Greetings!

In this edition we begin with a feature from Bruce Altschuler, profiling the recent play All The Way, which profiles presidential politics in the 1960s. The stage production revisits a period of political nostalgia that well informs the current political environment in which we live.

This edition also shines light on the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, focusing on our discipline at its best and its worst. The forum discusses—often with humor—what was the disastrous, fire-plagued conference in which Mr. Smith Goes to Washington met Backdraft. We use our PEP members to discuss their conference experience—one the discipline will not soon forget.

In turning to the serious, we review this year’s PEP section award winners. These awards for best book, best paper by a Ph.D.-holding scholar, best paper by a graduate student, and best undergraduate paper illustrate the finest work of the year among presidency and executive politics scholars, and work the authors and the subfield can be proud.

Finally, this PEP Report also profiles a variety of book reviews. The books pan a variety of topics from media and foreign policy to presidential environmental policy to an effort to rehabilitate “maligned presidents” and offer tremendous contributions to both research and the classroom.

Best,

John Hudak and Justin S. Vaughn
The PEP Report is published twice annually on behalf of the Presidents & Executive Politics Section of the American Political Science Association.

The PEP Report serves the scholarly community in presidential and executive politics. The editors of the Report welcomes your submissions and ideas.

PEP OFFICERS

PRESIDENT
B. Dan Wood
Texas A&M University
bdanwood@polisci.tamu.edu

VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT
Brandice Canes-Wrone
Princeton University
bcwrone@princeton.edu

SECRETARY-TREASURER
Andrew Rudalevige
Bowdoin College
arudalev@bowdoin.edu

PAST PRESIDENT
Steven Schier
Carleton College
sschier@carleton.edu

PEP WEBMASTER
Justin S. Vaughn
Boise State University
justinvaughn@boisestate.edu

PEP EDITORIAL TEAM

EDITORS
Justin S. Vaughn
Boise State University
justinvaughn@boisestate.edu

John Hudak
The Brookings Institution
jhudak@brookings.edu

GRAPHIC DESIGN
Emily Parsons
emily.m.parsons@gmail.com

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PRESIDENTIAL NOSTALGIA

Did you ever think you would long for the days when Lyndon Johnson was wheeling and dealing? Given the dysfunction and polarization of contemporary Washington, nostalgia for LBJ no longer seems as bizarre as it might have when the invasion of Iraq was uppermost in Americans’ minds. If only Barack Obama could cajole like the master manipulator LBJ, perhaps congress would pass transformative legislation. Robert Schenkkan’s play, All the Way, depicts the first year of Johnson’s presidency, concentrating on the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Johnson’s campaign to win election to the presidency in his own right.

During the first half of the twentieth century, playwrights portrayed presidents as great men overcoming major challenges and minor personal flaws. One of the most successful was Robert Sherwood’s Pulitzer Prize winning Abe Lincoln in Illinois which focused on Lincoln’s internal struggle to reconcile his opposition to slavery with his desire to preserve the union, ending with his election to the presidency and departure from Springfield to Washington, DC. By the late 1960s, however, increased public cynicism made heroic presidents less appealing to audiences. The last successful Broadway effort was Dore Schary’s 1958 drama about Franklin Roosevelt, Sunrise at Campobello. Less than ten years later, it was the satirical MacBird! that attracted theatergoers. A 1993 revival of Abe Lincoln in Illinois failed. Modern theater audiences seemed to prefer the complexity of the less than heroic Richard Nixon to even such great presidents as Lincoln and George Washington.

Schenkkan’s play revives the great person theory of the presidency, even if LBJ is far more flawed than Lincoln or FDR. It won the Edward M. Kennedy Prize for Drama Inspired by American History, awarded yearly to a new play “that enlists theater’s power to explore the past of the United States, to participate meaningfully in the great issues of our day through public conversation.” In an extensive interview at the Kennedy Prize’s website, Schenkkan, a Pulitzer Prize winner in 1992 for his series of one act plays, The Kentucky Cycle, stated that Johnson is “too big for the screen ... perfect for epic theater.” By epic theater, he means a play that deals with major social issues, has a large cast (in this case more than 20 actors playing some 50 parts) and takes place over an extended period of time.

The Kentucky Cycle was so commercially unappealing that it became the first play to win a Pulitzer without any kind of New York City production. When it finally appeared on Broadway late in 1993, it lasted only for 15 previews and 33 performances. All the Way, might seem nearly as unlikely to generate a profit given its subject matter, large cast and
PRESIDENTIAL NOSTALGIA

nearly three hour running time, but its salvation was that Bryan Cranston, fresh from his very popular cable television program, *Breaking Bad*, was cast in the lead.

