Greetings!

Welcome to a new academic year and a new issue of the PEP Report. Over the past year and a half, we have solicited feedback through emails, at conferences, and via conversation to get a better idea of the Report’s strengths and weaknesses. We thank everyone who has offered advice, and we encourage that conversation to continue.

One common suggestion is to make the Report more academic or scholarly. This issue seeks to advance that goal---if a bit. The balance we always seek is to engage topics of broad academic interest while making the Report an efficient product to consume. We continue to pursue that right balance.

This issue contains pieces on research, teaching, and forthcoming books. It also features some notices and news from around the subfield. The Report begins with two feature articles. One focuses on the development of the presidency from the Founding. The other explores what is “the ideal president.” Next, the research notes in this issue focus on the causes and consequences of interbranch strife in the current political environment---a topic that has received as much media attention as it has academic attention.

In addition, two more notes engage very different aspects of pedagogy in the study of the executive branch. In our continued commitment to exchange new ideas on teaching, we have solicited items from Dan Ponder and Alison Howard. Ponder focuses on the best way to incorporate the presidential biography into the undergraduate classroom. Howard explores the benefits of introducing new technology into presidency courses. These two stellar items offer food for thought and provide excellent advice that colleagues should consider using with their own students.

We are confident this issue has much to offer. We thank you for your continued interest, support, and readership.

Cheers!

Justin Vaughn
John Hudak

FROM THE EDITORS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PEP Leadership ..................................2

FEATURED ARTICLES

Raymond Tatalovich & Steven E. Schier
Hamiltonianism, Progressivism and American Political Development ................. 3

Michael A. Genovese
The Ideal President: Give Me a Depressed Introvert Any Day ..........................7

THE ROOTS OF INTERBRANCH CONFLICT FORUM RESPONSES

Julia Azari ..................................9
Ken Collier ..................................10
Patrick Homan ...............................12
Jeff Peake ..................................13
Wayne Steger ...............................15

TEACHING A MORE ENGAGING PRESIDENCY

Alison Howard
iPads, Polls, and the Presidency: A Semester Using Technology to Engage Students Inside and Outside of the Classroom ................. 17

Daniel E. Ponder
The Presidential Experience: Supplementing the Undergraduate Presidency Course with Biography ...........................................19

NEW BOOKS IN PRINT: AUTHORS’ NOTES

Graham G. Dodds .........................21
Lloyd C. Gardner .........................22
Fred I. Greenstein .........................24
William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman & Jon C. Rogowski .........................25
Dennis W. Johnson .........................26
Donald R. Kelley & Todd G. Shields .........................27
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. .........................28
Mary L. Rucker .........................29
Steven E. Schier & Todd E. Eberly.. 30
Mary E. Stuckey .........................31
John Hudak ...............................32

AROUND THE DISCIPLINE

Award Announcements ...............33
Conference Announcements ......35
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In our forthcoming volume, *The Presidency and Political Science* (M.E. Sharpe, 2014), we provide an intellectual history of the presidency since the Founding, as viewed by the leading authorities, including such presidents as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and as portrayed in the contemporary presidential scholarship. This review leads us to conclude that there have been three paradigms of presidential power: the Hamiltonian based on a strong president and a strong but limited national government; the Jeffersonian based on a weak president and a weak national government; and Progressivism based on a strong president and a strong but unlimited national government. Scholarship by Andrea Scoseria Katz, in the American Political Development (APD) tradition, succinctly summarizes the Progressive indictment: “The Progressives envisioned an enlarged executive, one outside the original guidelines of the U.S. Constitution, which they deemed ‘archaic,’ ‘undemocratic,’ and unsuited to the demands of the modern age, in which capitalism dislocated, alienated and disenfranchised the common man.”

The Jeffersonian paradigm is irrelevant for modernity because a strong president and a strong national government are here to stay. The only options today are Hamiltonianism or Progressivism. Both embraced a strong president but, more importantly, “the ideal-type Progressive president, with its bolstered administrative and legislative powers, is an institution fundamentally irreconcilable with an originalist understanding of the presidency,” adds Katz.

This assumption is contrary to the long-standing tradition of Hamiltonianism and, beyond that, only partly correct. While presidential scholars agree that the administrative presidency and legislative leadership are largely modern developments, an independent and powerful executive (especially in foreign affairs) was established by the Constitution. The Hamiltonian paradigm relied heavily on presidential prerogatives, as Fatovic explains: “Hamilton’s idea that the vesting clause in the first section of Article II of the U.S. Constitution implicitly authorizes presidential exercises of prerogative rests on his belief that prerogative is inherent in executive power.”

The tradition of Hamiltonianism is difficult to reconcile with Steven Skowronek’s claim that the “conservative insurgency” manifested by the “unitary executive doctrine” today simply builds onto the Progressive legacy in order to rationalize an energetic executive who can
pursue conservative causes. Our volume shows that constitutionalists have consistently endorsed an energetic executive throughout American history, and Charles Thach specifically repudiates the Progressive view of the separation of powers. It was not designed to prevent governing but, in fact, was intended to liberate the executive from encroachment by the legislative branch. During the 1950s and 1960s there were conservatives (Willmoore Kendall, C. Perry Patterson, and Alfred De Grazia) who feared strong presidents and believed that Congress was the natural home of republicanism or conservatism. But these “anti-aggrandizement” scholars were clearly intellectual outliers, not Hamiltonians.

Hamiltonianism also questions the APD view of democratization as the new standard for presidential legitimacy. Here again Steven Skowronek criticizes the advocates of “unitary executive doctrine” for returning to the guise of constitutionalism but stripping away any democratic underpinnings for presidential power. That makes this “conservative insurgency” even worse, a naked power grab unsupported by presidential democratization. Hamiltonianism reminds us, however, that the Framers wanted presidential legitimacy based on the Constitution, not public opinion.

Hamiltonianism is the only viable paradigm—both empirically and normatively—to guide presidency scholarship and our understanding of presidential power. The “Movement Conservatives” who accompanied Ronald Reagan into the White House and the Bushites who popularized the “unitary executive doctrine” are elements of a coherent intellectual stream: they share the historic commitment of Hamiltonianism to constitutional principles as the essential underpinning of presidential power and leadership. The ideological mandate of Progressivism (and its legacy of New Deal Liberalism) to democratize the regime and move on all domestic fronts to assure social justice lacks grounding in the fixed principles that guided the Founding of the republic. Fast-forward to the present, therefore, and George W. Bush can rightly be termed a Hamiltonian while Barack Obama would be welcomed as a Progressive.

The intellectual indictment of Progressivism is that much more damaging because so much contemporary empirical research on the presidency pays respect to the text and spirit of the Constitution of 1787. We will focus on two huge lessons drawn from contemporary presidential scholarship. First, we presidency scholars have acknowledged the importance of prerogative power and how our collective embrace of Neustadtian behavioralism denied us an understanding of the full scope of presidential power. To speak of Lockean prerogative, as the studies by Benjamin Kleinerman and Clement Fatovic illustrate, is to speak directly to the constitutional foundation of our regime. Of special concern today is the war prerogative, as the War on Terrorism has stimulated a robust debate just as the Vietnam War had provoked Arthur Schlesinger to pen his The Imperial Presidency. But the liberal Schlesinger was more opportunistic than principled in his criticism of Richard Nixon because, at that time like today and throughout history, the Hamiltonians always acknowledged the importance of presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs. Indeed, literally all the important precedents were established by George Washington. That lesson is abundantly clear if you read our accounts of Justice Joseph Story,
HAMILTONIANISM, PROGRESSIVISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

William Howard Taft, Calvin Coolidge, especially Edward Corwin, Terry Eastland or John Yoo and Richard Posner today. In contrast, the war prerogative has been subjected to harsh criticism by our colleagues Louis Fisher and Richard Pious. What is most important is that this debate over the war prerogative centers directly on Original Intent and the meaning of the Declaration Clause and the Commander in Chief Clause.

