"IS POOR SERVICE DELIVERY A THREAT TO CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES?"
EXECUTIVE EDITOR’S NOTE

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Dear friends and colleagues,

This is the last issue of the Annals under my leadership and my last words to you in this capacity. It has been a very rewarding nine years working with this outlet for our collective conversations and information sharing. I first started as a member of the editorial committee when Michael Bernhard took over as executive editor in 2009. He turned this into a real newsletter for our section with symposia on pertinent themes for our membership. We started with “Where Have We Been & Where Do We Go Next?” featuring scholars such as Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Jim Robinson, Tom Carothers, Giovanni Capoccia, and Dan Ziblatt. It was a terrific start and set a high standard which we have tried to live up to.

In 2012 Ben Smith and I took over as joint executive editors and in 2014, when I had left University of Florida to found the V-Dem Institute here at University of Gothenburg, I agreed to continue as sole executive editor. Five years later, it is time to step down.

I am proud of the 28 symposia we have provided. They have spanned much of the range of issues we cover in our field. From the conceptualization and measurement of democracy, autocracy and other concepts, to field work challenges and concerns with the use of experiments (see the very important piece on that by Macartan Humphreys in issue 9.3 in 2011) and the relationship to democratization. In addition we have examined issues such as colonial legacies, media control, opposition parties, inequality, civil war and conflict, democracy and authoritarian aid, and public opinion.

We also featured a few special issues dedicated to appraising the legacies of some of the giants in our field such as Guillermo O’Donnell and Barrington Moore. I have learnt a lot from all these excellent contributions by both senior and more junior scholars and would like to express my sincerest gratitude to all of you on behalf of our entire community. You have done a very important service by agreeing to share with us your most pertinent insights about the state of the art in your area of expertise.

This fantastic quality of contributions led me to suggest to the leadership of our section that the name of the newsletter be changed to better reflect the substantial academic value of the contributions. I wish I had thought about this earlier but from September 2019 it is now the Annals of Comparative Democratization. Whether the name should change again to reflect the switch to a new name for the section itself, I leave to the new section leadership and incoming executive editors.
My philosophy as executive editor has been to involve young scholars on the editorial board, specifically many of the amazing postdocs and PhD students affiliated with the V-Dem Institute and Ellen Lust’s GLD team here in the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. The young scholars are the future and they are typically much better at sensing where the research frontiers are than us older folks. More seriously, I see mentoring of the research leaders of tomorrow as one of the most important things that we do. Being in a position to provide them the space and trust to taking leadership responsibilities such as these has been a delight and a privilege. As you may have noticed, the composition of the editorial board has changed frequently over the past five years. This has been deliberate in an effort to provide opportunities to the rotating postdocs and by doing so ensuring that the *Annals* does not stagnate or repeat itself but keep going at the frontier of our field. I am very grateful for the diligent and highly professional manner these scholars have served – in order of service: Kelly McMann, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Brigitte Seim (then Zimmerman), Kyle Marquardt, Anna Lührmann, Adam Harris, Kristen Kao, Rachel Sigman, Steven L. Wilson, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Sirianne Dahlum, Ruth Carlitz, and Marcus Tannenberg.

It is now time to hand over to a new team and I am truly delighted to see my dear friends and esteemed colleagues Dan Slater and Robert Mickey at University of Michigan assume responsibility as executive editors. While this (unfortunately ☺) means the *Annals* now moves from Europe back to the United States, I am more than confident that Dan and Rob will take it to even higher standards.

On that note, allow me also to say how happy I am that the current – and my final – issue provides an additional and important perspective on the challenge of autocratization the world faces today. Ruth Carlitz and the team of contributors in this terrific symposium take stock at what the material side of the citizens-politicians relationship means for democratic backsliding and breakdown. I find this extremely important and timely to discuss. As of late, I have increasingly been analyzing the current wave of autocratization together with Anna Lührmann and others.

I have come to realize how much more this present development is reminiscent of the first backward wave in the 1930s than the second in the 1960s and early 1970s. I strongly suspect that the many economic and policy changes enacted since the mid-1980s in Europe, which spread to the global south via the Washington consensus, play a part in the rise of authoritarianism. These changes have made individuals increasingly responsible for their own life outcomes under conditions of vastly increasing inequalities. These inequalities are evident across a range of socio-economic factors including employment, education, health and social care. This risks makes people feel vulnerable, creates sensitivity to uncertainty, and can breed fear. Fear is a very dangerous political force that can be, and I believe is right now, used by reactionary actors to create narratives of threats to “us”, to segments of populations and to nations. These actors exploit and exacerbate the human tendency to identify an “out-group”.

We are, evolutionary biologists confirm, still herd animals and easily react to fear with a call for a strong leader to save us from threats. I think that resonates too well with what we observe today in too many countries for comfort.
Concerns about the viability of democracy have been on the rise as an increasing number of countries have been taking more and more autocratic turns. Furthermore, many hybrid regimes appear to be increasingly robust. These trends defy much of the received wisdom about democracy and have spurred a flurry of research into the causes and consequences of democratic backsliding. To date, much of the academic debate has focused on the strategies that elected leaders use to subvert the democratic process and consolidate their power. This symposium charts a different course – looking at the threat to democracy from the perspective of citizens. Specifically, the authors consider how citizens relate to their elected leaders through the receipt of public goods and services, the strategies they pursue in the face of poor service delivery, and the implications for democratic consolidation or backsliding.

First, Prerna Singh argues that we can understand recent reversals in democracy as well as declines in public goods provision as stemming the rise of exclusionary forms of nationalism.

Next, Anna Persson and Bo Rothstein call for a more dynamic approach to our understanding of hybrid regimes – arguing that it is important to recognize the ways in which citizens have agency in upholding the logic of these systems. Tariq Thachil also highlights the role of citizen agency, show how in some contexts, competition has reconfigured the relationship between poor service delivery and clientelism – enabling important channels of bottom-up accountability through which voters can pressure local machines to improve their delivery of basic goods and services.

Daniel de Kadt then considers the trade-off between informal and formal political participation. In contexts where political resources are limited and service delivery concerns pressing, he argues that formal and informal modes of political participation may be substitutes. Finally, my own contribution to the symposium highlights the risks of promoting citizen engagement for improved service delivery without addressing broader societal and institutional constraints.

Taken together, these pieces highlight the importance of taking a systemic perspective on democracy (and threats to its viability). In bringing forward the citizen perspective, the authors offer a fresh perspective to the democratic backsliding debate. They also raise new questions about the nature of sequencing, the ways in which citizens relate to elected leaders beyond the ballot box, and appropriate strategies for stemming the current global autocratic turn.
The past few years have witnessed a backsliding of both democracy and the provision of public goods. In its 2017 report, Freedom House reported that 71 countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties marking the 12th consecutive year of a decline in global freedom. Social expenditures have shrunk across many countries of the world, including traditional vanguards of the welfare state such as Denmark. This erosion of democracy and the provision of public goods and services each independently constitutes a grave challenge. The two are also inextricably linked. In theory, because of elections and other mechanisms of accountability, democracies are expected to outperform autocracies in the provision of public services to their citizens. The large body of empirical studies on this subject, however, has yielded more mixed results. In turn, insofar as the provision of social rights is seen as a duty of democracies towards their citizens, the effective (poor) provision of public goods is hypothesized to bolster (undermine) the legitimacy of democratic regimes. Is it then that the ongoing democratic backsliding is contributing to a decline in the provision of social welfare? Or is it (also), as this special issue conjectures, that poor service delivery is threatening contemporary democracies?

These are urgent, interrelated questions. Yet, in this article, I seek not so much to answer them as to take a step back. Specifically, I argue that the recent reversals in democracy and the decline in public goods provision can both be understood as stemming from a single source - the shrinking of the boundaries of the nation - as reflected in the rise of an exclusionary nationalism. (See Figure 1.) Democracy is derived from the Greek word ‘demos’; at the root of ‘public’ in public goods is the Latin word ‘publicus’, from ‘populus’, in turn derived from ‘populous’. As these etymologies make clear, central to the idea of both democracy and the provision of public goods is an idea of ‘the people’. For both democracy and the provision of public services, ‘the people’ have historically been defined in terms of the nation. Neither democracy nor the provision of social services can exist unbounded. Nation states define the space for the functioning of the institutional frameworks of both democracies and social welfare. Democracy and welfare provision can in turn both be seen as realizations of national communities. We have access to political, economic and social rights because we all belong to the national community. The key question is who belongs. At the core of the present constricting of democracy and the shrinking of public services is a narrowing definition of who belongs to the nation and concomitantly, who is deserving of political rights and freedoms, and of access to social services.

Democracy has historically been undermined in different ways, for example, by military coups. The contemporary challenge to democracy, however, comes from elected leaders themselves. Countries across the world have witnessed the rise of populist leaders such as Donald Trump in the US, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Benjamin Netayahu in Israel, Xi Jingping in China or Narendra Modi in India who are joined together by their undermining of institutions that serve as the guardrails of democracy (e.g., a free media, an independent judiciary and a robust civil society). Many of these leaders have also been the agents of welfare cuts and a decline in the scope and quality of social services.

The starting point for these populist projects is the drawing of an oppositional boundary between ‘the people’ - whom they alone can represent and are the only ones who matter - and ‘others’. The key criterion for populist definitions of who belongs to ‘the people’ and who does not, is political support. As Cas Mudde puts it, populists tend to divide the world into two warring camps - those who are with them, and those who are not. This definition of insiders and outsiders, critical to all populist projects, has intersected at this present moment with an exclusionary, ethnic nationalism.

Whether it is Trump, Orban, Putin, Modi or Xi, the nation is defined exclusively in terms of dominant ethnic groups - White-Christian Americans, Hungarians, Russians, Brazilians; Hindu Indians, Han Chinese. These dominant ethnic groups, from whom their support base is drawn, are pitted against minorities, both newcomers (immigrants and refugees) and native-born populations. Excluded from a definition of ‘the people’, of who belongs to the nation, these minorities are being singled out for the denial of political and social rights.

The populists’ strident espousal of this exclusionary nationalism has prompted a widespread bemoaning of the idea of nationalism itself. In popular and scholarly writings, nationalism is being described as a malaise, a regrettable, dangerous anachronism that we should have outgrown with ‘modernization’. Such laments echo older depolarizations, such as Einstein’s famous description of nationalism as an “infantile disease”, the “measles of humankind”. Yet I argue that the problem is not so much nationalism, but the way in which national boundaries are defined.

In as much as the exclusionary nationalist regimes in power across the world today are today eroding, nationalism has also historically been a driving force for both democracy and public service provision. (See Figure 1.) A cohesive and inclusive
nationalism has been shown to foster the establishment, and facilitates the effective functioning of, democracy. More critically, for our purposes, there is a longstanding and growing scholarship that demonstrates how an inclusive and powerful national identity has promoted public goods provision across various parts of the world at different points in time. I will briefly highlight some of these studies in section 1. Further, in section 2 I will point to how different routes to including minorities within the nation – assimilationist and accommodationist – can influence the nature of public services provided (See Figure 2.) I conclude with a call for more research on how to construct an inclusive nationalism towards addressing the twin challenges of the erosion of democracy and public goods provision.

