventions for rectifying common electoral problems and thereby improving the quality of elections. Submissions must be received by March 2, 2015. For more information, please visit http://electoralintegrity.blogspot.com/.

Committee Members:
Calvert Jones
City University of New York
Assistant Professor of Political Science
453 W, 46th Street
Apt 4C
New York, NY 10036
cjones3@ccny.cuny.edu

Michael Weintraub
Binghamton University (SUNY)
Assistant Professor of Political Science
P. O. Box 6000
Binghamton NY 13902-6000
mweintra@binghamton.edu

Committee Chair:
Christian Houle
Michigan State University
Assistant Professor of Political Science
331 South Kedzie Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
houlech1@msu.edu

Committee Members:
Michael Albertus
University of Chicago
Assistant Professor of Political Science
5828 South University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
albertus@uchicago.edu

Ryan Kennedy
University of Houston
Assistant Professor of Political Science
447 Philip G. Hoffman Hall
Houston, TX 77204-3011
rkennedy@uh.edu

5. Best Paper Award
Given to the best paper on Comparative Democratization presented at the previous year’s APSA Convention. Papers must be nominated by panel chairs or discussants.
Deadline: March 16, 2015

Call for Applications:
The University of Gothenburg (Sweden)’s department of political science is accepting applications for six doctoral students. All six positions are fully financed for four years and the doctoral students are employed by and located in the department of political science. The doctoral student (PhD) positions will however have three different specializations.

 ◦ The first two positions are in political science generally.
 ◦ Three positions are funded by a grant from the Swedish Research Council for the recruitment of Professor Ellen Lust from Yale University, and associated with one of two programs. The first is the Varieties of Democracy research program and students admitted in this program will be situated in the V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, and led by Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, who is also co-Principal Investigator for the V-Dem project. (See http://www.pol.gu.se/english/varieties-of-democracy--v-dem-/; https://v-dem.net). The second program is the “Program on Governance and Local Development at Gothenburg”. This program, headed by Professor Ellen Lust, will be similar in scope and design as the “Program on Governance and Local Development” that she founded and currently directs at Yale University (see http://gld.commons.yale.edu).
Sh The sixth position is in international relations, and funded by five-year project entitled “Women and Diplomacy: Gender Norms, Resistance and the Work of the Diplomat”. The project is financed by a Wallenberg Academy Fellowship from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to associate professor Ann Towns. The doctoral student is expected to write a PhD dissertation within international politics. While not a requirement, an interest in writing on the topics of diplomacy and/or gender is an advantage, as the student will be tied to the project just mentioned.


NEWS FROM MEMBERS
Michael Albertus, assistant professor of political science, University of Chicago, and Victor Menaldo published “Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats” in the September 2014 International Studies Quarterly. The article examines the fate of outgoing dictators following their ouster in democratic transitions and assesses the circumstances under which they are able to protect their most basic interests. Albertus also published “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution” with Victor Menaldo in the July 2014 British Journal of Political Science. This article identifies the conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution of wealth.
while documenting the methods in which economic elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.

Gabrielle Bardall, Ph.D. candidate in political science, Université de Montréal, and Skye Christensen published a working paper entitled “Gender Quotas in Single-Member District Electoral Systems” in December 2014 for the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Assessing case examples from Uganda, France, India, and elsewhere, the working paper refutes the myth of the incompatibility of gender quotas in single-member districts and discusses alternative methods of successfully implementing quotas in these districts. Ms. Bardall will be a visiting researcher at the department of peace and conflict research, Uppsala University, in January 2015.

Jason Brownlee has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Texas at Austin.

Zachary Elkins, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, James Melton, senior lecturer in British and comparative politics, University College London, and Tom Ginsburg announced an upgrade to the website of Constitute, an indexed repository of the constitutional texts currently in force in 194 countries. The new website, found at www.constituteproject.org, features a new look, new methods of viewing and analyzing texts, and a stand-alone site completely in the Arabic language with a subset of texts.

