Dear Members and Friends,

This issue of our APSA-CD newsletter breaks new ground in a different direction that before by detailing the many exciting avenues that new historical data going back to 1789 opens up. I am very grateful to guest editors Agnes Cornell and Haakon Gjerløw for shepherding the symposium to a successful conclusion.

At the same time that the historical analyses provides important perspectives on our field, the current developments are not exactly encouraging. As the Democracy Report 2018 (you find it here: v-dem.net) from the V-Dem Institute shows, autocratization is gathering momentum across the world. More and more countries are autocratizing while fewer and fewer are democratizing. In 2017 there were 24 countries sliding back on democracy – exactly as many as were advancing. It is the first time in almost 40 years that this happens (last time was 1979). There are also a number of large countries with big populations and across the democracy-autocracy spectrum in the group backsliding on democratic traits: Brazil, India, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States among them. This is a worrying trend.

As scholars studying democracy, we must be prepared and willing to do our share in taking our findings and general knowledge to the public sphere through op-eds, radio and TV, debates and seminars. I think that we must do our part as intellectuals – like the ones that came before us did – in these times when democracy is clearly being challenged.
Many of the institutions and structures studied by political scientists appeared for the first time at the end of the 18th and during the 19th century. At the time, the potential consequences were unknown, and political elites were pushed into the foreign territory of competitive elections, representation, suffrage, and mass political participation. Today, after years of experience with the modern political framework, those same institutions can be introduced under less uncertainty, and autocratic elites have refined their feats of co-opting mass participation. Suffrage, once the definite sign of political participation, can no longer be used to distinguish democracies from autocracies. The importance of the 19th century we argue, is not only to understand the origins of our political systems, but also to understand the importance of the fact that they were new – the potential difference between latecomers and first-movers for a range of political developments.

But history, as we know, is a foreign place for many political scientists. In introducing the Historical V-Dem data, the principal investigators Carl Henrik Knutsen and Jan Teorell highlight the rigorous efforts to produce comparable data from the often-contextual in-depth knowledge of individual experts. And while measures of democracy for the 19th century is already available from other sources, the 259 different indicators in the Historical V-Dem data set make possible a much more fine-grained study of political processes and institutions. It can therefore tell us a much richer story about the political developments in the 19th century, and, in turn, allows for a much richer understanding.

It is easy to highlight important events in Europe: the Napoleonic war, the unifications of Italy and Germany, the development of the modern nation state and bureaucracy, and the first wave of democracy. Moreover, industrialization developed fast during this period. New ideas arose in both science and politics – Darwin published “On the Origins of Species” and Karl Marx “Das Kapital”. The Historical V-Dem however, also cover significant developments outside the Western world. The 19th century marks the de facto end of hereditary empire in China and the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was the height of colonization, with the expansion of the British Empire and France into Africa and Asia, but also the height of decolonization in Latin-America, and the consecutive growth of nation states in this region.

As these events went on, many countries experienced new political institutions for the first time. The contribution by Matthew Wilson highlights that many theories of political science address the importance of timing: That the circumstances under which a country experienced a political innovation for the first time have ramifications for how they work and their consecutive political development. Many of these sequential-theories have been impossible to study quantitatively because of the lack of systematic data. Wilson shows how this now can be done using the Historical V-Dem data.

Some of the most remarkable political changes in the 19th related to civil liberties. Civil liberties such as freedom of expression and association often came prior to the expansion of suffrage or introduction of elections. A majority of countries saw the abolition of slave trade. And by the end of the century, female suffrage was realized in New Zealand. In hindsight, it was the early stages of an unprecedented increase in the respect for equality of man.

This is the topic in Svend-Erik Skaaning’s contribution. Due to the lack of systematic data, civil liberties are usually convoluted with concepts of liberal democracy, even though they can have different causes and consequences than electoral rights. Skaaning sketches out conceptual differences between different types of civil liberties, and how these phenomena can be studied using the Historical V-Dem data.

Integrated in the Historical V-Dem is also the Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD), a unique extension that also spans the contemporary V-Dem data. A severe blind spot in available datasets, has been the lack of information on informal regime change. This has forced many researchers to lump together different types of events that are likely to have different causes, under the conceptual umbrella of regime change. The HRD makes it possible to trace subtle changes in formal and informal rules of appointment of rulers, for over 1900 regimes since 1789 up till today. These data are introduced in the contribution by Vilde Lunnan Djuve, in which she highlights the importance of disaggregating different aspects of regimes.

Last, Adam Bilinski has contributed with a theory on the origins of sustainable democracy in Europe. Focused on the role of pre-democratic elites, Bilinski emphasizes the role of a certain form of monarchy – PA monarchy – for the fate of consecutive attempts at democratization. The theory touches upon the topics discussed in the other contributions, and we believe it triggers many questions about the importance of understanding the 19th century and studying it with both large-N and small-N analyses.

As we hope this newsletter will show, the Historical V-Dem data is an asset that can be used for much more than generating p-values. Many questions have simply not been possible to study in a quantitative manner so far. The richness of the data will hopefully ignite a wide range of research ideas across political science.
1. Introduction

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset is the most wide-ranging dataset on democracy and political institutions available – including several hundred indicators and indices for countries across the world. Yet, until now, V-Dem time-series start in 1900, omitting about half of "modern history", starting with the French Revolution. This disallows systematic comparative description of institutional developments during the "long 19th century", but also implies that several theories of political development lack the requisite (long time-series) data for testing.

Thus, we introduce Historical Varieties of Democracy (Historical V-Dem), which spans all major countries and several other polities globally, covering 1789-1920. With these data, most of the indicators contained in V-Dem now extend all the way from 1789 to the present. Historical V-Dem also provides several new indicators, many of them focused on features of state institutions and on the support coalitions of political regimes.

More generally, there has been a dearth of data for the 19th century. Of the widely used indices, only a few, such as Polity IV, go back to 1800. Yet, Polity (and other datasets with 19th century data) cover only a limited range of institutional features and aspects of democracy.

As a result, intriguing descriptive questions in comparative politics remain open. For example, did the long, first wave of democratization stretch back to the beginning of the 19th century or erupt only after WWI? Was the movement towards democracy across the long 19th century monotonic or characterized by reversals, and were changes gradual or mainly concentrated on certain points in time? The data situation has also left scholars unable to satisfactorily address key questions on the causes and consequences of institutional development. The link between institutions and most outcomes of interest is difficult to parse because of limited variation and because of the sluggish nature of institutions (and many outcomes). Only with a suitably long time-series can one hope to disentangle cause and effect. Historical V-Dem thus opens up new opportunities for social scientists studying the historical trajectories and causes and effects of political-institutional developments.

2. What does Historical V-Dem cover?

Historical V-Dem covers different areas of political life, including surveys on the following topics: Elections; Parties; Executive; Legislature; Judiciary; Civil Liberties; State; Civil Society; Media; and Political Equality. The data include indicators coded by RAs and evaluative indicators coded by country experts. The former involve features such as election violence, the relative power of elected and non-elected offices locally, de facto freedom from forced labor, and the extent to which recruitment to the bureaucracy is merit-based.

In total, Historical V-Dem includes 149 indicators coded by country experts, and 110 indicators coded by RAs. While the majority of indicators are extensions from V-Dem, about 70 are new indicators to Historical V-Dem, many with special relevance for the 19th century.

The 19th century was an era of state building, and Historical V-Dem contains several new indicators on state bureaucracies, armed forces, and various other agencies. For example, Historical V-Dem includes indicators on how bureaucrats (and army officers) are recruited and remunerated. These variables will, e.g., allow for systematic, empirical studies of processes of modern state formation, a topic that has so far largely been studied using lengthy case narratives.
Second, Historical V-Dem includes new indicators pertaining to “regimes” – sets of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. Indicators capture when and how a particular regime ended, the size of its support coalition, its geographical location, and which social groups are included in that coalition. These data will allow for testing arguments pertaining to particular social groups, e.g., agrarian elites, industrial workers, or the urban middle class, and their relevance for regime stability and change, as well as their implications for policy selection.4

The sample includes 14 polities from Africa and the Middle East, 21 from the Americas, 14 from Asia and the Pacific, and 42 from Europe – 91 polities altogether. The modal time series is 1789–1920; 41 polities are coded for this interval. Some polities cease to exist as independent entities well before 1920, such as Bavaria with the creation of the German Empire; Bavaria is thus coded from 1789 – 1871. Others cease to exist for some time before they reappear. Tuscany, for example, is not coded between 1807 and 1814 as it was annexed by France under Napoleon. The rule is that a particular area should not be coded for more than one polity in a year.

3. How was Historical V-Dem constructed?
Constructing Historical V-Dem required significant human and financial resources. Planning started in 2013. Taking the contemporary V-Dem codebook as point of departure, the team aimed to identify contemporary V-Dem questions to a) omit, b) adjust in order to fit the historical context, or c) create anew. Pilot surveys were conducted on Denmark and Colombia in 2014, after which we received comments and revised the codebook.

A number of RAs, located at several universities, were involved in coding the 110 variables that were not coded by country experts. Codings would then be checked by a team member or another RA for validation and possible adjustments.

Although the contemporary V-Dem coding includes about five experts per country, this number was not feasible to pursue for the historical era for coding the expert-coded variables. Detailed historical knowledge of political affairs is much rarer than knowledge of contemporary political affairs; only a few experts around the world would be able to code Bavaria, Madagascar or Oman in 1800. Thus, we sought to identify one or two highly qualified experts for each historical case, and compensated them generously for their time (1250 to 2000 Euro per country, depending on estimated workload), with the understanding that they would need to consult sources in order to answer many of the questions.