Inclusionary Nationalism and Public Goods Provision

There is a large, if inchoate scholarship on how an inclusive nationalism has historically been an important force driving state provision of public goods. A primary example is Europe, where the Second World War is widely argued to have fostered a sense of national cohesion and unity that extended across all groups in society. This national solidarity is argued to have been a key driver for the institutionalization and unprecedented “cradle to the grave” social policies including education, health, and housing that were made freely available to all citizens irrespective of their ability to pay for them. Nationalism remained a powerful driver for social policy in Europe in the post-war decades. More than class solidarity, it is nationalism which has been argued to fuel the rise of social democratic politics in the region. The breakthrough for social democratic parties occurred when they shifted from identifying as class parties engaged in class struggle, drawing upon class solidarity to defeat their class enemies to instead presenting themselves as “people’s parties” representing the nation as a whole and appealing to solidarity amongst co-nationals as a basis for social justice.

The importance of nationalism for the institution of social welfare policies is also brought out in the case of the US. A highly racially fractured sense of American identity has been argued to be an important factor impeding the institution of comprehensive, national social programs in the US, especially relative to Europe. America’s northern neighbor, Canada, has been characterized by a robust and inclusive sense of national identity. This has been shown to play a key role in its institution of a much wider social welfare program than the United States.

2) Furthermore, the proponents of the welfare state sought to make their proposals more persuasive by stressing how they expressed the “the fairness and solidarity inherent in the national character”. William Beveridge, widely seen as the architect of the British welfare state, for example, argued that the introduction of a national minimum was “a peculiarly British idea”. He described his report on social insurance as an expression of the British people’s deepest convictions: the Beveridge Report was “the British people become articulate” (cited in Jackson, B. (2008). How to Talk About Redistribution: A Historical Perspective. Retrieved from http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/how-to-talk-about-redistribution-a-historical-perspective.)


the population, approaching those of middle-income, industrialized countries, while other states have fared worse than countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I deploy a combination of comparative historical and statistical analysis to trace this striking variation in social welfare outcomes to differences in their strength of subnational identification. A shared identification generates a sense of “we-ness” and triggers ethical obligations among members of different subgroups and encourages a perception of not just individual but also collective interests. Elites bound by such solidaristic ties are therefore more likely to push for the prioritization of policies, for example, the provision of social services that further the welfare of the community as a whole. I point to a similar logic at play in Quebec and Scotland where strong, inclusive subnational solidarities have been shown to play a key role in the putting in place some of the most progressive social welfare policies across the different regions of Canada and the UK respectively.6

Modes of Inclusionary Nation-building and the Nature of Public Goods Provision

The way forward then, I want to suggest, is not to give up on nationalism itself. As the previous section should hopefully have made clear, nationalism has considerable progressive potential, especially as regards the provision of public services. The challenge is how to define national boundaries in an inclusive fashion. In particular, how might we construct inclusive national identities in the presence of people from many different ethnic groups? Ethnic diversity has been theorized to independently undermine both democracy and public goods provision.7 It is also seen to constitute a barrier to the building of a national identity. It is certainly the case that ethnic homogeneity can facilitate the emergence of a cohesive national identity, as was the case across Scandinavia. There are plenty of instances in the past when increases in ethnic diversity, especially through inflows of people, have prompted the narrowing of ideas of national membership. Indeed, the influx of refugees because of the humanitarian crises (war, gang violence, crushing poverty) in Syria, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala has been an important factor in the rise of exclusionary nationalism across Europe and North America today.

Yet it is neither necessarily the case that ethnic homogeneity will lead to successful nation building, nor that ethnic diversity impedes nation building. Even if the people in a political-administrative unit are mostly from a single ethnic group, it does not mean that they must also share a sense of common identity and mutual solidarity. Similarly, as I have pointed out in my analysis of the case of Kerala8 – the most ethnically heterogeneous but also the most solidaristic of Indian states - the presence of a large number of ethnic groups does not automatically imply competition or conflict between these groups. To assume such a relationship is to mistake demographic homogeneity (diversity) for political unity (divisions).9 The construction of nationalism is a political project. Ethnic demographics matters only in as much as they are used by the political elites who are the key agents in constructing the idea of, and defining membership in the nation at a particular point in time.

There are many instances of the construction of inclusionary nations in the contexts of ethnic diversity. In this section I point to two main historical pathways through which such inclusionary nation-building has happened - assimilation and accommodation.10 When states sought to nation-build through assimilation, they tended to ignore demographic diversity, discouraging or prohibiting the institutionalization of ethnic differences -- a classic case being France. States that adopted accommodation aimed to establish (or maintain) a national political community by recognizing ethnic distinctions. A popular example here being multicultural Britain.11 Both assimilationist and accommodationist states are united, and distinguished from exclusionary states by their shared aspiration of including a potentially diverse population within an encompassing national community. The scope of public goods provision in both states is therefore, at least in principle, universal. Yet while all citizens are granted at least nominal access to public goods, the nature of public goods provided in both assimilationist and accommodationist states can vary quite markedly. (See Figure 2.)

States that seek to nation-build through


9) The assumption that ethnic diversity will impede the construction of a shared national identity also ignores the reality and complementarity of multiple identities. Research has shown that holding subordinate (for example, ethnic) identities can in fact foster attachment to superordinate identities, such as nationalism.

10) Singh and vom Hau (2016)

assimilation are likely to provide public goods such as schooling or health care on a universal basis to all citizens without regard to ethnicity. Yet often they reflect and are driven by the implicit aim of establishing congruence between the ethnic markers (e.g., language, religion) of the dominant group and the national political community. In contrast, states that seek to build inclusive nations through accommodation recognize ethnic differences and are, therefore, open to the provision of distinct kinds of public goods to different ethnic groups in line with their preferences. For example, schooling might be universally accessible but unlike assimilationist states, where the content would be homogeneous and usually reflective of the preferences of the dominant ethnic group, accommodationist states might offer non-dominant ethnic groups opportunities for education in their native language. Similarly, public health care might recognize distinct medical traditions, while remaining oriented toward covering all citizens.

Conclusion

The wave of exclusionary nationalism espoused by populist regimes across the world today is threatening both democracy and public goods provision. Yet inclusionary nationalism has also historically been a constructive force, underpinning the foundation and maintenance of democracies and, as summarized in section 1, powering the provision of social welfare. Rather than rejecting nationalism outright, as scholarly and popular writings have tended to, the challenge is instead how to construct national identities in an inclusive way. How might inclusionary nations be built? This is the critical question I want to briefly return to. In section 2, I pointed to two historical pathways towards the construction of inclusive nations – assimilation and accommodation. There are trade-offs associated with each of these routes. The assimilationist route to nation-building tends to deny ethnic minorities avenues by which to, and/or the right to express, their identities. Inclusion of ethnic minorities within the nation requires their incorporation into the culture of the dominant ethnic group. While it has often been successful in forging a homogeneous national identity, such an assimilationist route to inclusive nation-building can also be highly coercive. In contrast, the accommodationist route to inclusive nations allows and even encourages ethnic minorities to express their identities. Ethnic minorities are sought to be inculcated into a multicultural national identity. In many ways, such an accommodationist route to inclusive nations is normatively more palatable than the assimilationist route. But at the same time this enshrining of ethnic differences in public service provision and other state institutions also encourages people to frame their lived experiences in ethnic terms, reifying and fixing what might otherwise have been more fluid ethnic distinctions. The institutionalization of ethnicity can intensify ethnic competition and increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict.

I point, in conclusion, to these tensions in our two established models of inclusive nation-building to pave the way for further research on this topic. The question of how to construct inclusive national identities is as challenging as it is necessary and urgent. Building national solidarities that include different ethnic groups is not an easy endeavour. But in as much as inclusive nationalism can offer a bulwark against the erosion of democracy and public goods provision, it is a task that is worthy of and requires our immediate, concerted attention.

12) It is important to note here that not only is the very definition of ethnic groups and minorities constructed, but that even within inclusionary models of nation-building, not all ethnic minorities are perceived the same way. White and non-white immigrants, for example, are often seen and treated very differently in both assimilationist and accommodationist models.

Figure 1: Nationalism, Democracy, and Public Good Provision

Figure 2: Inclusive Nation-building and the Nature of Public Goods Provided by the State
The (Unexpected) Rise and Persistence of Hybrid Regimes

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a radical increase in – as well as the unanticipated resilience of – a new type of political system; hybrid regimes. Typical for these regimes are that they combine some democratic elements – commonly elections – with authoritarian governance, characteristically the lack of rule of law and limited constitutional freedoms and rights. In fact, hybrid regimes are today the most common type of political system.

Against this backdrop, suffrage can no longer be used to distinguish democracies from autocracies. Moreover, with recent transitions to electoral politics even outside the industrialized world, clientelistic and corrupt politics have made a powerful entrance to the democratic scene; hybrid regimes are comparatively more clientelistic and corrupt than both full-fledged democracies and outright dictatorships. As a result, hybrid regimes tend not only to perform worse than consolidated democracies but also than authoritarian regimes on a large variety of public goods indicators, including population health, education, access to clean water and sanitation, as well as to basic infrastructure such as roads and electricity.

The rise of hybrid regimes as a relatively resilient type of regime runs counter to the case made by several influential schools of thought, particularly transitional theories of democratization and Median Voter Theory. On the basis of these theories, there has been a strong expectation among scholars and policy makers alike that the introduction of electoral politics to the poorer parts of the world should serve as an impetus to democratization, and eventually also to welfare expansion. More specifically, by making it possible for citizens to vote incumbents out of office that do not meet citizens’ presumed demands for a democratic and accountable government that serves the needs of the broader population, elections have until recently been viewed – and promoted – not only as a central but an indispensable driver of political and social development.

In short, in the light of dominant theories, the development of hybrid regimes is puzzling: Why has the expansion of suffrage led to the development of a regime type that typically serves the interests not of the broader population but of a small elite?

In response to this puzzle, the mainstream approach has been to forcefully blame the elites. More specifically, adopting an analytical framework which revolves around the concepts of reverse sequencing, clientelistic machines, and elite manipulation, the lion’s share of studies have depicted democratic failure as it plays out in the developing world as a top-down process under firm elite control. By such accounts, many states in the developing world have democratized “backwards,” holding elections before developing core institutional state functions, particularly the rule of law. As a result, unscrupulous and powerful elites have been able to circumvent the presumed democratizing effects of elections – through the means of outright violence, the manipulation of electoral laws, vote buying, illegal party financing, and nepotism – leading to the subsequent demise of any politics or policies favoring the broader population. In short, due to powerful elites taking advantage of weak state institutions, hybrid regimes are not only characterized by what Terry Lynn Karl once coined the fallacy of electoralism – i.e. the inability of elections alone to empower the people and help them “guard the guardians” – but they are characterized also by so-called perverse accountability. Within this framework, powerful elites – due to a variety of reasons, ranging from international and stability concerns to the rife opportunities for corruption provided by the system – continue to promote electoral politics at the same time as they turn the very essence of democratic accountability on its head by forcefully using citizens as clients. The widespread selling of votes, the failure of voters to actually punish corrupt politicians at the polls, as well as the tendency of citizens to actually punish the comparatively few politicians that actually provide public goods, have within this framework been interpreted almost exclusively in the light of particularly poor and vulnerable citizens falling prey to elite manipulation and control.