The “high” prerogative employed by Abraham Lincoln to save the Union has been domesticated as “unilateral executive power” like issuing executive orders. Thanks to the recent scholarship by William G. Howell, Kenneth R. Mayer, Phillip J. Cooper, and Adam L. Warber, domestic prerogatives are front and center in our analyses of presidential power. And once again, debate over their origins and constitutionality directly engages the Founding. Likely the most controversial domestic prerogative is executive privilege, and during the Watergate era constitutional scholar Raoul Berger even argued that executive privilege was a “myth” that violated Original Intent. His opinion was challenged by Mark J. Rozell who traced the historical practice since it was employed by the father of our country, George Washington. On the other hand, in their study of presidential “czars” as a strategy for the administrative presidency, Mitchell A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell argue that “czars” violate the Appointments Clause and the constitutional separation of powers.

Second, research on rhetorical leadership provokes much normative commentary about how presidential democratization violates Original Intent. The Framers were not enamored with democracy, though our Republic based its legitimacy on popular consent, and they were fearful of factions even though the early Federalists acted like a political party. In contrast, the forces of political party and public opinion were the bulwarks of presidential power for the Progressives. Nobody can turn the clock back and repudiate democracy but contemporary presidency scholars do not blindly accept presidential leadership enslaved by public opinion. The “expectations gap” thesis represents a huge normative body-blow at the Progressives’ desire to democratize the presidential office. We have raised the political profile of presidents despite the political realities of operating in a pluralist system and a separation of powers regime. Every scholar who draws upon this theme, popularized by Theodore J. Lowi, argues about how the disconnect between promise and performance holds the potential to undermine public trust in government, not just in the highest office. Lowi’s concern about the plebiscitary president is even more damaging than the Framers’ fear of demagogic leadership, since Lowi argues that a “new social contract” based on service delivery (peace and prosperity) has replaced representation as the keystone of the president’s political legitimacy.

APD scholar Jeffrey Tulis set the stage with his argument that Woodrow Wilson’s rhetorical leadership was the only fundamental break with the Founding. Colleen Shogan also references the Founding and warns modern presidents not to overuse moral rhetoric. Recent scholarship by Jean Yarbrough offers a revisionist argument that Theodore Roosevelt was no “moderate” because he used rhetorical leadership with abandon throughout his tenure. But even the strict empiricists among us reach back to the Founding and raise normative questions...
HAMILTONIANISM, PROGRESSIVISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

about presidential policy-making that is too beholden to the public. In their study of public opinion Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley are troubled that presidents are subjected to monthly referenda on their performance, which does not encourage good policy choices.\(^{12}\) Research by Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro as well as Brandice Canes-Wrone is encouraging because, in fact, presidents do not “pander” to public opinion.\(^{13}\) However, B. Dan Wood did sophisticated statistical analyses of presidential rhetoric at home and “saber rattling” abroad.\(^{14}\) Although Wood revisits the Founding and strongly prefers the Framers’ view of “statesmanship” that defends the public interest domestically and the national interest globally, the reality is that presidents tailor their policies for narrow constituencies or saber-rattle for partisan advantage. In sum, these empiricists are worried about how much democracy is too much democracy, a concern that would have never troubled the Progressives who celebrated public opinion and political party as the twin pillars of presidential power.

Our Constitution still matters. The energetic executive of the twenty-first century is grounded in Hamiltonianism, a paradigm that explains how presidential power works and how presidents ought to govern. Today Progressivism is moot as an intellectual enterprise, because normative debate over constitutional understandings permeates much contemporary empirical scholarship on the presidency, not some fixation over ideology and programmatic ends.

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FEATURED ARTICLES
THE IDEAL PRESIDENT: GIVE ME A DEPRESSED INTROVERT ANY DAY

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Americans like our presidents to ooze confidence and speak of hope for our collective future. We want to believe that tomorrow we will see better days. And those candidates who can articulate an optimistic, positive message usually win in presidential elections. Remember Ronald Reagan’s “Morning in America” and compare that with Jimmy Carter’s “turn down your thermostats”, and you can see the power that positive thinking has over the electorate. More recently, candidate Barack Obama’s 2008 message of “hope” can be contrasted with his opponent who seemed cranky and out of sorts. Hope wins.

It is understandable that we want to believe in a better tomorrow - it’s all we have. But is it “good” for us? Is being drawn to the candidate who is confident, outgoing, and optimistic healthy for the republic? No.

Research on decision making and from the emerging field of Neuroscience warns us that leaders who are confident, optimistic, and outgoing often prove the most dangerous when in office. And those leaders who are introverts, or characteristically depressed, more often make better, more rational decisions. Although it may seem illogical, history, as well as research, bears this out.

Extroverts capture our imaginations, sometimes our hearts. We like and feel comfortable when our leaders are “people-persons”, when they evidently like themselves and others, when they show confidence and optimism. By contrast, we have a hard time warming up to leaders who can’t warm up to us. Introverts seem aloof, even arrogant. Those who are depressed suck the air out of any room—or nation—they occupy. We are uncomfortable with people like this, and they seem uncomfortable with us.

But let us not allow our hearts get too far in front of our heads. The research on this is unmistakably clear: happy people do not make good decisions. Happy people are prone to be overconfident in their ability to control situations. Happy people often rush to judgment when a more thoughtful, measured response is required. Happy people tend to leap to conclusions and do not take the time or mental energy to consider the hard, tough choices. Happy people are also more prone to take unnecessary risk based on a presupposition that “everything will just work out.”

Introverts, by contrast, are more likely to problem solve in a more direct and logical manner, employ suitable due diligence, think more thoroughly, explore more options, always with an eye on the potential outcomes. Introverts and those who are depressed often visualize a worst-case outcome, so they take the time and effort to explore, examine, try to
indentify the weak points in their arguments and the false chords in their assumptions. If you expect everything to “work out in the end” you will not devote yourself to the hard work of examination and self-examination. If you expect that things might fall apart, you are more careful and reasoned in your problem solving.

Exhibit A is Abraham Lincoln. Historians have long noted that Lincoln suffered from deep and repeated bouts of “melancholy”. As a young man he repeatedly and openly spoke of committing suicide. Similarly, Winston Churchill was plagued by a depression he called his “black dog” that followed him around. In Lincoln’s case, we see how his depression and introverted nature led him to great pain over decisions, yet he was not paralyzed by his suffering. He was in fact ennobled by it. He converted his pain into empathy and understanding, and, being a deeper person, he was able to be a deeper thinker, and a more capable decision maker.

Yes, I know, Richard Nixon was a depressed introvert, so he may well be the exception that proves the rule.

Depression and introversion, in small doses, rather than being impediments to leadership, actually make one a more capable leader and decision maker. Optimistic leaders like John F. Kennedy could be high risk takers as witnessed in both the Bay of Pigs decision (a disaster) and the Cuban Missile Crisis decision (a success). George W. Bush, strutting and playing the over-confident cowboy with far too little thought or planning, embroiled the United States in the disaster of Iraq.

