Comparative Democratization

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The Promise and Perils of Democracy Assistance in Authoritarian Regimes

Sarah Bush, Temple University

In 2006, Thomas Carothers wrote a Foreign Affairs article titled “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” which documented how authoritarian leaders were pushing back against democracy assistance through a variety of legal and extralegal tactics in the wake of the Colored Revolutions.1 The trend Carothers identified has only intensified in the decade since he wrote that article, as shown by a recent and comprehensive analysis of restrictions to foreign funding for domestic civil society organizations. In this analysis, Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash found that 39 low- and middle-income countries had adopted laws restricting foreign funding.2


Contextualizing Democracy Promotion

Julia Leininger, German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik

It is uncontested that democracy promotion’s prospects for success depend on its political context. Most studies agree that domestic factors are the main drivers of democratization despite of international actors’ relevant influence on these processes. However, two major flaws remain, which make it difficult to generalize the influence of contextual factors on the process and effectiveness of democracy promotion. First, generalizable patterns of context conditions are not yet identified in quantitative and qualitative research. Second, most researchers focus on genuinely political factors such as type of regime, state fragility or political event, but turn a blind eye on social, cultural and global factors. In the following, I argue that democracy promotion can better be understood and explained if research sheds light on blind spots ranging from societal individual (micro) to cultural, political and spatial (macro) contexts of democracy promotion. An additional “blind spot” concerns the ethical responsibilities of research on democracy promotion. I conclude with implications for conceptualizing context factors in the study of democracy promotion.
THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY AID TO CLOSED AUTOCRACIES
Anna Lührmann, University of Gothenburg

Through democracy aid, governments and international organizations seek to promote democratic norms and institutions across the world. According to OECD figures, between 2002 and 2012, donors spent 106 billion USD on aid for democracy, rule of law and governance. At the same time, Thomas Carothers – a leading expert on the subject of democracy aid – cautions that all international actors can do is speed up “a moving train.” Based on this logic, we would expect democracy aid mainly to target countries where transition processes are already set in motion. Indeed, countries in transition – such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Afghanistan – and those in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy – such as Nigeria – are key recipients of democracy aid.

However, many democracy aid projects target closed autocracies such as China, Jordan, Eritrea and North Korea. This is surprising. Unlike more competitive autocracies or hybrid regimes, rulers of closed autocracies demonstrate their firm determination to non-democratic rule by not subjecting themselves to multi-party elections and substantially restricting the space for civil society. In closed autocracies, the train has not yet left the station, and date and time for departure are not set yet. Hence, it seems paradoxical that such regimes allow democracy aid activities within their territory and that democracy aid providers chose to target such regimes. The declared aim of democracy aid is to contribute to democratization - understood here as the gradual improvement of civil and political rights. If such aid would be effective, it could threaten the regime’s very existence.

1. Own calculation based on aid data at the project level from the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/; accessed on June 16, 2016). All data and project examples used in this text are based on this source. The figures are disbursements in constant 2013 USD.


Democracy Aid in the Middle East
Erin A. Snider, Texas A&M University

In the last year, scholars and practitioners of democracy aid have devoted renewed attention to a global decline in democracy. Advocates for such aid, especially in the wake of the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world, have also called for the expansion of democracy aid funding in response to retractions in political and civil rights worldwide. This renewed focus is an opportunity for scholars engaged in research on democracy aid to step back and reflect on how we study democracy aid and to revisit and critique assumptions on how we think it works in practice. The reflections that follow in this brief essay draw from my own research on US democracy aid in the Middle East over the last decade. Questions of power and security form an inherent tension and often contradiction with the expressed goals of democracy promotion and few regions underscore this more than the Middle East. While scholars have acknowledged the conceptual challenges and normative dimensions embedded within democracy promotion, they remain underexplored. In this essay, I argue that neglecting them in our work impedes our ability to build deeper knowledge about the micro politics of such aid and to understand the parameters and possibilities in restrictive states. I begin by highlighting some methodological and conceptual challenges to studying democracy aid. I then discuss how I address these challenges in my book manuscript on the political economy of democracy aid in the Middle East. I conclude with thoughts on the way forward for scholars studying democracy aid in challenging contexts drawn from my research in the region.

Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Democracy Aid
Over the last fifteen years, the question of whether international actors can promote democracy is one that has drawn significant scholarly interest. This interest reflects the elevated attention and position that democracy aid programs have assumed within the foreign policies of western governments and the growth of actors such as for and not for profit organizations, aid

(click to continue on page 12)
ELECTION OBSERVERS AND ELECTORAL FRAUD
Sarah Brierley, University of California, Los Angeles
George Ofosu, University of California, Los Angeles

Election observation - the deployment of trained personnel to monitor the compliance of political parties with electoral laws - has become a prominent feature of polls in countries across the world. Observers are usually deployed by multi-national organizations (international observers) or by local civil society groups (domestic observers). International election observers were present in 86 percent of the national elections organized in 95 newly democratic, or competitive authoritarian regimes, between 1989 and 2002. Today, domestic election observation groups are active in at least 60 countries.

The main purpose of election observers is to detect and deter electoral fraud and violence. Do observers achieve this goal? At the national level, establishing the causal effect of observers on fraud is difficult because governments usually self-select into the treatment (i.e. allow themselves to be monitored). In this case, an association between observers and low levels of fraud does not prove observers reduce fraud, because the countries that choose to have observers may have cleaner elections to begin with compared to countries that are not open to observers. Similarly, within countries, if civil society groups deploy observers to historically troublesome regions, a comparison of outcomes at monitored and unmonitored polling stations may underestimate observers’ impacts.

2. See http://www.gndem.org/members for a complete list of members.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM A NOVEL DATA COLLECTION EFFORT
Johannes Bubeck, University of Mannheim
Nikolay Marinov, University of Mannheim

When do outside powers decide to promote democracy abroad? When do they interfere in the electoral process by targeting resources towards certain candidates? Were the commitment to the international norm of encouraging free and fair voting serious and unyielding, it would amount to a force for democratization to be reckoned with. Unfortunately, even admirers of the West’s commitment to liberal values would agree that reality is far from this ideal. In a new working paper, we offer an argument, based on a game-theoretic model, to explain why outsiders adopt the strategies they do in the elections of others.

Our model of democracy promotion starts from a formal model of elections with bias. We argue that scholars need to distinguish between processes, the “how” of elections, and parties competing in them, the “who”. Given a certain degree of domestic support, parties compete for office. But whether they win or not, is also a function of the electoral process and the amount of resources spent on influencing their domestic electorate. The model produces predictions on three quantities of interest: amount and mix of resources invested by the outside power, incumbent vote share, and compliance with democratic rules. A further contribution of our approach is the ability to offer results on how “election wars” – conflictual investments by outsiders with competing agendas – change elections.

deserve more scholarly attention. As a multi- and
directional phenomena implemented in domestic
democracy assistance often falls between the
rags of International Relations and Comparative
Politics. We believe that scholars of comparative
democratization and scholars of comparative
democracy promotion can provide vital insights to better
understand – and potentially adjust – democracy
promotion efforts. In particular, systematic studies
based on in-depth understanding of the causes and
consequences of democratization are needed, in
order to capture the varying effects of international
interventions. We hope to spur further engagements
with such topics of direct societal relevance, beyond
the narrow focus of commissioned studies.

This issue of the APSA-CD Newsletter explores
the challenging political contexts of providing aid
to support democracy. In the opening article, Sarah
Bush outlines the key conceptual debates and
challenges related to democracy aid in authoritarian
contexts. This is followed by Julia Leininger who
argues that several blind spots, such as lacking
attention to political attitudes and local norms,
mare both the practice and the study of democracy
promotion.

The subsequent articles depict different
methodological approaches to investigate the
conditions shaping the outcomes of democracy
aid in such challenging contexts empirically.
Based on recent OECD data, Anna Lührmann
scrutinizes the paradox of democracy aid to closed
autocracies. The main argument is that direct aid
to public administrations is unlikely to enhance
democratization whereas civil society support
may lay the ground for future transition processes.
Erin Snider provides a critical analysis of U.S.
democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East
drawing on extensive field research and interviews.
Her findings suggest that such programs shy away
from challenging ruling elites in the region. Sarah
Brierley and George Ofosu present results from a
field experiment in Ghana, indicating that domestic
election observers are successful in reducing
electoral fraud and voter intimidation. Finally,
Nikolay Marinov and Johannes Bubeck reason
that influences of non-democratic international
actors may impede the effectiveness of democracy
promotion efforts.

The contributions together provide a relatively
comprehensive account of what we know about
democracy aid, and also demonstrate that scholarly
engagement with the practice of democracy
promotion can be fruitful in terms of providing
some guidance to real world issues. It will
hopefully inspire more students of comparative
democratization to pay increasing attention to this
important topic.

Anna Lührmann, Issue Editor

It seems to me that the past year’s issues of our
Newsletter have naturally come to reflect recent
developments in the world, where democracy is
being challenged in many parts of the world. For
a number of years now, we have as a community
started to worry more about what seems like
authoritarianism spreading again. The debate
about whether backsliding is real or just apparent
continues (e.g. *Journal of Democracy’s* first issue of
2016) but the concern seems legitimate when big,
 globally important countries such a Russia, Turkey,
and Bangladesh record negative developments. In
Europe, we register the worrying explicit calls for
illiberal “democracy” heard in Hungary with similar
expositions in Poland and the Czech Republic.

We are very grateful to the 26 colleagues authoring
ccontributions to expand our understanding of
authoritarianism and the threats to democracy
during the past year – too many to recite here,
but the 15 excellent pieces in those 3 issues were
graciously gifted to our membership. Thank you!

The coming year’s issues will hopefully signify
coming, more positive changes in the world. The
current Fall 2016 issue focuses on democracy aid in
challenging contexts, when it works and how, with
Anna Lührmann as lead editor. It has some good
news – it can work.

The Winter 2017 issue will provide some positive
perspectives on state building and democratization
with Rachel Sigman as the lead editor. Spring 2017
takes us to the new exciting ways of measuring
democracy and its very detailed component parts
with new methodologies, in an issue where the lead
editor is Kyle Marquardt. We even have the Fall
2017 issue scheduled where Allen Hicken will be
guest editor with pieces on what we know about
field work in political science, ethical challenges and
best practices.

Again, let’s be thankful for the work these lead
editors and the many colleagues making important
contributions to our community.

If the membership and the executive board will
renew our mandate beyond next year’s meeting, we
are ready at our end to continue the work with the

As advertised in the last issue and through my
message at the Business Meeting at APSA, I have
also decided to continue the practice of rotating
members in and out of the editorial committee for
the NL. I have found that to work well: At least
in my mind, new blood, new ideas, new networks
of scholars continue to enrich the Newsletter as a
consequence.

Thus, I would like to again recognize outgoing
members Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Kelly
McMann, and Brigitte Seim, for their selfless
service on the editorial board and for their great
contributions.

I would also like to welcome the new members:
Rachel Sigman, Constanza Petrarca, and Steven
Wilson - all three new postdocs in the V-Dem
Institute, Department of Political Science at
University of Gothenburg.

These three were joined already in May by
Ellen Lust, who as Professor at University of
Gothenburg has founded a Governance and Local
Development research program here, and her two
postdocs, Adam Harris and Kristen Kao.

I am really excited about the, partly new, constellation
and feel confident that we will be able to serve the
community with a high-quality newsletter also
going forward. As always, we naturally welcome
any suggestions for symposia and other things.

Last but not least, and thankfully, Melissa is still here
- she is the one that really makes the Newsletter!

Staffan I. Lindberg, Executive Editor
increasing barriers placed on democracy assistance by non-democratic governments in countries such as Ethiopia, Jordan, Russia, and Venezuela during the 21st century raise important questions: How do democracy aid providers operate in authoritarian regimes? How should they operate?

In this essay, I begin to answer those questions by outlining key points in the debate about whether and how it makes sense for international donors to pursue democracy assistance in authoritarian contexts. For the purposes of this discussion, I define authoritarian regimes as those regimes in which political leaders – specifically, the executive, the legislature, or both – are not chosen via free and fair elections with at least a minimal level of suffrage. On the one hand, authoritarian countries are arguably the places where democracy assistance is needed most. Moreover, some studies suggest that democracy assistance can play an important role in fostering democratic transition in these contexts by coordinating opposition movements and encouraging better elections, among other reforms. On the other hand, authoritarian environments present many challenges for the successful design and implementation of democracy assistance. Democracy promoters ought to worry in these contexts about whether they are legitimizing authoritarian rule by pursuing activities that do not challenge – or even cooperate with – authoritarian rulers. After discussing these concerns, I conclude the essay by suggesting several directions for future research on democracy assistance in light of this debate.