This article does not call into question the importance of powerful elites or the portrayal of particularly poor citizens as victims in the face of these elites. However, on the basis of insights gained primarily from informant interviews from Kenya and Uganda, but also from cross-section analysis, this article calls for a more dynamic approach to our understanding of hybrid regimes. In line with institutional theory’s emphasis on the importance of understanding mechanisms of reproduction in order to be able to achieve change, this article argues that, unless we begin to recognize the ways in which even the poorest of citizens serve not only as victims but as important autonomous and opportunistic actors in upholding the logic of hybrid regimes, these regimes will most likely continue to be lost in transition.

A Bottom-Up Perspective on Hybrid Regimes

At the core of this article is the argument that the "top-down approach" which dominates the literature is a simplified view of what is actually going on in hybrid regimes. Instead, this article conveys the ways in which the resilience of hybrid regimes can also be understood in terms of, if not highly uneven, dynamic process, in which not only political elites but also ordinary citizens rationally and autonomously respond to the incentives provided by reverse sequencing.

At the core of this argument is the insight that even the poorest of citizens, quite contrary to how they have typically been portrayed, are in fact to some extent empowered by elections even in a context of reverse sequencing. However, due to the “rules of the game” implied by reverse sequencing, citizens are likely to use this newly won power in quite a different manner than what standard theories would predict. More specifically, the results from the studies referenced above reveal how citizens in developing countries are typically not at all unaware of the limits provided by state weakness in terms of what state actors can and will be willing to provide in terms of democratic deepening and improved human well-being. Having lived experience of the “rules of the game” of weak and corrupt states, citizens instead tend to share a firm expectation that, whatever elites happen to promise in election rallies, in the end, they will neither have the capacity nor the willingness to expand democracy and welfare. In other words, in countries characterized by state weakness, a shared social contract – i.e. a joint understanding of the state as an instrument of collective action, oriented towards the provision of public goods – is typically lacking. Instead, due to the state’s limited financial capacity to actually provide public goods, and on top of that widespread corruption, which even further serves to undermine the prospects for public goods provision, most citizens tend to share an expectation of the state as a resource that will be appropriated to the benefit of whatever ruler that happens to be in power at that particular point in time.

In the light of this widespread awareness regarding what low institutional quality brings to the table – and with a clear insight of the short-term risks and costs associated with challenging the existing “rules of the game” – the typical citizen will tend to view, as well as use, elections not so much as an arena for articulating demands for public goods, but instead as a perceived only chance to get something out of the system, if yet merely in the form of non-programmatic, patronage goods. As a result, contrary to what previous studies have typically assumed, politicians in hybrid regimes do not normally have to spend a lot of effort to circumvent citizens’ demands for democratic deepening and welfare expansion; such demands are not likely to become articulated in the first place. Instead, elites are typically held accountable to citizens’ demands for targeted goods. As effectively summarized by the interviewees, the introduction of elections in contexts of state weakness can even lead to the development of a political system in which candidates, in fear of losing votes, feel necessitated to respond to citizens’ demands for cash transfers and other targeted benefits in return for votes. That is, what is developing is a system in which voters are in fact to some extent empowered by elections but still tend to evaluate political candidates not so much on the basis of promises about future institutional reform aimed at serving the public good as on the basis of their capacity to amass wealth and take care of their “own.” The interviewees even paint a picture of a “voter’s market” in which rational voters, assured that politicians will be unable to monitor their behavior, even sell their vote multiple times and to different candidates in order to gain as much as possible from the system once they have access. As described by one Kenyan interviewee:

[…] Because if you look at these MPs. Do you know what kind of pressure is on them? It is amazing. They spend so much money, buying the voters stuff.

[…] So the electorate has a lot of power in one way.

The story of the destructive social dynamics of hybrid regimes does not seem to end here. Instead, the aforementioned studies...
uncover how the complicity of ordinary citizens in terms of them actively playing the “rules of the game” during elections is likely to induce a reactive sequence, which serves to further “lock in,” even reinforce, the inherent logic of hybrid regimes. This happens via a variety of different mechanisms; ideational, psychological, as well as purely rational. For one thing, to the extent that citizens themselves actively promote clientelistic exchange during elections, they share a propensity to internalize a view that they actually have no subsequent “right” to demand accountability in the form of reforms that serve the public good since they have already been “paid off” during the elections. Citizens’ active participation in clientelistic exchange even seems to underpin the idea that political elites should be entitled to recoup at least some of the resources they lost during the elections, by the way of corrupt activities between elections. In other words, even if citizens perfectly well understand that they will be the ones that stand to lose from further corruption, partly because of their own active participation, they remain loyal to the “rules of the game” in a way that serves to further undermine the prospects for democratic deepening and welfare expansion. With the avoidance of what psychologists call “cognitive dissonance” as a backdrop, citizens who are well aware of their own role in the corrupt and essentially non-democratic “rules of the game” will in many cases not only be likely to fail to punish corrupt behavior but will even encourage such behavior. Moreover, on a pure rational note, citizens are likely to support corrupt behavior guided by the insight that, at the end of the day, the more politicians are able to reap the fruits from public office in between elections, the more resources they will have to distribute to the voters in return for votes during the next round of elections. This logic in turn feeds the internalization of the idea of the corrupt politician as the “good” politician.

In these described ways, the equilibrium in favor of hybrid regimes is decisively maintained not only from the “top-down” but also from the “bottom-up.” As a matter of fact, quite contrary to the understanding of accountability relationships in hybrid regimes as being “perverted” in the sense that citizens who show a tendency not to keep their end of the deal are being threatened by political machines, what the results of the denoted studies reveal is rather a situation in which accountability is in itself corrupt. That is, the accountability relationship that develops in the face of reverse sequencing serves to strengthen rather than weaken the incentives for political elites to engage in politics that undermine the prospects for democratic deepening and welfare expansion also through the creation of an outright “non-demand” for such politics from “below.” As forcefully concluded by one of the Ugandan interviewees:

I think in the Ugandan case democracy has encouraged more corruption than it has removed because the big people are slaves now also, they also fear those people who are down.

Summary and Conclusions: The Social Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes

The story of the resilience of hybrid regimes – and the corresponding lack of democratic deepening and welfare expansion despite elections being held – has typically been a story about predatory elites circumventing the demands of poor and vulnerable citizens. Without neglecting the central and powerful role played by elites, this article has painted a somewhat different picture of what is going on in hybrid regimes, focusing on the role played also by ordinary citizens as autonomous and opportunistic actors in sustaining such regimes. In short, what the article has emphasized is the importance of an approach to hybrid regimes that takes seriously the ways in which such regimes develop in response to a dynamic relationship between political elites and ordinary citizens. Within the framework of this dynamic relationship, not only are the people forced to “dance to the tunes of the elites,” such as has typically been described, but political elites are to some extent also forced to “dance to the tunes of the people” – if yet to radically different tunes than what standard theories of democratization and welfare expansion would predict. More specifically, with shared expectations regarding what political elites are likely to be able and willing to do in a context of state weakness as the main driver, not only a limited demand but a “non-demand” for democratic deepening and welfare expansion “from below” is likely to be present that will effectively work in tandem with the “non-provision” of such goods “from above.”

With these insights about the social dynamics of hybrid regimes as a backdrop, the next step for research will be to explore in greater detail how such stable equilibria can be escaped so as not to produce a “third wave of autocratization” but instead a “fourth wave of democratization.”

In this endeavor, the in-depth further exploration of the rational, ideational, as well as psychological, micro-level drivers of citizen behavior should be in focus. What rational reasons beyond material incentives can explain the role of citizens in the maintenance of hybrid regimes? What role do shared expectations about how the system works play? And what are the psychological effects of citizens’ passive role as the “people” – if yet to radically different tunes than what standard theories of democratization and welfare expansion also play a role in maintaining a system which forcefully serves to undermine the prospects for a better life for the broader population?

The delivery of material goods and services by governments to citizens in low-income democracies is frequently characterized as clientelist. Indeed, clientelist politics is thought to underwrite many of the shortcomings of public services in these arenas: inadequate levels of provisioning, intermittency of service, and discretionary targeting. Clientelistic party machines also provide the hierarchical structures that connect citizens to their governing regime, often through an array of local intermediaries (termed brokers). Any understanding of how poor service delivery impacts democratic politics and the legitimacy of governing regimes must therefore consider how this relationship is mediated by clientelist organizations and processes.

Precise definitions of clientelism remain highly contested, reflecting contextual variation in how such politics may be practiced. Yet scholars broadly agree that clientelist transactions center on a discretionary exchange of material benefits, rather than more rule-bound ‘programmatic’ provisioning. Politicians seek to deploy discretion to create an explicit or implicit contingent exchange of benefits for votes.¹

Typically, clientelism has been regarded as both a cause and consequence of poor service delivery. The first half of this essay outlines how this endogenous relationship has been argued to enable regimes to maintain their legitimacy, and indeed consolidate their dominance, in spite of poor programmatic records. These insights have largely been based on studies of dominant machines in settings with very low political competition.

The second half of this essay argues that competition reconfigures the relationship between poor service delivery and clientelism. Drawing on my own co-authored research in urban India I make two arguments.² First, clientelism is often competitive across much of the global south. Second, in competitive conditions, poor service delivery actually motivates citizens to engage in a number of participatory acts, which range from everyday claim-making to resident-driven selection of political brokers. In motivating citizen agency, competition thus enables important channels of bottom-up accountability through which voters can pressure local machines to improve their delivery of basic goods and services.

Clientelism and Poor Service Delivery: A Vicious Cycle

Clientelism is often viewed as a strategy parties use to eschew broad, programmatic service delivery. Handout-based forms of clientelism, notably vote-buying, seek to subvert electoral pressures for effective public service delivery through private handouts. Parties provide such benefits, including money, food, liquor, and even private welfare services, to secure votes without having to engage in more costly forms of public service provisioning. Other forms of clientelism affect service provisioning more directly. Notably, parties look to bias state services – including water, electricity, and roads – towards certain individuals and communities, and not others. While studies have hotly debated whether parties primarily target core supporters or swing voters, biased provisioning of either type reduces or prevents certain citizens from accessing valuable public goods and services.

Yet such shortcomings of service provisioning need not diminish the legitimacy of a governing clientelist party. Poor service delivery can ironically serve to strengthen the hold of political machines over local populations, by sustaining conditions of underdevelopment, weakening accountability, and diminishing political competition.

Economic Underdevelopment

Most straightforwardly, poor service delivery, whether in terms of inadequate provisioning or intermittency of service, reinforces clientelist governance by sustaining economic underdevelopment. Such structural conditions are highly conducive to the persistence of machine politics. Inadequate social services, including in health and education, prevent social mobility and sustain poverty and informality. Such conditions strengthen the ability of governing parties to continue to buy voters cheaply, thereby providing ongoing ‘fodder for clientelism’.³


Weakened Accountability

Inadequacies of clientelist service provisioning can also weaken the ability of citizens to hold their elected officials accountable for policy failures. When citizens lack reliable and regular access to basic services, they may be only further compelled to seek out discretionary channels, including via local brokers and clientelist politicians. Heavy reliance on brokers may inhibit citizens from gaining the skills required to autonomously broker, which may inhibit citizens from gaining the skills required to autonomously 

independence on intermediaries. Indeed, the skills required to autonomously brokers may inhibit citizens from gaining 

Weakened Competition

Poor service delivery thus pressurizes underserved voters to trade their votes for discretionary access. Such arrangements prevent citizens from basing their vote choice on their policy preferences, or the incumbent’s rule-bound programmatic performance. Chandra puts this point most starkly in her description of ‘patronage democracies’, in which voters support candidates most likely to grant them discretionary access to goods and services rather than whose policy positions match their programmatic preferences.