As we face the upcoming 2016 choice of who shall have his hand on the wheel of history, we should keep in mind that often, what it takes to become president (optimism, confidence, self-assurance) is at odds with what is necessary to be an effective president. President Obama seems more the introvert than extrovert. This got him into political hot water when he ended up taking so much time to decide what to do about U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Critics accused him of being weak, vacillating, not being strong. Former President Bill Clinton once remarked, “Americans would rather have a president who is strong and wrong, than weak and right”. But in the case of Obama, being thoughtful, examining a variety of options, thinking deeply was the right thing to do, even if it was not the most politically advantageous course.

And so, let us celebrate the depressed introverts among us. They may be our only saviors in these troubled times. Remember the words of the great American philosopher Woody Allen, “mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
Leading up to the 2008 election, Obama's stirring rhetoric raised the country's expectations. Yet his time in office has left many of these expectations unfulfilled. Despite promises to bridge the party divide in Washington, Obama failed to persuade Congressional Republicans to support his legislative program. He was also unable to enlist Congress as a partner in his efforts to close the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, and several of key elements of his economic and environmental agendas have failed to gain traction in Congress.

While Obama's shortcomings have been disappointing to many, they may not have been so surprising. As I argue in my forthcoming book, *Delivering the People's Message*, the political context for presidents has been challenging for several decades. The presidency experienced a period of high levels of trust and approval, and relatively low party polarization, during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. But beginning with Richard Nixon in 1969, presidents have come into office with lower initial approval ratings – less “political capital” – and higher levels of Congressional polarization. In the post-1980 period, neither party has fully attained dominance, making agendas difficult to define. Obama may have experienced the most severe effects of these long-term conditions, but his situation did not emerge out of nowhere.

Obama’s difficulties with the other branches can also be traced back to the asymmetry of party polarization. While it may be a stretch to call the twenty-first century Republican Party unified, it displays a philosophical and inter-branch coherence that has shaped its relations with the administration. Obama’s Republican predecessors, particularly Reagan and George W. Bush, filled Supreme Court vacancies with reliable conservatives. And the intense and effective messaging of the conservative news media and the Tea Party has made it even more difficult for Republican lawmakers to justify voting with the president to their constituencies.

Although structural conditions play a role in Obama’s success rate, the president’s own choices about communication have contributed as well. As Justin Vaughn and I find in our forthcoming article, “Barack Obama and the Rhetoric of Electoral Logic,” Obama’s rhetorical approach after the 2008 election not only emphasized the party victory, but at times took on antagonistic tone toward Republicans. After a strong victory in 2008, Obama took the partisan road and neglected to frame issues around the common ground he cited in his now-famous address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention.

It is impossible to understand the Obama presidency without taking note of the institutional developments that came before, or without assessing the state of
party polarization, especially in Congress. I have noted that, alongside the rise of party polarization, the prestige of the office has declined. Despite these public misgivings, the role of the president has become ever more prominent as Congress becomes more paralyzed. In response to Congressional inaction, Obama has taken unilateral action on immigration policy, federal marriage law, and environmental regulation, to name a few (Romano and Kaidman 2012). In the second term, it remains to be seen whether Obama can offer leadership in the face of obstructive political circumstances.

The origins of the tensions between the branches are as interesting as they are abundant. However, one question close to the heart of those of us who study the White House is how well Obama’s organization managed the tensions. While polarization was clearly one of the greatest challenges facing them, the White House seemed to accept the problem rather than changing the tone of the debate in Washington. Much of the congressional reaction to Obama was an overheated and melodramatic, but the White House choice to respond in kind help ensure that the votes of some members of congress would remain out of reach. Even as the President himself was cool and conciliatory, plenty of tension streamed out of the White House briefing room or leaked out through less official channels. The administration’s counterattacks elevated their critics’ importance, stirred their anger, and validated their approach. Instead of creating an environment in Washington more conducive to bargaining and cooperation the White House chose to often perpetuate and escalate the war of words.

REFERENCES


FORUM RESPONSE

This tension between the branches may have been unavoidable, but the White House made it easier by allowing the President and his staff to be seen as distant. The lines of communication between the White House and Capitol Hill continue to suffer and the President and his Office of Legislative Affairs were not familiar enough with members of Congress to win friends or develop the political intelligence it needs to construct an effective strategy. Listening to Congress is a key component of congressional liaison and the White House is often not hearing what it needs to know because they have not made themselves insiders on Capitol Hills. Lyndon Johnson continued to reach out to those who opposed him on important and pivotal issues like civil rights because he knew there would be other times he needed their votes later. He also reasoned that even if he did not win their vote, any act of kindness might soften their efforts against him. Obama’s distance from members of Congress and the partisan language coming from his staff and political allies has made opposing the President much easier than it had to be.

It is hard to blame Obama for his lack of enthusiasm for spending more time working with Congress when so many members criticize him harshly and make themselves comfortable with some of the more extreme attacks on his citizenship, religion, and politics. Animosity toward Obama even led Republican leaders to prefer Obama keep his support for some bipartisan proposals under wraps lest it trigger opposition among the rank and file.

Obama seemed to begin his presidency with the best of intentions for bipartisanship and compromise. However, partisan politics has taken its toll as the president and members of Congress became anxious about surviving in an increasingly hostile and unpredictable electorate. Like George W. Bush before him, Obama’s political strategy would get him reelected but left him less able to reach out to members of the opposing party and win the votes needed to win passage for a greater policy legacy.
When it comes to U.S. foreign policymaking, there are certain aspects of the recent strife between the branches that are unique to today and the Obama administration. At the same time, the results that we are seeing now are also reflective of greater historical or systematic changes surrounding presidential foreign policy powers.

First, President Obama’s tumultuous record can be explained in personal terms. The president’s inability and often unwillingness to personally charm adversaries, as Ronald Reagan or Bill Clinton did, has created a vacuum in which critics and political opponents have been only too happy to fill. Consequently, when President Obama fails to clearly explain his foreign policy goals, such as striking Syria, others have been willing to step in and define them using less than flattering language.\(^1\) President Obama’s cautiousness and pragmatism in foreign policy has been described as “sensible and serious but not pathbreaking.”\(^2\) However, as the debate over Syria has shown, the president’s penchant for process and deliberation can often be mistaken for uncertainty – or what opponents might label as weakness.

The low levels of support that President Obama has received on issues of foreign policy can also be explained by a recent ideological shift amongst Republicans and their views on international affairs.\(^3\) In recent years, moderate-internationalist GOP members of Congress, such as Senator Dick Lugar (R-IN), have either retired in the face of increasingly frustrating partisan gridlock or been defeated by the more radical factions of their party. These legislators, who were often counted on to cross the aisle, have now been replaced by officials who put partisanship before principle and see compromise as a dirty word. Some examples of today’s more confrontational, ideological GOP include opposition in the Senate to ratifying uncontroversial treaties such as New START and the Law of the Sea Treaty.\(^4\) As one foreign policy expert recently put it, “GOP leaders stopped being smart foxes and devolved into stupid hedgehogs.”\(^5\)

While some of the characteristics of the Obama administration are distinctive, the current state of partisanship in foreign policy is a byproduct of more systematic structural and institutional changes. Structurally, over the last few decades, foreign policymaking has become more fragmented and complex as the process of globalization has increasingly blurred the distinctions between domestic and foreign policy.\(^6\) A “flatter world”\(^7\) and the resulting “domestication” of American foreign policy have led to greater levels of involvement by more actors within the U.S. government on these new “intermestic” issues.\(^8\) As a consequence, more partisan politics have been introduced into the foreign policy equation. For example, when the Obama administration argues that the key to U.S. foreign policy is the domestic economy, it increases the likelihood of domestic discord.