Team members and RAs compiled long lists of potential country experts, employing scholarly networks and web- and literature searches. Ideal experts had an academic track record working on the political history of the country. Experts with identifiable competencies in a broad range of political-institutional features were prioritized, and, everything else equal, experts with comparative knowledge of other countries were also prioritized. In the end, most experts were historians or historically oriented political scientists. A few experts were asked to code more than one polity if they had comprehensive knowledge of different polities (for example, the expert for Baden also coded Württemberg). The coding was conducted through a web-platform constructed for V-Dem and customized for Historical V-Dem. Experts could contact the team with questions of clarification and information about potential issues with the pre-coded data on, e.g., election dates or heads of state and government. These issues were then discussed by the team, and any identified errors were corrected before the expert ensued coding.

Country-expert coding (including updated coding for the pilot countries) started in December 2015 and is still ongoing for some countries, currently with a special focus on double-coding using a second country expert.

4. Methodological problems and solutions
As with contemporary V-Dem, we faced the key challenge of achieving equivalence across countries and experts. We want to ensure that when, e.g., scores between France and Russia in 1848 differ, this is because the situation in these two countries differ, and not simply because the French expert is more or less “conservative” than the Russian. We therefore employ a latent variable model to generate estimates based on various sources of information, anchoring scores across time and space to a common scale. Point estimates are accompanied by uncertainty estimates to reflect measurement error.5 Experts also rate their own subjective certainty (from 0–100) for each observation. Issues of measurement uncertainty are even more pertinent for the 18th and 19th centuries than recent


decades, due to a dearth of sources and fewer scholars that specialize in the political institutions of the early period. Accordingly, uncertainty about historical point estimates is generally higher than in contemporary V-Dem.

Incorporating historical ratings into the V-Dem modeling framework required several model refinements. Regarding sources of information fed into the measurement model, historical experts were incentivized to code three extra countries for one year. Participants that volunteered to do this additional coding selected three countries from a list of six (USA, UK, France, Mexico, China, and Russia), and coded all variables for the first year after 1900 with an election, for each selected country.

Second, all historical experts coded an identical set of indicator-specific anchoring vignettes prior to coding their cases. 6 Vignettes provide a powerful tool for addressing differences in ordinal scale perceptions, allowing us to compare coders who do not share expertise across cases.

Third, experts also coded an overlap period with contemporary V-Dem of about twenty years, typically 1900-1920, for the polity that they coded pre-1900 or that country’s successor state (e.g. Italy for Modena). Overlap years thus include data from historical and contemporary experts. By comparing an historical expert’s scores during this period to those of her contemporary colleagues, the measurement model algorithm can assess both her reliability and the degree to which she systematically codes different ordinal categories than her peers. Though these methods, in principle, could have been sufficient to ensure cross-temporal and cross-national comparability, preliminary analyses indicated substantial disjunctures between the pre- and post-1900 periods, due to historical expert scores systematically diverging from contemporary V-Dem expert scores. Intuitively, experts might adjust their scales to the range of institutional quality that they observe across the observations that they consider – with historical experts applying more favorable judgments to the quality of democracy in the 19th century. To account for this effect, we adjusted the measurement model to include country-specific offsets into the prior values for the years that historical experts coded.

5. Patterns of democratization in the early part of modern history
The Historical V-Dem data allows us to construct V-Dems Polyarchy (“Electoral democracy”) index back to the French revolution. 7 This, for instance, allows for assessing the overall changes to democracy, globally in Huntington’s (1991) “first wave of democratization”. 8 Indeed, there is a recognizable upward trend in Polyarchy from 1789 to WWI, and this global trend is gradual. There is a brief dent in the steady upward slope around the revolutionary year of 1848, but only with the truly international event of WWI do we find a large spike in Polyarchy. Overall, the shape of the (electoral) democracy trend in our data follows Congleton’s description of the 19th century as an era of multiple, minor, liberal reforms. The first wave was not only a long wave, but also a slow one. 9

This aggregate global trend is not very dissimilar from what one can find with the existing, and widely used Polity2 index. However, the data sources are quite different in other respects. First, since Polarchy combines information from a number of underlying indicators, we can drill down to view the evolution of its constituent parts. (Polity2 also offers opportunities for disaggregation. However, there are just a few components of this index, and these components are themselves highly aggregated.) When considering the trajectories of all five of Dahl’s institutional guarantees of electoral democracy, which make up the components of Polyarchy – elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and suffrage – several interesting, and some hitherto unexplored, patterns emerge. 10

First, the average across our polities for freedom of expression actually declined after the French Revolution and during the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, the “freedom” components are the ones in highest observance, whereas the more strictly political ones, concerning the electability of executives and legislatures, the fairness (or even holding) of elections, and suffrage extension, display much lower average scores throughout most of the 19th century. This is markedly different from the 20th century after WWII, where suffrage and elected officials are the clearly highest-ranking components of Polyarchy. Finally,

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suffrage is the aspect of Polyarchy that had the lowest average scores, at least from 1850 to WWI. This might explain why universal suffrage has often been treated as the “crowning event” of democratization during the first wave. The second conspicuous difference between Polity2 and Polyarchy is that Polity2 offers a more lenient standard of democracy, signaled by Polyarchy’s consistently lower average scores globally across the long 19th century. Figure 1 illustrates this difference by plotting Polyarchy scores against Polity2 scores (re-scaled 0-1), averaged across the 1789–1945 period, for the 58 countries covered by both measures across the entire time period. The diagonal line marks no average differences (which might mask yearly differences that cancel each other out), so countries above/below the line have higher/lower Polyarchy scores. Few countries have higher average Polity2 than Polyarchy scores. We have highlighted the three top countries in the former group (Baden, Bavaria and Modena), and the ten countries falling furthest below the line in the latter.

Figure 2 plots the latter “top ten” countries over time. The differences are quite substantial. Polity2 scores the US at its maximum already in 1871, and does not pick up any subsequent change in democracy, despite, for example, de jure and de facto restrictions on voting rights for large parts of the population, including women and African-Americans (especially) in the South. Similarly, Polity2 ignores suffrage restrictions in Canada, Costa Rica, Greece and Switzerland. Polity2 also has a surprisingly high appraisal of democracy in Ethiopia and Korea, despite these polities never holding elections and, with the partial exception of the Great Korean Empire from 1897 until Japanese annexation in 1910, severely restricted freedoms of expression and association. In sum, we contend that Polyarchy has superior face validity to Polity2, if we are to treat these indices as measures of common notions of electoral democracy across the early period of modern history.

6. Conclusion
We have laid out the general features and content of Historical V-Dem, and described how it addresses issues of
reliability, validity, inter-temporal- and cross-country comparability. When combined with contemporary V-Dem, the about 260 indicators contained in Historical V-Dem open up new possibilities for drawing on historical information from the entirety of “modern history” to inform the study of democracy and related phenomena. Going forward, researchers can use these data to delve into potential determinants and effects of different varieties of democracy, as well as the determinants and effects of more specific political institutions.

**Figure 2. Ten Largest Country Discrepancies in Polyarchy vs. Polity2, 1789–1944**

![Graph showing ten largest country discrepancies in Polyarchy vs. Polity2, 1789–1944.](image)
Although there is considerable disagreement over how it ought to be studied, institutionalist research is generally united in the belief that the relationship between time and institutions is an important feature of the processes that generate democracy. As Fioretos et al. (2016) noted, “To a much greater extent than a generation ago when scholars debated whether institutions mattered in shaping politics, the discipline is now defined by multiple approaches to determining how and when institutions shape political developments” (pg. 3). Scholars have therefore advocated for taking a more precise look at the ways in which time moderates the effects of variables in political science. Nevertheless, time dependence takes different forms. In addition to the values that a set of variables take, their impacts on an outcome may also depend on the spell over which values occur, the speed at which values change, and the order in which variables change. Not only may “time matter” for the comparative study of democratization, distinct features regarding sequences in which changes occur may make the difference between successful and unsuccessful outcomes.

There are a variety of arguments in political science that sequencing matters, which features prominently in historical institutionalism. A variant of ‘new institutionalism’, or the batch of empirical models that emerged in response to the emphasis on behavior during the 1960s and 1970s, historical institutionalism is an approach that focuses on how the timing of events affects the emergence and transformation of political institutions. In contrast to other approaches that emphasize institutions as the purposeful products of rational calculation or as cultural constructs that create cognitive templates for behavior, historical institutionalism treats institutions as rules that arise from power asymmetries and reinforce them by making certain actions more or less likely. In particular, this approach is defined by a focus on critical junctures and developmental pathways. Critical junctures refer to periods of uncertainty in which a contingent event alters the set of possible outcomes that can occur in the future, while path dependence broadly connotes the enduring impact of previous outcomes—that the past shapes the future. Within historical institutionalism, the concept of path dependence has been used to indicate that institutions become more entrenched over time or that outcomes constrain decision-making and affect subsequent choices among alternatives. By pointing to specific events as important predecessors and tying them to a later outcome, historical institutionalist arguments are often underlaid by implied references to sequences.