How Competition Shapes Clientelist Service Provision

The insights outlined so far suggest poor service delivery begets clientelism, which begets poor service delivery. This endogenous relationship can trap citizens in relations of dependence that strengthen the legitimacy of a regime in spite of its inadequate policy record. Clientelist provisioning subverts programmatic politics and inverts accountability pressures to flow from elites to citizens.

Yet several recent studies complicate our understanding of how poor service provisioning, machine politics, and accountability might relate to one another. A key factor that underpins many of these analyses is political competition. In research conducted (jointly with Adam Auerbach) on slum politics in two north Indian cities, we found competition reconfigured key dynamics within clientelist service provision. In particular, competition grants clients nontrivial choice and agency in their dealings with machine organizations. In such conditions, poor delivery can serve to motivate a range of participatory acts, from resident-initiated requests for assistance to the active selection of local brokers. Competition can also weaken the ability of parties to enforce reciprocity, freeing citizens to accept handouts while still voting programmatically.

Our findings resonate with studies from other parts of the world, which document the coexistence of competition and clientelism. While traditional models have often assumed clientelist systems are uncompetitive, an expert survey (Kitschelt 2011: 9) documents competitive “bilateral or multilateral” clientelistic party systems as more common than “unilateral clientelism.” Multilateral clientelism is found across the global south, including Asia (Indonesia, India, Taiwan), Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), and Latin America (Brazil and Colombia). Further, even

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within “unilateral machines,” ethnographic studies find evidence of microlevel competition among party factions and brokers.\(^8\)

**Resident-initiated demands**

In Indian slums, residents buck their portrayal as passive recipients of clientelist machines. Instead, they actively pressure, protest, and negotiate with local political organizations to deliver goods and services to them. Such actions are often motivated by inadequacies with existing service provision, and are observed elsewhere. Nichter and Peress (2017, p. 3) discuss the practice of ‘client-initiated exchanges’ in Brazil and Argentina, in which ‘citizens frequently request help from machines during campaigns.’ Such citizen-initiated exchanges can be prevalent beyond the campaign period, and can be raised by even the most marginal communities, as Kruks-Wisner details in her recent book on everyday claim-making by poor villagers in north India. These insights build on anthropological literature documenting the nontrivial agency of clients in pressuring political machines for assistance.\(^9\) Recent studies even documented the presence of client-initiated requests within the strongholds of the Peronist party, an iconic example of a dominant machine.

Yet competition undoubtedly strengthens the client’s hand. We regularly observed residents threatening to defect to another broker or party when demanding assistance from local intermediaries. Their ability to do so was enabled by the highly competitive nature of local brokerage, with an average of nine political brokers across the 110 slum settlements we surveyed. Such threats have been observed across clientelist systems of all kinds. Nichter and Peress (p. 3) similarly note client-initiated actions in Brazil and Argentina were enabled by the fact that citizens ‘may threaten to cast votes for competitors if their requests are unfulfilled.’

**Broker Selection**

A second form of citizen agency that is compelled by poor service delivery, and enabled by competition, is broker selection by clients. In the urban north Indian slums we studied, persistent conditions of poverty and unemployment ensured a steady stream of residents who sought to make careers as political brokers. Inadequate service provisioning created a steady demand for intermediaries who could help residents access goods and services ranging from piped water to cleaning gutters. Such conditions led to a flourishing and highly competitive brokerage system.

Fierce local competition afforded residents considerable agency in whom to seek help from and follow. In roughly a third of our surveyed settlements, such bottom-up broker selection took a deliberative form, with residents holding informal elections replete with official rules for contestation and paper ballots. Many of these slums even formed neighborhood ‘development councils’ in order to organize their demands for better services. In other settlements, selection took a more decentralized, everyday form, with residents ‘voting with their feet’ in deciding which broker to seek out and support. Competition also afforded slum residents an ongoing say in who should be their local leader, as underperforming brokers would lose their following to preferred challengers.

**Which Brokers Do Residents Choose?**

We studied the preferences of residents that guide their selection of brokers through a forced-choice conjoint experiment. Under persistent conditions of poor services, we found residents prioritized leaders who they regarded as most likely to prove competent in securing valued goods and services for their settlement. Residents placed greater weight of indicators of competence, such as education, than factors such as shared ethnicity often seen to govern political selection in India. We then conducted a representative survey of 629 slum leaders across our study city. Importantly, this enabled us to show the observational characteristics of these leaders reflected the preferences of residents. In other words, residents actively shaped the machine structures that governed them.

These local decisions carry important implications for service delivery. Notably, we found that in India’s competitive democracy, political parties must compete to incorporate influential slum leaders within their local organizations. Through a similar conjoint experiment with local party patrons, we found the latter’s preferences align in key respects with those of slum residents. In particular party patrons value educated slum leaders, in large part because they understand such leaders are preferred by slum residents. Capable local brokers can enhance service provisioning in their settlement.\(^10\)

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10) In separate work, Auerbach finds the density
Conclusion

Under competitive conditions, poor service delivery can motivate a range of important participatory acts by citizens to hold machines accountable. These acts can range from individual requests, to collective claim-making, and even selecting local leaders to spearhead efforts to demand better services from the state. Competition thus enables key processes of bottom-up accountability and local representation. In some cases, such efforts can empower citizens to ensure minimal levels of competence from local brokers and politicians, which in turn can underpin improved service delivery, at least to some degree.

Yet it is important to note the limits of the citizen-initiated actions detailed above. Most of these actions continue to operate squarely within the confines of patronage politics. As such, they are not evidence of fundamental transformations towards programmatic service delivery. Whether these actions constitute incremental changes in that direction, or whether they will merely serve to consolidate machine politics, remains an open question for scholars of clientelism.

Future research on clientelist service delivery can begin by moving away from equating machine politics with low levels of political competition. It is far more productive to explicitly recognize the significant variation in competition across clientelist systems, including at the local level. Doing so will allow us to more systematically theorize and test how competition reshapes the relationship between clientelist service delivery and democratic politics.

-of local brokers within a settlement is positively associated with local public goods within the slum (Adam Auerbach. 2016. Clients and Communities. World Politics, 61, 1: 111-148).
The future of liberal democracy appears uncertain. In the advanced industrialized democracies of North America and Western Europe politicians and parties associated with authoritarianism, white supremacy, and right-wing nationalism appear to be in the ascendency. One set of hypotheses advanced in the wake of this anti-liberal, anti-democratic turn is that generalized "economic anxiety" among large swathes of the population has led to a shift in political preferences away from the core tenets of liberal democracy. Whether this hypothesis is correct remains up for debate, and much recent work suggests that personal economic conditions are one of only myriad factors explaining the anti-democratic turn. 1

I consider the causes of this 'democratic disconnect' from a parallel perspective. Instead of focusing on economic conditions and anxiety in wealthy established democracies, I consider economic conditions as a function of basic service provision in lower- and middle-income developing democracies. Specifically, I focus on the African continent, but the argument, such as it is, likely generalizes to places like Mexico, Brazil, India, and beyond. Most of these democracies are reasonably young, and formal democracy is typically not deeply entrenched, suggesting greater potential fragility. Instead of focusing on authoritarian sentiment, white supremacy, or right-wing voting as outcomes, I focus on the trade-off between informal and formal political participation. The intuition is that in new democracies where political resources are limited and service delivery concerns pressing, formal and informal modes of political participation may be substitutes.

As such, in lower- and middle-income democracies, stagnant or worsening service delivery, or state failures to provide what has been promised, may cause people to divert their energies away from formal political processes, such as elections, into informal political participation, such as riots and protests. If political elites respond to this electoral exit by following the people into the informal political arena, this may create a dangerous cycle in which formal democratic processes lose importance in the political system. If this is the case, then poor service delivery may pose a threat to lower- and middle-income democracies.

**Service Delivery and Political Participation**

In many lower- or middle-income countries, service delivery is one of the central economic functions of government. In these contexts, where personal accumulated wealth is typically low or non-existent, these services are fundamental to peoples’ daily lives. Many people are heavily reliant on services provided by the government and cannot make do when service provision lapses for even short periods of time. Inconsistent provision of services causes people to become acutely aware of their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The types of services provided by these governments are diverse: they range from the provision of schools and clinics to the presence of security personnel capable of maintaining order. In this essay I focus on four services -- water, sanitation, electricity, and security -- but there is no obvious reason why the argument should not generalize to similar types of goods.

Where formal participation is not yet baked into society, there exist numerous exit ramps for people to divert their political energy into informal participation. Informal political actions are those that are not constrained by well-regulated, well-understood, institutional rules. These include sharing information and ideas in social contexts, signing unofficial petitions, engaging in boycotts, and so forth. I focus on an ascendant type of informal participation in middle- and lower-income countries: riots, demonstrations, and protests. To be sure, these types of alternative political expression do exist in most established democracies where they may be driven by economic conditions, and there is mixed evidence about whether they serve as complements for or substitutes to formal participation. 2 Yet the logic of informal protest participation in younger, and poorer, democracies is likely somewhat different. 3

First, in lower- and middle-income democracies service delivery failures may represent particularly pressing issues that require immediate attention. Service delivery issues are often time-sensitive. Small businesses cannot operate without electricity. Families struggle without access to sanitation or clean water. Inadequate security means property rights cannot be meaningfully enforced. In such cases, people may be unwilling to wait for the slow political fixes that might occur through the ordinary democratic process. As such they may engage in protest action, offering the

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possibility of immediate resolution. Given the low benefits of voting, the implicit costs therein, and limited resources, energy, and time, individuals substitute informal political action rather than wait for opportunities to engage more formally.

Second, young democracies often lack meaningful opposition, either because the opposition is poorly resourced and coordinated, or because the incumbent has inherited authority from the country’s political past. Many countries worldwide hold regular, independent, free and fair elections, but remain politically dominated by hegemonic single parties. Post-independence states are particularly prone to these dynamics, and many struggle to move beyond them. Some of these cases, like Tanzania, descend back into electoral authoritarianism, but many, such as the democracies of Southern Africa, continue as minimally-competitive dominant party democracies. In such contexts, voters may feel that exiting the electoral process entirely is the only alternative to voting for the incumbent.

As such, if service delivery is particularly poor, people may divert their energy away from expressing their views at the ballot box, and may even encourage their friends and neighbors to do the same. While it could be the case that formal and informal participation are complements, the act of voting and maintaining one’s registration is a resource-consuming activity that has few direct upsides at the individual level. It does not seem a stretch, then, to suppose that ordinary people with limited energy and resources may view formal and informal participation as substitutes. When informal political expressions are much more effective -- subjectively or objectively -- than electoral expressions, people may riot or protest at the expense of voting. Local elites and activists may likewise turn their attentions from electoral mobilization efforts to coordinating informal activities.