Institutionally, President Obama holds office at a time when the presidency itself has ceded much of its power and authority to Congress. Since the Vietnam War, the president’s power in foreign policy has been in steady decline. While
the “imperial presidency” briefly reappeared during the immediate post-9/11 era, the trend of diminishing presidential power has continued with the end of the Cold War. President Obama’s decision to go to Congress to receive authorization to use force in Syria exemplifies the weakened condition of the presidency and an increasing level of deference on issues of war and peace.

The future of the president’s role in foreign policymaking will continue to be affected by the trends and developments discussed above, and so future administrations should expect to have the same types of difficulties that President Obama faces today.

Over the past few years, strife between the branches has been substantial. President Obama has received low levels of support in Congress, particularly the House of Representatives. His administration has also had a poor record in his relations with the Supreme Court, winning only about 1/3 of the cases, compared to a typical rate of about 70%. Are these results unique to the Obama presidency or are they characteristic of something more systematic that we have seen historically? How might the current state of politics inform our understanding of the future?

Washington is not working effectively. Basic barometers of functioning institutions and effective policymaking indicate something is amiss. The problems go much deeper than the actions taken by President Obama and his team. Congress now routinely fails to pass budgets and appropriations legislation. It is unable to pay the bills and guide its priorities via the budgetary process, instead relying on brinksmanship in order to keep the government

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running under the cloud of default and sequestration. President Obama and Congress are unable to effectively legislate on numerous national priorities, ranging from immigration to climate change. Measures of legislative productivity indicate that the 112th and 113th Congresses are the least productive in modern history.

There are two explanations for these problems, both of which center on Congress, not the White House. First, the parties in Congress have never been as polarized as they are now—at least not since the era following the Civil War. Second, each of the polarized parties controls one chamber of Congress. Divided government makes for a difficult leadership challenge, but dividing the Congress between the two parties under the context of polarization may prove an impossible situation. No amount of presidential persuasion can ameliorate this situation.

What was once routine policymaking has now become very difficult—more akin to having a cavity filled without anesthetic. With talk of “going nuclear” in the Senate, the brinksmanship has carried over to the confirmation of executive and judicial nominations, weakening the president’s hand in shaping the implementation of policy and the federal judiciary.

Even routine foreign policy matters have become difficult and politicized. For example, the Senate seems unable to process routine treaties and President Obama has largely avoided submitting treaties to the Senate. Obama has submitted far fewer treaties than any modern president, averaging just 7.5 treaties per Congress in his first term, and just three this year. Presidents from Truman to Bush averaged 32 treaty submittals per Congress.

For their part, the Senate has set new record lows in processing treaties, approving just two treaties during the 112th Congress, beating the record low set by the 111th, which approved just seven. Obama’s success rates on treaties on which he has taken a position is 27%, compared the pre-Obama average of 78% (Peake 2013).

In prior work on the domestic politics of treaties, Glen Krutz and I (2009) document the history of the treaty process and the rise in presidents’ use of executive agreements, the more unilateral alternative to treaties. There have been other periods where the treaty-approval process has broken down. From 1869 to 1898, another period with high partisan polarization, the Senate failed to approve a single significant treaty. During the same period, the use of executive agreements took off. However, executive agreements did not completely replace treaties, as presidents routinely submitted significant multilateral agreements to the Senate, as well as the more basic tax and extradition agreements.

More generally, when presidents are faced with an ineffective Congress with whom they must share power, they are more likely to rely on their range of unilateral powers (Howell 2003). Policymaking does not stop because Congress is unable to act; it just takes on an executive sheen. And, since Congress is unable to block unilateral presidential action because it is unable to act on even routine matters, the president may have a freer hand when contemplating executive action.

My expectation for the future is that President Obama and his successors will continue to push the envelope of executive power through
unilateral action. Whether or not Congress will act to effectively restrain the president will depend on its ability to act in the institution’s interest rather than partisan interests.

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FORUM RESPONSE

ASYMMETRIC PARTY GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF POLARIZED PARTIES

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The strife between the branches reflects the extraordinary polarization of the political parties. That President Obama has received less support in Congress than did George W. Bush, however, reflects an asymmetry in this polarization. The Republican Party is drifting more conservative than is the Democratic Party drifting liberal. An implication is that Democratic presidents are less able to govern through legislative means than are Republican presidents. Republican presidents can build winning legislative coalitions in Congress even when they lack partisan majorities in the House and Senate. George W. Bush showed that he could pass legislation with cross-over support from moderate Democrats. Democratic presidents cannot easily draw cross-over support from Republicans and they are more likely to face more defections from their own partisans when they have a majority in Congress.

Political geography currently favors Republicans. The rural bias of the Electoral College, in which less densely populated states...
gain more representation per person than do larger urban states, carries over the U.S. Senate. More Senators come from less densely populated states than large, urban states—the nine largest states have about as many people as the other 41 states. Although there is considerable regional variation, less densely populated states tend to be more conservative than large, urban states. To get majorities in the Senate, the Democrats necessarily have moderates or conservatives who will be more inclined to defect from a liberal Democratic coalition. Representation in the House also has been skewed in a Republican direction. While populations are fairly evenly distributed across congressional districts, the partisanship of people living in congressional districts is not evenly distributed. Republicans used gains in state governments to take advantage of reapportionment and redistricting after the 2010 census to cement their advantage in the House. Democratic leaning voters are more densely packed into safely Democratic districts. Republican leaning voters are distributed across districts—making those districts less safely Republican but increasing the chances that Republicans will carry more districts. Combined with the socioeconomic, demographic, and educational factors involved in voter turn-out, Republicans have a higher natural vote in a given election year in a political map that favors them. Democrats have to work harder to get out their voting base, which is relatively harder in a mid-term election.

Beyond their constituencies, Republican legislators are less likely to cross-over to support a Democratic Party president because they are more likely to face primary challenges from the ideological right of their political party. Democratic legislators less frequently face intra-party primary challenges from the left. This asymmetry means that Republicans face higher electoral risk to their careers when they support a Democratic president, than do Democratic legislators when they support a Republican president.

These considerations affect the legislative opportunities of Democratic and Republican presidents. Democratic presidents have to negotiate with a larger number of legislators representing more conservative states and districts. The same context advantages Republican presidents. The strategy of seeking cross-over votes lends itself to Republican presidents more than Democratic Presidents. Republican presidents can count on party support and can attract cross-over votes from Democrats. Democratic presidents have to hold their own party coalition together—a task that is harder as the number of Democratic legislators gets large because the gains in seats will come from more conservative states and districts. Democratic presidents cannot easily attract Republican cross-overs because Republican legislators know that they face an increased chance of a primary challenge if they cooperate with the enemy.

REFERENCES


TEACHING A MORE ENGAGING PRESIDENCY

IPADS, POLLS, AND THE PRESIDENCY: A SEMESTER USING TECHNOLOGY TO ENGAGE STUDENTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE CLASSROOM

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Over the past few years I noticed that my students seem to be increasingly tethered to an electronic device of some kind. Given that this unlikely to change, I secured a small grant from my university’s library to purchase iPads for students to use for the entire semester in my American Presidency course. iPads are ideal for use inside and outside of class because of their versatility to be an interactive tool, a reference tool, and a productivity tool. The main project for the course tasked students with using the iPads to design, implement, and present the findings from four distinct polls as they related to readings and topics covered in the course. I also found ways to incorporate the iPad during almost every class session by identifying appropriate apps, including news aggregators (Zite, Instapaper) for our daily “news roundtable,” an in-class “clicker” response (Socrative) to be used to “quiz” students about the readings, an off-line polling app (iSurvey) for the polling assignments, as well as standard productivity apps (Pages, Keynote, and Numbers) that were used for presentations and all course assignments. These apps helped students to be better prepared for class discussions and stay more abreast of current events.