John P. Entelis, professor and chair of political science, Fordham University, presented a memo entitled “The Authoritarian Impulse vs. the Democratic Imperative: Political Learning as a Precondition for Sustainable Development in the Maghreb” at “The Arab Thermidor: The Resurgence of the Security State,” a workshop held at the London School of Economics on October 10, 2014.

Robert M. Fishman, Department of Sociology and Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, and Omar Lizardo, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, received the 2014 Charles Tilly Best Article Award from the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association for their article, “How Macro-Historical Change Shapes Cultural Taste: Legacies of Democratization in Spain and Portugal,” American Sociological Review 78(2), 2013.

Vladimir Gel’man, professor, European University at St. Petersburg, and Finland Distinguished Professor, University of Helsinki, served as a guest editor of the fall 2014 issue of Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, entitled “Authoritarian Modernization in Russia?” In this issue, he also published “The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” which analyzes the major features of electoral authoritarianism and its life cycle of emergence, development, and decay. Gel’man also co-authored a new book, Reexamining Economic and Political Reforms in Russia, 1985–2000: Generations, Ideas, and Changes (Lexington Books, 2014), with Dmitry Travin and Otar Marganiya. This book explores the impact of generational shifts of political thought on major political and economic reforms conducted in Russia during the last fifth of the twentieth century. His upcoming book, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes, will be published by University of Pittsburgh Press in March 2015.


Kenneth F. Greene, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, is the 2014-2015 Chair of Excellence and a visiting professor at the Juan March Institute–Carlos III University in Madrid, and will also serve as the program chair for the Comparative Democratization section of the American Political Science Association 2015 Annual Meeting in San Francisco.

Greene also published “Using the Predicted Responses from List Experiments as Explanatory Variables in Regression Models” with Kosuke Imai and Bethany Park in the November 2014 Political Analysis. The article proposes the use of a maximum likelihood estimator to predict unobserved responses to sensitive questions during list experiments and applies this approach to the Mexico 2012 Panel Study examining whether vote-buying is associated with increased turnout and candidate approval.

Mary Alice Haddad, associate professor of government, Wesleyan University, published “Paradoxes of Democratization: Environmental Politics in East Asia” in the Routledge Handbook of Environment and Society in Asia (Routledge, 2015), edited by Paul G. Harris and Graeme Lang. The chapter examines environmental politics in four states (mainland China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan) and argues that the variation in their environmental politics resulted from the timing of their environmental movements and those movement’s linkages to other political movements and parties. Haddad was also recently awarded the 2015 Fellowship for
Advance Social Science Research on Japan from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission.

Manal A. Jamal, associate professor of political science, James Madison University (JMU), was awarded a research fellowship at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative (MEI). She will spend the 2014-2015 academic year on a research leave from JMU working on the project in residence at MEI.

Calvert Jones, assistant professor of civic and global leadership, The City College of New York, will begin the fall 2015 semester as assistant professor of comparative politics at the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland-College Park. Jones also published “Exploring the Microfoundations of International Community: Toward a Theory of Enlightened Nationalism” in the December 2014 International Studies Quarterly, where she tests key theories on how a sense of shared international community may arise and evolve among individuals. Jones is author of “Seeing Like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering in an Illiberal State” in the March 2015 Perspectives on Politics, in which she investigates Persian Gulf autocrats’ motives and styles, empirically relying on evidence from palace ethnography to document how personal experiences in the West can influence autocrats to trust in Western-style liberal social engineering to drive liberal change.

Jan Kubik is now director, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London.

Tomas Larsson, lecturer, St. John’s College, published “Monkish Politics in Southeast Asia: Religious Disenfranchisement in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective” in the January 2015 Modern Asian Studies. The article explores the political and historical roots of the disenfranchisement of Buddhist clergy, finding that secularization theory and religious-economy approaches fail to explain the development of this practice.