If political participation becomes increasingly informal at the cost of formal participation, this may further induce a “cycle of political informality”: politicians, who also face resource constraints in terms of time and fiscal resources, may abandon elections as the central point of political contestation and begin to focus their attention on informal politics (e.g. trying to placate those who protest immediately with resource allocations). This may in turn incentivize further informal political action. This cycle could be compounded by the complexities of electoral accountability. There is mounting evidence from young democracies that service provision can have complex electoral consequences for incumbents. While there is evidence that voters reward service provision in Ghana there is also evidence from Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda that receiving aid, public services, or cash transfers can actually result an electoral turn toward the opposition.⁵ As such, incumbents may view general broad-based service delivery as a potentially risky way to engage in electoral politics, and may favor informal processes for the distributive decisions.

The South African Case: Protest, Dissatisfaction, and Turnout

To demonstrate this theoretical argument in action, I briefly present an analysis of South African democracy, with a focus on service delivery, protest behaviour, and turnout in the 2019 National and Provincial general election. The case analysis tells a clear story: citizen dissatisfaction with water, sanitation, and energy provision is strongly predictive of higher protest activities, controlling for demographic and economic conditions. Yet this informal political activation is paired with a deep dissatisfaction with democracy, which seemingly bleeds into lower formal participation, measured as turnout in elections.

The South African case is particularly apt for exploration, as service delivery is a thorny political subject in South Africa, rife with complexity and contradiction. Nearly three decades after the end of apartheid, millions of South Africans still live in poverty, with patchy or non-existent provision of core services like running water, flushing toilets, uninterrupted electricity, or active policing. Despite this sad reality, service provision has in fact increased dramatically under successive African National Congress (ANC) governments, from Mandela through Ramaphosa: millions of households have received access to services where none existed before.

Yet dissatisfaction with service delivery remains a high across the country, specifically in relation to energy and electrification (there are persistent rolling blackouts), and security (crime rates remain very high). Yet there is also significant variation over space, symptomatic of the various socio-economic legacies of apartheid. To measure dissatisfaction with regard to water, sanitation, energy, and security, I use data from survey questions about

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personal satisfaction with different services, collected in the Quality of Life V (QOL V) survey, a sample of 30,000 South Africans representative at the Gauteng ward level, conducted by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO). These data show that there are generally high levels of dissatisfaction with service delivery across the province.

Given this context -- slow and often poor service delivery, pronounced spatial and demographic inequality, and general dissatisfaction -- it is no surprise that "service delivery protests" have become ubiquitous in the country, steadily increasing in prevalence over time since they began in the mid-2000s. These protests are typically targeted at local politicians and bureaucrats, regularly include disruptions and blockades, and have occasionally resulted in serious violence. At the same time that participation in protests has risen, formal participation in elections has trended systematically downward. The most recent national elections, held in May 2019, were marked by a dramatic drop in turnout across the country, a full 8 percentage point decrease in turnout among the registered, to the point that fewer than 50% of the voting age population cast a ballot.

I aggregate (with appropriate weights for representativity) data from the fifth round QOL V survey to the ward level (n = 529). To analyse patterns in service dissatisfaction, protest behavior, attitudes, and turnout, I merge the QOL V data with ward level election returns from the 2019 election (surveys are not ideal for measuring turnout as respondents tend to mis-remember or overstate). I then regress protest participation (survey item), democratic satisfaction (survey item), and ward turnout (election returns), on expressed dissatisfaction with each service in turn, controlling for a host of economic and demographic covariates. The results, for four different services -- water, sanitation, energy, and security -- are presented in Figure 1. This analysis is fundamentally descriptive in nature and serves only to illuminate cross-sectional relationships in the data that speak to the theory outlined above.

The regressions reveal a strong association between self-expressed dissatisfaction with service delivery, regardless of the service. In general, moving from maximum satisfaction to minimum satisfaction is associated with a roughly 5.5 - 20 percentage point increase in the percent of citizens in a ward who claim to have attended protests. The same movement is associated with a 15 - 25 percentage point decrease in average self-expressed democratic satisfaction, coupled with a 5 - 10 percentage point decrease in aggregate turnout, measured objectively using election data.

How elites react to these trends will be important in shaping the trajectory of the country. There is a distinct possibility that the ANC will respond by focusing their attention on protesters, slowly retreating from the formal electoral arena. The South African case serves to highlight the potential importance of service delivery in shaping attitudes towards democracy, but also their behaviours. As noted above, these findings may provide insights for similar young democracies in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Eastern Europe, and beyond. In particular, these dynamics appear highly plausible in places where there is dependence on state services and somewhat limited organized opposition.

Ways Forward in Research and Practice

How can social scientists study the (non) existence of this hypothesized vicious cycle in a more rigorous and satisfying ways? To begin with, we need better and more reliable measures of service delivery, protest, and turnout. This constraint is being gradually relaxed as census data and electoral data becomes more freely accessible in some emerging democracies, and hopefully this trend will continue apace. But improving the measurement of informal political action remains a major hurdle. For example, while cross-national datasets on protests do exist, they often rely on news media, expert, or interest group reporting, each of which have implications for the quality and breadth of coverage. If there is a spatial or demographic bias in media attention, for example, that bias is carries over into datasets.

Another barrier to research is that, outside of large-scale field experiments in the development sector, service delivery is rarely randomly or "quasi-randomly" assigned. As such, scholars have had to rely on design-based observational

8) Gauteng City Region Observatory. Quality of Life Survey V (2019).


8) While it is unclear whether those who are becoming protesters are the very people who are less likely to vote, the QOL V data shows a negative association (β = -0.15, p = 0.059) between protest participation and self-reported turnout in the 2016 local elections, conditional on race group dummies and gender.

9) The empirical specification: $Y_w = \alpha + \beta D_w + \gamma X_w + \delta \text{Metro}_w + \epsilon_w$, where $Y_w$ is the outcome for ward $w$, $\alpha$ is a global intercept, $D_w$ dissatisfaction with the particular service, $X_w$ covariates (race-group population shares, language-group population shares, share male, share unemployed, and average education level), and $\text{Metro}_w$ is an indicator of major metropolitan status. $\epsilon_w$ are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The parameter of interest is $\beta$, estimated for each service and outcome variable separately.

10) ACLED, GDELT, ICEWS, UCDP/PRIO, SCAD, and TERRIER, for example.
techniques like difference-in-differences, geographic “discontinuities”, or appropriate instrumental variables. The opportunities to credibly implement these designs are limited, and even best empirical practices may lead us astray when data are limited or of questionable quality. If data continue to become more readily available over both space and over time, there should be opportunities to implement more credible research designs. Moving forward, researchers may also benefit from leveraging pre-existing large-scale field experiments that randomize some component of service delivery.

How can elites, activists, and ordinary people stem the downswing in formal participation? If the hypotheses presented here are correct, two things are needed. First, efforts must continue to improve the reach and reliability of public services, especially those that are of central importance in people’s lives. The more voters feel that their immediate needs are unmet by the ballot box, the more dissatisfied with formal democracy they may become. Second, and perhaps even more challenging, is the sustained development of credible opposition parties. Single parties that dominate democratic elections can certainly do good work for their people; credible alternatives are important. As such, improved service delivery and sustained competition may both be necessary for the long-term health of young democracies.

Figure 1: Estimated Conditional Association Between Service Dissatisfaction (Various) and Participation and Satisfaction in Gauteng, South Africa

Note: Points are regression coefficients estimated with OLS, adjusting for covariates – racial population shares, language group shares, male population share, unemployed share, average highest level of education, and a single dummy for major metropolitan area (Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, or Tshwane). Lines represent 95% heteroskedasticity-robust confidence intervals. Unit of analysis is the 2016 political ward (n=529), and only includes Gauteng Province.
Throughout the developing world, large swathes of the population suffer from poor public service delivery. As a result, children spend years in school without learning how to read, hundreds of thousands of people die annually of malaria and other preventable diseases, and women and girls walk for hours each day to make sure their families have enough water to drink. Such outcomes are not unique to war-torn, weak states. They persist even when governments (buoyed by massive injections of foreign aid) have the resources to provide basic services to their citizens.

One widely cited culprit for this state of affairs is the absence of consolidated democracy. Elections in many countries fail to serve as a source of accountability given the absence of viable opposition parties and a lack of open and informed public debate. In light of this, the international development community has seized upon “social accountability” as an alternative means of holding elected representatives and service providers to account. Specifically, international aid agencies and civil society organizations have been increasingly promoting the engagement of ordinary citizens to monitor and demand improvements to service delivery through initiatives such as citizen report cards, public expenditure tracking studies, and participatory budgeting.

Systematic and rigorous evaluations of these initiatives are somewhat few and far between but the emerging evidence suggests limited effectiveness. This essay offers insights into why this may be the case. First, social accountability initiatives frequently ignore the fact that those citizens whose needs with respect to service provision are greatest also tend to be those whose ability to effectively express demand for improved services is most constrained. Moreover, social accountability is rarely an effective substitute for democratic accountability, since the factors constraining democratic accountability often hinder social accountability initiatives as well. In what follows, I unpack these challenges in order to highlight the risks of promoting citizen engagement for improved service delivery without addressing broader societal and institutional constraints.

Homogeneous Citizens?

The rise of social accountability initiatives reflects the influence of the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report (WDR), which promoted a “short route” to accountability. The WDR distinguished this from the more traditional “long route,” through which citizens delegate authority to political representatives, who in turn influence service provision through their management of the bureaucracy. In contrast, the “short route” links citizens directly to service providers, through various oversight, voice, and exit mechanisms. Taking the “short route” is seen to have both normative appeal (contributing to the realization of participatory democracy) and instrumental value (promoting improved service delivery).

However, efforts to engage citizens have tended to ignore the fact that most countries (and indeed most villages) exhibit considerable variation among citizens in terms of their resources, motivations, and feelings of efficacy. As a result, we should not expect all citizens to be willing or able to engage in the same way. The tendency to homogenize “citizens” is particularly problematic given that many social accountability initiatives are implicitly or explicitly based on a “logic of collective action.” That is, participants must trust that the initiative in question will benefit them as members of their community, and trust that other potential beneficiaries will not free ride on their efforts. This is fairly obvious in the context of initiatives such as participatory budgeting, which typically provide an opportunity for residents of a municipality to deliberate over the spending of resources in their community. However, this logic also features more generally in projects aimed at benefiting a given village or imagined community (e.g. “women” or “the poor”), where such collective action is more unlikely. In such contexts, I argue that it may be better to characterize social accountability initiatives as nested principal agent problems: the citizens who participate are in effect agents of their fellow community members (principals) who are then trying to hold another set of politically appointed/elected agents to account. The question, then, is whether more active or engaged citizens can serve effectively as agents of their communities at large. A growing body of evidence suggests that in many cases they cannot, due to elite capture. Furthermore, expecting...
more active or engaged citizens to further the interests of their peers seems challenging unless communities to have relatively homogenous interests and shared priorities.

In what follows, I present evidence from Tanzania to show how the expression of demand for improved service delivery is frequently unrelated to the objective level of need in a given community. I then show how within communities, it is often the most marginalized citizens who are the least likely to express demand, thus potentially furthering the cycle of marginalization.