The project on polls was assigned at various points in the semester and covered the Republican presidential primaries and caucuses, characteristics of an “ideal” president, Obama’s first term legislative accomplishments, and presidential legacies. While there were specific guidelines for each poll, students had quite a bit of freedom in designing their survey instruments. Students were grouped into threes and each member was required to ask a minimum of fifteen people from the community to take each poll. The in-class presentations included a discussion of the rationale for their poll design and survey methodology, how the questions connected to the readings, their results, and a reflection of their experience.

As the semester progressed, students continuously showed improvement, became more creative, and used the course material in more thoughtful ways which led to more robust class discussions. The poll about Obama’s 2008 campaign promises and whether or not he fulfilled them as well as the one that asked people to “create their ideal president” led to great class discussions about the “expectations gap” and presidential leadership. Both of these polls had questions that referenced the concepts from the applicable course readings (Edwards and Wayne 2010, Genovese 2000, and Achenbach 2008). For the election related poll, in addition to asking questions about the candidates and issues, students showed political ads and measured people’s reactions, something that would not have been possible...
without iPads. In California not many ads were broadcast, so this gave people in the community an opportunity to watch them while participating in the poll. One interesting result was that many of the respondents were reminded to vote in the upcoming primary because of participating in the poll, and this gave students great satisfaction.

Students enjoyed working on the presidential legacies poll the most because they were able to be the most creative. Each group was assigned three presidents (since FDR) and had to use the content from the assigned readings (Campbell et al 2008 and Rockman et al 2012) to write the questions. Students showed pictures to determine whether or not people were able to identify presidents and asked questions to learn about how people remember presidents. Many of their contemporaries could not identify most presidents by their pictures. Perhaps not surprising scandals were the most memorable aspect of presidential legacies and for those without a scandal people were hard pressed to come up with the president’s “legacy.” Some groups also asked questions about presidential rankings and used C-SPAN’s rankings for comparison, which allowed students to see how scholars and the public assess presidents.

Using the iPads allowed me to teach the material in a new and effective way. Students clearly demonstrated their knowledge of the material in their poll design and presentations as well as on the exams. Additionally, these assignments provided an opportunity for students to conduct primary research, albeit in a limited manner, to learn about their community, and motivated them to become more engaged with the upcoming election.

REFERENCES


I suspect that many who read this begin their undergraduate course on the American presidency the same way I begin mine, with a “stern” warning that goes something like this: “This is not a course on presidents. We will not begin with George Washington and end with Barack Obama. Rather, it is a course on the presidency.” Still, I think it is fair to infer that most people who enroll are or have at one time been interested in presidents, and is a reason why they sign up (particularly if they are not political science majors). In my own life, an abiding interest with presidents AND the presidency have been front and center, embedded as deeply in my reservoir of interests as the St. Louis Cardinals or the music of Bob Dylan. It is not an exaggeration to say that I took the first step on the thousand mile journey toward becoming a political scientist when in 1974 at the age of eight I picked up a children’s biography of John F. Kennedy, read it, and was hooked on presidents and politics.¹

For years I have taught, and continue to teach, the presidency from a “new institutionalism” perspective, throwing in examples of individual presidents and administrations as illustrations. About fifteen years ago, after APSA in Washington and being around all the monuments, the White House, and so on, I began to reflect on how the “realpolitik” of presidents was what had drawn me to the study of the presidency in the first place. Soon after, I was reading over some syllabi and I came across one by Cal Mackenzie, and it caught my eye that he assigned students to choose a biography from a list he included in the syllabus. I quickly adapted this practice. I always use a core text, a packet of readings, at least one other supplemental book, and the fourth item is the biography.

The ways in which I have used the biography or memoir have evolved, but generally it works like this. I created and continue to update a lengthy list of biography/memos, categorized by president, and attach it to the syllabus or post it on-line. Students get about a week or so after the semester starts to choose one from that list. The choice of book is limited to those on the list as a measure of quality control. The books on the list are generally “popular,” written by historians, political scientists, journalists, or, of course, presidents themselves or their aids, and not diatribes or polemics for or against a president, though on balance they may lean slightly favorable or critical. The list dates from Franklin Roosevelt to the present, though I have added books that were for whatever reason getting a lot of attention at the time, such as Doris Kearns Goodwin’s book on Abraham Lincoln. There is nothing magical about the New Deal in this scheme, but I try to make the list manageable for me. Indeed, I recently pared...
down the list as it had gotten rather lengthy and several did not focus on a presidential administration in its entirety (e.g. looking only at various episodes in an administration). If a student has a specific interest in another president, or a book not on the list, I will consider it, but I generally limit the choice to those provided. This semester, though, I had a student interested in Warren Harding and we found a book that fit the purposes of the course.

In addition to the exploration of a specific president, another reason for using biography is simple: It fosters critical thinking. I distribute critical thinking questions at the beginning of each topic in the course, and beginning with material and lectures on the electoral process many of the questions specifically implicate the student’s president. For example, when looking at presidential-congressional relations I pose this question (among others), which students must address in writing and be prepared to discuss: “What legislative strategies did your president use most frequently? That is, how did he and his office go about dealing with Congress? How successful was he in dealing with Congress? Link your answer directly to assigned readings and lectures.” I have employed similar questions on exams and paper assignments, though not all questions are focused on the biography.

Some presidents are more popular than others. I teach at Drury University, a small liberal arts college in my hometown of Springfield, Missouri, and someone nearly always chooses a book on Harry S Truman—usually McCullough’s *Truman*, or Alonzo Hamby’s *Man of the People*. Kennedy attracts a lot of interest, and Jim Giglio’s book on *The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* published in the Kansas series gets a lot of attention. The rest is a mixed bag. This semester students chose an interesting crop, including William E. Leuchtenburg’s *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, Bill Clinton’s *My Life*, and George W. Bush’s *Decision Points*. Some of the books are quite long (McCullough doesn’t put Truman in the White House for 400 pages, nor does Clinton doesn’t get to the 1992 campaign until deep into the book), so students they can read the entire book if they like, but may skip to the candidate’s decision to run for office and what follows.

The key is that students are required to analyze presidents in the context of the presidency and American politics writ large. Critical thinking takes pride of place in my course objectives, so having students read and systematically contemplate presidents by moving from abstract theory to the concrete world of politics is enormously useful in meeting those goals. And it keeps students interested and learning. One of the constants of my course evaluations is that students are most interested in seeing not only how political scientists go about studying the presidency, but also how their chosen biography helps illuminate the intersection of theory and practice.2

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2. I am happy to share the biography list with anyone who wishes. Simply contact me at deponder@drury.edu if you would like a copy.
NEW IN PRINT: BOOKS ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY AND EXECUTIVE POLITICS

TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Five years into his presidency, Barack Obama has come under increasing criticism over his use of unilateral directives, such as executive orders, proclamations, and memoranda. But neither the use of unilateral presidential directives nor the criticism of it is new, as presidents have often used unilateral directives to impose controversial policies, and Congress and the courts have at times complained but have seldom offered much real resistance. My book Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential Directives in American Politics (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) seeks to situate recent controversies about unilateral presidential directives in a broader context. Its main argument is this:

In unilateral presidential directives, American political development has witnessed a dramatic expansion of presidential power that rests on vague justifications and has gone relatively unchecked. This development has roots in the Constitution’s ambiguity and the character of executive power. But the rise of more activist central governance from the Progressive era onward – advanced first by Theodore Roosevelt and then by a variety of successors, with congressional, judicial, and popular acquiescence – has led to extensive governance by unilateral presidential directives. This state of affairs has strengths as well as weaknesses, but it is hard to reconcile with robust conceptions of democracy.