Democracy Assistance in Authoritarian Regimes: Opportunities

According to Thomas Carothers, more than $10 billion per year is now spent on democracy assistance activities, which involve “thousands of projects” in “every country that has moved away from authoritarian rule, as well as most countries living under dictatorship.” This phenomenon has attracted considerable recent scholarly interest, with several comprehensive studies concluding that democracy assistance is correlated with improvements in countries’ levels of democracy according to general indices such as Polity and Freedom House. These studies’ findings – especially when combined with noteworthy examples of successful transitions away from authoritarian rule – suggest that donor governments ought to support democracy assistance activities in non-democratic states if they want to support democratization.

But to what extent is democracy assistance focused on democratic transition in authoritarian states, as opposed to democratic consolidation in already democratic states? To answer that question, in Figure 1, I explore patterns in the data from the Finkel, Pérez-Liñan, and Seligson study of American democracy assistance cited above, which found a positive effect of democracy assistance on democracy. I plot the total amount of U.S. democracy assistance between 1990 and 2003 (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) against the recipient country’s level of democracy according to the Polity IV data set. As the figure illustrates, U.S. democracy assistance is thought to have played an important supporting role, such as Poland in 1989 and Serbia in 2000 – but not in 2003 – suggest that donor governments ought to support democracy assistance activities in non-democratic states if they want to support democratization.

Figure 1: Total U.S. Democracy Assistance 1990-2003 by Polity2 Level

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5. Although the United States is by no means the only important democracy assistance donor, it is the largest one, which is one reason why it has been the main focus of this literature. See Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003,” World Politics 59 (April 2007): 404-438; James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988-2001,” International Studies Quarterly 55 (March 2011): 47-69.
which is indicated by relatively high Polity2 scores (typically 5 or greater). At the same time, it also shows that democracy assistance has been present in authoritarian countries (i.e., those countries that have relatively Polity2 scores). Interestingly, the amount of U.S. democracy assistance given at each level of the Polity2 score between 1990 and 2003 generally tracks the total number of states in the world at each level of the Polity2 score over the same time period. In other words, the relatively low amounts of democracy assistance given to states scoring between -5 and 5 on the Polity2 scale is related to the fact that there are relatively few countries during the time period that actually received those scores.

**Democracy Assistance in Authoritarian Regimes: Challenges**

As noted above, several important studies have found that democracy assistance is positively correlated with democratization in recipient states – even when authoritarian countries are included in the analysis. Yet democracy assistance also has its critics. In particular, some observers have advocated for a more focused approach to democracy assistance in which donors concentrate on sending aid to countries that are already in the process of transitioning to democracy. There are at least two types of concerns about the effectiveness of democracy in authoritarian environments that should be considered.

First, scholars have argued that authoritarian rulers are quite skilled at manipulating democracy assistance in their favor. In my research, I have described certain types of democracy assistance as “regime compatible” or “tame” because they tend not to challenge – or can even reinforce – authoritarian rule. Programs supporting improved local and national governance in non-democratic countries typically fall into this category since they often involve close coordination between international donors and incumbent regimes. Not only do such programs generally avoid confrontation with incumbents, but they may also at times reinforce the status quo; for example, activities that reduce corruption or improve accountability may decrease the likelihood of popular protest and therefore support the survival of incumbents. Similarly, incumbent regimes may be quite willing to welcome democracy assistance programs that are designed to support their limited procedural reform efforts, such as holding elections or adopting quotas designed to incorporate women into politics. These procedural reforms do not necessarily undermine incumbents’ hold on power and may even dovetail with their strategies for survival via clientelistic elections, which means that democracy assistance can reinforce the status quo instead of challenging it.

The cited studies suggest that, in authoritarian environments, international aid programs may offer incumbents valuable financial and technical resources that help them avoid popular challenges. For example, parliamentary strengthening programs may enhance the technical capabilities and public image of a parliament that is fundamentally an authoritarian institution. At the same time, international aid programs may also offer less tangible resources. For example, the presence of uncritical international election observers – who are often supported via multilateral and bilateral democracy assistance – could add legitimacy to flawed elections.

Second, international and domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) might be unable – and perhaps even unwilling – to pursue certain types of challenging activities in authoritarian environments because of their survival instincts. NGOs often deem challenging activities too risky for authoritarian regimes given the crackdowns against foreign-funded democracy assistance programs in Egypt and elsewhere. This dynamic is important to understand since NGOs play a key role in the design and implementation of many democracy assistance activities in authoritarian settings. Often, they are the best placed actors to pursue democracy assistance activities that are not designed and implemented in cooperation with incumbent authoritarian regimes. However, NGOs – especially given the increased number of laws that restrict their activities cited above – often find it difficult to operate in authoritarian environments if they are not cooperating with the government.

Out of concern for their own survival, these organizations may therefore hesitate to pursue activities – such as support to civil society organizations, dissidents, and political parties – that would undermine the incumbent regime. Instead, they are more likely to opt for tamer activities that will not disrupt – or may even reinforce – the political status quo.

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Former democracy practitioner Melinda Haring argues that international NGOs with field-based offices are particularly likely to tame their activities because they have to cooperate with incumbent regime. Citing examples from a number of states in the post-Soviet region, such as Azerbaijan, “where the U.S. government found serious fault with the 2010 parliamentary elections and then trained the winners,” she suggests that donors’ limited democracy assistance dollars would go farther in countries that are democratizing already. She refers to this as a “triage” approach to democracy assistance. Indeed, if NGOs are deliberately seeking out non-confrontational approaches to democracy promotion in authoritarian environments, then it will be difficult for international donors to effectively support transition in these settings.

Directions for Future Research

Future research on democracy assistance in authoritarian settings might pursue several key areas, which promise to help improve both our theories about international pressure as well as policy decisions related to democracy assistance. First, researchers should disaggregate democracy assistance and examine which types of aid are more or less effective in authoritarian regimes. The first generation of research on democracy assistance – including many of the influential studies cited above – understandably focused on the effects of democracy assistance writ large, at best disaggregating democracy assistance into a limited number of categories such as aid to civil society, governance, political processes, and the rule of law. However, as the discussion above suggests, democracy assistance programs vary considerably in terms of how easy it is for incumbents to co-opt them. It will be important for future research to account for variations in terms of how tame democracy assistance programs programs are. Are tamer forms of aid less likely to support democratic transition in authoritarian states?

Second, more researchers should look at democracy assistance donors outside of the United States. Although the United States is the largest democracy assistance donor and therefore merits special scrutiny, relatively few cross-national studies of aid effectiveness have focused on other democracy donors. Given the increasing availability of project-level aid data, it will be important for researchers to look beyond the United States – not only to the other traditional democracy donor states in Western Europe, but also to the newer democracy donors, such as in Central and Eastern Europe. One point that is consistently made in the literature on democracy promotion is that donor states’ strategic interests influence where and how they seek to aid democracy. We know that foreign aid donors vary in the extent to which their national security interests shape their decisions about economic aid, with the United States being a donor that is relatively likely to link aid to geopolitics. Future research should


Finally, research on democracy assistance ought to grapple with a puzzle that the recent phenomenon of authoritarian restrictions on democracy assistance raises: Why didn’t authoritarian incumbents become suspicious of democracy assistance earlier? My research suggests that democracy assistance is generally becoming tamer – or less confrontational – over time, which suggests that authoritarian rulers should have been at least as suspicious of democracy assistance in its early days as they are today. In retrospect, it appears somewhat strange that for much of the 1980s and 1990s, and even after some well-known early successes such as Poland, international donors and NGOs were allowed relative freedom to pursue democracy assistance activities in other countries. Although it makes sense that sincerely democratizing countries would have welcomed external support to help them with transitional processes, it remains unclear why more firmly authoritarian governments did not pursue formal and informal measures that they have more recently adopted, which make it difficult for outside actors to agitate for change within their borders. Understanding this dynamic may shed valuable new light on how authoritarian regimes engage with the international community on issues related to democracy.

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The programmatic approach proposed in this essay can help to better explain democracy promotion as well as to guide practitioners. Some of these suggestions are already part of our recent research on democracy promotion at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and the German Research Network “External Democratization” while others emerge from this research.1

The Micro-Context: Pay More Attention to Individuals at Large

Contesting democratic values and norms has become the “new normal”. Democracy is under threat from within and from the outside. Autocrats challenge democratic norms openly in international fora. They pro-actively promote repressive structures in other countries while Western democracies’ international reputation and the global level of democracy decreased after 2014 to its lowest point since the end of the Cold War.2 Also within western societies, populist and nationalist leaders as Donald Trump in the USA or Viktor Órban in Hungary attack core democratic values such as political equality of all citizens.

An analytical focus on political elites has become the common denominator of these studies. Authors argue that democratization and effective democracy promotion became more difficult because these political elites contest and refuse democratic values. Although comparativists started to study the relevance of social movements for the opening of authoritarian regimes in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, elite-centered approaches are still the dominant analytical lens in the study of democratization and its promotion. But such a focus on elites’ contestation of democratic values is likely to mislead analysts of democracy promotion. We should not assume that democratic values per se are contested. To the contrary, according to various sources as the World Value Survey or the Afrobarometer popular support of democracy has never been as high in history as nowadays. Four fifth of the respondents in all world regions indicate that democracy is important for them or that they prefer democracy over alternative types of a political regime, independent of the level of freedom in the respective country (Figure 1).

Responses from authoritarian contexts might be biased because people might not feel able to respond openly and according to their political convictions. However, a cross-check of the respondents’ assessment of the de facto political situation in their respective country suggests that they are likely to feel free enough to take a critical standpoint in the survey. There is a high correlation between regime type and the perceived level of freedom of speech according to the Afrobarometer (e.g. more than 50 per cent feel completely free to speak up in more democratic countries; around 15 per cent say the same in less democratic contexts). Democracy is conceived to be the best alternative and very relevant by 78 to 83 per cent of the respondents amongst all religions and those who are non-religious. Only Hinduism builds an exception with less than 70% favoring democracy and 16% indicating that democracy has a very low relevance for them. Recent empirical research on the role of religious actors for democratization in countries with different religious-majoritarian backgrounds backs the argument that individuals support democracy independent of their religious denomination.3

Democracy promotion’s success depends on such general popular support for democracy. Democracy promotion only has a chance to yield fruits if the people in a recipient country are in accordance with the idea of democracy. Neither scholars nor democracy promoters themselves should fall into the “cultural trap” and assume that specific cultural contexts are per se pro- or anti-democratic as suggested in the debate about the “clash of civilizations”. Finally, there is an additional empirical argument that makes the inclusion of individual perspectives in the study of democracy promotion necessary in the future. Demographic change will double the world population until 2050 in the poorest – and often least democratic – societies of the world. The political socialization of these approximately 900,000 young “new arrivals” will be decisive for the future of democracy. It will therefore make a crucial difference for the future of open societies to understand better how democracy promoters can shape the formation of individuals’ political attitudes.

The Cultural Context: Be Open for a Re-Conceptualization of ‘Democracy Promotion’

If there is a general support for democracy, another immediate question emerges: what kind of democracy? Liberal notions of democracy embrace individual freedom and are often linked to the idea of a market economy. Some political elites and protesters in the Global South contest notions of liberal values associated with “western” culture, in particular individualism. Such challenges go hand in hand with ideas about non-western, locally genuine concepts of democracy. If we do not want to fall into the trap of using stereotypes, we must engage in a more profound empirical analysis of the cultural particularities of democracy in non-western countries. This also implies a conceptual revision of ‘democracy promotion’. The concept of democracy promotion typically refers to an ‘external’ actor who aims at influencing political processes inside a country from outside. However, I argue that democracy promoters influence a political regime from “within” and not from “without”. Democracy promotion does not start from scratch in a country. It is embedded in diplomatic relations with local presence and makes part anti-western discourse to call for more authentic political institutions, often serving as democratic façades for autocratic practices. But these claims are not limited to the Global South. Calls for more participative and accountable democratic regimes are also growing in Western societies.

Promoting the “wrong” model of democracy has been frequently identified as one of the major obstacles for effective democracy promotion. Some scholars argue that the “Western model” cannot be exported elsewhere. However, this finding lacks a solid empirical basis. The process of democracy promotion implies a constant contestation and (re-)negotiation of democratic models between those who are involved in that process. Except for the literature on liberal peacebuilding and international socialization (“localizing norms”) almost no research has focused on these local interactions between democracy promoters and local elites. We therefore know little about what kind of model or aspects of democracy Western donors promote in practice.