Need ≠ Demand

In order to study how objective need relates to the expression of demand for improved services, I draw on data from a recent nationally representative panel survey in Tanzania. The survey comprises 2,500 households from 250 locations (villages and urban neighborhoods), with 10 households per location. The first round of the survey (the baseline) was conducted in early 2011, and a follow-up round took place in mid-2015. My analysis focuses on the following survey questions related to citizen actions to improve the delivery of health, education, and water services:

- **In the last 12 months have you taken any of the following actions, or have you heard about anybody in this community doing any of the following things?**

  - Attend health, education, or water committee meeting?
  - Raise issues about clinic, school, or water services in a community meeting?
  - Speak to a health worker, teacher, or water company employees about an issue?
  - Discuss health, education, or water problems in a meeting of any group/organization you belong to?
  - Monitor health issues (like drug stock outs), education issues (like teacher attendance) or water issues (like water point functionality)?
  - Call radio program to talk about health, education, or water problems?

In 2015, 26% of all respondents reported taking one or more actions to improve service delivery; 18% reported taking action related to education, 13% action related to water, and 6% action related to health. 5

I complement my analysis of the survey data with geo-located data on service provision, 6 which I use to construct objective and relative measures of need for different services at the ward level – the third-level administrative unit in Tanzania. The survey maps respondents to wards, which I then link to ward-level measures of access to communal water points, primary schools, and health facilities. 7 I also construct ward-level averages of pupil-teacher ratios, and Primary School Leaving Exam (PSLE) scores and pass rates, as well as relative measures of need – comparing the ward in question to all other wards in that district. This captures relative deprivation, in a geographical sense. The data I use to construct measures of objective need are only available for 2014, so I link these to the 2015 round of the survey.

Next, I estimate a series of logistic regressions where the dependent variable indicates whether the respondent took action with respect to education, health, or water. I regress these variables on the sector-specific measures of need, as well as other factors that may be associated with taking action, including respondent gender, the presence of an education, health, or water committee, and reported problems with service delivery in the sector. 8 I find that in almost all cases, the objective measures of need and relative deprivation are statistically unrelated to the probability of taking action to improve the service in question. That is, respondents in the localities with the most dire situations are not the most likely to take direct action to rectify the situation. Rather, the respondents most likely to take action are those who reported having a problem with a specific service. The presence of a health, school, or water committee is also positively associated with taking action – even if the respondent is not a member of the committee him or herself. This highlights the importance of existing institutional channels through which citizens can express demands.

Who Makes Noise? Who Stays Quiet?

The Tanzania survey also provides insights as to which citizens within a given community are most likely to express demands for improved service delivery. This is important for understanding the potential of social accountability initiatives to empower marginalized citizens. Here, I pool the data for 2011 and 2015 to look at how taking action is associated with a number of characteristics typically associated with political participation:

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5) Statistics incorporate survey weights to account for survey design effects and recover estimates that are more representative of the population of Tanzania; unweighted proportions are similar, however.

6) This data comes from the Tanzania Open Data Portal (http://opendata.go.tz/) and for water, from a water point mapping exercise conducted by the World Bank in partnership with the Government of Tanzania (http://wpm.gaf.de/).

7) I define access as living within 1km of a water point, and 5km of a school or clinic.

8) Standard errors are clustered by locality.
wealth (proxied by an asset index), education, access to information (frequency of listening to the radio), gender, and civic skills (whether the respondent participated in a community group in the past year). I also proxy for internal efficacy by examining responses to the question, “How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local government decisions?” and external efficacy with the question, “If you have some complaint about local government services (such as health or education) and took that complaint to a local official, do you think that he or she would pay a lot of attention to what you say, some attention, very little attention, or none at all?”

Figure 1 shows that many of the results for demographic characteristics are in keeping with the notion that socioeconomic status and civic skills tend to promote participation. Women on the other hand are less likely to take action across the board. This is unsurprising given findings from both poor and rich countries that women tend to be less politically engaged than men. However, the result for water is striking, given that women in Tanzania (and many other low-income countries) tend to be the primary household members responsible for water provision. Wealth matters, though only for actions related to education and health and the size of the coefficient is very small. Respondents who are more informed are also more likely to take actions of all kinds, though it is interesting to note that education levels do not demonstrate any relationship with action-taking. Finally, internal efficacy is significantly and positively associated with actions related to all sectors, while external efficacy (not shown) is only significant for water (though to a smaller degree).

In sum, citizen engagement to improve service delivery appears to vary considerably across citizens. In particular,
women tend to take action to improve service delivery less frequently than men – even to improve services that they bear primary responsibility for delivering (e.g., household water). Socioeconomic status, access to information, and civic skills all enhance the likelihood of actively demanding improved services. This suggests that the most active and engaged citizens tend to be relatively more empowered than their peers, calling into question whether they are the most effective “agents” of their communities. These results add a layer of nuance to the received wisdom about elite capture, and, coupled with the findings on how action is often divorced from objective need, suggest that the most disadvantaged citizens may continue to be left behind by social accountability initiatives.

Demand in Context

Beyond individual- and community-level characteristics, it is important to consider how the larger political and social context affects the expression of demand for improved service delivery. Fox’s recent meta-analysis of recent social accountability initiatives highlights the importance of enabling environments for collective action and state capacity to respond to citizen voice. While these factors clearly play a role in determining the success of social accountability initiatives, they also arguably affect the likelihood that citizens will engage to demand improved service delivery in the first place.

In particular, consider the demonstrated importance of efficacy in promoting citizen engagement. Democratic theorists concur that political participation is an important driver of political efficacy. However, not all forms of political participation are created equal. Political participation is considerably more likely to foster efficacy when elections are free and fair, and when freedom of speech and association are guaranteed. This ensures that broad swathes of the population can participate in politics and that their participation can have a meaningful impact. Such feelings of efficacy in the political sphere arguably extend to interactions with state service providers. Presumably, citizens in countries where the government in power is already more constrained through an independent judiciary or free and fair elections may be more willing to engage in local accountability efforts to hold local service providers to account. Less well-functioning government institutions may in turn deter citizens from engaging in accountability efforts. This highlights a great irony of social accountability initiatives – while they are often promoted as substitutes for electoral accountability mechanisms, in all likelihood they function more as complements. Accountability begets accountability.

In sum, it appears that there are no quick fixes for persistent problems of service delivery. Efforts to enhance access to and quality of public services cannot ignore political actors and state.

OBITUARY FOR SIDNEY VERBA
Kay Lehman Schlozman, Boston College
Henry E. Brady, University of California - Berkeley

Sidney Verba of Harvard University is remembered for his foundational contributions to political science; for his generous good citizenship in each of the many venues in which he operated; and for his warmth, humor, generosity, decency, fairness, and inclusivity to all who had the good fortune to encounter him.

Sidney Verba was born on May 26, 1932, in Brooklyn to Morris and Recchi Verba, immigrants from an area of Imperial Russia that is now part of Moldova, who ran a small curtain and drapery shop. He was educated in the local public schools. A first-generation student at Harvard College, he majored in History and Literature before matriculating in the graduate program at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, with the goal of entering the foreign service. After receiving his MA, he stayed on at Princeton in the Department of Politics, first in the PhD program and then as a faculty member, achieving tenure at 28. He subsequently taught at Stanford and the University of Chicago before moving in 1973 to Harvard, where he enjoyed a long career.

Research

Verba used to tell graduate students, “I don’t do research. I write books.” Of course, he did both—conducting research that resulted in more than 20 books and dozens of other publications. With wide-ranging substantive interests, he made contributions to a number of subfields within political science—most notably comparative politics and American politics but also international relations and political methodology. As varied as his subject matter, the core characteristic of Verba’s scholarship was a capacity to train empirical evidence—usually drawn from surveys of citizens—on essential questions of democratic governance and the role of citizens within it, making a major contribution to what is known as empirical democratic theory. He was a master of seeing complex patterns within data and then crafting the analytic narrative that not only explicated those patterns but reminded the reader why we care about the matter under scrutiny. (Extended and illuminating discussions of Verba’s research can be found in Paul Sniderman’s “Sidney Verba: An Intellectual Biography” in PS 27(3) and an interview with Verba conducted by Nancy Rosenblum in 2010 which can be found by searching “Sidney Verba Nancy Rosenblum interview” on Google.)

For the first in a long series of investigations based on surveys of citizens, The Civic Culture (1963), Verba teamed up with his mentor, Gabriel Almond. The Civic Culture, a cross-national study that asked what is required of citizens and elites for stable and functioning democracy, more or less invented the field of comparative political behavior. Written at a time when World War II still cast a shadow and new nations were emerging from colonial empires, Almond and Verba announced their intention in their first sentence: “This is a study of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it (p. 3).” What they aptly named the “civic culture” is “the mixture of attitudes that support a democratic system (p. 505).” Almond and Verba explored the role of such social institutions as the family and the workplace and the significance of education in nurturing and sustaining the norms that foster democracy. Based on interviews with 1,000 citizens each in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico), The Civic Culture—which was groundbreaking in comparative politics for its use of survey data to study five democracies—was informed by self-conscious methodological concern with the difficulties of making systematic cross-national comparisons when nations differ from one another so fundamentally.

Verba followed up with another multi-nation study, this time moving away from the emphasis on democratic norms to focus on a more concrete dependent variable, citizen political participation. Anxious to overcome academic imperialism, in each of the seven countries he worked with collaborators who then were free to use the data in their own scholarship. Many also became coauthors with Verba.

Before the major comparative book appeared, Verba and Norman Nie published a book based on the American data from the cross-national survey. Participation in America (1972) probed a question to which Verba returned over and over in ensuing decades: the consequences for democratic equality among citizens when the voices of the well-educated and affluent are more likely to be heard through citizen participation. With a broad understanding of political participation that goes well beyond voting, Verba and Nie investigated the social class roots of disparities in participation and demonstrated how such disparities vary across particular participatory acts and how they are modified by affiliations with voluntary associations and political parties.

Focusing on national as well as individual differences in Participation and Political Equality (1978), Verba and Nie, joined by Jae-on Kim, returned to the question of the way that inequalities with respect to social and economic matters have consequences...
for political inequalities. The seven countries in the cross-national study—Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United States, and Yugoslavia—included established liberal democracies, fledging new democracies, and one socialist system, touted for its “participatory democracy.” With varying strength, the relationship between SES and political activity holds for all seven, but it is especially strong in the United States in comparison with the other rich countries on the list. An important factor in explaining the differences among nations in the representativeness of participant publics is the operation of linkage institutions: the extent to which there are parties and voluntary associations tied to social class and other prominent political cleavages and the way that they mobilize or depress political activity among those of differing SES levels.

A decade later, Verba revisited the question of the roots of participatory inequalities in the United States, this time with Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry Brady. A new survey, administered in Spanish as well as in English, oversampled African Americans and Latinos as well as those who have engaged in such relatively rare acts as making a large campaign donation or attending a protest. The investigation sought to go “beyond SES” and to understand the causal mechanisms linking the components of socioeconomic status to political participation. Their volume, Voice and Equality (1995), put forth the Civic Voluntarism Model which anchored political participation in three sets of factors: resources such as time, money, and skills that make it possible to take part; psychological engagement with politics; and location in networks through which citizens are mobilized to take part. Different configurations of these factors—all of which are fostered by educational attainment and all of which are developed in the nonpolitical domains of adult life—are germane for different participatory acts.