Staffan Lindberg, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, was awarded “Best Article Prize for 2013” by Sage for his article, “Mapping Accountability: Core Concept and Subtypes” in the June 2013 International Review of Administrative Sciences. Lindberg has also been awarded a €260,000 grant from NORAD and International IDEA to update portions of the data from V-Dem under the title “States of Democracy: Open Data, Dialogue, and Dissemination.”


Kelly M. McMann, associate professor of political science, Case Western Reserve University, published Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia (Cornell University Press, 2014). The book offers a new understanding of corruption by focusing on the role of ordinary citizens, rather than government officials, in political corruption. McMann examines how market reform can encourage ordinary citizens to use personal connections, bribes, and promises of political support to meet basic needs.

Andrey Meleshevicevich, professor of law, National University of “Kyiv-Mohlya Academy,” was elected president of the university on November 17, 2014. He published “Bringing Human Rights Home: The Challenge of Enforcing Judicial Rulings in Ukraine and Russia” with Carolyn Forstein in the second semiannual issue of the 2014 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, in which the authors use two case studies to examine systemic non-enforcement of European Court of Human Rights’ judgments in Russia and Ukraine.

Kevin Morrison, assistant professor of public policy and political science, University of Pittsburgh, published Nontaxation and Representation: The Fiscal Foundations of Political Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, taxation leads to instability, not representation, and that nontax revenues (such as foreign aid, oil revenues, intergovernmental grants, and borrowing) lead to decreased taxation, increased government spending, and increased political stability of democracies, dictatorships, and their leaders.

Olena Nikolayenko, assistant professor, Fordham University, published the article “Trust in Government and Goal Pursuit in a Transition Society” in Comparative Sociology, (vol. 13, issue 5) and a research note “Marching against the Dictator: Chernobyl Path in Belarus” in Social Movement Studies (vol. 14, issue 2). Nikolayenko delivered numerous guest talks on protests and elections in Ukraine: “Hopes, Fears, and Opportunities: Ukraine after the Elections” (Columbia University, November 12, 2014); “Putin, Religion, and Ukraine” (The Orthodox Christian Studies Center, Fordham University, November 4, 2014); “Struggle for Democracy and Independence in Ukraine” (Department of European Languages, Literatures, and Cultures, Stony Brook University, May 1, 2014); “Women’s Engagement in Anti-Government Protests: The EuroMaidan in Ukraine” (Gender and Transformation in Europe Workshop, Center for European and Mediterranean
Studies, New York University, April 18, 2014).

**Pippa Norris**, Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Harvard University, published a new book, *Why Electoral Integrity Matters* (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The first in a planned trilogy, Norris’s book draws on the World Values Survey Wave 6 to analyze the consequences when elections are flawed or failed, including for trust and confidence in elected officials, for turnout and protest activism, and for regime persistence and change.

**Andreas Schedler**, professor of political science, Center for Economic Teaching and Research (CID), released a new dataset in both English and Spanish. Entitled “Mexican National Survey on Organized Violence,” or “Encuesta Nacional de Violencia Organizada (ENVO),” the survey comprises a popular opinion survey with a sample size of 2,400 and an elite opinion survey with a sample size of 629. The dataset can be obtained in the CID Data Archive for Applied Research in the Social Sciences (BIIACS).


**Lahra Smith** has been promoted to associate professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. She has also begun new research on citizens’ understandings of constitutional reform in Africa, particularly focused on civic education around Kenya’s new constitution. In 2015, she will travel to Kenya to conduct research on this topic and on universal health coverage in Kenya and other lower-middle income countries.


**Jan Teorell**, professor of political science, Lund University, received two new research grants. The first is a 36-million Swedish krona grant from “Riksbankens jubileumsfond” for STANCE, a six-year collaborative research project hosted by Lund university on state-building and the international system in “the long 19th century”; the second is a 6-million Swedish krona grant from the Swedish Research council to study the causes and consequences of democracy in the 19th century.

**Maya Tudor**, associate professor, University of Oxford, spent autumn of 2014 conducting field research as a visiting professor at the University of Yangon in Burma, where she researched nascent democratic liberalization in the country and taught a course called “Democratization and its Alternatives” to the first crop of students to attend the University since it was shut down in the aftermath of the 1988 student protests.