Figure 2: Religious Denomination and Support of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>79.86</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>8.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>13.77</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>82.19</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>68.03</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>16.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>78.79</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>83.71</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79.37</td>
<td>12.49</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Politis, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger, “Religious Actors in Democratization. Evidence from Five Young Democracies”, Democratization 16 (December 2009): 1058-1092. Preliminary results of an ongoing project of the latter authors on “Religion in the Fourth Wave of Democratization” also indicate that (pro- and anti-democratic) political theologies only matter if political institutions mediate these theologies.


5. For more research on the interaction in democracy promotion see http://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/.

Leininger
of a larger and mostly longstanding cooperation portfolio. In short, international actors are in most cases interwoven with the recipient regime and co-constitute its political culture. Only an “inside-out perspective” opens the black box of interactive conceptual politics in democracy promotion and allows for integrating cultural factors more systematically.

The Political Context: Identify Patterns of (Fragile) Statehood

More scholarly attention than to individual and cultural factors has been paid to state fragility and political conflict in the context of democracy promotion. Most of these studies assume that democratization fosters conflict and that successful democracy promotion in contexts of fragile statehood is unlikely. However, efforts to systematically study fragile contexts were very limited in the past. Identifying patterns and different intensities of fragility would be an important factor to better judge the effects of democracy promotion. A research team at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) found that the effects of international support to democracy are likely to vary according to the pattern of state fragility in which international interventions take place. Based on a typology of fragile statehood developed at DIE we clustered countries according to three dimensions of statehood: capacity (provision of basic life chances), authority (control of violence) and legitimacy (citizens’ trust in the state). It finds that four groups of fragile states can be empirically distinguished: three groups each with serious deficiencies in mainly one out of the three dimensions of statehood, and one group with deficiencies in all three dimensions. For instance, where the legitimacy of the state decreases drastically – as in the dawn of the Arab spring of 2011 – a destabilization of the political regime is likely. Comparative case studies showed evidence that democracy promotion in states with limited state capacity and decreasing state legitimacy is likely to be effective – at least if international donors impose coordinated political conditionality. As a consequence for the study of democracy promotion, we need more efforts to systematize the relationship between (fragile) statehood and democratization in comparative empirical analyses.

The Spatial Context: Change Your Focus of Interest to Urban Spaces

As seen above, when studying democracy promotion, most scholars refer to political context as macrostructures such as political regimes, the state and geographical regions. These units of analysis shape data-collection and analysis. However, such units are likely to become less important in the shadow of structural, global changes. According to the United Nations the global urban population is likely to increase from almost 4 billion in 2014 to 6.5 billion in 2050 due to internal migration from rural to urban areas and by demographic change. Such demographic and migration dynamics will change urban infrastructure and alter the dynamics of political rule and regime change. Mass-based collective actions in cities might facilitate political mobilization and boost modernization but could also foster political instability and lead to an increase of violence in urban areas. These trends will be most prominent in Africa and Asia, where by 2050 almost three quarters of the global urban population is likely to live. If we want to catch up with these empirical trends in the study of democracy promotion, we must shift our attention to other units of analysis. Research can help to build scenarios to identify opportunities and challenges of urbanization for successful democracy promotion such as the potential for political mobilization and new social media in urban areas. Furthermore, urbanization is likely to cause problems such as increasing social inequality between the urban and rural areas or by creating new cleavages within huge cities. Such social inequalities will shape future opportunities for democracy promotion.

Ethical Perspective: Be Aware of the Shrinking Space of (Academic) Civil Society

We have been observing a “shrinking space” for free action and assembly of civil society at a global scale in recent years. Legal regulation of non-state actors such as NGOs or civic associations has become one of the standard toolkits of autocrats and to-be-autocrats. They use legal regulations to punish, demobilize and repress those who are perceived as threats to the survival or stability of a political regime. This trend has severe implications for the planning and implementation of research but also for research partners in non-democratic contexts.

Empirical research on democracy promotion is data-driven. Access to primary sources depends on cooperation with local research partners, open-access state institutions and good relations with local authorities and associations. Cooperation with local research partners and authorities in a context of shrinking space for civil society implies more responsibility of international researchers and of

6 Julia Leininger, “‘Bringing the outside in’: illustrations from Haiti and Mali for the re-conceptualization of democracy promotion” Contemporary Politics 16 (January 2010): 63 – 80.

their funding organizations. While international researchers can choose to leave a country when civil space is shrinking, local research partners have no choice in most of the cases. State authorities are likely to hold them responsible for controversial research results. Hence, researchers studying democracy promotion should be aware of the consequences of their research and take responsibility for their actions.

Conclusion: Implications for the Future Study of Democracy Promotion

I have identified five sets of individual, societal, cultural, political and spatial factors that will help to identify patterns of democracy promotion's context. Such patterns serve to better understand and explain democracy promotion in the future. Four implications for a future research program emerge from these observations on contextual factors.

First, through studying the influence of societal and cultural factors on political attitudes and, in turn, of political attitudes on institution-building and on the behavior of political elites in (de-)democratization, we can learn more about regime change in general and how democracy promotion could challenge autocrats. Such actor-centered approaches can help to shed light on the effects of democracy promotion, but does not substitute for an analysis of democratic institutions and collective behavior. Although we know that attitudinal change is a precondition of democratic consolidation we do not know how democracy promotion influences the formation of political attitudes.3 Given massive demographic change and at least 900,000 additional young people on earth until 2050 more knowledge is needed on how democratic attitudes can be pro-actively shaped.

Second, the study of democracy promotion can contribute to identify different models and concepts of non-western democracy. This is of particular importance because the model of liberal democracy has been contested in the Global South. Analyzing the interaction between local and internationally promoted concepts of democracy can further inform the conceptualization of varying types of democracy. At the same time, a conceptual distinction of political regimes and the state influence political regime change. Third, spatial transformation requires a re-focus of the unit of analysis from purely state centered foci to urban spaces. Analytical approaches of multi-level governance and social network analysis will help to capture such spatial and migratory dynamics.

Fourth, awareness for the political nature of the empirical study of democracy promotion is important – and potentially even life-saving – for researchers in repressive regimes. Research results feed into strategies of democracy promoters. Hence, the research process indirectly influences the space of civil society in countries of the Global South. Scholars of democracy promotion are therefore “part of the political game” and have to take responsibility for their actions that goes beyond the publication of research results.

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What Is Democracy Aid and Who Receives It?

Leading scholars have included aid for governance and rule of law in their measures of democracy aid. For example, in their widely cited study on U.S. democracy aid, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Mitchell A. Seligson have counted aid to rule of law, governance, civil society, human rights, media and elections as democracy aid. Sarah Bush, Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright proceed similarly, but with global scope.

Donors themselves tend to use narrower definitions of democracy aid. For example, USAID does not subsume all governance or rule of law-related activities under the label of democracy aid, but explicitly refers to this sector as “democracy, rule of law and governance.” This makes sense. It is debatable if and to what extent aid for governance and rule of law contributes to democratization particularly in closed autocracies. Scholars argue that effective state administrations and the rule of law are key or even a prerequisite for democratization. However, we also have evidence that strengthening the public administration does not directly contribute to democratization—if at all. Dictators also use their state apparatus for repression and cooptation. Hence, even if international support to these sectors might have some long-term benefits for democratization, such benefits might be out-weighted by counter-intended paybacks for the ruling elites. Furthermore, donors labeled and reported activities as aid for governance and rule of law, which clearly serve primary purposes other than enhancing democratization. For example, the United States included large-scale counter-narcotics and law enforcement programs in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan or Colombia as aid in the sector of “legal and judicial development.” Evidently, such projects are less likely to directly contribute to democratization than aid allocated to civil society or elections—or might even have counter-intended effects.

For conceptual and analytical clarity, I therefore follow the USAID approach and disentangle democracy aid from aid for governance and rule of law. Aid for governance and rule of law includes projects in the realm of public sector and administrative management, public finance, legal and judicial development, anti-corruption and decentralization and subnational governance. Democracy aid is limited to activities targeting key institutions and processes of democratic governance such as elections, democratic participation and civil society, human rights, media, legislatures and political parties.

Figure 1 depicts the total amount of aid for democracy, governance and rule of law – 106 billion USD – across political regimes (dashed line). 25% of that total amount is core democracy aid (26.8 billion USD). The figures shown here include aid provided by all donors based on the records of the OECD database on official development assistance. Earlier studies have often focused on US democracy aid. While the United States is the largest single donor of democracy aid, other donors account for more than two thirds of all aid for democracy, rule of law and governance from 2002 to 2012. Hence, in order to gain a comprehensive picture of such aid, we need to move beyond analyzing the US engagement only.

As indicator for political regime, I use the Electoral Democracy index from the new Varieties of Democracy data set (V-Dem). Based on Robert


4. The V-Dem project has compiled a data set on 400 different aspects of democracy with the help of more than 2600 expert coders from the entire world.
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, this index aggregates relevant expert-coded V-Dem indicators - such as clean elections, full suffrage and freedom of association - to a continuous index of electoral democracy ranging from 0 (not at all achieved) to 1 (fully achieved). The V-Dem Index distributes observations over the full spectrum of its scale as illustrated by grey bars on Figure 1. Conversely, on the widely used Polity Indicator, most observations are clustered in the higher or lower end of the spectrum (see Sarah Bush’s contribution in this newsletter). Hence, the V-Dem index reflects nuances of regime characteristics better and hence allows highlighting of and analyzing the grey zone between democracy and autocracy more thoroughly, which is a considerable advantage particularly for understanding allocations patterns of democracy aid. As discussed above, we expect democracy aid to be mainly allocated to the grey zone where neither democratic nor autocratic regimes are fully established. In line with these expectations, aid for democracy, rule of law and governance peaks in such hybrid regimes with scores on the V-Dem index between 0.35 and 0.65.5

The expert coders are typically academics from the respective country and are recognized experts on a specific sub-set of V-Dem indicators. To ensure reliability of the indicators, five expert coders per country are typically assigned to each indicator and also record their confidence in their assessment. These ratings were then aggregated based on a Bayesian ordinal item response theory model – which takes the reliability of individual coders into account - to the point estimates used in the regression analysis of paper. For further details see Michael Coppedje, John Gerrig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaing, Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya Mechko, and Farhad Miri. “V-Dem Codebook v6” (V-Dem Institute, 2016) and Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Expert-Coded Data.” V-Dem Working Paper 21 (V-Dem Institute, 2015).

5. For further discussion, Agnes Cornell and Anna Lührmann, “The Role of Democracy Levels for

Closed autocracies receive 15% of overall aid for democracy, governance and rule of law, a total of 15.9 billion between 2002 and 2012 (see black line on Figure 1). In closed autocracies – as defined here - the head of executive is not subjected to multiparty elections and/or the space for civil society substantially restricted. Other scholars – for example Andreas Schedler - have used the notion of closed autocracies to refer to countries that do not hold multiparty elections for the head of the executive. However, from my perspective, the mere holding of multiparty elections is not a sufficient criterion for some degree of openness of a political regime, because many governments hold multiparty elections while severely restricting space for civil society. Therefore, in my operationalization, in order to lose their status as closed autocracy, political regimes need to hold multiparty elections for the head of the executive and exert not more than moderate control over civil society. Based on the operationalization of this definition with V-Dem data, between 2002 and 2012, 42 countries qualified as closed autocracies such as Jordan, Rwanda, Sudan, Eritrea, Tajikistan (from 2004) and Belarus (from 2005).6

What Kind of Democracy Aid Do Closed Autocracies Receive?

One reason why dictators may allow democracy aid within their borders

the Allocation of Democracy Aid” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2016).

6. The lack of direct or indirect multiparty elections for the head of the executive is indicated by a score of 1 or 0 on the applicable V-Dem indicator (see FN 6) on multiparty elections (v2elmulpar_ord). The head of the executive is either the head of state or the head of government, depending on who is more powerful, as identified in the V-Dem variable how. Closed civil society space is indicated with a score of 0 (“monopolistic control”) or 1 (“substantial control”) on the V-Dem indicator capturing the control of government over entry and exit of civil society organizations (v2seorgs_ord).

could be that democracy aid has become “tame” – to use Sarah Bush’s words - and tends not challenge authoritarian rule.7 This notion resonates with comparative studies shedding light on the difference between de-jure and de-facto democratic institutions. Many authoritarian governments have introduced de-jure democratic institutions such as elections and parliaments but manipulation, repression and clientelism restrict their implementation in practice. Staffan Lindberg and others have argued that such institutions may nevertheless contribute to democratization provided that rulers allow for some degree of openness. However, scholars such as Ellen Lust and Andreas Schedler warn that in highly repressive political contexts – in particular without multiparty elections for the head of the executive – de-jure democratic institutions such as parliamentary elections are unlikely to contribute to the subversion of authoritarian rule. Conversely, such institutions may help dictators to stabilize their rule by refining legitimation and cooptation strategies.8 The same might apply for democracy aid.