My analysis of the development of unilateral presidential directives distinguishes several preconditions and stages. The preconditions are constitutional ambiguity and judicial sanction, and together they enabled the development of unilateral presidential directives, which itself was caused by presidential assertion. The Constitution does not mention unilateral presidential directives, so their status is bound up with the broader question of the scope of executive power. The judiciary first endorsed the constitutionality of unilateral presidential directives – subject to constitutional and congressional restrictions – by the time the nation was only 23 years old, fully 140 years before the Court famously reiterated those limits in striking down Harry Truman’s seizure of the steel industry in 1952.

Notwithstanding the early judicial acceptance of unilateral presidential directives, presidents did not much use this new policymaking tool for some time. But the nature of unilateral

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Presidential directives changed dramatically with Theodore Roosevelt, who found in them the perfect means to implement his “stewardship” view of the presidency at the vanguard of an active government. TR issued almost as many executive orders as all of his predecessors combined, and he did so for controversial purposes, provoking sharp conflicts with Congress.

The regular use of unilateral presidential directives was not just an aberration under TR but rather became entrenched over the next half dozen presidencies, including not only TR’s progressive brethren Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, but also the four more reserved presidents who served between the two Roosevelts. The number of executive orders declined after FDR, as presidents turned to other devices like executive memoranda to enact their policy preferences, but the use of unilateral directives has figured prominently in areas like national security, labor, civil rights, and environmental protection. Even with evolving issue areas, periodic congressional resistance, and the occasional court case striking down a directive, odds are that presidents will continue to use unilateral directives for significant purposes.

Beyond the details of this broad development, my analysis has implications for several longstanding academic debates, including the roots of presidential power, the modern presidency, the nature of political development, and interbranch relations. These considerations indicate that the development of unilateral presidential directives is not some minor, isolated phenomenon; rather, it influences and is influenced by much of what is important and interesting in American politics.

I suppose the best way to talk about my book is to begin by saying that drone warfare took everyone by surprise. The nation’s attention was fixed on the newly fashionable military outlook summed up under the rubric Counterinsurgency or COIN. President George W. Bush had painted himself into a corner with statements about “Mission Accomplished” dressed in a flying suit on an aircraft carrier. The second Iraq War did not go that way, however, and Bush fell back on the “Surge” and a savior general, David Petraeus, to bail out the nation using tactics that at least bought breathing space – if not the accomplishment of all (or even most of) the nation’s goals.

Against that background, a new president, Barack Obama, assigned a similar mission to Petraeus in the long underestimated war in Afghanistan. By the time Petraeus got there...
in mid 2010 a big change had taken place in military thinking. The general promised he was not changing strategy or tactics, but something had definitely changed. It had long been assumed that the war in Afghanistan could not be won without eliminating enemy strongholds and launching points in neighboring Pakistan. Obama had actually forecast the situation in a speech at the Wilson Center in 2007 as he launched his presidential campaign, talking about the wild and inaccessible frontiers of the area that made it difficult to use conventional weapons or ground troops to eliminate the threat. One very large obstacle was that Pakistan would not tolerate “boots on the ground,” and the Al Qaeda “infection” had spread outward as well to Yemen and other places. Indeed, it became difficult, from official statements, to determine exactly who the enemy was and how COIN could succeed on the basis of current strategy.

In this atmosphere, the drone looked to be the best option. CIA director Leon Panetta even dubbed it the “only game in town,” even as the Administration made no official recognition of individual missions to the public. To add to the confusion, drone warfare was being conducted by two separate entities in the government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. An official from the CIA offered a comment that summed up the situation, and became the title of the book. He told a reporter that in the past decade the Agency had become a “killing machine.”

My book is centered on the rapid growth of drone warfare, and how presidents, especially, of course, President Obama, have sought to square the use of the CIA as a kind of private army to achieve military ends. It is concerned with the role of the Office of Legal Counsel in supplying justifications – most of which have never been declassified except in a composite White Paper produced under duress when the president was anxious to name his drone “Czar” John Brennan to head the Agency.

From the outset there have been serious questions about whether drone warfare constitutes a legitimate response to the new forms of warfare waged since 9/11, or constitutes an assassination program. The use of so-called signature strikes raises further questions about whether it can ever be legal under international law to attack suspected groups relying only upon questionable intelligence.

The Administration’s case has largely been one, ever since State Department legal counselor, Harold Koh, gave a speech to international lawyers in 2010, that President Obama can be trusted to wage war in accord with international standards. His speech was followed by a succession of other speeches including those by John Brennan and Eric Holder that all follow similar patterns.

The argument that drone warfare has been effective on a purely military basis or as political intimidation (another objective – but one less spoken about), has never been demonstrated. And my book is an effort to initiate debate on all these issues.
Presidents and the Dissolution of the Union is the third in a series of books that characterize the leadership styles of sequences of presidents and assess them in terms of their strengths and weaknesses in the realms of public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style and emotional intelligence. The book examines six Civil War era presidents – James K. Polk, Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Abraham Lincoln.

Polk is generally recognized by historians to have been the most effective president of the period from Andrew Jackson to Abraham Lincoln. He set a series of goals for his presidency and accomplished every one of them, presiding over a war with Mexico that vastly increased the nation’s size. However, he failed to foresee that there would be bitter contention between the North and South over the status of slavery in the territory acquired from Mexico (which is known as the Mexican Cession).

Zachary Taylor was a roughhewn professional soldier who advanced a divisive plan for addressing the issue of slavery in the Mexican Cession. Taylor’s plan became moot when he died in July of his first year in office. Taylor’s successor was Vice President Millard Fillmore, a politically skilled moderate Whig who helped broker a compromise that delayed the Civil War by a decade.

The turbulent decade of the 1850’s was presided over by two of the most flawed presidents in the nation’s history – Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. Both men were northern politicians with southern convictions. Pierce stoked regional conflict by advancing the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a measure that authorized slavery in areas in which it had been banned. Buchanan’s actions further divided the North and the South. By the time he stepped down, seven states had seceded and the nation was on the brink of war.

Abraham Lincoln is widely viewed to have been the nation’s greatest chief executive. He had the self-confidence to appoint his four competitors for his party’s nomination to his cabinet and he was noteworthy for his sense of timing, persistence in promoting his purposes, and ability to advance them with unequalled eloquence.

The tragedy of the Civil War had many causes. Important among them was the above-mentioned cast of characters.
As we note in the preface to *The Wartime President*, this is not the book we intended to write. Not at all. Reacting to a literature on wars and presidential power that is long on historical case studies and grand claims and short on quantitative evidence and theory, we intended to write a short, critical essay that would dispel—or at least clarify—some of the conventional claims advanced on the subject. The evidence, however, did not cooperate. While expecting to find that congressional voting patterns remained reasonably stable as the nation moved into and out of war, we instead found widespread evidence of members falling behind the president's domestic policy agenda during times of war—or, more exactly, during some wars, particularly World War II and the post-September 11 military ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq. Evidence of congressional accommodation, moreover, proved especially robust in domestic policies that only tangentially related to the war efforts themselves. Interestingly, though, other wars—notably the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War—did not augment the president's influence within Congress nearly so greatly.