Challenges in Historical Institutionalist Research

Historical institutionalist work grapples with several challenges as it pertains to presenting and testing arguments about sequencing in political science. The issues that it faces include debates about the meaning and applicability of core concepts and the duality of contingency and determinism. The first is the question of what institutionalists mean when they describe political processes as being path dependent. The argument that small, contingent events can exert long-lasting effects on future outcomes is but a broad feature associated with the concept of path dependence, which is a process characterized by increasing returns over time. In the narrow sense, path dependent processes arise endogenously and are self-reinforcing.

Originating from institutional economics and most commonly used in depictions of technological change, path dependence entails large set-up costs, learning and coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. North (1990) argued that institutions can be similarly characterized; likewise, Pierson (2000) suggested that the “main properties of increasing returns processes provide considerable support for many of the key claims of ‘historical institutionalist’ analyses in political science” (pg. 264). The concept has been subject to concept stretching, however, insofar as scholars have used the term to characterize a variety of mechanisms that do not share the same properties. The concept of critical junctures is similarly problematic. Schwartz (unpublished) pointed out that “[p]ath-dependent arguments pertain only to the class of events that involve a critical juncture with contingent outcomes, and in which the mechanisms that produce the critical juncture can be differentiated from the mechanisms that sustain that outcome” (pg. 2).

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Current uses of the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures are largely unable to distinguish between contingent and deterministic processes. An obvious challenge for historical institutionalist arguments is to identify where in a sequence the potential cause is located. There is thus ongoing debate over what critical junctures are, and more recent research that tries to identify the antecedents of critical junctures. Beyond this, scholars argue that institutional continuity is not guaranteed, leaving historical institutionalist research subject to criticism over the probabilistic nature of politics.

It is also not easy to quantitatively test such arguments. The main challenge stems from its reliance upon description—contextualized knowledge that limits analyses to small-N research and juxtaposes it against statistical analyses. The requisites of context and description have made institutional sequencing the near exclusive domain of qualitative analysis. As a result, some argued that comparative historical analysis and statistical analysis have substantially different goals. At the same time, however, commentaries on whether the concept of path dependence is suitable for institutional analysis have issued calls to test for the existence of self-reinforcing mechanisms and to select cases that favor parallel demonstrations. Parallel demonstration involves selecting cases that share the same outcome and in which the same theoretical mechanism was at work to provide support against alternative mechanisms and undermine the possibility that it was coincidental.5

In addition to unpacking different forms of institutional change and acknowledging the probabilistic nature by which institutions change and affect outcomes, therefore, historical institutionalists must provide greater demonstration of the potential feedback effects that institutions may have. In contrast to the rational choice approach, explaining outcomes as resulting from the long-term impacts of more or less contingent events is beset with greater difficulties. Such challenges include conceptualizing the process of institutional change and differentiating the process from the causal mechanism, asserting long-term effects without making deterministic claims, and situating a contextually specific relationship in a broader theory. Still, ignoring the potential for seemingly minor events to generate rules that have long-lasting effects risks confounding the origins of political practices with their functions.

Using Description to Evaluate Causal Claims
One solution to this problem is to go back to description, with a focus on visualizing and characterizing changes within a large-N sample. Description is a fundamentally overlooked tool that is intertwined with the aim of establishing causality; by answering the questions of what and how, it provides flesh to causal arguments regarding the question of why.6 Potential benefits of doing so include demonstrating the existence of a critical juncture across multiple units and evaluating the extent to which path dependence (or another form of time dependence) is observable in the data. In outlining the process of critical juncture analysis, Capoccia (2015) recommended identifying ‘candidate’ junctures and testing for structural effects.7 Focusing on illustrating and describing the extent of change and their concurrence along a particular dimension enables one to leverage a large number of cases to compare potential junctures and to validate their existence across units. It also offers the ability to better characterize the extent to which a juncture exerted reverberating effects, and whether such change was sudden or gradual.

Furthermore, describing variation in ‘paths’ across multiple cases eschews seemingly deterministic explanations for institutional change by highlighting the probabilistic nature of patterns in the sample. Some cases may resemble the theoretical path to a point, after which they diverge; others may follow the expected trajectory, but in a ‘three steps forward, two steps back’ fashion. Beyond this, it may also support identifying counterfactual examples, inasmuch as illustrating the broader sample of cases shows some that contradict the expected pattern. Notwithstanding arguments that path dependence characterizes mechanisms but are not adequate substitutes for them, empirical analyses of concepts such as positive feedback, diffusion, and sequence should strive to make use of the variability of patterns in cross-sectional time-series data to summarize the extent to which a hypothesized mechanism is observable and to contrast it against alternative possibilities.

‘Stateness-first’ Arguments and Economic Development
Focusing on identifying novel, innovative ways to describe institutional change would also tentatively enable

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simple quantitative tests of effect based on differences in sequences. As an example, I am currently involved in a collaborative project that scrutinizes the relationship between state capacity and economic development. One prominent ‘sequencing argument’ is that positive development outcomes are more observable where effective state institutions occurred prior to democratization. Fukuyama (2014) presented a version of what we call the ‘stateness-first’ argument, in which he maintained that state capacity and rule of law were important predecessors of democracy.8 According to Fukuyama (2014), the introduction of democracy where an effective state does not yet exist risks engendering clientelistic practices in which political contenders offer government positions and rents in exchange for votes. Such practices reduce the quality of government by directing government activities toward serving private interests. It is an inefficient allocation of resources that should also have a negative effect on economic development, and may be self-reinforcing as elites become entrenched through patron-client relationships.

For reasons that we elaborate on in the aforementioned paper, we argue that the ‘stateness-first’ argument lacks adequate theoretical and empirical support. For one, the argument is based on the critical assumptions that statebuilding is harder to achieve in democracies and that autocrats are better able to develop state institutions. Additionally, studies that advocate this argument often fail to outline the counterfactual and thus do not compare this pattern to its alternatives. Much of the evidence for the stateness-first argument comes from a few historical cases that constitute a common narrative about the sequencing of institutions in Western countries. Quantitative tests also show mixed results and remain subject to criticisms regarding counterfactuals and the operationalization of sequences.

In a preliminary analysis of the potential impacts of state capacity on development, we took a multi-method approach that elucidated methodological challenges and emphasized description. Combining Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data and the Historical V-Dem data presented by Knutsen and Teorell in this issue, we differentiated between more- and less-democratic countries by dividing the electoral democracy index conceptualized by V-Dem at the median. To indicate differences in the level of state capacity, we use a measure of ‘rigorous and impartial public administration’ that is included in the dataset and similarly divided the variable at its median. Combining the dichotomous measures of democraticness and our stand-in for meritocratic recruitment produces a four-fold set of categories based on evenly split sub-samples that represent observations with low values of both state capacity and democracy, high-capacity and low-democracy and low-capacity and high-democracy observations, and observations with above-median values of state capacity and electoral democracy. By dividing the sample of observations in this way, we are able to illustrate long-term patterns involving changes in state capacity and democracy.

In addition to using standard panel regressions, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), we tested the extent to which the order of changes in state capacity and democracy corresponded to future levels of per capita GDP. Compared to the panel tests and matching analyses, this approach leverages the entire institutional history of a country and correlates it with long-term growth, making it a rather straightforward test of the ‘stateness-first’ argument. Figure 1 distinguishes countries that transitioned from low democracy and high state capacity to high levels of both from all other countries. The figure illustrates the sequence of changes that occurred in each country, with each country history stacked on top of one another. According to the stateness-first argument, the 68 countries that had above-median levels of capacity and below-median levels of democracy prior to becoming more democratic should, on average, have higher levels of GDP. These include generally high-growth countries such as Austria, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, and Denmark, as well as countries with more mixed development records such as Mongolia, Serbia, Turkey, and Venezuela.

Across various specifications—which include limiting the distinction to countries that experienced twenty years of high capacity and low democracy as well as twenty consecutive years—, we find a consistently negative association between stateness-first countries and future values of per capita GDP. Figure 2 shows that for leads between two and twenty years, the transition from high capacity and low democracy to high levels of both is significantly associated with lower levels of per capita GDP. When we estimate levels of GDP further into the future, estimate uncertainty increases but the coefficient is increasingly negative. We also find similar results when we operationalize transitions based on mean values of both variables as well as when we compare observations before and after the transition within the same country.

Taken together with results from our other analyses, the findings overall show either a null relationship between high-capacity democratizers and economic development or a negative association. We interpret them to suggest that having high levels of state capacity and being relatively democratic is conducive to economic development, but that arriving at this institutional combination by first building state capacity and then democratizing is not a positive factor. If anything, the hypothesized sequence of factors that led to ‘Denmark’—Fukuyama’s example of a democratic, secure, well-governed, and prosperous country—appears to be unique to countries that constituted the first wave of democracy and not to subsequent democratizers. Consistent with some prior quantitative tests, our analyses show evidence that is in discord with the stateness-first argument. They do not definitively decide the question, and they remain subject to criticisms regarding potential identification issues and the way in which we defined state change. Cumulatively, however, the analyses that I have described are intended to serve as a plausibility probe that uses innovative techniques and alternative estimation strategies to evaluate a prominent theory by way of quantitative analysis.

Descriptive Sequences and Historical Institutionalist Research
In one sense, we minimized potentially valuable information to depict the relationship between state capacity and democracy as a sequence; in another, we attempted to maximize the available information across units and over time to compare alternative ‘paths’ in the sample. This concern for visualizing and discriminating between trajectories, however, suggests one way in which historical institutionalist research can move beyond the exclusive use of positive cases to elucidate on state dependence and institutions. Given theory about the way in which institutions and their timing affects long-term changes in the likelihood of different outcomes, illustrating such changes in the broader sample of cases could go a long way toward demonstrating the ‘criticalness’ of specific junctures and the extent to which particular patterns of institutional change are dominant. Central to the analysis of sequences in other disciplines is the concept of entropy, which refers to the amount of variation in states at a given point in time and which can be used to quantify institutional differentiation and convergence.