Although his work became increasingly sophisticated in making causal connections, Verba never forgot that we care about participatory inequalities because they have consequences for the democratic promise of political equality. A direct outgrowth of his concern with the underrepresentation of the political voices of the disadvantaged was a concern with groups. Even when disparities in activity among groups could be explained by deficits in education, income, or civic skills, he emphasized the descriptive finding: a relative reduction in political input from African Americans, Latinos, or people who live in substandard housing or rely on means-tested benefits. Moreover, he made clear that the group-based resource disadvantages that operate so powerfully in explaining group differences in political voice are not merely coincidental but are organically related to shared group experiences.

Meanwhile, Verba returned to the concern with political methodology that had emerged earlier in the context of the cross-national surveys. Together with Gary King and Robert Keohane, Verba produced the highly influential Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (1994), known familiarly as “KKV.” KKV originated in a jointly taught course in which several cohorts of Harvard PhD students were exposed to these three versatile scholars as they sought to build bridges between quantitative and qualitative research. KKV functions as a handbook for those seeking to improve research standards for both quantitative and qualitative work and those seeking to increase communication between practitioners of the two kinds of research. The lessons from KKV continue to be staples of political methodology courses, and the dialogue it stimulated between qualitative and quantitative scholars has greatly enriched political science.

Professional Service and Recognition

As befits someone whose intellectual life focused on the political life of citizens, Verba was a good citizen in every endeavor in which he was involved. He was called upon frequently to serve the profession including as President of APSA (1994-1995). He chaired the Social and Political Science Section of the National Academy of Sciences before becoming chair of its Committee on Human Rights, which advocates on behalf of scientists, engineers, and health professionals around the world who have been subject to serious human rights abuses, especially those whose professional activities or exercise of free speech have led to reprisal.

When asked about awards and honors, Verba would refer self-effacingly to having earned the General Excellence Medal in elementary school at P.S. 235. In fact, however, he was honored in just about every way possible. In 2002, he was awarded the Johan Skytte Prize. As described on its website, the Skytte Prize, “often considered to be the political science equivalent of the Nobel Prizes, is the most prestigious award within the field of political science.” He won several other career awards, including the James Madison Award from APSA; the Helen Dinerman Prize from the World Association of Public Opinion Research; and Warren Miller Prize from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. He was a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Philosophical Society as well as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. A number of his books have been recognized with book prizes.

Sid

While Verba’s CV attests to his pioneering professional contributions, it cannot convey the human qualities—his wisdom,
good judgment, decency, empathy, approachability, warmth, and legendary sense of humor—that made him both respected and loved by everyone whose lives he touched. In his scholarship as well as his professional comportment more generally, he reflected the values that form the underpinnings of American democracy with the principles upon which the American academy rests: freedom of expression, commitment to the truth, equality, nondiscrimination, tolerance, standards of professional excellence, procedural fairness, responsibilities to students, colleagues, and institutions.

As befits someone who put equality at the center of his research on the role of citizens in democracy, he did not pull rank. Members of his collaborative research teams—from coauthors to undergraduate research assistants—were treated not simply with respect but with the expectation that their input would be taken seriously. Undergraduate team members were incredulous when the big-shot senior professor walked into the project meeting carrying paper bags full of sandwiches for lunch and, then, took detailed notes as they discussed the problems they were encountering in coding the data.

He used to tout the benefits of collaboration by pointing out that “you do a fraction of the work and get all the credit and none of the blame.” In fact, he did the opposite of what he said. Understanding that his own contributions would not go unrecognized if he shared authorship with younger scholars, he was liberal with credit. A quick, and incomplete, enumeration across his publications shows that that he had at least three dozen coauthors, nearly half of whom began collaborating as graduate students, all of whom deemed it a privilege to have joined in intellectual inquiry with him.

We know that we speak for colleagues around the world when we conclude by observing how much we miss him.
Section News

Auerbach, Adam and Tariq Thachil were awarded the 2019 Heinz I. Eulau Prize for the best article published in the American Political Science Review in 2018, for their article, “How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India’s Slums.” APSR, 112, 4 (November): 775-791.

Bates, Genevieve (PhD Candidate, University of Chicago), Ipek Cinar (PhD Student, University of Chicago), and Monika Nalepa (Associate Professor, University of Chicago) have published “Accountability by Numbers: A New Global Transitional Justice Dataset (1946–2016)” in Perspectives on Politics.

Binder, Seth and Eve Sandberg, Mohammed VI’s Strategies for Moroccan Economic Development (London and New York: Routledge Press, August 2019. First Edition). This book analyzes the economic development choices initiated by Morocco’s King Mohammed VI since he ascended the throne in 1999, and situates those choices in the political economy literature. Eve Sandberg is Professor of Politics at Oberlin College and Seth Binder is Advocacy Officer at Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).

von Borzyskowski, Inken recently moved as an Assistant Professor of Political Science from Florida State University to University College London. She recently published the book “The Credibility Challenge: How Democracy Aid Influences Election Violence” (Cornell University Press, 2019). The book argues that international election support (technical election assistance and observation) can change election credibility and thus election violence.

von Borzyskowski also published the following three journal articles:


Bustikova, Lenka was recently promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University.


Jamal, Manal A. Democracy promotion is a central pillar of the foreign policy of many states, but the results are often disappointing. In Promoting Democracy, Manal A. Jamal examines why these efforts succeed in some countries, but fail in others. A former journalist and researcher in the Palestinian territories, she offers an up-close perspective of the ways in which Western donor funding has, on one hand, undermined political participation in cases such as the Palestinian territories, and, on the other hand, succeeded in bolstering political engagement in cases such as El Salvador.

Based on five fieldwork trips and over 150 interviews with grassroots activists, political leaders, and directors and program officers in donor agencies and NGOs, Jamal brings into focus an often-overlooked perspective: the experiences of those directly affected by this assistance. Promoting Democracy makes an important and timely argument about how political settlements ultimately shape democracy promotion efforts, and what political choices Western state sponsored donors can make to maximize successful outcomes in different contexts across the world.

https://nyupress.org/9781479878451/promoting-democracy/


Kuo, Didi, Senior Research Scholar, is the Associate Director for Research at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. She recently published “Comparing America: Reflections on Democracy Across Subfields” in Perspectives on Politics.
Section News

LeVan, Carl published Contemporary Nigerian Politics: Competition in a Time of Transition and Terror (Cambridge University Press). Using mixed methods and extensive field research, the book examines the political campaigns and the voting behavior that led to the first ever party turnover in Africa’s largest democracy.


Ong, Elvin, a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Asian Research in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, recently received the 2019 Dan David Prize Scholarship for Young Researchers in the field of Defending Democracy. He also recently published “Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies” in the American Journal of Political Science (co-authored with Jennifer Gandhi) (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12441) and “Online Repression and Self-Censorship: Evidence from Southeast Asia” in Government and Opposition (https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2019.18).


Thomson, Henry, Assistant Professor at Arizona State University, published the book “Food and Power: Regime Type, Agricultural Policy and Political Stability” with Cambridge University Press.

Turner, Kimberly, PhD candidate at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, was awarded the 2019-2020 Diversifying Higher Education Faculty fellowship, as the Adam Smith Fellowship at the Mercatus Center. These fellowship will support her dissertation and research work for the upcoming academic year.

Vachudova, Milada Anna (UNC Chape Hill) published an article with Sophie Meunier titled “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union” in the Journal of Common Market Studies (56, 7: 1631-1647). She also published an article with Jan Rovny in the Monkey Cage blog of The Washington Post on the protests to safeguard liberal democracy taking place in the Czech Republic titled “In Prague, protestors demand the resignation of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. Why is liberal democracy under threat in the Czech Republic?” (June 25, 2019). Find it here.

Wilson, Matthew Charles, Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina Published “A Closer Look at the Limits of Consociationalism” in Comparative Political Studies (published 16 July 2019, OnlineFirst). In the article, Wilson demonstrates that current conclusions that some powersharing features exacerbate conflict risk in more ethnically diverse states are based on a flawed assumption that the expected effect of institutions on conflict are linear across levels of ethnic diversity. He shows that proportional representation is positively associated with domestic conflict at mid-range levels of ethnic diversity--where ethnic polarization is highest--but negatively associated the risk of domestic conflict in more diverse settings.
2019 Comparative Democratization Section Awards

**Award Title: Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy**

**Award Description:** Given for the best dissertation on democratization and/or the development and dynamics of democracy and authoritarianism completed and accepted in the two calendar years immediately prior to the 2019 APSA Annual Meeting (i.e., 2017 or 2018).

**WINNER:** Nakhar Gaikwad, “Identity Politics and Economic Policy” (Yale University)

**Committee Chair:** Soleded Prillaman
Research Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College at the University of Oxford.

**Committee Members:**
- Elizabeth R. Nugent
  Department of Political Science, Yale University
- Noam Lupu
  Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University

**Committee’s Remarks**

It is my extreme pleasure to award the Juan Linz Dissertation Award to Nikhar Gaikwad. The committee received many exceptional dissertations for consideration, but Nikhar’s dissertation stood out as a clear stand out. His dissertation, entitled “Identity Politics and Economic Policy” accomplished the impressive feat of bridging important questions in comparative politics and international relations to contribute to scholarship on trade protection, economic policy-making, and identity politics. The committee was particularly impressed by how this dissertation clearly tackled a question of incredible scholarly importance through both creative theory-building and rigorous methodological analysis.

This dissertation argues that, contrary to traditional expectation, in culturally divided societies politicians target economic policy to the interests of minorities because they are unable to utilize identity appeals, which they draw on when mobilizing support from majority groups. In particular, Nikhar develops a formal model to show that industries with more workers from the majority identity group are likely to receive fewer preferential policies. These arguments stand in contrast to conventional wisdom that politicians economically cater to their own identity groups first and foremost.

The dissertation then draws on an impressive array of data to test these claims in the context of India, including an original data set of annual import tariffs spanning 75 years and 5,000 product lines, including the ethnic distribution of workers. Nikhar shows that the presence of minority group workers in an industry’s workforce is directly connected to the ability of that industry to receive preferential trade policy, but only when identity politics becomes salient in the electoral arena. He further tests the implications of his theory through a survey experiment with voters, politicians, and firms as well as supplemental case studies of Brazil and the U.S.

This work has implications for our understanding of policy-making in diverse societies and our understanding of trade protection and thus is a must read for anyone in the fields of comparative politics or international relations.

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**Award Title: Best Article Award**

**Committee Chair:**
- Michael Albertus
  Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

**Committee Members:**
- Bryn Rosenfeld
  Department of Political Science, University of Southern California
- Jason Wittenberg
  Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

**WINNERS:**
- Aditya Dasgupta’s “Technological Change and Political Turnover,” APSR, Volume 112, Issue 4 November 2018, pp. 918-938

**Committee’s Remarks**

I served as the chair of this year’s best article award for the section. The other committee members were Jason Wittenberg (UC Berkeley) and Bryn Rosenfeld (USC). We received a couple dozen submissions for this year’s prize and the competition was stiff. But after convening, we quickly homed in on two outstanding articles that share this year’s best article award.

1. The first is Fiona Shen-Bayh’s “Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival,” which was published in World Politics. This article represents the best of studies of comparative democratization: it brings original data gathered through dogged and innovative fieldwork to examine a theoretically important but poorly understood aspect of authoritarian regime duration. Shen-Bayh’s article asks the following question: Considering the range of repression tools
at an autocrat's disposal, under what circumstances do they turn to courts?