In order to succeed, historical plays need to avoid becoming mere civics lessons and to reshape real events and characters for dramatic purposes. *All the Way* is largely a theatrical civics lesson that uses a variety of spoonfuls of sugar to make that lesson go down relatively easily. It consists of a series of rapidly paced short scenes. Cranston, who is officially listed at five foot eleven, makes little attempt to look like the much taller Johnson. However, he sets a frenetic pace, never content to do just one thing at a time. While engaging in crucial conversations, whether in person or on the phone, he is also performing everyday tasks, getting fitted for clothes or even having his hair cut. Fortunately for the audience, Schenkkan does not show LBJ's penchant for continuing to talk even while seated on the toilet. Phone conversations are kept short as LBJ presses his argument, makes a threat or presents an incentive, then hangs up before the other party has much chance to reply, a sure fire laugh getter, at least the first couple of times. Like Lincoln, Johnson often makes his points through folksy humorous story telling although in a more vulgar way. During the performance I attended, the audience laughed at every epithet, seeming to enjoy the contrast between the dignified image presidents, even Richard Nixon, hope to present to the public and what we believe they say in private. Schenkkan has explained that although he had to invent most of the dialogue, he tried not to be “unfair” to any characters.

The play also uses what might be termed hindsight humor, easy laughs at the expense of characters whose weaknesses and hypocrisy are far more evident today than they were at the time. J. Edgar Hoover is the most obvious target. For example, when Johnson’s aide Walter Jenkins is arrested for soliciting in a men’s room, Johnson asks Hoover, how you can tell when someone is “that way.” A cartoonish George Wallace and other segregationists also provide targets too tempting to resist.

In order to explain events of half a century ago to members of the audience not fully familiar with them, Schenkkan uses multimedia to avoid too much exposition. The play opens with pictures of John Kennedy’s fatal motorcade. Titles are projected both to inform the audience of the time and place of events and to create a countdown to the 1964 election. Despite this, there is still a significant amount of clunky dialogue to supply necessary information.

Schenkkan makes it easier to follow the large number of characters by dividing them into groups: White House aides, southern segregationists, civil rights leaders etc. This adds dramatic conflict by showing the debates over strategy within each group. The heated discussion among black leaders between the cautious Roy Wilkins and the more militant Bob Moses and Stokely Carmichael, with Martin Luther King, Jr., played quite charismatically by Brandon J. Dirden, refereeing from the middle is particularly illuminating. The one group that is slighted is liberals. Because they are represented almost entirely by Senator Hubert Humphrey, their internal debates are minimized, except for a few conversations between Hubert and Muriel Humphrey who fret over Johnson’s
PRESIDENTIAL NOSTALGIA

constant dangling of the vice-presidential nomination to assure Humphrey's loyalty. Robert Kennedy, who is only briefly mentioned, does not even appear in the play. Even though it is hard to suggest adding dialogue and characters to such a long play with so many parts, this omission unbalances the debate and minimizes the Attorney General's role. For example, when three young civil rights workers disappeared (and were eventually found to have been murdered) in Mississippi in 1964, an event explored at length in the play, it was Kennedy who not only informed Johnson, but also he who, in a telephone message that was recorded by the White House system, urged that the president express his "personal concern for them and their families." LBJ's first reply, about twenty minutes later, was "I'm afraid that if I start housemothering each kid that's gone down there and that doesn't show up, that we'll have this White House full of people every day asking for sympathy."  

Watching Johnson cajole, manipulate, threaten, and make deals in order to get the congressional support necessary to pass the civil rights bill and overcome a Senate filibuster makes for a dramatic first act. The key question for Schenkkan is what means justify such a worthy goal. When LBJ agrees to remove the voting rights section from the bill, he tells a skeptic, "this is not about principle, it's about votes." Nevertheless, he gains Republican Senate leader Dirksen's support both by appealing to his vanity and his sense of what is right.

Because the subject of the second act is Johnson's overwhelming election victory, Schenkkan has to work much harder to pump up the action. He exaggerates Wallace's threat when in fact there was no doubt that LBJ would be the Democratic nominee. In the handful of states that had contested primaries, Johnson chose to remain above the battle and not only not campaign or advertise, but not even have his name listed on the ballot. Instead, Maryland Senator Daniel Brewster and Wisconsin and Indiana Governors John Reynolds and Matthew Welsh, each with his own liabilities, served as stand-ins, making it easy for voters with a variety of motivations to cast a protest vote.

Equally exaggerated is any threat from Republican nominee Barry Goldwater. Both the published and Johnson's own internal polls showed a likely landslide victory throughout the campaign. Although nothing that Johnson did had much effect on this outcome, the great person theory suggests that we look at his actions rather than outside forces or social causes. The second act concentrates on the fight over seating the integrated delegation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the national convention either along with or instead of the official state party's all white delegates. Johnson was able to strong-arm King and some of his allies into accepting a proposal that seated their delegation while only granting it two votes, one by a white member, the other by an African-American, without unseating the regulars. All of this maneuvering had little or no effect on the election results. Even if Johnson did lose five southern states along with Goldwater's home state of Arizona, his 61% of the popular vote carried the remaining forty-four. The convention fight over seating the Freedom Democratic Party delegation made no significant difference in the vote in the South which reflected larger racial issues that
PRESIDENTIAL NOSTALGIA

ultimately resulted in a realignment of the South from Democratic to Republican and much of the North in the opposite direction. Schenkkan also heightens the dramatic tension by depicting Dr. King’s Nobel acceptance speech and the FBI’s sending of a blackmail letter to him as if they occurred simultaneously, when they actually took place three months apart.