Elaborating on the different pathways to an outcome can inform the scope of one’s theory and point to
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counterfactual examples. Moreover, sophisticated descriptive techniques may also help to differentiate modal patterns and to exemplify variations in development, such as institutional displacement, layering, drift, and conversion. These aims are further supported by the availability of longitudinal data that would enable such comparisons, for which Historical V-Dem data are especially helpful. Portraying institutional change across a large number of cases with data that extends the range over which it can be observed provides a valuable means for retesting, honing, and expanding institutionalist work in the comparative study of democratization. In light of concerns over the tradition of studying institutions—which are long-held to be time-dependent phenomenon—such description provides a powerful tool that can guide future historical institutionalist research.

Figure 2. Estimated difference in GDP associated with “stateness-first” transitions at different leads (showing 90-percent confidence intervals)
There are only a few comprehensive, secular and non-philosophical written statements on civil liberties before the Reformation. One of the first documents that fulfills all three criteria is probably the Magna Carta from 1215 issued by King John under pressure from the English barons. But only with the Puritan Revolution (1642–1648) – with its ferment of religious and political ideas and movements – were a broader set of civil liberties placed high on the political agenda. Thereafter, the monarchical restoration was followed by the Glorious Revolution (1688), which led to the English Bill of Rights (1689). These developments have been identified as the pre-eminent English contribution to the history of Western Freedom as they set England squarely in opposition to the absolutist tendencies prevailing in other European monarchies.1

The ideas, events, and institutional reforms had lasting effects on the political order and provided inspiration for liberal political theory, elaborated by prominent thinkers such as John Locke, Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, and Immanuel Kant. About a hundred years later, the British example inspired path-breaking political actions and documents in the New world (the American Revolution and the US Bill of Rights) as well as in the Old world (the French Revolution and the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen), which stimulated additional struggles for freedom in the years to come. From then on, a full set of civil liberties was associated with liberalism and became an integrated part of constitutional frameworks.

However, there are important gaps in our knowledge about respect for civil liberties during the first wave of democratization, spanning from 1789 to the early 1920s. One of the reasons is that studies of liberalization and democratization have not been sufficiently comparative. Conceptually, civil liberties have been conceived as constitutive parts of liberal democracy, but they have not received much attention in terms of separate and disaggregated theorizing and empirical appraisal. Theoretically, most models of political change do not take into account that the correlates of liberal rights might be different from electoral rights – or that different dynamics might exist for subsets of civil liberties. Empirically, increased recognition of the analytical value of long time-series has spurred several data collection projects that capture political institutions, regimes, leaders, and conflicts back into the 19th century.2 Yet, a lack of systematic data on de facto respect for civil liberties has made scholars focus on the rise and spread of electoral institutions, liberal ideas, and the formal codification of political and civil liberties in national constitutions. This situation can finally be improved with access to the historical extension of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset presented by Carl-Henrik Knutsen and Jan Teorell in this issue.

Against this backdrop, the aim of this essay is to put the comparative historical study of civil liberties on the research agenda. The first section offers some conceptual clarifications and distinctions and links subsets of civil liberties to indicators from the V-Dem dataset, which with the introduction of the Historical V-Dem dataset now offers data on de facto respect for a broad selection of civil liberties back to 1789. The second section sets the stage for new comparative-historical studies of civil liberties based on the V-Dem data.

Conceptual clarifications and distinctions
The meaning(s) of liberty and freedom

The first written reference to the concept of liberty or freedom is said to be the Sumerian word ama-gi, which was used to describe a reform process under Urukagina (2,350 BC). It literally means ‘return to mother’. This makes sense considering that Sumerian and later Babylonian kings periodically announced general amnesties that allowed debt-peons to return to their families.

In English, we have the unique opportunity to choose between liberty and freedom, which is not an option in any other ancient or modern Western language. Whereas most scholars and laymen use the concepts interchangeably today, their backgrounds and original meanings are somewhat different although both in their early uses referred to not being a slave and the ability to exercise personal will and a power to choose.3 The concept of liberty is Mediterranean, and it originally referred to autonomy, release, and separation; freedom has a Northern European background and its underlying idea was kinship to free people. Liberty was something that may be given (a privilege), and emphasis was put on the responsible use of independence; freedom was something that must be given (a right), and with rights came the obligation to serve and support a free folk and respect the rights of others. Current conceptions of liberty and freedom often cut across these original meanings.

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Skaaning

Inspired by Benjamin Constant’s classic distinction between ancient and modern liberty and Isaiah Berlin’s notorious distinction between negative and positive liberty, it is useful to distinguish between three traditions of thought about liberty. The first, republican freedom, understands a free person as a citizen who plays an active role in government so that the enacted laws reflect the wishes of the people. The second, liberal freedom, views freedom as a property of individuals and consists of the absence of constraint or interference by public authorities and/or other persons in general. Finally, the third tradition, idealist freedom, deems a person free if this person is led by his or her own authentic desires or rational beliefs about how he or she should live.¹

Civil liberties and self-government

Civil liberties are clearly associated with the second, liberal understanding of freedom. Civil liberties more generally concern the area, degree, and impartiality of the control to which people are subjected. This is different from the degree to which people can realize the ‘good life’ (associated with idealist freedom) and whether the person is the source of control (associated with republican freedom). Civil liberty is thus found where liberal rights are respected. By implication, the state should not abridge these freedoms (such as the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression, association, assembly, and movement) and personal guarantees, including the rights to personal security, privacy, due process, and equal treatment under the law.²

This specification indicates that there might be partial overlaps and reinforcing dynamics between the different kinds of freedom that challenge the acclaimed distinction between access to power and exercise of power. For example, the schism between civil liberties and popular sovereignty is dissolved when certain liberal rights are understood as prerequisites for the meaningful functioning of self-government because they serve as constitutive conditions of free political decision-making. We see this conflation in even the most minimalist definitions of democracy, where opposition parties should be allowed to organize and compete for government power. It becomes even more evident with regard to Robert Dahl’s polyarchy criteria, which comprise broad understandings of freedom of expression and freedom of organization. However, only with liberal democracy is there a full-blown merger between the whole package of civil liberties on the one hand and self-government on the other, where the latter is partly limited by the former.³

Subsets of civil liberties

Civil liberties can be subdivided based on various criteria according to the research question at hand. One way is to distinguish between the four subsets of personal integrity rights, legal equality and due process rights, private freedoms, and political freedoms.

The first subset, personal integrity rights, concerns the bodily integrity of people. More specifically, it refers to life and security and, accordingly, rights that protect people from government approval of, or active involvement, in killings, torture, and forced labor. The second subset of civil liberties, legal equality and due process rights, ensures that people are treated equally by the law and that all people are subject to the same laws of justice. In other words, these rights pertain to equal treatment of individuals (by the court system and the public administration more generally) irrespective of certain personal characteristics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, religion, education, income, and locality.

The third and the fourth subsets, private and political freedoms, respectively, cover liberties understood as actions that individuals might wish to perform without undue interference by the government. What distinguishes them is how fundamental they are for the democratic process. The political liberties, i.e., the freedoms of speech/press, association, and assembly, are at the core of democratic theory (for example, they are included among Dahl’s polyarchy criteria). In comparison, the private liberties (such as the freedoms to own and use property, to movement, and to practice a religion of own choice) are not as directly associated with political activities.

The division into these clusters is not fully waterproof; although they tend to be exhaustive, it is harder to argue that the categories are always mutually exclusive. For example, restrictions on freedom of movement are sometimes targeted directly at political opponents rather than used as a general tool to control the population. In such cases, it seems more correct to understand it as a violation of a political than of a private liberty. Nonetheless, the distinctions are likely to be useful for many research agendas that either seek to track developments in respect for civil liberties or identify their causes or consequences. In Table 1, I have linked the subsets of civil liberties/liberal rights to particular V-Dem indicators.

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² Some scholars distinguish between civil rights (protections against discriminatory treatment) and civil liberties (freedom from oppressive government authority). However, this distinction only originated in the early years of the Cold War in the US, and it is widely contested. See Christopher W. Schmidt, “The Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Divide.” Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 12 (2016): 1-41.

Setting the stage for comparative-historical research avenues

Fascinating variation across nations and time characterized respect for civil liberties during the first wave of democratization. But why should we, as social scientists, get involved in the historical study of civil liberties? There are several reasons to take on this task. First, if we only look at the present, we neglect a lot of interesting and relevant variation in different contexts that can give our analyses leverage. This argument opens up for revisiting old research agendas based on historical data. The additional variation can be used to disentangle contextual limitations of established theories. For example, studies on the correlates of personal integrity rights generally use a standard battery of variables, including socio-economic development, regime type, and population size. We do not know much about how far back the explanations travel and whether the relationships are conditioned by other factors since previous studies have...
been limited to recent decades where many countries have only shown little variation in their performances. If we go back far enough, also countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden show significant changes in respect for civil liberties.