**Jeremy Wallace**, assistant professor, Ohio State University, published *Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China* (Oxford University Press, 2014). The book explores how the Chinese Communist Party’s internal migration controls have helped it ward off the challenges urbanization presents to nondemocratic regimes by balancing policymaking toward urban and rural areas.

**Shannon Drysdale Walsh**, assistant professor and McKnight Land-Grant Professor, University of Minnesota Duluth, was awarded an American Association of University of Women American Fellowship through the Postdoctoral Research Leave fellowship program for 2014-2015. This award provides Walsh with time to work on her book project, *Engendering State Institutions: State Response to Violence against Women in Latin America*, which will explain variation in efforts to implement laws on violence against women within justice system institutions in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Walsh was also awarded a University of Minnesota McKnight Land-Grant Professorship, a two-year award that “designed to advance the careers of the most promising junior faculty members who are at the beginning stages of their professional careers, and who have the potential to make significant contributions to their departments and to their scholarly fields.” Since receiving these awards, she has spent several months conducting field research in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

Walsh also published “Women’s Organizing and Intersectional Policy-Making in Comparative Perspective: Evidence from Guatemala and Germany” with Christina Xydias in the November 2014 *Politics, Groups and Identities*. 

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**Section News**
Section News/New Research

Yuhua Wang, assistant professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, published Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Wang’s book examines the development of legal reforms in China to determine under what conditions authoritarian regimes become interested in the rule of law and how they develop it without loosening their grip on power. Among Wang's findings are that in China, regions where investment mostly comes from foreign investors have better rule of law than regions with mostly domestic investors.

NEW RESEARCH

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

African Affairs, Vol. 114, no. 454, January 2015
“Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern Africa” by David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight

“Muslim Politics and Shari’a in Kano State, Northern Nigeria” by Alex Thurston

“Violence, Popular Punishment, and War in the Central African Republic” by Louisa Lombard and Sylvain Batianga-Kinzi

“Power, Peace, and Space in Africa: Revisiting Territorial Power Sharing” by Franziska Zanker, Claudia Simons, and Andreas Mehler

“An LRA for Everyone: How Different Actors Frame the Lord’s Resistance Army” by Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur

“The Eritrean Diaspora and its Impact on Regime Stability: Responses to UN Sanctions” by Nicole Hirt

“Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting” by Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon

“The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa” by John F. McCauley

“Foreign Military Presence and the Changing Practice of Sovereignty: A Pragmatist Explanation of Norm Change” by Sebastian Schmidt

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 47, no. 3-4, September-December 2014
“Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy” by Tuomas Forsberg, Regina Heller, and Reinhard Wolf

“Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy” by Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko

“Obsession with Status and Ressentiment: Historical Backgrounds of the Russian Discursive Identity Construction” by Olga Malinova

“Greatpowerness’ as the Key Element of Russian Self-Consciousness under Erosion” by Mark Urnov

“Status Conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and Emotional Biases” by Tuomas Forsberg

“Russia’s Quest for Respect in the International Conflict Management in Kosovo” by Regina Heller

“The Frustrating Partnership: Honor, Status, and Emotions in Russia’s Discourses of the West” by Andrei P. Tsygankov

“Russia as a Great Power: Status Inconsistency and the two Chechen Wars” by Hanna Smith

“Russia’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership” by Igor Gretskiy, Evgeny Treshchenkov, and Konstantin Golubev

“Voices of Discontent: Student Protest Participation in Romania” by Toma Burean and Gabriel Badescu

“Post-communist Transformation in Progress: Poles’ Attitudes toward Democracy” by Urszula Jakubowska and Krzysztof Kaniasty

“Power and Public Chambers in the Development of Civil Society in Russia” by Kirsti Stuuvy

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 4, March 2015
“Diffusion of Diaspora Enfranchisement Norms: A Multinational Study” by Anca Turcu and R. Urbatsch