Therefore, it seems puzzling that democracy aid providers would target

7. Sarah Bush, ibid.

such political regimes. Donors might in fact pursue aims different from democratization when giving democracy aid, such as stabilization, fighting terrorism or opening channels of cooperation and communication. In order to investigate such suspicions, we have to understand better to what kind of democracy aid is allocated to closed autocracies and how democracy aid providers operate in such contexts.

Figure 2 shows a breakdown of this aid by sectors. It indicates that most aid to democracy, rule of law and governance to closed autocracies targets public sector and administrative management (40%), followed by public finance (14%) and democratic participation and civil society (13%).

Only 28% of aid for democracy, governance and rule of law to closed autocracies is actually allocated to core democracy aid sectors.9 Aid to governance and rule of law tends to be granted more frequently directly to the recipient government or other public sector entities. Conversely, NGOs are more often the recipients of core democracy aid. Arguably, if governments directly receive aid they are in control of its implementation and can make sure the respective projects are implemented to their benefit.

9. 30% of aid for governance and rule of law to closed autocracies was delivered through the recipient government or other public sector entities and 1% through national or international NGOs. Conversely, 11% of democracy aid to closed autocracies was delivered through the recipient government or other public sector entities and 14% through national or international NGOs. Furthermore, aid is delivered through multilateral institutions (35% of core democracy aid/ 14% of other), donor governments (1% of core democracy aid/ 4% of other) and research institutions (0.9% of core democracy aid/ 0.4% of other). However, for a large proportion of aid projects the information about the channel of delivery is missing (40% for core democracy aid/ 51% for aid for governance/rule of law). Therefore, this data has to be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to highlight that the data we have indicates different patterns of delivery for democracy aid and aid for governance/rule of law. Therefore, such aid is likely to support the status quo and not to challenge the incumbent regime. Conversely, one might expect that independent NGOs could use democracy aid to create a push for democratization. However, in recent years the romanticized image of NGOs as champions of democratic norms has somewhat suffered. In particular in the restricted context of closed autocracies, we can find many Government Owned NGOs (GONGOs) that are only pro-forma independent entities, but in reality controlled by the government. Furthermore – as Sarah Bush argues convincingly - many increasingly professionalized NGOs avoid challenging ruling elites in order to not to risk losing their contracts and permissions to work, which are their main source of income.10 Hence, NGOs receiving democracy aid in closed autocracies might not have the incentives to do their best to enhance democratization. The Eritrea National Association of the Blind, for example, received 117 000 USD from the Norwegian government in 2012. Likewise, the EU supported the Confederation of Eritrean Workers with 962 000 USD in 2012. Given the highly repressive character of the Eritrean regime, it seems likely that the government controls every formally registered NGO. Hence, immediate effects of aid to such (GO)NGOs on democratization seem unlikely.

Conclusions
Nevertheless, judging aid for democracy, governance and rule of law to closed autocracies across-the-board as ineffective seems too generalizing or even misleading. If transition processes come into motion, the capacities of people with experience in internationally supported civil society sector may enhance the

10. Sarah Bush, ibid, p. 131-159.
prospects for sustained democratization – provided donors chose the right people to support. Furthermore, some democracy aid projects targeting closed autocracies are openly regime-subversive. For example, in 2012 the US-American National Endowment for Democracy allocated 1.2 million USD of democracy aid targeting North Korea, which – according to the OECD data - supported the broadcast of radio programs from outside to North Korea and unconventional civic education activities such as training of North Koreans active in informal private markets. Such examples illustrate that donors may find innovative ways of circumventing official barriers to channel democracy aid to innovative projects targeting closed autocracies.

However, in recent years authoritarian regimes have intensified their repression against NGOs. This trend makes it even more difficult for genuinely independent and pro-democracy NGOs in authoritarian contexts to receive international funds and reduces the number of credible partners in closed autocracies further. In light of the described challenges, design and partners of democracy aid projects in closed authoritarian contexts have to be carefully selected in order to ensure a positive impact and avoid the risk of strengthening authoritarian rulers through democracy aid. Particularly democracy aid that is channeled directly to the recipient government and to sectors such as public administration and law enforcement seems likely to be beneficial mainly to the survival of the dictator and not for immediate regime transformation. Nevertheless, such aid might serve other important purposes such as keeping channels of communication with authoritarian regimes open and improving prospects for long-term democratization. Future research could provide for a more detailed assessment of how political context and specific types of aid for democracy, rule of law and governance interact in order to provide better assessments of risks and benefits. In particular it seems fruitful to expand the rich, recent comparative research on authoritarian rule to the subject of democracy aid in such context.

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contractors, consultants, and academic institutions comprising what scholars refer to as a ‘democracy industry’ or ‘democracy establishment’. Scholars have since developed increasingly sophisticated methods to explore the impact and effectiveness of democracy aid on democratization and have found a positive relationship between the two. A cross-national quantitative study commissioned by USAID to assess the effectiveness of its spending for democracy in its programs worldwide from 1990-2005 concluded that spending for democracy ‘works’. Though methodologically sophisticated, the actual politics embedded within democracy aid is often absent from findings in studies like that commissioned by USAID. Indeed, one of the limitations for aggregate cross-national studies is their inability to give sufficient attention to the form or structure of democracy programs, the context in which they were executed, and the negotiations between both donor and recipient states.

Evaluating the impact of democracy programs on democracy—a contested concept in itself—has also been a notoriously thorny endeavour for both scholars and aid practitioners. What does it mean to say a democracy program is working? For whom is it working? Institutional and bureaucratic pressures imposed by donor agencies and other aid organizations to produce results often lead to compromises and trade-offs, generating numbers at the expense of more nuanced understandings of the indirect and time-delayed effects of democracy aid. For example, one of the most common measures used by scholars to assess progress on democracy is the ordinal scale, FHI, developed by the advocacy group Freedom House. Ordinal measures like the FHI though mask complex changes within states receiving aid and often relay a superficial understanding of reform trajectories. Scholars using the FHI and similar indices acknowledge the limitations inherent with such measures yet continue to use them in their research. These points are not meant to castigate quantitative approaches to the study of democracy promotion or dismiss findings from such studies altogether; instead, they are meant to attune us to what is missing in the extant literature on democracy promotion.

Donor transparency in the area of democracy aid would seem to be an imperative given the purported aims of such aid. Yet, information provided by donors like USAID, for example, seldom includes project level data on democracy programming or information about contractors executing the projects, the recipients of the aid, and the process behind how grants and projects were selected. Finding such data is possible, but difficult. Donor reluctance to share details makes it challenging to evaluate how democracy aid really works in practice and implicitly raises questions about donor intentions. The constellation of actors engaged in democracy promotion is vast. Each actor though may hold very different ideas about democracy and its conceptualization and the best approaches to advance their particular interpretation. Careful consideration of such differences and motivations is seldom found in scholarship on democracy aid, but is critical for understanding how aid works in practice. Other challenges extend beyond data issues in understanding the parameters and possibilities for democracy aid. In her examination of aid and activism in the Arab world, Carapico observes that such aid may function both “as a mode of empowerment and a modality of power.” This viewpoint though is seldom engaged seriously in the literature on democracy aid. Democracy is often understood as a good in and of itself with little interrogation about its meaning. As Hobson and Kurki remind us though, defining democracy “is an avoidably political and normative act with serious ramifications both for democracy promotion and the role of scholars studying the subject.” In the next section, I discuss how the meaning of democracy matters in my research on democracy aid in the Middle East, particularly in thinking about how such aid may serve to reinforce rather than challenge restrictive regimes.

A Political Economy of US Democracy Aid in the Middle East

In my book manuscript, I offer a different approach to understanding the practice of democracy promotion that challenges how we think about the impact and effectiveness of aid. The book began as doctoral research motivated then by the puzzle that despite more than $2 billion expended by the US for democracy across in the region since 1990, little impact seemed to exist. Scholars and


7. Finkel et al., “Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy
analysts seeking to understand economic and political drivers of protest in 2011 revisited this aid, asking whether international support, particularly that from the United States, played an instrumental role as it had for civil society groups in Eastern Europe in the years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts to link democracy aid cleanly to uprisings in the Middle East met with challenges. Initial reports noted that some protestors active in organizing and participating in protests such as Egypt’s April 6th movement, attended conferences outside of Egypt with support from the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Others observed that in Tunisia, where protests began, then President Ben Ali had forbid all US democracy programs. The difficulty of tying that aid to the 2011 uprisings reflects a more complicated story that challenges the way we think about the origins and foundations of the protests, as well as the ways in which US democracy programs evolved in the region and what those programs supported.

That strategic and security interests may explain the limited impact of democracy aid in the region would come as little surprise to scholars and observers of politics in the region.8 How do geostrategic concerns shape the form and function of democracy aid? Strategic imperatives have long shaped the US’ relationship with states in the region. A more pointed question though is one that extends beyond regimes in the Middle East: Why would an authoritarian state even allow democracy programs? After all, democracy aid programs, according to Thomas Carothers - one of the foremost scholars in this field, fundamentally aim to challenge the structure of power in a recipient state.9 Answering this question connects us to core issues of power and political economy absent from recent studies aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of such aid. It also requires a more complex consideration of the relations between the US as a donor and recipient states in the region and the actors engaged with such aid in the bureaucracies of both.

In my book, I tackle these questions by advancing a political economy framework that considers how ideas, interests, and institutions mediate and shape the form and function of democracy programs. Examining the role of ideas, interests, and institutions connects us to concerns about how actors within a democracy establishment interact to shape the form and ultimate function of democracy programs. How do the ideas individuals hold about democracy influence the strategy advocated by an aid institution? Who decides which conception of democracy is to be used in programs? What criteria are used to select aid recipients? How much agency do local actors have in the construction and execution of democracy programs?

I engage with these questions in developing a framework to examine the design, evolution, and impact of democracy aid informed by historical case studies of efforts in Egypt and Morocco, two of the highest recipients of democracy aid in the region. In doing so, I find that US democracy aid programs did little to challenge state power in the region. In both states, democracy programs were framed in terms of their benefit to the economy. This framing reflected an institutional preference in the US for a market oriented democracy as well as a strategy used to sell democracy programs to resistant regimes. I show how regimes have been able to appropriate elements of US aid to bolster their control over society, for example, by using support for civil society to help fulfill social welfare functions. US programs aiming to promote democracy often served to reinforce regime structures they aimed to challenge. The ability for states to resist this strategy and dilute programs to their benefit was shaped by their level of dependence on and strategic importance to the United States. I argue that dependency matters in understanding an authoritarian regime’s ability to resist democracy aid programs, but that it is contingent on the availability of other potential patrons to act as a surrogate for donor aid.

My findings are developed from extensive field research in Egypt, Morocco, and Washington DC, and draws from archival work, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and over 150 interviews in Arabic, French, and English with development practitioners, diplomats, contractors, activists, and US Embassy and USAID staff to understand how programs and projects in the region evolved since 1990. Beyond suggesting the limits of linkage politics and foreign aid, my work underscores the importance of further research on the micro politics animating the democracy bureaucracy both in Washington and in the field. For example, I detail how ideas about democracy emerge and are reproduced even with evidence of learning that they don’t work, drawing from novel data of more than 1,700 professionals

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working in the democracy promotion field. Security concerns also alter the way aid practitioners in DC and in the field approach democracy programming. As an example, in my interviews in the Middle East, staff within USAID spoke frequently about frustration over framing any potential aid program in counter-violence or terrorism terms to gain the reception and by extension, funding from Congress.

This dimension is not new or particular to the Middle East. In my book, I recount a staff member admonished by his director in USAID’s Latin America bureau in the 1980s for his modest assessments about program impact, which he felt would jeopardize future funding from Congress. As he recalled: “I argued that even though there had been this wave of democratic elections in Latin America, it was clear from this historical record that that had happened before and then democracy failed to take root and that there was no assurance that the countries were going to stay democratic. [the director] didn’t like that…His concern was that if Congress read it my way, they would think that any money we put into this could go down the drain and therefore why do it. I’d argued, and my office argued, that unless we indicated their weaknesses and vulnerabilities and deficits that needed to be dealt with, why have a program. We never agreed on that.”