We then set to work on constructing some theory that would make sense of this pattern of results that we had no expectation of finding. The result is a book very much in the EITM tradition, blending formal theory with quantitative evidence and historical case studies, each meant to advance our basic understanding of how wars can reshape executive-legislative relations—often, but not always, to the president's advantage. In addition to clarifying what it is about wars that can augment the president's influence at home, we also think we have identified how the president's uniquely national vantage point on policy matters is a source of inter-branch policy conflict that extends well beyond the kinds of partisan and ideological disputes that presidency scholars are accustomed to studying.
CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT 2012: STRATEGY AND TACTICS

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This book, the third volume in the George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management’s Series on Applied Politics, examines the strategy and tactics underlying the 2012 presidential election. Political scientists specializing in campaigns and elections and political consultants have contributed to this volume. Long-time Washington insider David Rehr examines the formidable challenges facing Obama as he seeks re-election while Michael John Burton, Ohio University, analyzes the strategic positioning of Republican candidates during the primaries. Anthony Corrado, Colby College, looks at the money race in an era of seemingly unlimited funding. Julie Germany, vice-president of digital strategy for a major political consulting firm, examines the advances in campaign technology. Evan Tracey, former president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group, writes about the use and misuse of political advertising. Charles Cushman, Georgetown University, examines the major issues of the campaign, while Henry Sun, University of Chester, and Dennis Johnson look at the reality and rhetoric behind the issues of jobs and the economy. Tad Devine, veteran Democratic consultant who had battled against Mitt Romney in earlier contests, examines how Obama prepared for re-election, while long-time Republican strategist Tom Edmonds characterizes the Romney campaign as the last 20th century campaign. Stephen K. Medvic, Franklin & Marshall College, examines the impact of Super PACs, parties and other non-candidate actors, and Matthew J. Streb, Northern Illinois University, looks at the Democrats general election strategy. Finally, Michael Cornfield, George Washington University, summarizes this election, looking at the twelve consequential choices made by the Romney and Obama campaigns. Editor Dennis W. Johnson has written the introductory chapter and assembled the detailed appendices, which include a timeline of the presidential election, short biographical entries for all of the candidates, information on campaign spending, selected advertising scripts, state-by-state results of the primaries and general election, and—unique among presidential campaign books—a detailed listing of the major campaign staff and consultants for Romney and Obama. The final appendix features some of the humorous or outlandish things said by candidates, from Herman Cain’s “9-9-9”, to Romney’s “47 Percent,” and Rick Perry’s “Oops” moment.
TAKING THE MEASURE: THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH

The chapters in this book are the products of a conference on the George W. Bush presidency at the University of Arkansas. The conference sponsored by the Fulbright Institute of International Relations and the Blair Center of Southern Politics and Society in the J. William Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Arkansas.

Donald R. Kelley, organizer of the conference, arranged a schedule that allowed each conference participant to present their paper to the other conference participants. This allowed each chapter writer to sharpen their arguments through scholarly interaction with other conference participants. The conference concluded with a public forum videotaped and later broadcast by C-SPAN.

During the seminar, participants discussed many aspects of the George W. Bush presidency, including questions of international security, presidential competence, racial justice, campaigns and voter alignments. Though seminar participants had divergent views regarding the Bush presidency, constructive scholarly discussion characterized the sessions.

The edited book on the Bush presidency is the second of a series drawn from conferences on the American presidency and sponsored by the Fulbright Institute and Blair Center. The first conference, held in 2002, resulted in the publication of The Clinton Riddle: Perspectives on the Forty-second President (University of Arkansas Press, 2004).

As they did in the seminar, chapter writers differed on important aspects of Bush’s legacy. Disagreement over his use of unilateral powers, initiation of the Iraq war and domestic policy record can be found in chapters of the book. But the rancor and vituperation issued by other authors in defense or criticism of Bush is refreshingly absent in this volume. Participants did agree, however, that the George W. Bush presidency was a highly consequential one.
The 21st century began with an extraordinary imbalance in world power. The United States was the only country able to project military force globally; it represented more than a quarter of the world economy, and had the world’s leading soft power resources in its universities and entertainment industry. International relations theorists tend to explain this change in terms of structural forces that would occur regardless of human agency. In this book, I ask whether presidents were essential to the establishment of American primacy, or was it an “accident of history” which would have occurred no matter what type of leader occupied the Oval Office? To answer this question, I look at the leaders who presided over the key periods of the creation of American primacy. Then I use counterfactual history to ask what types of decisions might have been made if a most plausible alternative had been president in their stead. Would history have turned out the same. In about half the cases, I conclude that it would but in the other half, not. But the ones who mattered were not necessarily those one might have expected.

The second question I turn to in the book is what type of presidential leadership matters.

Leadership experts extol the virtues of transformational leaders who set out bold objectives and take risks to change the world. Analysts tend to downplay the role of transactional leaders with more modest objectives as mere managers. Looking back over the past century, some presidents tried with varying degrees of success to forge a new international order while others sought mainly to manage America’s existing position. But looking at the leaders who presided over the key periods of expansion of American primacy, I found to my surprise that while transformational presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan changed how Americans see the world, transactional presidents like Dwight Eisenhower and George H.W. Bush were sometimes more effective and more ethical. I would not have come to this unconventional conclusion before I undertook my research.

The third question I address, is the ethics of presidential decision making in foreign policy. The third chapter of the book lays out criteria for judging the ethics of presidential decisions in terms of goals, means and consequences. I look at the key presidents not in terms just of their effectiveness, but also their ethics, and assign scorecards to each.

In the concluding chapter, I look at the experience of the two 21st century presidents and suggest that President Obama and his successors should beware of thinking that transformational proclamations are the key to successful adaptation to the rapidly changing politics of a global information age. American power and leadership will remain crucial for stability and prosperity at home and abroad, but honing their contextual intelligence and remembering their transactional predecessors’ observance of the Hippocratic oath (“above all, do no harm”) will provide future presidents better guidance than stirring calls for transformational leadership.
**OBAMA’S POLITICAL SAGA: FROM BATTLING HISTORY, RACIALIZED RHETORIC, AND GOP OBSTRUCTIONISM TO RE-ELECTION**

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*Obama’s Political Saga* is grounded in the U.S. historical experiences of African Americans who have battled systemic racism from the days of slavery and the Jim Crow era to another form of racism that would deny Americans of color their Constitutional rights and wanting Mexican immigrants to self-deport themselves to Mexico.

*Obama’s Political Saga* relies on ideology and hegemonic politics to explain America’s continued practice of racism from the protetariate the most elite members of society. As the first African American president, Obama battled systemic racism in his first term with Radical conversatives and the Tea Party adamantine to subject Obama to the worst kind of racialized rhetoric any president has had to endure from downright disrespect and degradation, what Ismael Reed calls the “nigger breaking” tactic to political beat Obama with the whip of eliminationist rhetoric and relentless GOP obstructionism to deny him any degree of success by making him a first term president. Consequently, the Tea Party adamatine Tea has pulled the Established Republican Party to the extreme right making it impossible for the GOP to compromise with Obama to lead this country to some semblance of economic prosperity. By using systemic racism to drive this research, it explains the reason half of the American people have become enslaved to the racialized as well as the eliminationist rhetoric of the conservative power elite. What is not new in politics is that a certain segment of the electorate still vote against their own interests. Yet, there is the power elite that would prefer to fill the coffers of politicians with the corrupting influence of money who are too willing to let the rich influence government tax policy that would benefit the wealthiest U.S. citizens.