She argues that courts become instrumental when rulers confront challengers from within the regime. Unlike regime outsiders who pose a common external threat for insiders to repress, internal rivals present a more complex target. To deal with the latter type of challenger, the ruler needs to first mobilize insiders behind the idea that he is legitimate and his rivals are not. Generating this belief can help turn insiders against one of their own and makes it easier for the ruler to punish disobedience within the regime. Courts are an ideal forum to propagate narratives of incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Specifically, they provide a stage for rulers to prosecute their challengers for crimes against the regime.

To test this hypothesis, she turns to postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, where authoritarian leaders encountered disparate insider and outsider threats shortly after independence. Through impressive archival work with documents of the British and Foreign Commonwealth Office that included intelligence reports, private correspondence, and newspaper accounts, among other sources, she identifies some 2,500 threats to authoritarian leaders from various domestic actors across seven different countries. Then, in a series of well-constructed empirical tests, she finds that extrajudicial repression was more likely to be used against insiders.

The article is a model for work in the field, and we should all undoubtedly be adding to our syllabi for the impending fall term! Congratulations!

2. The second co-winner of this year's best article prize is Aditya Dasgupta's "Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India," which was published in the APSR.

This article is a careful and sophisticated empirical study of one of history's largest-scale natural experiments of the last 50 years: the introduction of high-yielding variety crops in India. This experiment not only radically improved the welfare of millions of rural Indians; Dasgupta shows that the Green Revolution also shook the foundations of the urban-based and elite-dominated Congress Party, contributing to the rise of agrarian opposition parties and playing a pivotal role in the rise of multiparty electoral competition in India.

Drawing on a theoretical framework based on models of contests, Dasgupta argues that high-yielding variety crops strengthened the incentives and capacity of political outsiders – in this case agricultural producers – to seek greater political representation. He brilliantly exploits the timing of the introduction of HYV crops, together with district-level exogenous variation in suitability for the new crop technology, in an instrumental variables analysis of some 20,000 electoral races between 1957 and 1987 to demonstrate that the local introduction of HYV crops generated greater political completion at the local level. Further tests indicated that was driven by an increase in wealth among politically excluded agricultural producers due to a spike in productivity, greater incentives to seek representation due to the critical role of the government in providing agricultural inputs and subsidies, and an increase in collective action capacity as crop market prices declined.

The findings support theories linking technological change to political turnover and therefore have important implications for the political economy of democratization. The article is an exemplary model for sophisticated empirical analysis that speaks to longstanding questions of theoretical interest, and, like Shen-Bayh's article, I encourage all of you to add it to your syllabus this fall if you haven't already! Congratulations!
The committee found that Yashar’s book stood out for its exploration of what delivers peace at a globally challenging time for democracy; for its novel theoretical claims; and for the quality of careful empirical analysis across space, levels and time.

The core question probed in Homicidal Ecologies is why the end of authoritarian rule and civil wars did not bring peace to Latin America but, instead, high levels of violence. She specifically zeroes in upon why, following post-conflict democratization, homicide characterized some countries, and regions within countries, and not others. Why is this so?

Drawing upon careful case studies of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, Yashar shows that three factors – when combined – explain which regions/countries are the most violent: transnational illicit economies, weak or complicit states, and organizational competition. Yashar shows that the highest levels of homicide rates, or homicidal ecologies, result when all three circumstances jointly occur.

The committee found that Yashar’s book brought questions surrounding contemporary levels of violence to the forefront of broader political science debates about the trajectory and prospects of third-wave democracies. Historically, research into democratization in Latin America has understandably focused upon the role of the military in stepping out of formal politics. This important book encourages us to turn our analytic gaze to include the courts and the police and reminds us that these institutions not only define the modern Weberian state but that they are, for most citizens, also the everyday face of the state.

Alongside a trove of empirical data, Yashar’s theoretical claims are compelling: she urges political science research to more comprehensively investigate into illicit institutions—which are neither formal nor informal institutions. Equally novel is the way that Yashar empirically validates these claims through a careful exploration of regional, national, and transnational data.

The committee was thus unanimous in selecting Yashar’s Homicidal Ecologies to be the recipient of the 2019 Comparative Democratization Best Book Award.

**Award Title: Best Field Work Award**

This prize rewards dissertation students who conduct innovative and difficult fieldwork on the topics of democratization and/or the development and dynamics of democracy and authoritarianism. Scholars who are currently writing their dissertations or who completed their dissertations in 2018 are eligible.

**WINNERS:**

Rachael S. McLellan, Princeton University
Hind Ahmed Zaki, University of Washington

**Committee Chair:**

Egor Lazarev
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

**Committee Members:**

Sule Yaylaci
Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia

H. Zeynep Bulutgil
Department of Political Science, University College London
z.bulutgil@ucl.ac.uk

**Committee’s Remarks**

Hind Ahmed Zaki’s dissertation “In the Shadow of the State: Gender Contestation and Legal Mobilization in the Context of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia” explored societal responses to the dramatic rise of public assaults against women during and after the Arab Spring. She found that in Tunisia, mobilization by women’s groups was limited, however, women succeeded in courts and the passing of laws upholding women’s rights. In contrast, Egypt witnessed extensive and sustained bottom-up women’s mobilization, but the courts were much less responsive than in Tunisia. Hind developed an interesting and counterintuitive argument grounded in the feminist theoretical framework. Fieldwork for the dissertation included participatory observations, archival research, and semi-structured interviews that together allowed her to conduct a comparative analysis and immersive multi-site political ethnography in very difficult conditions. Hind also provided thoughtful critical reflections on the fieldwork.

Rachel McLellan’s dissertation “Dynamics of Contestation and Control in Post-Decentralization Tanzania” explores the political implications of decentralization in electoral authoritarian regimes with a focus on Tanzania. Rachel argues that authoritarian leaders can use the more fine-grained political information afforded by decentralization to sanction both individuals and communities who support the opposition. At the same time, where the opposition gets local control, it can build local state capacity and signal competence in governance. Rachel’s fieldwork is based on interviews with local politicians (from both the opposition and the ruling party) and bureaucrats. She also ran her own survey of voters and collected an extensive and
unique local-level data on taxes and public goods. Rachel’s dissertation combines several strengths: contribution to an important ongoing debate in the literature (i.e. consequences of decentralization), clear and innovative theory (as well as conceptual definitions); very impressive and extensive fieldwork that produced different types of data, a comparative research design that is very solid, and analysis that uses different types of fieldwork evidence to evaluate not only the ultimate dependent variable but also the empirical implications that relate to the theory.

2019 COMPARATIVE DEMOCRATIZATION SECTION AWARDS

Award Title: Best Paper Award
Given to the best paper on democratization and/or the development and dynamics of democracy and authoritarianism presented at the 2018 APSA Convention.

WINNER:
Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), “Suffrage Restrictions and the Reach of the Nation-State.”

Committee Chair:
Daniel Treisman
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Committee Members:
Imke Harbers
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam
Agustina Giraudy
School of International Service, American University

Committee’s Remarks
The paper “Suffrage Restrictions and the Reach of the Nation State” by Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer offers an original and informative account of a crucial issue at the intersection of democratization and state-building. The paper analyzes the political logic of education expansion under literacy-based requirements for voting. Leveraging a compelling subnational comparative design for the case of Colombia, the paper demonstrates how political elites strategically expanded and restricted access to education in order to shape the electorate. Literacy requirements provided partisan elites with incentives to strategically expand schooling, and the legacy of these early investments often persisted over time unless homogenizing measures were taken. The paper offers a compelling argument of how democracy can spur unequal public goods provision, and compound existing inequalities in society. It therefore speaks to emerging scholarship on the origins of the state’s unequal reach across territory and society, and how democracy interacts with state- and nation-building. The jury was particularly impressed by the wealth of empirical evidence employed to probe the argument. The analysis draws on untapped archival sources to map subnational variation, and employs quantitative and qualitative methods to make its case. The paper is a pleasure to read and we hope that it will find a wide readership among scholars of comparative democratization.

Honorable Mention:
Adam Auerbach, American University
Tariq Thachil, Vanderbilt University

Committee’s Remarks
In “Cultivating Clients: Reputation, Responsiveness, and Ethnic Indifference in India’s Slums,” Auerbach and Thachil analyze the often overlooked role that voters play to hold brokers accountable. Studies of clientelism overwhelmingly focus on how brokers target voters with top-down benefits during elections. Yet brokers also receive requests from voters for assistance between elections, initiating the processes through which they cultivate clients. Why are brokers responsive to the requests of some voters and not others? Answering this question is immensely challenging, given the informal nature of political brokerage. Yet, Auerbach and Thachil succeed. Using a wide array of research methods, including a conjoint experiment with 629 Indian slum leaders, ethnographic fieldwork, and a survey of 2,199 slum residents, the authors find strong evidence of reputational considerations shaping broker responsiveness. Such reputations are required for brokers to attract large personal followings that they can mobilize politically. The paper offers a compelling argument of brokers’ reputational preferences that rules out other alternative explanations, such as brokers’ monitoring concerns, and ethnic favoritism, both assumed to dominate brokers’ behavior in many developing countries. The paper is beautifully written and we hope that it will find a wide readership among scholars of comparative democratization and clientelism.
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Executive Editor

Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science; Director of the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg; one of the PIs for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow and holder of an ERC Consolidator Grant. He is author of Democracy and Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, and has also worked on women’s representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

Ruth Carlitz is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. Prior to joining Tulane, she was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Program on Governance and Local Development at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Her research looks at government responsiveness from the ‘top down’ (how governments distribute public goods) and the ‘bottom up’ (what citizens and non-governmental organizations can do to promote transparency and accountability). She focuses primarily on East Africa, inspired by my experience living and working in Tanzania from 2006-2008. In addition to her academic research, she has worked on commissioned research for organizations including the World Bank, the International Budget Partnership, the UK’s Department for International Development, and the Open Government Partnership.

Kristen Kao is a Research Fellow with the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) at the University of Gothenburg and a PhD Candidate in Political Science at UCLA. In 2014, she ran a nationwide survey in Jordan in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lind say Benstead funded by the GLD program at Yale. She has served as a program consultant and election monitor for a variety of international organizations, including The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute.

Ellen Lust is the Founding Director of the Programs on Governance and Local Development at Yale University and at the University of Gothenburg, and Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. She has authored Structuring Conflict in the Arab World as well as articles in Perspectives on Politics, edited The Middle East and several volumes. The Moulay Hicham Foundation, NSF, the Swedish Research Council and other foundations have supported her research on authoritarianism, political transitions, and local governance.

Anna Lührmann is assistant professor of political science and Deputy Director of the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg. She has published on autocratization, polarization, electoral assistance, democracy aid, elections, and accountability among other issues. Prior to turning to academia, Anna was an MP in the German National Parliament (Bundestag, 2002-2009).

Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His current project uses data from extensive field and survey research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social identities.

Marcus Tannenberg is a PhD Candidate at the V-Dem Institute at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. His research looks at self-censorship and the issues that it poses for measuring legitimacy and popular support in autocratic countries, as well as at the effects of autocratic development aid. Additional research concerns the classification of political regimes, which has been published in Politics and Governance. He has also worked on commissioned research for the Swedish Government’s Expert Group for Aid Studies, and is currently running survey experiments on behalf of the UNDPOslo Governance Center in order to develop robust measures of a number of the Sustainable Development Goals.