Many practitioners and activists that I’ve spoken to in the region have also advocated for a more social democratic approach to democracy aid that would focus more on deficits in human development and social justice issues. Advocates for such an approach make compelling arguments that investments in education and health are critical to the foundation and quality of democracy and are less likely to incite pushback from restrictive regimes. Practitioners have shared with me that in an ideal world absent of funding and bureaucratic obstacles, the composition and direction of such programs would respond to local demand rather than the imperatives of donors. Even if that dynamic prevailed, there are still other dimensions to consider.

As scholars, we should be clear-eyed and critical about the motivations, logic, and rationale animating the actions and donor organizations engaged in democracy aid. In asking and debating the important question of whether some types and approaches to democracy aid are better suited for more restrictive states, we should also be honest in acknowledging the opacity and gaps that remain in our own understanding of how democracy emerges. Understanding the practice of aid also attunes us to how good intentions often have unintended and sometimes perverse consequences for the citizens donors aim to support in restrictive regimes. In one example from my work, a senior advisor to a US funded civil society program in Egypt noted that a project meant to act as a concentration point for all NGOs, ultimately made it easier for the Egyptian government to exercise control over them.

A final point from this example concerns ethics. Scholars should engage with important ethical questions embedded in how democracy aid programs are formed and delivered in restrictive states. For the United States, a big question is whether a donor should be engaged in democracy aid in a state if its security interests therein make it unwilling to protect recipients of that aid in the event of a government crackdown. What responsibility do donors have to local recipients in the wake of a government crackdown? Would multilateral democracy aid efforts have more credibility and legitimacy in restrictive environments? Is it possible to speak of an ethical democracy strategy in authoritarian states? One of the most promising ways for scholars to navigate the complex ethical debates and dilemmas of democracy aid in any context is to adopt a consequentialist approach in weighing the merit of any one form of such aid. This approach would, as Kathryn Sikkink has written, “try to evaluate the relative importance and weight of…progress and regress…in order to make an ethical judgement about action in the future, we need to have an idea of the relative balance of the different consequences, or the conditions under which certain benefits or costs will be more likely.” That no easy answers or solutions exist should not dissuade us from the important work of deepening our knowledge of how democracy aid works in autocracies.

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Randomization presents scholars with a powerful tool to eliminate bias and estimate the effects of observers on fraud, because it creates a clean counterfactual. A simple difference-in-mean analysis between treated (observed) and control polling stations (stations with no observers) can indicate election fraud, even when political parties employ fraudulent tactics that are hidden from onlookers. To measure fraud, scholars can use otherwise benign electoral outcomes such as turnout rates and political party vote shares at polling stations. When organizations deploy observers at random, all else equal, electoral outcomes should be the same, on average, across treatment and control stations. Significant differences between treatment and control units are then suggestive of fraud.

The Impact of International Observers on Electoral Fraud
To our knowledge, Hyde was the first scholar to use tools of randomization to measure the impact of observers on fraud.³ Hyde analyzes Armenia’s 2003 presidential election, leveraging the near-random assignment of 233 international election observers to over 1,000 polling stations. Her results show that observers reduce the incumbent vote share in the first round of the polls by 5.9 percent and by 2 percent in the second round (pg. 54). Moreover, polling stations that were visited by observers in the first round of the election, but had no observers in the second, saw a 4.4 percent decrease in the incumbent’s vote share in the second round (pg. 55). The latter result suggests that observers’ effects can persist over electoral rounds.

A year later, Hyde mounted the first fully-randomized experiment to estimate the effect of international election observers in Indonesia’s 2004 presidential polls.⁴ She assigned 482 villages to treatment and roughly 1,700 to control. However, problems with implementation meant that observers visited only 94 of the treatment villages and accidentally visited some (23) of the control communities. Despite the small number of observations, Hyde finds that, contrary to her finding in Armenia, the assignment of villages to treatment (i.e., the intent-to-treat effect) resulted in a 6.5 percent increase in votes cast for the incumbent candidate, President Megawati Sukarnoputri (who eventually lost the election). Hyde explains this finding by suggesting that observers ensured that polling officials kept polling stations open until required by the election laws. She argues that this potentially increased the turnout rate among the incumbent’s supporters, who were a more apathetic group compared opposition parties’ supporters. An important takeaway of Hyde’s results is that observers appear to increase polling officials’ compliance with electoral laws.

While these two experiments represented a significant step forward in the literature estimating the effects of observers, challenges still remain. First, it is not clear whether polling stations that receive international observation experience the same treatment. The transitory nature of international observers means that they usually spend varying amounts of time at different stations. These differences may confound the treatment effect. For example, Susan Hyde suggests that observers spent about twenty minutes at polling stations but were “instructed to stay as long as they think is useful” at a station when they witnessed problems (pg. 50). A significant difference in the time observers spend at “red flag” polling stations can introduce bias in the estimation of the effect of observers, potentially overestimating their effects. Second, as was the case Hyde’s second study, some control stations may end up accidently receiving monitors as international observers move around looking for their assigned stations. Again, such behavior has the potential to introduce bias to the estimation of the treatment effect.

Lastly, as in all experiments, to estimate an unbiased effect of treatment, units must only respond to their own treatment assignment. That is, the outcome at Polling Station A must be a result of it’s own assignment to treatment or control, and should not be influenced by the treatment status of Polling Station B. The technical term for this assumption is Stable Unit Treatment Value Assignment (SUTVA). Violations of SUTVA are potentially serious because it could plausibly be the case that in the presence of observers, political parties simply move fraud to stations without observers.

The Impact of Domestic Election Observers on Electoral Fraud
Later experimental studies have attempted to overcome some of these challenges by studying the impact of domestic, as opposed to international election observers, on fraud. The advantage of studying domestic observers is twofold. First, domestic observers generally stay at one station for the entire day. This arrangement helps ensure uniformity in treatment across treated stations. Second, domestic observers usually observe polling stations in electoral districts where they reside. This protects against them inadvertently “observing” control stations. Scholars working on the impact of domestic election observers

³Susan D. Hyde “The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence From a Natural Experiment” World Politics 60(1):37–63.
have also began to acknowledge, and explicitly measure, violations of SUTVA and account for the potential spillover effects of observers.

Ichino and Schündeln provide the first empirical analysis of the causal impact of domestic election observers. Their study is novel in two important ways. First, Ichino and Schündeln study the effects of observers during the pre-election period as opposed to on election day. Specifically, the authors measure the effects of observers on the manipulation of the official voter list ahead of Ghana’s 2008 general elections. Registration fraud is important as it can result in ineligible voters being able to vote on election day. Second, their study directly addresses potential violations of SUTVA by attempting to measure the spillover effects of observers.

Ichino and Schündeln find that the presence of observers during the voter registration process reduced the number of registered voters in electoral areas (EAs) between 2004 and 2008 by 3.5 percentage points (pg. 302). In addition, the authors find evidence of spillover. Specifically, polling stations in untreated electoral areas less than 5 kilometers away from treated electoral areas see an increase in registered voters by 2.7 percentage points. This result suggests that when encountering observers parties displaced registration fraud to nearby stations without observers (pg. 302). Interestingly, later work has shown that observers can also have negative spillover effects (i.e. a deterrence effect). In Russia, polling stations located within the same building as a station with an observer witness lower levels of fraud than other control stations.

These two studies highlight the need for scholars to account for the response of political parties to the presence of observers to avoid bias in estimates. One potential weakness of prior work is that the authors assume a limited spatial model of spillovers. In other words, they assume that political agents will respond locally to the presence of observers. If party agents operate across entire constituencies, however, it need not be the case that spillovers are contained within very localized spatial boundaries.

The Effect of Observers on Fraud and Violence during Ghana’s 2012 Election

In our own work (co-authored with Joseph Asunka, Miriam Golden and Eric Kramon) we study the effects of domestic election observers during Ghana’s 2012 presidential election. We extend previous work to measure the impact of observers on both electoral fraud and election-day violence at polling stations. Additionally, our research design allows us to directly account for and measure the potential spillover effects of observers within entire constituencies. By measuring spillover effects we can also assess whether political parties respond differently to the presence of observers – whether through enacting fraud or violence – across electoral constituencies with different levels of electoral competition.

To account for potential spillover effects, we adopt a research design from Baird et al., which involves two levels of randomization. First, we randomly assigned constituencies in our sample to a treatment saturation level. The saturation level indicates the proportion of polling stations in a constituency that will receive observers. We assigned constituencies to three levels of treatment: low, medium, and high. At the second stage, we randomly assigned polling stations within these constituencies to be observed or unobserved.

Our unit of analysis is the individual polling station. To measure the direct effect of observers we compare outcomes at treatment and control stations. Our measure of fraud is polling station turnout. To measure intimidation, we use reports from observers (at treated stations) and party agents (at control stations) on intimidation during voting. To measure spillovers, we compare outcomes at control stations in high and medium saturation constituencies to control stations in constituencies we assigned to the low saturation condition. We do this because the low saturation control units are the least likely to be impacted by spillover effects.

Our findings are twofold. First, observers reduce fraud and violence at polling stations. Figure 1 displays these results. The presence of an observer reduces turnout by 5 percentage points, a 6 percent decrease. Similarly, the presence of observers reduces voter intimidation during the voting process by 7 percentage points, a 58 percent decrease.

Second, levels of local electoral competition shape party activists’ response to observers. In stronghold constituencies, parties are able to use local party networks to relocate...
fraud to stations without an election observer. In contrast, party activists relocate intimidation to stations without observers in competitive areas. This finding suggests that the degree of electoral competition at the local level can significantly influence the effectiveness of democracy promotion interventions such as observation.

Avenues for Future Research on Election Observers and Electoral Fraud

As we demonstrate, the literature on election observation has progressed immensely over the last 15 years. However, there is still enormous potential for future work in this area. Many studies document the positive effects of observers on reducing electoral fraud and violence. The next step is to nail down the precise mechanism through which observers are effective. Doing so should increase the effectiveness of observer missions.

To understand how observers reduce fraud, we need to know who the main perpetrators of fraud are. The two likely contenders are political party agents and election officials. If election officials are the main perpetrators of fraud, this suggests that scholars and civil society groups should pay greater attention to the bureaucratic processes through which election commissions hire polling station staff.

Secondly, we distinguish between a legal-sanctioning and a community-sanctioning mechanism through which observers may influence fraudulent activities. Observers reduce fraud even in contexts where the threat of legal punishment for wrongdoing is low. The fact that observers are effective in such environments suggests that observers’ effectiveness may be a product of potential social sanctioning (or shaming) within communities. If a party agent wants to attempt fraud, the presence of an observer may deter her because she is scared that the observer will report this behavior to local elites. If the threat of community shaming, rather than legal sanctioning, is the mechanism through which observers are effective, this implies that observers who are embedded in local, social networks may be more effective in reducing fraud than observers who do not have local ties. It would also suggest that domestic observers are likely to be more effective than their international counterparts.

Finally, in future studies scholars should consider the possibility that observers simply push election fraud or violence to later or earlier stages of the electoral process. In a new paper, Ofosu and Posner, find that the presence of observers reduces the likelihood of the public posting of results at polling stations and increases the probability of fraud at the aggregation stage during Malawi’s 2014 presidential election. Progress in this area will shape our thinking about the equilibrium effect of observers on election quality.

Sarah Brierley is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). She studies political accountability in developing democracies, with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. George Ofosu is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He studies electoral integrity and democratic accountability of politicians in new democracies, with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa.


The central result of the paper is the relationship between the relative position of the platforms parties adopt in an election vis-a-vis the outside power (political polarization) and the spending mix chosen by foreign influencers. We argue that investments in processes and parties are mutually dependent: an extra dollar for a candidate buys more or less depending on election bias. When parties adopt platforms that differ from the point of view of the outsiders, at least some resources are invested in candidates. This does not preclude democracy promotion. Especially when geo-political importance of a country is high, candidate support increases the overall investment in a clean political process by liberal outsiders.

Our work helps us understand an important and recurring challenge: that of aiding democracy in a world of overlapping spheres of influence among powerful outsiders. Testing systematically the insights of the model in elections is a matter of identifying appropriate data. In this case, such data would include election-level data, with divisions among the opposition and governing parties on policy issues important to the outside powers. The National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data has a comprehensive listing of all elections. Systematic data on policy divisions between the main domestic actors is not available. For a simple illustration of the logic of our argument, we selected at random 63 election cases from NELDA, and we asked research assistants to code whether the government and main opposition party were divided in their position on cooperation with the United States, as well as whether another power was active pre-election. The data is a small sample, and yet, when merged with the NELDA dataset, it reveals patterns, shown on the figures below. Thanks to a research grant by the DFG (German Research Foundation) we will be able to significantly expand the coverage of this dataset in the near future.