“Electoral Systems and Legislators’ Constituency Effort: The Mediating Effect of Electoral Vulnerability” by Audrey André, Sam Depauw, and Shane Martin

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 3, March 2015
“The Ties That Bind: National Identity Salience and Pro-Social Behavior Toward the Ethnic Other” by Volha Charnysh, Christopher Lucas, and Prerna Singh


“Women’s Political Engagement Under Quota-Mandated Female Representation: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment” by Amanda Clayton

“Instruments of Political Control: National Oil Companies, Oil Prices, and Petroleum Section News/New Research
Subsidies” by Andrew Cheon, Maureen Lackner, and Johannes Urpelainen

**Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 2, February 2015**
“The Conditional Ideological Inducement to Campaign on Character Valence Issues in Multiparty Systems: The Case of Corruption” by Luigi Curini

“It’s My Money: Why Big Government May Be Good Government” by Anna Persson and Bo Rothstein

**East European Politics, Vol. 30, no. 4, 2014**
“The Political Economy of Regulation in Post-war Kosovo: Intended and Unintended Consequences of External Actors’ Involvement” by Luca J. Uberti, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, and Venera Demukaj

“The New Institutionalism in the Context of Kosovo’s Transition: Regulatory Institutions in Contested States” by Anneliese Dodds, Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, and Ahmed Badran

“Bounded Altruism: INGOs’ Opportunities and Constraints during Humanitarian Crises and the US Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo” by Andrew L. Halterman and Jill A. Irvine

“Securitising Islam, Securitising Ethnicity: the Discourse of Uzbek Radicalism in Kyrgyzstan” by Rebekah Tromble

**Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, no. 2, January 2015**
“Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism” by David S. Siroky and John Cuffe

“Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections” by Adam Przeworski

“Taming the ‘Rogue’ Sector: Studying State Effectiveness in Africa through Informal Transport Politics” by Tom Goodfellow

“Anti-Government Protests in Democracies: A Test of Institutional Explanations” by Yen-Pin Su

“Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts” by Alexander Stroh and Charlotte Heyl

“Religious Institutions and Civic Engagement: A Test of Religion’s Impact on Political Activism in Mexico” by Christopher W. Hale

“Presidential Dynamics and Legislative Velocity in Russia, 1994–2007” by Paul Chaisty

**International Political Science Review, Vol. 36, no. 1, January 2015**
“Responding to the Call: Human Security INGOs and Countries with a History of Civil War” by Amanda Murdie and Sean Webeck

“The Battle of Ideas and Discourses before Democratic Transition: Different Democratic Conceptions in Authoritarian China” by Jie Lu and Tianjian Shi

“Evaluating the Role of Online Data Availability: The Case of Economic and Institutional Transparency in Sixteen Latin American Nations” by Martin J. Murillo

“Constitutional Choices: Uncertainty and Institutional Design in Democratising Nations” by Jai Kwan Jung and Christopher J. Deering

“Mind the Gap: Do Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a more Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich?” by Julian Bernauer, Nathalie Giger, and Jan Rosset

“Deliberative Capacity as an Indicator of Democratic Quality: The Case of the Philippines” by Nicole Curato

**Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 52, no. 4, December 2014**
“Community Policing and the Politics of Local Development in Tanzania” by Charlotte Cross

“Legacies of a Nationwide Crackdown in Zimbabwe: Operation Chikorokoza Chapera in Gold Mining Communities” by Samuel J. Spiegel

“Networks of Violence and Becoming: Youth and the Politics of Patronage in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Delta” by Akin Iwilade

“The Black Middle Class and Democracy in South Africa” by Roger Southall

**Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 56, no. 4, Winter 2014**
“The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America” by David Doyle

“The Effect of Unions and Organized Civil Society on Social Policy: Pension and
New Research

Health Reforms in Argentina and Brazil, 1988–2008” by Sara Niedzwiecki

“As Clear as MUD: Characteristics, Objectives, and Strategies of the Opposition in Bolivarian Venezuela” by Barry Cannon