To account for these developments, most contemporary theories of state repression exclusively refer to the pursuit of power, money, and/or prestige. However, we should not forget that humans are also driven by ideals that go beyond narrow self-interest and that these ideals can both support and undermine civil liberty. Competing ideals were present and played a prominent role. On the one hand, liberal ideas gained ground and influenced politics and policies. On the other hand, moral concerns often pulled in the opposite direction because the church and public authorities worried that people in general, and the uneducated masses in particular, could easily be led astray by what they considered sinful or decadent thoughts and behavior.

The second reason to engage in comparative-historical analyses is that path-dependency and diffusion characterize many social phenomena of broad interest. For example, the early strength of liberalism as well as waves of liberal revolutions have had lasting impacts on political regime developments in both Latin America and Europe. This means that it is often helpful for our understanding of present-day situations to track down the historical origins of a phenomenon and analyze how critical junctures and cross-spatial and cross-temporal learning processes have influenced their trajectories. In many places, people have become so accustomed to living in open societies that it is difficult to imagine anything else, while particular restrictions in other countries are taken as self-evident— at least until similar countries begin to experience change and then function as inspiration.

The third reason is that processes of democratization have not always been characterized by synchronic transformations where all institutions are introduced simultaneously. Rather than moving in lockstep, different aspects of democracy have tended to replace authoritarian practices at different speeds and at different times—and the sequence has differed between countries. A similar logic might apply to different subsets of civil liberties. Although the recognition of particular civil liberties tends to be positively correlated, important discrepancies exist. Only totalitarian regimes—by definition—continuously oppress all civil liberties to a high degree, whereas other regimes demonstrate more selective and fluctuating approaches. Despite strong interdependencies, the different civil liberties have sometimes been introduced sequentially, and the upturns and downturns have been formed by different constellations of supply and demand of state repression. The supply-side here concerns the administrative and coercive means to oppress, while the demand-side concerns the material and immaterial preferences of the political rulers (and their potential challengers).

The case of Denmark illustrates the point nicely. Corruption in the public administration was largely eliminated during absolutist monarchy, and the king and his administration generally did not interfere with court rulings. Despite significant political disagreements, political killings have been extremely rare in modern times with the partial exception of the German occupation during World War II. Slave trade was abolished in 1792 (with effect from 1803), and slavery was abolished in 1848 after a rebellion in the Caribbean colonies. In the following year, Denmark became a constitutional monarchy, and all the classical liberal rights were officially bestowed to all citizens after the king complied with public demands without any bloodshed. However, some ‘non-traditional’ religious communities continued to face obstacles regarding official recognition, socialist parties and labor unions were harassed until a major agreement between unions and employers settled a hundred-day labor dispute in 1899, and self-censorship was now and then intensified, depending on the domestic and international political climate. Asynchronous political histories of other countries lend further support to the potential value of a disaggregate, comparative perspective.

The fourth and final reason for social scientists to go historical is that history is simply too exciting and important to be left to historians. Whereas they do indeed provide a lot of valuable knowledge using their own toolbox, social science theories and methods have the ability to shed new light on historical issues of broad interest, such as the dynamics of political regimes, state-building, violent conflict, and economic and social development. The historical extension of the V-Dem data presents unique opportunities to pursue research agendas related to these issues.

Since the 2010 elections, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his government have, through a series of smaller constitutional changes, moved to incrementally dismantle parts of the Hungarian democracy. With a stated aim of pursuing “illiberal” democracy, the Hungarian regime under Orbán is by most accounts reverting, after little more than two decades of Post-Communist development. Thousands of miles further south, Robert Mugabe was bloodlessly removed from the Zimbabwean presidency in November 2017. Although it is unclear, yet, what political developments will play out in Zimbabwe and what consequences they will have for the well-being of the Zimbabwean people, the repressive rule of one of the world’s longest ruling dictators has forcefully come to an end.

These transitions, one away from democracy, and one possibly opening the door to it, are conceptually unified in that they constitute regime change. Regime changes in plural, defined as substantial changes in the formal and/or informal rules of a state’s governmental system, are the ultimate expressions of political instability. These changes can happen with violent means; through coups, assassinations, uprisings or wars, or through internally instigated and directed changes; such as the current democratic reversion in Hungary. The monumentality of these events poses a series of immediate questions that have long been under study in political research:1 What causes democratization? Why do some democratic regimes crumble? Why do some dictators remain in power for so long? And, what consequences do these expressions of political instability entail for a country’s population?

In this piece, I discuss the continued importance of studying political regimes, give a brief introduction to the rationale behind and usefulness of an upcoming dataset of regimes (the Historical Regimes Data nested within Historical V-Dem), and describe some fruitful research agendas these data can, and should, be used to address.

Studying Regimes: The Disaggregation Agenda

Regime change is studied in many ways, either through concentration on specific phenomena (such as coups, revolutions, inter-state wars etc.) or in aggregation, where political instability is typically the overarching term. The conglomerate findings of this field can hardly be done justice in brief, and I focus here on pointing to one core concern and overarching agenda that is particularly relevant to the study of regimes and regime change – namely the disaggregation agenda. What I refer to as the disaggregation agenda is, briefly put, the push to avoid unwanted aggregation of concepts in both theory and measurement, to thereby reach conclusions that are conceptually and empirically more precise.

A quite recent literature has pointed our attention towards the way in which instability – in various forms, is measured. Wright and Bak illustrate that, for the literature linking non-tax revenue and unearned foreign income to political instability, choice of measurement is quite essential. They examine data on executive leadership, political authority, and autocratic regimes and illustrate the conceptual differences between these variables. For another specific field, the study of the economic effects of instability, Richard Jong-A-Pin found four underlying dimensions of instability to have fundamentally differing effects on growth – namely, politically motivated violence, mass civil protest, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime. Only the instability of the political regime has a robust and significant negative effect.2

These findings are illustrations of the importance of the disaggregation agenda, which is motivating many of the current most expansive data collection efforts in political science. The potential problem of aggregation is that it combines different types of causes and treats them as equal. This might be fruitful if the true cause is indeed some latent dimension of different variables, but as the studies above indicate, this seems not to be the case. Combined with the need for more precise data, with a much wider temporal scope than existing datasets, avoidance of excessive aggregation is a core motivation for the forthcoming Historical Regimes Data (HRD).

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The Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD)

The forthcoming Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD), constructed and coded by members of the Historical V-Dem team as well as myself, contains new data on the identity, period of existence, and mode of breakdown for more than 1900 political regimes. HRD spans most large polities in the world throughout the entire course of modern history after the French revolution, documenting the life-cycles of regimes at a high level of temporal precision, typically down to the day on which regimes originate or die. We define a "political regime" as the set of rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and maintaining them in power. These can be formal rules, for instance embedded in a constitution, but also informal rules, enforced by some form of coalition.

In other words, we aim to capture regimes both by their coalitional and institutional features. Where institutional structures determine the way in which the policies and leaders of a given polity are chosen, we see the institutional make-up of a system as the defining feature of this regime. If formal institutions are inconsistent with the way in which ruling coalitions are chosen and sustained, we emphasize the ruling coalitions. In extension, the formal and informal rules of any given regime can be understood as two separate dimensions that may or may not diverge. Both of these dimensions are tracked in parallel, and substantial changes occurring in either of them are coded as regime change. See Figure 2 for an illustrating example.

Figure 1: Yearly frequencies of regime deaths due to coups, uprisings, international war, and guided liberalization in HRD 1789-2015. Note that the sample included is flexible (polities included as they gain and lose sovereignty) which impacts trends shown here.
Accordingly, regime changes can also be defined by either formal or informal rules. A constitutional democratic regime might either end through changes in its formal rules (through substantial liberalization, e.g. universal suffrage, or through non-liberalizing legislative action, e.g. the change from parliamentarism to strong presidentialism), or through changes to its informal rules imposed through, e.g., a coup, popular revolt or foreign invasion. For concrete coding purposes, a large set of rules and rules of thumb for identifying changes to formal and informal rules were developed. Deliberation and revision of the questions and definitions employed in HRD were done by scholars from the Historical V-Dem team.4

As illustrated by Figure 1, the frequency of each regime end type (coup, uprising, interstate war and guided liberalization) display serious fluctuations of the time span covered. Regime death by inter-state war is particularly pronounced around the early 19th century and the Second World War. Coups happen particularly frequently around 1850 and in the latter half of the 20th century. That said, there is no tendency for any of the types to either dramatically decrease or increase in importance – all four curves behave in waves – underlining their continued relevance.