We see that, when the incumbent is friendly to the U.S., i.e. the variable ‘Polarization’ is coded as 1, the incumbent also does better in elections. We also see that this is correlated with significant bias (in favor of the incumbent). Election war cases show a pattern that is different, and is consistent with a conflict between, what we call a liberal and an aliberal power in our theoretical model. Conflictual interests are associated with the opposition doing better when the U.S. likes the government, and the incumbent winning when the U.S. prefers the opposition. ‘Wars’ lessen the importance of being close to the United States for winning elections. The rapid decrease in bias in ‘war’ cases where the U.S. likes the incumbent is somewhat surprising, possibly indicating the need to adjust for covariates.

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4. Section 1 of the Online Appendix of the working paper (see Footnote 2) shows the cases and the raw codings.
Based on V-Dem data, one in ten elections occurs under conditions of diminished domestic or international sovereignty, implying that an outsider has very wide leeway in influencing domestic political competition.5 We can add to the list of vulnerable countries those that are former colonies, or occupy the periphery of powerful states’ regions of influence.

Our study shows that the limited impact of democracy-promoters might arise from the clash of complex interests. It does not, however, mean that Western states do not contribute positively to democracy elsewhere.

Johannes Bubeck is a doctoral student at the University of Mannheim’s Department of Economics. Nikolay Marinov is a professor of political science at the University of Mannheim.

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5. Based on V-Dem data variables v2svdomaut and v2svinlaut (values <2), out of 3174 elections with competition (per NELDA), we have 388 occurring in countries with limited domestic or international autonomy. This includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-war Poland, Greece. See: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya Mechkova, and Farhad Miri. V-dem codebook v6. University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2016.
2016 Section Award Winners

Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy:
Bryn Rosenfeld (Nuffield College, Oxford) for her dissertation on “Varieties of Middle Class Growth and Preference Formation.”

Committee Members: Henry Thomson (Nuffield College); Mai Hassan (University of Michigan); and Christian von Soest (GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies)

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winner: Bryn Rosenfeld’s Dissertation, “Varieties of Middle Class Growth andPreference Formation” is an insightful and fascinating study of economic development, the growth of the middle class and democratization. Rosenfeld engages with canonical theories of economic and political change to question the link between the middle classes and demands for democracy. Drawing on evidence from the former Soviet Union, she argues that contemporary autocratic regimes often control access to the middle class, particularly through public sector employment. They use this control to exert a pernicious influence on individuals’ support for democracy and propensity to engage in collective action. Throughout, this dissertation carefully and rigorously analyzes new and interesting data on both public opinion and protest behavior, using advanced quantitative methods. It also makes a major contribution by implementing a novel case-control design for drawing inferences on the characteristics of protest participants which can be adopted by other researchers. Rosenfeld makes a significant contribution to our understanding of democratization in the post-Soviet world and to our theories linking economic development and democratic reform. Her key findings also shed light on developments in authoritarian states outside the post-Soviet world and will be of interest to all scholars of comparative politics. She is a very worthy recipient of the 2016 Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democratization.

Best Book Award

Committee Members: Kurt Weyland (University of Texas at Austin); Sheena Chesnut Greitens (University of Missouri); and Rachel Beatty Riedl (Domaine Universitaire)

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winner: The award committee received thirty-one submissions this year. We conducted the selection process in two rounds and at least two of us assessed each entry. We read a number of very good, even excellent books – so academic production on political regime issues continues to be vibrant and exciting!

In the end, a clear winner emerged easily and by consensus: Kenneth Roberts, Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era (Cambridge University Press, 2015). What makes this book stand out is the author’s ambitious and successful effort to “make sense” of and bring theoretical order to a topic of massive cross-sectional and longitudinal scope, namely party systems in Latin America over the course of several decades. This is a difficult analytical challenge, given the volatility and variation that these party systems have experienced. Roberts develops a complex argument that systematically weaves together economic, social, political, and institutional factors and thus accounts for the historical constitution of Latin American party systems and their later transformations—a topic of crucial significance for the emergence of democracy, its consolidation, and its potential erosion.

By going beyond the usual focus on the “major” Latin American countries, most of which used to have labor-mobilizing party systems, Roberts identifies a second broad type, namely elitist party systems, which prevailed mainly in the smaller and less developed countries of the region. One of the principal—and paradoxical—insights of the study is that contrary to European experiences, labor-mobilizing party systems proved less resilient to drastic economic adjustment and market reform, the major shock highlighted in this structuralist account. How “neoliberalism” was enacted then shaped the degree and type of change that Latin American party systems underwent especially during the last two decades: where conservatives spearheaded market reform (as in Brazil and Chile, e.g.), party-based opposition from the left led to a programmatic alignment in the party system. By contrast, where leftists or populists were compelled to impose tough adjustment, this unexpected policy switch produced programmatic de-alignment, soon prompted a radical backlash, and thus threw party systems into turmoil. In sum, as Roberts shows, the collapse of state-led development and the transition to neoliberalism fundamentally reshaped the character and purpose of state power, the patterns of association in civil society, and the nature of state-society relations. And this reshaping occurred in different forms according to the extent of lower-class political incorporation and elite party control.

Roberts carefully develops these arguments and supports them with a multi-methods approach that combines statistical analysis with a set of country cases. In drawing together a variety of causal factors, Roberts parses out their specific contributions and speaks to a number of important literatures, all focused on the interrelation of market reform, party systems, and democratic development. The author systematically explains the causal linkages between these diverse factors, producing a superb theoretical synthesis. He develops a sophisticated argument that bridges political economy, democratic transitions, and party politics to shed light on a series of crucial developments in Latin American politics.
By tracing historical processes over a long time frame through the effective, thoughtful use of a “critical junctures” framework, the book offers a broad canvas that richly covers important dimensions of Latin America’s socioeconomic and political development. While the historical paths before and after the challenges arising from neoliberalism do not neatly align by forming a “branching tree,” Roberts puts fundamental categories of historical institutionalism to excellent use and provides an insightful overview of party evolution in Latin America from the 1930s to the 2010s. The book presents a masterful blend of deep history, comparative case study, succinct and innovative theory, and broad connections to the literature. In its focus on Latin America, the analysis speaks to current global debates on democratization, critical junctures, political party systems, and neoliberal reform. It engages relevant debates from across the field, and offers new insights into how the interaction of state, market, and party competition can have dramatic consequences for democratic stability and volatility.

Condensing many years of thinking and research, Changing Course in Latin America is exceedingly well-crafted. The committee unanimously felt that among all of the books we received, this volume stood out with its enormous scope and academic contributions. Kenneth Roberts has written a magnificent book that richly deserves the 2016 award of APSA's Comparative Democratization section.

Best Article Award

Daniel Treisman (UCLA) for “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover” (published in the American Journal of Political Science in 2015).

Committee Members: Jordan Gans-Morse (Northwestern University); Sebastian Mazzuca (Johns Hopkins University); and Simeon Nichter (UC San Diego)

Best Field Work Award

Pia Raffler, Yale University for her fieldwork in Uganda. Kathleen Klaus, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for her fieldwork in Kenya.

Committee Members: Barry Driscoll (Grinnell College); Michael Broache (University of Tampa); and Colm Fox (Singapore Management University)

Committee's Remarks on the Award

Winner: Treisman tackles one of the foundational questions in comparative politics—does economic development lead to democratization?—and adds novel insights to a long-enduring debate. How is it that after decades of studies, no consensus has been reached about this fundamental question? Treisman shows that in part it is because the debate has paid short shrift to critical distinctions between the short and medium term, changes in and levels of economic development, and the role of structure and agency. Offering a theoretical framework centered around the impact of leader turnover, Treisman impressively manages to integrate these disparate considerations into a unified theory. While the structural pressures of economic development may have a democratizing effect, regime change will occur when entrenched dictators leave office. Employing rigorous econometric techniques, Treisman shows that data are remarkable consistent with his theory’s predictions. Along the way, he helps to explain a number of underappreciated yet important stylized facts, such as the stronger relationship between economic development and democratization in the middle term (10 to 20 years) than in the short term. Overall, Treisman’s article is a major contribution to the study of comparative democratization, and to comparative politics more broadly.

Best Field Work Award

Pia Raffler, Yale University and Kathleen Klaus of UW-Madison are co-recipients of the 2016 APSA Fieldwork Award.

Pia’s dissertation develops and tests a novel theory concerning the relationship between political oversight of bureaucrats and service provision by local governments, combining qualitative and experimental methods that involved 18 months of in-depth fieldwork in Uganda.

The theory developed in Ms. Raffler’s dissertation addresses a critical question in political economy, with particular relevance to emerging democracies: how and under what conditions increased democratic accountability affects the provision of government services at the local level. Pia posits that increased oversight will improve service delivery, conditional on the underlying issue impeding effective service delivery and the integrity of bureaucrats and officials. This theory is directly informed by hundreds of in-depth, semi-structured interviews that Ms. Raffler conducted with local government officials and civil society representatives.

To test this theory, Ms. Raffler used extensive contacts with government agencies and researchers to design and implement a field experiment involving the rollout of a reform that affected local politicians’ and challengers’ access to budgetary information and capacity to exercise oversight vis-à-vis bureaucrats in 260 localities nationwide. Working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, Ms. Raffler managed an extensive logistical operation, including the recruitment and training of local facilitators to administer training workshops to over 3,000 local government officials and challengers and the dissemination of local budgetary information, while at the same time organizing an impressive data collection effort that involved a panel survey of over 2,800 politicians and bureaucrats, physical inspections of over 1,200 local
government project sites, and review of local-level budgeting and voting data.

The Committee also wishes to be clear that while Pia’s fieldwork is unusual in its very high levels of funding, it was neither the magnitude of the study nor the resources at her disposal that made Pia’s work stand out. Rather, what made it stand out was the complexity involved in carrying out such ambitious work, and in doing so in such a careful and methodical way. Ms. Raffler’s research provides valuable insights into the conditions under which interventions to enhance democratic accountability may promote the effective provision of government services at the local level. These insights were only possible as a result of Ms. Raffler’s rigorous fieldwork, which required deep knowledge of the country context, extensive cooperation with local officials, and management of a highly complex logistical project. Ms. Raffler’s work is therefore a deserving recipient of the Best Fieldwork Award.

Kathleen’s dissertation looks at the connection between land allocation and electoral violence in Kenya. Her research uses a multi-staged research design implemented during 15 months of fieldwork.

In the first stage, Kathleen employs an in-depth qualitative approach using intensive micro-comparative case studies. To build her argument from the ground up, she did hundreds of lengthy interviews and dozens of focus groups across numerous carefully selected cases. Through this, she finds that land was often allocated unevenly, that it created ‘contentious land narratives’ in some regions, and ultimately, that these narratives resulted in electoral violence in some of these regions, but not in others.

For the second stage, Kathleen drew on her qualitative research to designed context-relevant questions for a 750 household survey. The survey was implemented across regions that experienced violence and those that did not. Given the sensitivity nature of the survey, Kathleen utilized list experiments and also used experimental questions that randomized an “ethnic cue”.

Ultimately Kathleen finds that when the allocation of land was unequal and lacked legitimacy, ‘contentious land narratives’ developed. Politicians could then draw on these narratives to mobilize for violence. But this only occurred if voters believed their land access and rights hinged on the outcome of the election.

In preparation for fieldwork, Kathleen developed a deep knowledge of Kenya and learned Swahili. During fieldwork she spent a significant amount of time engaging with Kenyans in urban and rural areas, and managed a team of enumerators to implement a sophisticated survey under difficult circumstances. Overall, the sophistication in the planning and execution of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of Kathleen’s research is truly remarkable and represents the very best in fieldwork.

Only through extensive fieldwork at the micro-level, was Kathleen able to develop an original argument that placed ordinary citizens and their experiences at the center of the analysis. It moves beyond simplistic explanations based on instrumentalism or ethnicity, to explain how history, land access, local understandings, and political competition can result in electoral violence. It richly deserves the prize as joint-winner of the Best Fieldwork Award.

Best Paper Award
Anne Meng (UC Berkeley) for her paper on “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.”

Committee’s Remarks on the Award Winner: In her compelling paper, “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change”, Anne Meng argues that weaker autocrats create institutionalized ruling parties whereas stronger ones rely on personalist regimes. Moving away from Huntington’s notion of party institutionalization as the infusion of value by its members, Meng argues that the institutionalization of authoritarian incumbent parties should be understood as a commitment to resource-sharing between a dictator and his support coalition. As she shows with careful formal modeling, strong rulers can survive by doling out patronage at will whereas weaker ones must commit to a permanent minimum level of resource sharing through a “a semi-autonomous organization that can enforce joint rule”.