Obama won re-election because the Obama team relied on the changing demographics while the GOP engaged in culture wars with the electorate and leaned heavily on the old-order post-Reconstruction conservative party to woo older whites, white males, and southern states, where some still believe in the ideology of the Confederacy and General Robert E. Lee, their Civil War icon, who commanded the Confederate Army in the American Civil War to preserve the institution of slavery. Consequently, Obama won re-election largely with the help of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and women but single women posed the most serious threat to the GOP. Single women refuse to have their bodies politicized and the women who embrace the conservative party have, in essence, become enslaved to the new masters’ dictates, for they know their place and are in complicit with their own oppression.

In spite of the insurmountable obstructionist behavior of the GOP, Obama went on to win a second term with a lion’s share of the electoral votes as well as winning the popular vote. Therefore, *Obama’s Political Saga* serves as a counter-narrative to the anti-Obama narratives to help us engage in genuine political and intellectual debate about the first African American president and his legacy.
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR DISCONTENT: STABILITY WITHOUT SUCCESS

Our book originated with Todd Eberly’s research revealing stable national electoral alignments since the 1960s. We further developed our book by drawing upon the path-breaking research of political scientists John Aldrich and Richard Niemi, who had previously detected the advent of a “Fifth Party System” in the 1960s. Our subsequent investigation of other national governing institutions revealed how they, like the party system, all had been transformed from 1955–1980. Key presidential, congressional, bureaucratic and judicial behaviors and traits remarkably have remained stable during the decades since then. A new American political system of paradoxical constancy had arisen from 1955–1980 and is with us still.

This book is designed for use in American Government courses, from survey classes to more focused courses on the national political system, including classes on Parties and Elections, the Presidency, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy. In it, we place the operation of each of these national political institutions in broader systemic perspective.

Our book’s theme will surprise some readers. Despite considerable political turbulence in national politics since the 1960s, we found considerable stability in the national political system over the last four decades, displayed with empirical evidence throughout our chapters. Two traits have simultaneously served to produce electoral turbulence but systemic stability during that time: widespread popular discontent with national government and the increasing dominance of occupational professionalism among the ranks of those who govern our nation. Popular discontent produces regular spasms of electoral turbulence, but professional government has remained a stable and defining characteristic of our national political system since the 1960s.
I argue that three main shifts occurred during the Roosevelt administration: power moved from the states to the national government; within the national government, it moved from Congress to the Executive; and internationally, it moved from the empires of Europe (colonial Britain and the military dictatorships of the USSR and Germany) to the United States. Those shifts did not merely happen by mistake. They were not inevitable; they had to be argued for. The American people had to be persuaded to accept new roles for their government, their president, and their nation. In many ways, that argument was not easily made, and Roosevelt faced considerable resistance to his philosophy and the programs based on that philosophy. His persuasive effort was accomplished over time, in a variety of venues, and can best be understood through Roosevelt’s understanding of the metaphor of neighborliness. “The Good Neighbor” was not just the label for FDR’s foreign policy concerning Latin America. It was also the philosophical warrant for his entire presidency. In this book, I tease out the elements of neighborliness (shared commitment to specific values; actions based on those values; a clear delineation of friends and enemies; a commitment to a rich understanding of civil discourse; and an extension of this understanding of political democracy into an international context). All of these elements combined to make a powerful case for the extension of governmental power exercised by a strong national executive; they all continue to have consequences for the theory and practice of American politics.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK: WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL GRANTS

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In *Presidential Pork*, John Hudak explains and interprets presidential efforts to control federal spending and accumulate electoral rewards from that power. Certainly, presidential pork barrel spending does not garner as much attention as projects that members of Congress secure for their constituents. Robert Byrd, for example, was renowned for his prowess at bringing federal dollars to his home state of West Virginia, and political pundits still chuckle about the “Bridge to Nowhere.” But Hudak clearly illustrates that while Congress claims credit for earmarks and pet projects, the practice is alive and well in the White House, too. More than any representative or senator, presidents engage in pork barrel spending in a comprehensive and systematic way to advance their electoral interests. It will come as no surprise that presidents target the federal largesse toward “swing states,” where the electoral stakes are highest. The White House often influences the enormous federal bureaucracy to spend funds in states that are “in play,” and this capacity cannot be matched by challengers. It is a major advantage that only incumbents enjoy.

Hudak reconceptualizes the way in which we view the U.S. presidency and the goals and behaviors of those who hold the nation’s highest office. He dissects the mechanisms and techniques presidents employ in order to make federal agencies responsive to his or her needs. Hudak reveals not only what White Houses have done in distributing presidential pork, but also how they go about it. The result is an illuminating and highly original take on presidential power and public policy.
AROUND THE DISCIPLINE: AWARD ANNOUNCEMENTS

THE MARTHA JOYNT KUMARFOUNDERS AWARD (PH.D)

Martha Joynt Kumar Founders Award for the best paper presented by a Ph.D. holding scholar; 2012—in honor of Founders Award in honor of Erwin Hargrove; formerly the Fred Greenstein Award

2013

Stephen Weatherford, University of California at Santa Barbara

“Obama and the Economy: The Financial Crisis, the Fed, and the Inequality Agenda”

GEORGE C. EDWARDS III DISSERTATION AWARD

Given annually for the best dissertation in presidency research completed and accepted during the previous calendar year.

2013

John Hudak, Vanderbilt University


RICHARD E. NEUSTADT BOOK AWARD

For the best book published that contributed to research and scholarship in the field of the American presidency.

2013

Jean M. Yarbrough, Bowdoin College

_Theodore Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition_ (University of Kansas Press, 2012)
AROUND THE DISCIPLINE: AWARD ANNOUNCEMENTS

OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP BOOK OF THE YEAR

2013

Thomas E. Cronin, Colorado College, and Michael A. Genovese, Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles

_Leadership Matters: Unleashing The Power Of Paradox_

THE DAVID NAVEH FOUNDER’S AWARD (GRADUATE)

David Naveh Founder’s Award for the best paper presented by a graduate student; 2010-Founders Award in honor of Stephen Wayne; formerly the Michael Grossman Award.

2013

Rachel Potter, University of Michigan

“Strategic Transparency in Agency Rulemaking”

THE FOUNDERS AWARD (UNDERGRADUATE)

Founders Award for the best paper written by an undergraduate student.

2013

Lisa McAlister, University of North Texas

“Exploration of Ticket Splitting: The Battleground State Effect”
AROUND THE DISCIPLINE: CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS

CONFERENCE ON THE GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENCY

Hofstra University is pleased to announce that its Conference on the George W. Bush Presidency will take place March 24-26, 2015. Hofstra has a long and distinguished tradition of hosting conferences on the administrations of all the Presidents of the United States who have served during the University’s lifetime, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt forward. During each conference, Hofstra brings together scholars, policy makers, and journalists for a series of panels and roundtables to discuss a president’s campaign, political leadership, policy agenda, and legacy. The University has published volumes of selected articles and commentary from every conference, which have become standard scholarly volumes and early oral histories of each presidency.

For more conference details and the Call for Papers, see the link below. Paper proposals are due January 8, 2014, and the program committee will make selections in Spring 2014. We welcome your submissions.

http://www.hofstra.edu/Community/culctr/gwb/gwb_callforpapers.html