Some suggested directions for future research

One novel aspect of HRD is its recording of directed regime change events – events where incumbents in some way alter their own ruling systems. While studies of externally induced regime changes are quite common, as well as studies of regime type-related changes (especially studies that consider transitions between regimes with democratic and autocratic characteristics or gradual changes along a democracy scale, capturing processes of democratization or de-democratization),5 we know comparatively little of what the drivers are for internally induced regime changes. HRD can also have substantial impact, when used as an explanatory factor. In the following sections, I describe two research agendas that seem especially fruitful in this sense: one that concerns the effect of various forms of regime instability on violent conflict, and one that concerns the effect of instability on economic development.6

Both of these agendas stem from inconsistencies in the literature with regards to how regime change is conceptualized and measured. A helpful illustrating example is Kyrgyzstan since the fall of the USSR. In HRD, Post-Communist events in Kyrgyzstan have been captured concretely: as two regime transitions in 2005 and two transitions in 2010 – in both cases capturing one transition into and one transition out of interim governments caused by popular protest. There have

6 Both of these agendas are central to my own, ongoing PhD project.

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**Figure 2: Timeline of Kyrgyzstan as captured in HRD (above) and the Polity IV Durable variable (below)**
been no irregular leader removals in Kyrgyzstan in this period, meaning that its Post-Communist changes are not captured by Archigos. In Polity, Kyrgyzstan’s durability is recorded as 0 years for each year between 2005 and 2001, and otherwise recorded as stable both before and after. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

Political instability and economic development
Accepting as truth that political stability fosters economic growth has very important ramifications for practitioners and scholars of developmental policy. If we emphasize stability over other regime-level traits, this should no doubt be based on systematic and non-contradictory evidence. And, although there is a substantial body of research insisting on the importance of stability for economic development, some studies also suggest the opposite. That is, that political stability either makes economic policy lazy or, when occurring in autocracies, is inherently detrimental to growth because of incumbents’ structural interest in prohibiting development. 7

The aforementioned study by Jong, which investigates different forms of instability (politically motivated violence, mass civil protest, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime), illustrates the significant gap left in this literature because he shows that the economic effects we find of instability depend entirely on the respective type of instability. This finding therefore also illustrates the importance of measurement of political instability, in addition to the aforementioned study by Wright and Bak. Accordingly, further investigating the sensitivity of previous findings to alternative specifications is crucial, as well as emphasizing more broadly a general focus on conceptualization issues in the instability literature.

Existing measures of political instability focus on a myriad of indicators ranging from number of coups, assassination attempts, leadership changes, government duration, to outright regime changes – that is, changes where the entire political regime is substituted with another. These substantial discrepancies are sometimes due to differing understandings of the concept of instability, but in other cases it stems from inadequate measures being used for given forms of instability. As there are such contradictory findings in the field of instability and growth, both HRD, Historical V-Dem, and further data collection efforts will be especially useful here in order to conclude more forcefully on whether the discrepancies are due only to researchers understanding the concept differently, or also to critical inadequacy of the data used in these studies.

Regime change and violent civil conflict
In a series of studies, semidemocracy and transitions between regimes have been examined as important determinants of violent civil conflict, and civil war, though their results have been volatile to alternative specifications. The reputed parabolic relationship has, amongst other disputes, been found to only pertain to state-centered conflicts, whereas democracy has a positive and near linear effect on the risk of territorial rebellion. 8 Furthermore, the distinction between the two features has been fuzzy, as most of these studies employ measures of regime transitions that are inherently linked to democracy levels, both conceptually and operationally – almost always relying on the Polity Dataset. 8 Applying HRD in this setting alleviates this issue because measuring regime change without relying on conceptions of regime type makes it more plausible to actually separate, both conceptually and statistically, the effect of these two features. As illustrated by Figure 2, HRD also tends to be more precise.

First, I theorize that instances of coups d’état will increase the risk of violent conflict. The theoretical foundations of this assumption are rooted in the opportunity structures described by Gleditsch and Ruggieri in a very interesting contribution to the


9 This issue was first addressed by James Raymond Vreeland, “The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy.” Journal of conflict Resolution 52(3) (2008): 401-425. For an important exception see Gleditsch and Ruggieri (2010), in which Archigos data is used (Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. “Introducing Archigos: A dataset of political leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46(2) (2009): 269-283.). Though the Archigos data is comparably more suited to capture distinct regime-level dynamics than a modification of average democracy level, it does not presuppose substantial change to the regime beyond the position of the leader and can therefore at best serve as a proxy.
As they write, theories of political opportunity structures have been developed primarily to study nonviolent phenomena. However, the idea that dynamic changes in state weakness or political opportunities can encourage mobilization has clear relevance for the risk of civil war as well.

Second, I expect that legislative directed regime changes, those that are, to some extent, directed by the sitting regime with the aim of liberalization, will reduce the chances of violent domestic conflict. Rather than serving as windows of opportunity, I assume that these changes act as defuses to conflict due to their signaling effect to opponents. In these instances, typically marked by the passing of new legislation or the holding of elections, the bargaining component of democracy might come into play. For a possible state adversary, aware of the costs of armed rebellion, greater political inclusion – clearly communicated – can de-escalate conflict. Moreover, this effect might be exacerbated by the fact that incumbents might reach for the “democratization-button” as a counter-tactic towards oppositional forces rather consciously – meaning that the measured liberalization is part of some larger, unmeasured, reconciliatory trend. With the extensive timelines and accuracy of both HRD and the larger Historical V-Dem project, investigating these ideas is made possible.

Conclusion

In this piece, I have described and argued for the disaggregation agenda as one core motivation for the continued relevance and importance of studying regime changes in all their forms. Alongside the need for high-precision data, this is also a core motivation for the forthcoming Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD), which contains over 1900 regimes spanning modern history since the French Revolution in 196 political polities, containing information on the end types and durations of regimes down to their specific dates. I have attempted here to underline some of the most important research features and potentials for impact this data collection effort enables. In particular, I have focused on how our knowledge of the consequences of political instability for economic and conflictual outcomes can be substantially improved, both substantively and methodologically.

This is but a small part of the plethora of different research questions that can be addressed with the HRD and Historical V-Dem data. Moving forward, these larger efforts to code, systematize and aggregate data on difficult political phenomena will be of great importance for the advancement of political science. Without these efforts, it would be a lot more practically difficult, and a lot less substantively plausible, that we would be able to take advantage of the range of increasingly highly sophisticated analytical techniques modern political scientists are applying today.
A NEW OUTLOOK ON THE ORIGINS OF SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE BEFORE WW2
Adam Bilinski*, Pittsburg State University

At least since the publication of Moore’s Social Origins in 1966, the emergence of democracy in Europe has been a focus of substantial research with explanations based either on socio-economic or political factors. This essay outlines a novel strand of research with explanations based on socio-economic or political factors. This essay outlines a novel theory of the origins of democracy in Europe that subscribes to the second strand of research, as it concentrates on the role of political legacies. My theory aims to explain why some European countries managed to create sustainable democracies before WW2, while others failed in this task.

In this essay I argue that there had been overall a single historical path from absolute monarchy (a default regime type in the seventeenth century) to sustainable democracy in Europe before WW2. The path was marked by several critical junctures. The first juncture referred to the emergence in some European countries of a regime which I called “PA monarchy,” because it combined political pluralism and the possibility of electoral alternation in legislative control. PA monarchies mixed features of absolute monarchies and democracies; they possessed freely elected legislatures (under restricted or universal male suffrage), but the executive power was still controlled by the monarch, who exercised it either directly or through a prime minister/chancellor (who was NOT responsible to the legislature). If PA monarchy was established and persisted for sufficiently long time, it led to the embrace of democratic norms by the elites, and subsequent development of sustainable democracy. On the other hand, if a long-lasting PA monarchy had not emerged in a given country, the path to sustainable democracy there before WW2 remained closed. The entire historical process leading from PA monarchy to sustainable democracy is shown on Figure 1.

PA monarchy was a unique institutional solution which created optimal conditions for the natural emergence and the habituation by the elites of the norm of free electoral competition for power. Initially, this norm was the necessary element of the compromise between the politically-active classes on one hand, and the monarch (and the pro-monarchical aristocracy) on the other. The nature of the compromise was that the politically-active classes obtained real representation (based on free electoral competition) in the legislature whose consent was necessary to accept new legislation, taxes, and the budget. On the other hand, the monarch and his associates retained control over the executive power and the power of the legislative veto. Election rigging by the monarch would entail breakdown of the agreement and a likely revolution, hence it was almost never attempted. The incentive to manipulate elections in favor of the government was also diminished by the fact that its survival in office did not depend on electoral returns. In fact, the monarch and the government often portrayed themselves as acting in the national interest and standing above “the parties and politics.” There were long periods during PA monarchy (as in Denmark in 1870-1901) when the parties in opposition to monarchical governments controlled the legislature and had to be included when deciding government policies.

Gradually throughout the period of PA monarchy, the parliamentary elites and their constituents accepted the norms of free electoral competition, and became committed to the general principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law. These norms were effectively habituated probably because, as mentioned, they were initially enforced by an actor external to the electoral process itself. A few decades later, after the transitions to the responsible government, the norms continued to be respected even though its consequences were now dramatically different: the losing faction, with the loss of the legislative majority, lost also control over the government. Nevertheless, electoral turnovers were quite frequent in the periods shortly after the transitions from PA monarchy to responsible government; and scant complaints about electoral manipulation in this period show how firmly the norm had been established. One should also note that the same kind of commitment to free electoral competition and constitutionalism developed among the representatives of some groups initially excluded from suffrage (i.e. the Socialist Parties), as they were socialized to the same set of elite norms.

While the elites of democracies endowed with a legacy of PA monarchy were characterized by deep-seated commitment to democratic values, very different normative commitments characterized the elites which came to power in democracies (or competitive oligarchies) established without such a legacy. These elites initially accepted the norms of free electoral competition

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1 Barrington Moore, Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966)
and constitutionalism, but because these norms were not enforced by any external actor, the acceptance was weaker and conditional. Hence, democracy was abandoned when under supposed threat of Fascist takeover (as in the Baltic states in the 1930s), or non-elected actors decided to abolish democratically-elected governments to take power (as in Poland in 1926). In other circumstances (as in Piedmont in 1857) elections were rigged to permanently exclude one’s opponents from power; this was a rational move given the justified expectation that the latter would do exactly the same once in office.