She tests her argument on one-party regimes in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2005, arguing that initially strong autocrats were leaders of independence movements or created their own dominant parties, making them more difficult to remove than weaker autocrats who were more closely aligned with outgoing colonial powers. Meng’s paper is an important advance in the study of autocratic regimes. The existing literature agrees that institutionalized ruling parties generate political stability, but Meng presents a thoughtful argument about the origins of such parties. Her work also implies a cruel twist of path dependent fate. Initially strong leaders are compelled to go it alone, failing to broaden their support coalition and to establish clear lines of succession. As a result, subsequent regimes may be surprisingly unstable. At the same time, initially weaker autocrats survive by distributing political and economic power to regime supporters and thus may sew the seeds of stability. The committee was impressed with the methodological rigor and incisiveness of Meng’s work and we look forward to seeing it appear in journals and a book in the years to come.
**Australian Voter Experience Project:**
The Electoral Integrity Project has partnered with the Australian Electoral Commission in July 2016 to launch the new Australian Voter Experience (AVE) project. The survey gathers public feedback about Australian experiences and perceptions of the administration of elections, especially the integrity and convenience of the process. The Electoral Integrity Project was also awarded the 2016 Lawrence and Lynne Brown Democracy Medal by the McCourtney Institute for Democracy at Penn State in May 2016. The Brown Medal is awarded annually to a project that works to advance democracy in the United States and around the world.

**Conference on “Varieties of Democracy: Nature, Causes, and Consequences”:**
The Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame is sponsoring a conference on “Varieties of Democracy: Nature, Causes, and Consequences” November 11-12, 2016. Its goal is to promote interaction between selected V-Dem researchers (Michael Bernhard, Michael Coppedge, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Pamela Paxton, Dan Pemstein, and Vello Pettai) and democracy or regime researchers who use or may decide to use V-Dem data. The conference includes a mix of panels and roundtables featuring Zachary Elkins, Jennifer Gandhi, Gary Goertz, Amy Erica Smith, and Milan Svolik, among others). A complete list of papers and participants can be found at kellogg.nd.edu. For further information, contact coppedge.1@nd.edu.

**NEWS FROM MEMBERS**

**Nancy Bermeo**, Nuffield Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Oxford published an article on Democratic Backsliding in the January 2016 *Journal of Democracy*. It shows that the most blatant challenges to democracy, such as election-day ballot fraud and military coups, are becoming less common but that more vexing challenges are taking their place. These include “strategic electoral manipulation” which occurs long before polling-day, and “executive aggrandizement” whereby heads of state use legal channels to legitimate the erosion of checks and balances. Bermeo has also published *Parties, Movements and Democracy in the Developing World* (Cambridge University Press, 2016) along with co-editor Deborah Yashar, professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University. The book examines the limits to class-based approaches to understanding regime trajectories in the developing world and argues that parties and movements deserve more attention as key (and often autonomous) collective actors throughout the democratization process. The project’s contributors include Erik Kohunta, Ellen Lust, Rachel Beatty Riedl, Ken Roberts, Dan Slater, Maya Tudor and David Waldner.


*Property and Political Order* also won the Best Book Award from the APSA-ASA African Politics Conference Group and was Honorable Mention for the Melville Herskovitz Award, the Best Book Award of the African Studies Association.


**Archie Brown**, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Oxford, was guest editor of the Summer 2016 *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “On Political Leadership”. He authored the Introduction to the issue (pp. 5-8) and the article, “Against the Führerprinzip: For Collective Leadership” (pp. 109-123). Contributors include Nan Keohane, Laurence S. Rockefeller Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Center for Human Values, and Al Stepan, Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government, Columbia University.


**Matt Buehler**, assistant professor of political science, University of Tennessee, published “Do You Have ‘Connections’ at the Courthouse? An Original Survey on Informal Influence and Judicial Rulings in Morocco” in an upcoming issue of *Political Research Quarterly* (available now online).

**Michael Buehler** was promoted to associate professor in the department of politics and international studies at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Buehler’s specialty at SOAS is Southeast Asian politics with particular reference to state-society relations during democratization and decentralization. He recently published *The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), in which he provides a new framework for understanding how Islamist activists gain and maintain influence in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.
Section News

Buehler and Dani Muhtada, lecturer of law at Semarang State University, also published “Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari’a Law: Comparative Insights from Indonesia” in Southeast Asia Research. Based on an original dataset established during years of field research in Indonesia, this article analyzes the spread of shari’a regulations across the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy since 1998.

Joan Cho received her Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University’s department of government in May 2016. In July 2016, she began an appointment as the Korea Foundation assistant professor of Korean political economy at the College of East Asian Studies and the department of government at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut.

Javier Corrales, Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science at Amherst College, published “Can Anyone Stop the President: Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016” in the Summer 2016 Latin American Politics and Society.

Jennifer Raymond Dresden has been appointed as an assistant teaching professor and the associate director of the Democracy and Governance Program at Georgetown University.

Thomas E. Flores, associate professor of conflict analysis and resolution, George Mason University, and Irfan Nooruddin, Al-Thani Chair in Indian Politics and professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, published Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016). The book argues that elections fail to promote democracy when held in countries with little democratic experience, scant fiscal space, and violent civil conflict.

Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political science, European University at St. Petersburg, and Finland distinguished professor, University of Helsinki, published an edited volume titled Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies (Routledge, 2017).


Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies and director of the Korea-Pacific Program, and Robert R. Kaufman, professor of political science, Rutgers University, published Dictators and Democrats: Elites, Masses and Regime Change (Princeton University Press, 2016). Examining seventy-eight cases of democratic transition and twenty-five reversions since 1980, the authors show how differences in authoritarian regimes and organizational capabilities shape popular protest and elite initiatives in transitions to democracy, and how institutional weaknesses cause some democracies to fail.

Haggard and Kaufman, along with Terence K. Teo, assistant professor of political science and public affairs, Seton Hall University, also published “Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset.” (Descriptive narratives of changes to and from democratic regimes, 1980-2008).

Kathryn Hochstetler is now professor of international development at the London School of Economics. In July, she published, with Ricardo Tranjan, policy development officer for the City of Toronto, “Environment and Consultation in the Brazilian Democratic Developmental State” in the July 2016 Comparative Politics.

Donald L. Horowitz, James. B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus, Duke University, and senior fellow, International Forum for Democratic Studies, recently published “Time for a New Primary Electoral System” on RealClearPolitics.com on a more appropriate electoral system for primary elections. In September, he delivered the Castle Lectures on Ethics, Politics, and Economics at Yale University. The overall topic for the series was “Constitutional Design for Severely Divided Societies: Many Architects, Few Buildings.”

Shelley McConnell was granted tenure and promoted to associate professor in the department of government at St. Lawrence University in August 2016.

Kelly M. McMann, associate professor and director of the International Studies Program, Case Western Reserve University, published “Developing State Legitimacy: The Credibility of Messengers and the Utility, Fit and Success of Ideas” in the July 2016 Comparative Politics.

Anne Meng is now an assistant professor in the department of politics, University of Virginia. Her paper, “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change” won the 2015 Best Paper Award in the APSA Comparative Democratization Section.

Christoph Mohamad-Klotzbach, a research assistant and PhD student, University of Würzburg, Thomas Kestler, professor of political science, University of Würzburg, and Hans-Joachim Lauth, chair of the political science and sociology department, University of Würzburg,
had their article “Comparative Politics and Comparative Research on Latin America in Germany” featured in *Politica latinoamericana comparada* (Rosario: UNR Editora, 2015). The article examines current research fields in the German trend and comparative research on Latin America by German scientists.


Illan Nam, associate professor of political science, Colgate University, published *Democratizing Health Care: Welfare State Building in Korea and Thailand* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). The book examines the process of health reforms that resulted in universal health insurance coverage in the two countries during the early 2000s. It attributes these outcomes to the emergence of new welfare actors in Korea and Thailand that possessed both the political resources and ideological beliefs to pursue expansive welfare initiatives and argues that the countries’ democracy movements of the 1970s-80s gave birth to these new actors.

**Pippa Norris**, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, ARC Laureate Fellow, professor of government and international relations at the University of Sydney, and director of the Electoral Integrity Project, and **Andrea Abel van Es**, research associate at the Electoral Integrity Project, published *Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 2016), which presents an original theory for understanding policies regulating political finance, reflecting the degree to which laws are laissez-faire or guided by state intervention.

**Elizabeth Pisani**, director of Ternyata Ltd, and **Michael Buehler**, associate professor of politics and international studies, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, published “Why Do Indonesian Politicians Promote Shari’a Laws? An analytic framework for Muslim-majority democracies” in the *Third World Quarterly*. Taking the discussion in the existing literature on the adoption of shari’a laws in democratizing Muslim-majority countries as a starting point, the authors identify two broad motivations for democratically-elected politicians to adopt shari’a laws and regulations.

**Benjamin Reilly**, Dean of the Sir Walter Murdoch School of Public Policy and International Affairs, Murdoch University, gave invited presentations to the ‘Making Democracy Work’ conference at Central European University in Budapest, the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University in Western Australia, the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, and the Perth USAsia Centre. He also worked in the Philippines with the Australian Embassy in Manila to produce a series of on-line articles about electoral reform options for the Philippines in the lead-up to the recent presidential election there. He also published two new book chapters: “Timing and sequencing in post-conflict elections” in Arnim Langer and Graham Brown (eds), *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding* (Oxford University Press, 2016), and “Centripetalism” in Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict* (Routledge, 2016).


**Oxana Shevel**, associate professor of political science, Tufts University, published “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine” in the October 2016 *Current History*.

**David S. Siroky** was granted tenure and promoted to associate professor of politics and global studies at Arizona State University. He recently published “Random or Retributive? Indiscriminate Violence in the Chechen Wars” in the October 2016 *World Politics* with **Emil Aslan Souleimanov**, associate professor of international studies, Charles University of Prague.

**Oisin Tansey**, senior lecturer in international relations, King’s College London, published a new book, *The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Oxford University Press, 2016), which offers a typology of different international forms of influence on authoritarianism, and examines the ways in which external forces shape autocratic rule at the domestic level. Tansey also co-authored an article with **Kevin Koehler**,
New Research

research associate, King's College London, and Alexander Schmotz, research associate, King's College London, entitled “Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkage and Regime Survival”, published online at Comparative Political Studies in September 2016.

Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, Daniel Ziblatt, professor of government, Harvard University, and Fabrice Lehoucq, associate professor of political science, University of North Carolina-Greensboro, published the online article “Introduction to Special Issue: The Causes and Consequences of Secret Ballot Reform” in the April 2016 Comparative Political Studies.

Sultan Tepe, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, published “Contesting Political Theologies of Islam and Democracy in Turkey” in the Journal of Religious and Political Practice. It won the 2016 APSA Weber Best Paper Award from the Religion and Politics section.


Kurt Weyland, Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin, published “Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848” in the May 2016 American Political Science Review.


NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The October 2016 (Vol. 27, no. 4) Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles on “The Specter Haunting Europe” and “The Vote in the Philippines,” as well as a number of individual studies on transition in China, Tunisia, Iraq, and Peru.

“Transition in China? More Likely than You Think” by Minxin Pei
Evidence from social science and history suggests that China is entering a “transitions zone” that will threaten its capacity to maintain both authoritarian rule and high levels of economic growth.

The Specter Haunting Europe

I. “Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s Challenges” by Takis S. Pappas
Liberal democracy in Europe today is under siege from a variety of political forces, but it is critical to recognize the distinctions among them.

II. “Will the German Center Hold?” by Timo Lochocki
Europe’s democratic stability hingers on Germany, but a far-right challenger is on the rise. Can the country’s long-dominant centrist parties hold on?

III. “Heritage Populism’ and France’s National Front” by Dominique Reynie
Once a protest party, the right-wing National Front has sought to recast itself for electoral success. How will Marine Le Pen fare in the 2017 presidential race?

IV. “Populism and Protest in Poland” by Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk
Once the poster child for successful postcommunist transitions to democracy, Poland is now governed by populist nationalists. What happened?

V. “The Lost Left” by Sheri Berman
Post-1945 Western Europe benefited greatly from center-left parties offering real solutions to real problems. Where has the left gone?

VI. “Surging Illiberalism in the East” by Jacques Rupnik
The crisis of liberal democracy is Europe-wide, but it has assumed an especially intense form in Central and Eastern Europe.

VII. “The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order” by Ivan Krastev
What some had thought would be the “end of history” has instead turned out to be the “new world disorder.” Democratic liberalism may have no new ideological rival, but older identities are powerfully reasserting themselves.