“Narrowing the Gap: Explaining the Increasing Competitiveness of the Venezuelan Opposition” by Yordan K. Kutyski and André Krouwel

“Filling In the Missing Link Between Universalism and Democracy: The Case of Costa Rica” by Juliana Martínez Franzoni and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea

“Rules of Procedure as a Cause of Legislative Paralysis: The Case of Costa Rica, 2002–2012” by Fabián A. Borges

Middle East Journal, Vol. 69, no 1, Winter 2015

“Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance” by Benedetta Berti

“The Justice and Development Party in Moroccan Local Politics” by Miquel Pellicer, Eva Wegner

“Education, Political Participation, and Islamist Parties: The Case of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front” by Hamed El-Said and James E. Rauch

Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, no 4, Fall 2014

“Do Power-Sharing Systems Behave Differently amid Regional Uprisings?: Lebanon in the Arab Protest Wave” by Tamirace Fakhoury

“Political Instability and Conflict after the Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon” by Ohannes Geukjian

“Iraq’s Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation” by David Romano

“The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria” by Mark Dohrmann and Robert Hatem

Middle East Policy, Vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 2014

“Iran under Rouhani: Still Alone in the World” by Thomas Juneau

“Iran and Its Neighbors since 2003: New Dilemmas” by Matteo Legrenzi and Fred H. Lawson

“Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring: Finding a Middle Ground” by Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar

Party Politics, Vol. 21, no. 1, January 2015

“Parties, Conditionality and Leader Effects in Parliamentary Elections” by Anthony Mughan

“Horizontal Accountability during Political Transition: The Use of Deputy Requests in Ukraine, 2002–2006” by Erik S Herron and Nazar Boyko

Party Politics, Vol. 20, no. 6, November 2014

“States and Strategy in New Federal Democracies: Competitiveness and Intra-Party Resource Allocation in Mexico” by Imke Harbers

“Political Realignment and Democratic Breakdown in Argentina, 1916–1930” by Eduardo Alemán and Sebastian Saiegh

“Autors or Money? Explaining the Electoral Success and Persistence of Political Parties in Lithuania” by Raimondas Ibenskas

World Politics, Vol. 67, no. 1, January 2015

“The Logic of Party Collusion in a Democracy: Evidence from Mali” by Jessica Gottlieb

“How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?” by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen

SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


AFRICA


ASIA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


Comparative Democratization
Vol. 12, No. 3                                                                               November 2014

Editorial Committee

Executive Editor

Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science and heading the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg; is one of four principal investigators for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. He is author of Democracy and Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?, and has also worked on women's representation, political clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

Members

Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University and the Varieties of Democracy project manager for subnational government. She currently is conducting research on how democracy develops within countries, initially by examining contemporary cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and activism and has been published in the books Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia and Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

Yi-ting Wang is a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her work primarily focuses on legislative institutions and politicians’ accountability strategies with an emphasis on questions of conditions for democratic stability. Her dissertation addresses how and why legislative committees differ in their abilities to exert policy influence across democracies. Her current project explores the consequences of different legislative capacities to participate in law making and monitor the executive for the quality of democracies.

Brigitte Zimmerman recently obtained her PhD from the University of California, San Diego and is currently a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research agenda examines accountability institutions in consolidating democracies, with a geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa. In her dissertation, she analyzed the strategic responses of political officials to anti-corruption interventions, documenting patterns of corruption substitution through extensive fieldwork. Other current research addresses discrimination in petty corruption, incumbency advantage in diverse institutional contexts, the political economy of FDI and foreign aid, and the ethics of field research.

Managing Editor

Melissa Aten is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg or Melissa Aten.

APSA-CD is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

Eitan Tzelgov is a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. He studies legislative institutions and political parties. His dissertation, awarded the Carl Albert Award by the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association, examines the strategic use of parliamentary speeches by the legislative opposition.

Yi-ting Wang

Brigitte Zimmerman

Managing Editor