Historically, most PA monarchies existed in Europe in the period between the end of Napoleonic Wars and WW1 (as illustrated in Table 1). The first PA monarchies were established in Britain (1689) and Sweden (1809). In these countries, the idea of representative government remained popular among both the aristocracy and the middle classes due to persistence of the medieval representative institutions. These institutions challenged the monarchical absolutism, which ended in a compromise granting the parliaments the right to veto any new taxes or legislation. Yet, the legislatures existing in those countries preserved pre-modern, medieval features until the reforms of 1832 and 1866, respectively. Otherwise, the timing of introduction of PA monarchy depended on two primary factors: the popularity of the idea of representative government among the politically active classes, and the economic strength of the liberal middle class, which was partially determined by the level of development. Early introduction of PA monarchy in most of Western Europe (shortly after the Napoleonic Wars) could be explained by its geographical proximity to London and Paris, the centers of liberal thought in the period, and higher levels of economic development. Economic development was slower, and views more conservative in Central and Eastern Europe, which explains later establishment of PA monarchies in that region (only after the Spring of Nations).

Existence of long-lasting monarchical institutions seemed to be a precondition of emergence of a stable PA monarchy, because such regimes did not emerge in any of the newly-independent monarchies of the Balkans. A stable PA monarchy could not also emerge if a monarch once agreed to PA monarchy, but shortly after it reneged and reintroduced absolutism. This applied to the historical episodes in Spain (1813–14), Portugal (1821–1823), and Two Sicilies (1848–1849). In the first two cases, the middle class became committed to the idea of representative government (due to the influence of the revolutionary France and the effect of the Napoleonic Wars), but was economically too weak to guarantee once-won concessions, which enabled the monarch and the aristocracy to renage. In consequence, in those countries the groups interested in introduction of representative government lost interest in PA monarchy as an institutional solution and opted for a fully elected government instead. This could be explained by the breakdown of trust between the rulers and the ruled: once the monarch reneged, he could no longer be trusted to respect the rules of the PA monarchy and thus had to be removed from power altogether. As a result, in those cases the path to sustainable democracy became closed.

One should note, however, that removal of a ruler who had insisted on preservation of absolutism and had never agreed to introduce PA monarchy did not preclude establishment of PA monarchy at a later stage. Thus, PA monarchy was introduced in Britain (1689) and France (1816) in spite of the legacies of revolutions and regicides. The challenge was to find a monarch, or a dynasty, which would agree to respect the constitutional rules of PA monarchy as a compromise institutional solution, and the task was accomplished in both cases (in France, partially due to international pressure).

Due to a specific set of historical circumstances, PA monarchy also did not emerge in two cases of long-established monarchies, in Piedmont-Sardinia and Hungary. There, monarchs yielded to the middle class pressure for fully elected government, which was established in 1850 and 1867, respectively (after only two-year periods of PA monarchy in each case). Because competitive oligarchies established in those countries did not enjoy a sufficiently-long legacy of PA monarchy, their elites were not committed to the norms of free elections and constitutionalism. Hence, these regimes quickly degenerated into non-competitive regimes characterized by limited civil liberties and manipulated elections (after 1857 and 1872, respectively). The regime which existed in the unified Italy after 1861 was a direct continuation of the Piedmont’s regime. Similar non-competitive oligarchies emerged also in the previously analyzed cases of Portugal and Spain, while the newly independent monarchies in the Balkans oscillated between the periods of unstable democracy and civilian or monarchical dictatorships. The second critical juncture on the path from absolute monarchy to sustainable democracy referred to the transition from PA monarchy to democracy: whether it took place at all, and if so, the character of the transition. If the transition from PA monarchy to democracy was peaceful and resulted in preservation of the
monarchy, a sustainable democracy emerged (this pertained to Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark). If the transition to democracy involved a regime discontinuity (a revolution or a coup) and resulted in establishment of a republican democracy, this democracy was prone to breakdown. The latter developments occurred in France after 1848 (which, due to the revolutionary legacy, was likely to experience violent regime transitions) and in Germany and Austria after 1918. Obviously, the path to sustainable democracy became closed if a PA monarchy made a transition to a dictatorship (as in Russia in 1917). Apparently, those PA monarchies which had been established comparatively late (after 1850) were less likely to make a peaceful transition to democracy before WW1 and thus suffered violent ends due to exogenous shocks caused by military defeats in this war.

The transition from PA monarchy to democracy involved two separate processes. The first process referred to the transfer of the executive power from the monarch to a freely elected legislature, or to put it more precisely, the process through which the government, instead of being responsible to the monarch, became responsible to and could be recalled by the legislature. Throughout this process an intermediate stage could be identified during which both the legislature and the monarch determined the choice of prime minister and key government policies. The second process referred to the extension of the suffrage so that it ultimately encompassed nearly all adult population. All of the aforementioned cases, with the exception of Denmark, experienced a stage of competitive oligarchy during which the suffrage was restricted to less than 50% of male adults, but the government was responsible primarily to the freely elected legislature. These processes are illustrated in Table 1.

Regarding the European countries which became independent only after WW1, they chose a republican form of government. The sustainability of their democracies depended to a large degree on whether they enjoyed a legacy of PA monarchy as a part of another state. Thus, sustainable democracy emerged in Ireland, which seceded from a democracy with a legacy of PA monarchy. Democracy turned also relatively stable in Czechoslovakia, most of whose population had lived in Austria (a PA monarchy in 1866-1918). Other newly-independent countries enjoyed only short legacies of PA monarchy as parts of the Russian Empire in 1906-1915, or did not enjoy such a legacy at all, hence their democracies turned out prone to breakdown and collapsed. In the partially exceptional case of Finland, its first attempt at democracy ended after only a year with the outbreak of the civil war and the country’s disintegration in January 1918. The second attempt turned out more successful nevertheless, probably as a result of this traumatic experience.

Developments were different in those countries where the transition from PA monarchy to democracy involved a regime discontinuity and establishment of a republic (in France in 1848, and Germany and Austria in 1918). Compared to monarchical democracies with a legacy of PA monarchy, such republican democracies functioned with a heightened risk of breakdown and they did ultimately break down. The first risk factor pertained to the legitimacy deficit characterizing the new republican democracies. A large group of voters and the elites representing them, mostly of conservative views, had been committed to the preservation of the monarchy with its associated traditional symbolism. These groups considered the new republics illegitimate, and because democratization was associated with abolition of the monarchy, they came to abhor the idea of democracy itself (their dissatisfaction was also caused by the sudden loss of power, prestige, and influence). These groups came to vote for the parties which were either anti-democratic (DNVP and later NSDAP in Germany) or ambiguous towards democracy (Christian Social Party in Austria). Naturally, the popularity of anti-system parties increased the risk of democratic breakdown; this risk was also evident, in case of Germany, through two failed coup attempts (the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923).

Otherwise, the establishment of republican democracies was also associated with creation of entirely new institutional frameworks, which created political opportunities for anti-system actors who had been marginalized under the previous systems. This process was particularly visible in France after 1848, where democratization was associated with sudden extension of the suffrage to politically non-mobilized peasant masses, and creation of presidentialism. The first presidential election was won by Louis-Napoleon, who, enjoying the imperial legitimacy, sidelined the traditional elites and directly appealed to the peasant electorate. Having entered into a conflict with a legislature dominated by traditional notables, he decided to abolish democracy in order to preserve and consolidate power.

The history of Germany and Austria in the interwar years could be counterfactually compared with the history of Sweden and Denmark, and the history of France after 1848 with
the history of Britain in the same period. If Germany (or Austria) had democratized through introduction of the government’s parliamentary responsibility while preserving their monarchies (in the same way as Sweden or Denmark), their democracies would have likely survived (this would have occurred at a later stage if WW1 had not broken out, or if Germany had won the war).²

A similar argument has been recently made by Daniel Ziblatt,³ who observed how democracy survived after “settled” transitions in Britain and Scandinavia, while it collapsed after an “unsettled,” or revolutionary, transition in Germany. In addition, Ziblatt argued that the organizational strength of the conservative parties explained their attitude to democracy after the transition: while well-organized Scandinavian and British conservative parties embraced democracy, the poorly organized German conservatives, because they could not effectively compete for votes, rejected it.

The argument presented herein supports Ziblatt’s observation on the importance of conservatives’ attitudes to democracy, but offers an alternative explanation of why the conservative parties diverged in their attitudes. During PA monarchy, in Scandinavia and Germany the pro-monarchical conservative parties had a similar basis of support (in landholding class, clergy, and civil servants) and dominated the monarchical governments. Yet, after the transition to democracy, the Danish and Swedish conservative parties gradually embraced the new monarchical democracies, while German conservative parties, mostly because they rejected the new republican democracy as illegitimate, transformed into the anti-system DNVP. Hence, the mode of transition to democracy itself, rather than organizational strength, explains the anti-democratic attitude of the German conservatives and pro-democratic attitude of the Swedish and Danish conservatives.⁴

Further discussions on how my argument relates to other theories of European democratic development⁵ is discussed in my original publication.⁶

4 This is also clear in the light of the evidence Ziblatt presented himself: the bulk of organizational effort of the conservative parties in Britain, Denmark, and Sweden took place already after those countries made a transition to democracy in 1884, 1901, and 1911, respectively (when at least 50% of male adults were enfranchised and parliamentary government established). The German conservatives did not face the same incentive to organize before 1918 because their influence in the government did not directly depend on electoral returns.