“Tunisia: Ennahda’s New Course” by Abdou Filiali-Ansary
Tunisia is a small country, but its influential Islamist party has taken a big step by separating its political wing from its religious activities.

“Iraq’s Year of Rage” by Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski
Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian stripes are fed up with the ineptitude and corruption of their political leaders, parties, and government institutions.

The Vote in the Philippines

I. “ELECTING A STRONGMAN” by Julio C. Teahankee and Mark R. Thompson
The surprise victory of Rodrigo Duterte in the
Philippines’ May 2016 presidential election represents a major shift in the liberal-democratic regime established thirty years ago after the “people power” revolution.

II. “Elite Democracy Disrupted?” by David G. Timberman

Duterte promised voters that he would swiftly reduce crime and poverty and enact constitutional change. But will he violate democratic norms and the rule of law in the process?

“Peru: A Close Win for Continuity” by Eduardo Dargent and Paula Munoz

Peru’s economic boom is over and newly elected president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski faces a Congress dominated by opposition parties, putting him in a more precarious position than his predecessors.

“When Dictators Die” by Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz

What political consequences can we expect when aging dictators die while in power? A fifth of the world’s autocracies are facing such a possibility, but the evidence shows that this may not augur well for democracy.

Democratization (Volume 23, no. 7, 2016)

“Procedural Justice and Perceived Electoral Integrity: the Case of Korea’s 2012 Presidential Election” by Youngho Cho and Yong Cheol Kim

“Does Democracy Reduce Corruption?” by Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

“Local Determinants of an Emerging Electoral Hegemony: The Case of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey” by Kursat Cinar


“Horizontal Accountability and the Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Africa: Evidence from Liberia” by Landry Signé and Koiffi Korha

“Democratic Inclusiveness, Climate Policy Outputs, and Climate Policy Outcomes” by Tobias Böhmelt, Marit Böker and Hugh Ward

“Arab Spring Constitution-Making: Polarization, Exclusion, and Constraints” by Ester Cross and Jason Sorens

“Recall Referendums in Peruvian Municipalities: a Political Weapon for Bad Losers or an Instrument of Accountability?” by Yanina Welp

“Does Political Inclusion of Rebel Parties Promote Peace after Civil Conflict?” by Michael Christopher Marshall and John Ishiyama

“From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties: Prospects for Post-War Democratization” by Terrence Lyons

“The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit: the Long Collapse” by Michael E. Allison

“Rebel-to-Political and Back? Hamas as a Security Provider in Gaza between Rebellion, Politics and Governance” by Benedetta Berti and Beatriz Gutiérrez

“Dealing with Populists in Government: the SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece” by Paris Aslanidis and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

African Affairs, Volume 115 Issue 460 July 2016

“Contested ANC Hegemony in the Urban Townships: Evidence from the 2014 South African Election” by Marcel Paret


“Electoral Campaigns as Learning Opportunities: Lessons from Uganda” by Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz

American Political Science Review, Volume 110, Issue 2, May 2016

“Crafting Countermovement: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848” by Kurt Weyland

“Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion” by Güneş Murat Tezcür
“Political Characterology: On the Method of Theorizing in Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism” by Hans-Jörg Sigwart

“The Organizational Roots of Political Activism: Field Experiments on Creating a Relational Context” by Hahrie Han

“Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives” by Jonathan W. Kuyper

“Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to Government Performance Information” by John Holbein

“Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion” by Vincent Phillip Muñoz

“The Limits of Political Representation” by Howard Schweber

“Party Policy Diffusion” by Tobias Böhmelt, Lawrence Ezrow, Roni Lehrer, and Hugh Ward

“Pride Parades and Prejudice: Visibility of Roma and LGBTI Communities in Post-Socialist Europe” by Aidan McGarry

“State-building and Local Resistance in Kosovo: Minority Exclusion through Inclusive Legislation” by Jelena Lončar

“Mapping the Substance of the EU’s Civil Society Support in Central Asia: From Neo-Liberal to State-led Civil Society” by Vera Axyonova and Fabienne Bossuyt


“Regional Differences in Political Trust: Comparing the Vysocina and Usti Regions” by Daniel Čermák, Renáta Mikešová, and Jana Stachová

“From the Communist Point of View: Cultural Hegemony and Folkloric Manipulation in Albanian Studies under Socialism” by Enika Abazi and Albert Doja

“Evaluations of Perestroika in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Public Views in Contemporary Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” by Timur Dadabaev

“Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist Regions” by Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman, and Anastassia Obydenkova


“Conciliatory States: Elite Ethno-Demographics and the Puzzle of Public Goods Within Diverse African States” by Erin Metz McDonnell

“Tribal Mobilization, Fragmented Groups, and Public Goods Provision in Jordan” by Eleanor Gao

“Coup d’État and Democracy” by Curtis Bell

“Colonial Migration and the Origins of Governance: Theory and Evidence from Java” by Thomas B. Pepinsky


“Democracy by Example? Why Democracy Spreads When the World’s Democracies Prosper” by Michael K. Miller

“Between Adaptation and Breakdown: Conceptualizing Party Survival” by Jennifer Cyr

“Democratizing Democracy? Civil Society and Party Organization in Bolivia” by Santiago Anria

“Environment and Consultation in the Brazilian Democratic Developmental State” by Kathryn Hochstetler and J. Ricardo Tranjan

“Immigrant Political Economies and Exclusionary Policy in Africa” by Lauren Honig
“Developing State Legitimacy: The Credibility of Messengers and the Utility, Fit, and Success of Ideas” by Kelly M. McNann

“The Electoral Environment and Legislator Dissent” by Yael Shomer

*East European Politics, Vol. 32, no. 4, 2016*
“Deepening Democratisation? Exploring the declared Motives for “Late” Lustration in Poland” by Aleks Szczerbiak

“The EU and Rule of Law Promotion in Western Balkans – a New Role for Candidate States’ Parliaments” by Alexander Strelkov

*East European Politics, Vol. 32, no. 3, 2016*
“Russian Patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution” by Andre W. M. Gerrits and Max Bader

“Power Ideas and Conflict: Ideology, Linkage and Leverage in Crimea and Chechnya” by James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse

“Linkage and Leverage Effects on Moldova’s Transnistria Problem” by John Beyer and Stefan Wolff

“Stateness, Contested Nationhood, and Imperiled Sovereignty: The Effects of (Non-Western) Linkages and Leverage on Conflicts in Kyrgyzstan” by Matteo Fumagalli

“Diffusion and Default: A Linkage and Leverage Perspective on the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict” by Laurence Broers

*Electoral Studies, Vol. 43, September 2016*
“Trading Old Errors for New Errors? The Impact of Electronic Voting Technology on Party Label Votes in Brazil” by Cesar Zucco Jr. and Jairo M. Nicolau

“Presidential Coattails and Electoral Coordination in Multilevel Elections: Comparative Lessons from Brazil” by André Borgesa and Ryan Lloyd

*Government and Opposition, Vol. 51, no. 4, October 2016*
“Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets” by A. Carl LeVan and Assen Assenov

*Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 38, Number 3, August 2016*
“NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide” by Luc Reydams

“Women’s Progress and Women’s Human Rights” by Martha C. Nussbaum

“Rethinking What is Necessary in a Democratic Society: Militant Democracy and the Turkish State” by Kathleen Cavanaugh and Edel Hughes

“Translating Law into Practice: Museums and a Human Rights Community of Practice” by Jennifer A. Orange

“Freedom of Religion and Apostasy: The Malaysian Experience” by Nehaluddin Ahmad, Ahmad Masum, and Abdul Mohaimin Ayus

“Linking Discourse and Practice: The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development in the Village Assaini Program in the Kongo Central” by Tine Destrooper

*International Political Science Review, Vol. 37, no. 4, September 2016*
“Who to Punish? Retrospective Voting and Knowledge of Government Composition in a Multiparty System” by Lauri Rapeli

“Policy Choices in Tough Times: The Case of Democraticization and Currency Defense” by Byunghwan Son

“Electoral Authoritarianism and Political Unrest” by Ryan Shirah

“Political and Economic Accountability in a Delegative Democracy” by Rollin F’Tusalem

“Remarkable Economic Growth, but So What? The Impacts of Modernization on Chinese Citizens’ Political Satisfaction” by Yida Zhai

“Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages and Experience with Democracy” by Christopher D Raymond, Michael Huelshoff, and Marc R Rosenblum

*International Studies Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 3, September 2016*
“The Wisdom of the Many in Global Governance: An Epistemic-Democratic Defense of Diversity and Inclusion” by Hayley Stevenson

“Aid Modalities Matter: The Impact of Different World Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries” by Kassandra Birchler, Sophia Limpach, and Katharina Michaelowa

“Do Resource-Wealthy Rulers Adopt Transparency-Promoting Laws?” by Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati and Indra De Soysa

“Built to Last: Understanding the Link between Democracy and Conflict in the International System” by Mark J.C. Crescenzi and Kelly M. Kadera

“A Menace to the Democratic Peace? Dyadic and Systemic Difference” by Seung-Whan Choi

“The Changing Religious Composition of Nigeria: Causes and Implications of Demographic Divergence” by Marcin Stonawski, Michaela Potančoková, Matthew Cantele, and Vegard Skirbekk
New Research

“Peace from Below: Governance and Peacebuilding in Kerio Valley, Kenya” by Emma Elfversson

“Censorship or Self-Control? Hate Speech, the State and the Voter in the Kenyan Election of 2013” by Warigia M. Bowman and J. David Bowman

Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 58, no. 3, Fall 2016
“Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?” by Catherine Reyes-Housholder

“Laboring Under Chávez: Populism for the Twenty-first Century” by Paul W. Posner

“Contemporary Left-wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez’s Venezuela” by Yannis Stavrakakis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos

“Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process-driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War” by Ana Arjona

“Malapportionment and Ideological Bias in Chilean Electoral Districts” by John M. Carey

Middle East Policy, Vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 2016
“Libya since 2011: Political Transformation and Violence” by Hanspeter Mattes

“Egypt’s Future: Status Quo, Incremental Growth or Regional Leadership?” by Robert Mason

“Sisi, the Sinai and Salafis: Instability in a Power Vacuum” by Lyndall Herman

“Mission Accomplished? Russia’s Withdrawal from Syria” by Emil Aslan Souleimanov

“Erdogan’s “New Turkey” Slides into Turmoil” by Jeremy Salt

“Turkish-Iranian Energy Cooperation and Conflict: The Regional Politics” by H. Akin Unver

“Globalization and Its Discontents in the MENA Region” by Robert Springborg

“Political Parties, Ideology and the Substantive Representation of Women” by Silvia Erzeel and Karen Celis

“Representing Women Voters: The Role of the Gender Gap and the Response of Political Parties” by Rosie Campbell

“Feminist Allies and Strategic Partners: Exploring the Relationship between the Women’s Movement and Political Parties” by Elizabeth Evans

SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


AFRICA


ASIA

New Research


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


Executive Editor

Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science and director of the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of Democracy and Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?, and has also worked on women's representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

Members

Adam Harris received his Ph.D. from New York University in August 2015. He specializes in ethnic and African politics. Adam has conducted research on ethnic identifiability (recently published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution), ethnic and immigrant prejudice, the determinants of political protests, ideological ideal point estimation among African legislators, and the effects of foreign aid in recipient countries. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, New York University, and Columbia University.

Kristen Kao is a Research Fellow with the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) at the University of Gothenburg and a PhD Candidate in Political Science at UCLA. In 2014, she ran a nationwide survey in Jordan in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead funded by the GLD program at Yale. She has served as a program consultant and election monitor for a variety of international organizations, including the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute.

Anna Lührmann is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at Humboldt University (Berlin) – studies the causes and effects of United Nation’s electoral assistance. She currently works on several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion.

Ellen Lust is the Founding Director of the Programs on Governance and Local Development at Yale University and at the University of Gothenburg, and Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. She has authored Structuring Conflict in the Arab World as well as articles in Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Political Studies, and other journals, and edited The Middle East and several volumes. The Moulay Hicham Foundation, NSF, the Swedish Research Council and other foundations have supported her research on authoritarianism, political transitions, and local governance.

Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His current project uses data from extensive field and survey research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between language and separation. Other projects involve the use of list experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social identities.

Rachel Sigman is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg and an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. She studies African politics and the political economy of development. Her current research investigates the ways that political financing shape patronage practices and governing outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. She is also working on projects that develop new measures of state capacity and revisits the relationship between state-building and democratization.

Managing Editor

Melissa Aten is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.