I would also dispute the Ziblatt’s argument that German conservatives under PA monarchy relied on comparable methods to obtain votes as the ruling factions in Italy or Spain in the same period. German conservatives, in comparable way as British conservatives before 1860s or Danish conservatives under PA monarchy, obtained large number of votes through employee intimidation or influence (mostly of farm workers or tenants). On the other hand, election outcomes in Italy or Spain were controlled by government thanks to a centralized operation of vote rigging.


6 Adam Bilinski, “Paths to democracy and authoritarianism in Europe before world war one.” Journal of Historical Sociology (2018): 1–23. In addition to the alternative explanations, the article also discusses in detail the case of Switzerland, and the problem of quality of elections under PA monarchy.

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Figure 1. Path from PA monarchy to sustainable democracy in Europe (years of transitions in brackets)

Absolute monarchy

Transition to PA monarchy → Path to sustainable democracy open
Pertains to the United Kingdom (1689), Norway (1814), Netherlands (1815), Belgium (1815), France (1815), Denmark (1848), Germany/Prussia (1848), Austria (1861), Sweden (1866), Russia (1906)

Discontinuity transition → Path to sustainable democracy closed
Pertains to Spain (1814/23), Portugal (1823), Piedmont / Italy (1848), Serbia (1858), Romania (1859), Greece (1862), Hungary (1867)

Non-discontinuity transition to democracy or competitive oligarchy → Path to sustainable democracy open
Pertains to France (1848), Germany (1918), Austria (1918) (to democracy), Russia (1917) (to a dictatorship)

Sustainable democracy:
Pertains to Denmark (1901)

Sustainable competitive oligarchies which subsequently made a transition to sustainable democracies
Pertains to United Kingdom (1784, 1885), Netherlands (1848, 1897), Belgium (1847, 1894), Norway (1884, 1900), Sweden (1905, 1911)
Table 1. Countries with a legacy of PA monarchy in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PA monarchy</th>
<th>Competitive oligarchy</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Regime discontinuities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1689-1784</td>
<td>1834-85</td>
<td>1885-</td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1834)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1809-1905 (20)</td>
<td>1905-11</td>
<td>1911-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1815-48 (68)</td>
<td>1848-97</td>
<td>1897-</td>
<td>1798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1815-30, 1830-47 (57)</td>
<td>1847-94</td>
<td>1894-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1816-36 (48)</td>
<td>1836-48</td>
<td>1848-51, 1869-70, 1871-1789, 92, 99, 1830, 48, 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1814-84</td>
<td>1884-1905</td>
<td>1905-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>1848-50</td>
<td>1850-57</td>
<td>1901-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1848-1901 (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-33</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/Prussia</td>
<td>1849-1918</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-20, 1928-31</td>
<td>1864, 66, 1938, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1859-64</td>
<td>1866-67</td>
<td>1919-20, 1928-31</td>
<td>1864, 66, 1938, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1865-67</td>
<td>1867-72</td>
<td>1919-33</td>
<td>1918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1866-1918</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-33</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1917-18, 1918-1919-34</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1917-18, 1918-1919-34</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-34</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-26</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-21*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1920-26</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1906-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1920-34</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1866-1917</td>
<td></td>
<td>1920-38*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1689-1801</td>
<td>1801-1885</td>
<td>1885-1918, 1921-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE – The number in brackets indicated a year when monarchical influence regarding the choice of prime minister ultimately terminated. *indicates foreign-induced (exogenous) discontinuity which terminated a given regime. Dates in italics indicate that a given period was experienced when a given territory formed a part of another country.
**SECTION NEWS**

**News from Members**


**Berenson, Marc P.**, recently published his book, *Taxes and Trust: From Coercion to Compliance in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge University Press, 2018.) *Taxes and Trust* is the first book on taxes to focus on trust and the first work of social science to concentrate on how tax policy actually gets implemented on the ground in Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

**Bäck, Hanna, Jan Teorell & Staffan Lindberg.** “Cabinets, Prime Ministers, and Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-War Europe.” Political Studies, forthcoming (online first available [here](http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15813.html)).

**David, Roman** published the book *Communists and Their Victims* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), which combines quantitative and qualitative methods to examine a post-repression country. For more info, see [http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15813.html](http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15813.html).

**Güneş Murat Tezcür**, Jalal Talabani Chair of Kurdish Political Studies at University of Central Florida, has been promoted to the rank of Professor.


**Lupu, Noam, Mitchell Seligson, Liz Zechmeister, and all of Vanderbilt University.** The 2018 Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Dataset Award by the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, was made to Mitchell Seligson, Liz Zechmeister, and Noam Lupu, all of Vanderbilt University, for the AmericasBarometer. This survey dataset now covers some 30 countries in the Americas, with face-to-face interviews of about 1,500 respondents, covering a wide range of topics in democracy and governance. Surveys are conducted in more than 10 languages, and samples are multi-stage, stratified and clustered. Scores of books, articles, and dissertations have utilized the database, which is free to download in Stata and SPSS at [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org).

**Morse, Yonatan L.** 2018. “Presidential Power and Democratization by Elections” Democratization 25, 4: 709-727


**Opoku, Darko and Eve Sandberg,** eds. Challenges to African Entrepreneurship in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018) This book asks why have black African businesses been so difficult to establish and sustain? The authors argue that African states’ domestic political networks, not their markets, are the primary variables that determine the success of African businesses. In order for their enterprises to survive, African business actors have had to devise creative coping strategies and assume unusual responsibilities that previously were undertaken by state institutions, and in some cases, by non-governmental organizations. The book explores the challenges and coping strategies of aspiring African entrepreneurs. Eve Sandberg is a Professor in the Politics Department at Oberlin College and Darko Opoku is an Associate Professor of Africana Studies at Oberlin College.

**Raffler, Pia,** is winner of the section’s 2016 Best Field Work Award. Pia Raffler was appointed Assistant Professor at the Harvard Government Department.


**Thomson, Henry,** published the article “Grievances, Mobilization and Mass Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: A Subnational Analysis of East Germany’s 1953 Abbreviated Revolution” in Comparative Political Studies.


**V-Dem News**

Democracy in decline for one third of the world, according to the V-Dem annual “Democracy Report 2018 “Democracy for All?”. The study revealed that in 2017 democratic qualities were in decline in 24 countries across the world, including some of the most populous, such as the US and India. Report is available here: [https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/democracy-reports/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/democracy-reports/) V-Dem Institute published a number of new Working Papers. You can access them here: [https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/working-papers/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/working-papers/)


V-Dem Announcements

V-Dem is searching for a Country Coordinator on Brunei: https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/call-country-coordinator-brunei/

V-Dem is looking for Country Experts to assist with the next update in January 2019: https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/call-country-experts-v-dem/

Welcome to join us for the Research Workshop “Democracy in Reverse: Patterns of Autocratization in Eastern Europe and Eurasia” on Friday, 19 October 2018 at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Workshop is designed to look at both the more visible pathways of autocratization in areas such as Central Asia, Russia or Belarus. More information here: https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/research-workshop-democracy-reverse/

The Policy Dialogue Day 2019 is scheduled for 22 May 2019. Read more about this year’s event here: https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/international-policy-day-democracy-support-and-governance/


Annual Meeting Events

You are cordially invited to the Comparative Democratization Section business meeting and reception at the APSA annual meeting. Provide input on new initiatives, celebrate the winners of this year’s awards, and enjoy hors d’oeuvres, drinks, and conversation.

Friday, August 31, 2018
Business Meeting, 6:30-7:30 pm, Room 312, Hynes Convention Center
Reception, 7:30-9 pm, location to be announced
is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is jointly produced by members of the V-Dem Institute and GLD at University of Gothenburg.

Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science and director of the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; one of four PIs for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; member of the Young Academy of Sweden and the Board of U of Gothenburg; and a Research Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of Democracy and Elections in Africa and has also worked on women’s representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

Kristen Kao is a Research Fellow with the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) at the University of Gothenburg and a PhD Candidate in Political Science at UCLA. In 2014, she ran a nationwide survey in Jordan in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lind say Benstead funded by the GLD program at Yale. She has served as a program consultant and election monitor for a variety of international organizations, including The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute.

Anna Lührmann is a Research Fellow at the V-Dem Institute since 2015. She received her PhD in 2015 from Humboldt University (Berlin) with a doctoral thesis on the United Nation’s electoral assistance. Prior to turning to academia, Anna was an MP in the German National Parliament (Bundestag, 2002-2009). She currently works on several research projects in the realm of autocratization, autocracy, democracy aid, and elections. Her research has been published or is forthcoming in Electoral Studies, International Political Science Review and the Journal of Democracy.

Ellen Lust is the Founding Director of the Programs on Governance and Local Development at Yale University and at the University of Gothenburg, and Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. She has authored Structuring Conflict in the Arab World as well as articles in Perspectives on Politics, edited The Middle East and several volumes. The Moulay Hicham Foundation, NSF, the Swedish Research Council and other foundations have supported her research on authoritarianism, political transitions, and local governance.

Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His current project uses data from extensive field and survey research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social identities.

Sirianne Dahlum is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her dissertation, which was received from the University of Oslo in 2017, studies the relationship between education, mass protest and democratization. She currently works on projects related to mass protest movements, politics in authoritarian regimes and political violence.

Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Mannheim in 2015. She specializes in elections, representation, and survey research. Her current research examines the effects of immigration on elections, develops new measures of multicultural democracy, and investigates the relationship between gender and corruption. Other projects include survey experiments, public opinion, and text analysis. Constanza is also Associate Editor of Representation, Journal of Representative Democracy.