The flaw of the great person theory embraced by All the Way is that it largely ignores social forces and other factors beyond the control of even the greatest of presidents. Changes in public opinion and the growing role of the media, particularly television were among the factors creating the climate favorable to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, in the year after All the Way ends, the Voting Rights Act. Presidents do make a difference at the margins, but conditions were ripe for the passage of a major civil rights act. Johnson’s skills hastened that passage and resulted in a stronger law than if a less committed and legislatively gifted president had been in office. However, if a contemporary LBJ replaced Barack Obama, it seems unlikely that in the present circumstances he could convince congress to pass a progressive agenda, although it is fun imagining a conversation between two Texans of such different sensibilities as Johnson and Ted Cruz.

Nevertheless, during a time when Broadway plays prefer frivolity to serious topics, All the Way is worth seeing. It won Tony awards for best new play and for Bryan Cranston as best actor in a leading role. Audiences liked it enough that it turned a profit. Big issues are presented in an entertaining and surprisingly suspenseful way. Schenkkan asks the important question of when worthy ends justify questionable means. His LBJ is a far more complex figure than we see on stage, in film or on television. Schenkkan shows that the very qualities that made him such a great persuader such as an absolute focus on his own goals and the ability to cajole and manipulate also led to such cruel actions as his abandonment of long time loyal aide Walter Jenkins after his arrest, dangling the vice-presidential nomination in front of Humphrey as if it were a rabbit in a dog race, and verbal abuse of his wife. How much nostalgia should we feel for such a president?

Although the play’s limited run ended June 29, its success guarantees that audiences will be able to see it in the future. In addition to the likelihood that regional theater companies will produce their own versions, Steven Spielberg, having succeeded with his film Lincoln, plans to have Cranston star in a television version of the play. Schenkkan has already written a sequel, The Great Society, that recently premiered at the Oregon Shakespeare Festival, although, as with their original production of All the Way, with an actor other than Cranston as LBJ. Is All the Way a unique event or does it herald a theatrical revival of the president who changed the world for the better?

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2 For more on this subject, see Bruce E. Altschuler, Acting Presidents: 100 Years of Plays About the Presidency, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

3 http://kennedyprize.columbia.edu/winners/2013/schenkkan/page/interview-robert-schenkkan


FEATURED ARTICLES

THE 2013-14 PEP AWARDS:

Richard E. Neustadt Award for best book on the presidency published in the preceding year:


Award Committee members:
Chair — Andrew Rudalevige, Bowdoin College; Karen Hult, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Mark A. Peterson, UCLA Meyer and Renee Luskin School of Public Affairs; Bert Rockman, Purdue University; Roderick P. Hart, University of Texas. Founders

Award honoring Martha Joynt Kumar for the best paper on executive politics authored by a PhD-holding scholar at the previous year’s APSA annual meeting:

Andrew Rudalevige, Bowdoin College, Bargaining with the Bureaucracy: Executive Orders and the Transaction Costs of Unilateral Action.

Award Committee members:
Chair — Douglas L. Kriner, Boston College; Sharice D. Thrower, University of Pittsburgh; Brian Newman, Pepperdine University; Jasmine Farrier, University of Louisville.

Founders Award honoring David Naveh for the best paper on executive politics presented by a graduate student at either the preceding year’s APSA meeting or at a regional meeting in 2013-14:

Janna Rezaee, University of California-Berkeley, OIRA: The Other Edge of the Sword.

Award Committee members:
Chair — David E. Lewis, Vanderbilt University; Matthew N. Beckmann, University of California-Irvine; Patricia L. Sykes, American University; Daniel J. Galvin, Northwestern University.

Best Undergraduate Paper on executive politics completed in the academic year 2013-14:

Aaron Goodman, Dartmouth College, Presidential Delegation of Foreign Policy Powers.

Award Committee members:
Chair — Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston; Julia Azari, Marquette University; Bruce Buchanan, University of Texas; Kevin J. McMahon, Trinity College.
In the paper, “OIRA: The Other Edge of the Sword,” I highlight a downside of presidential management of the bureaucracy from the standpoint of the president’s own interests. I argue that presidential preclearance of bureaucratic policymaking coordinated by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) enhances presidential control, but at the cost of inefficiency. I introduce a theory of bargaining between OIRA and an agency wherein OIRA sometimes leads to policy withdrawals by the agency even though there are policies that both the agency and the president prefer to the status quo. I provide preliminary empirical evidence that is generally supportive of the theory.

OIRA is a small office within the Office of Management of Budget, but it has at its disposal the resources and expertise of specialized policy offices throughout the Executive Office of the President. Since the Reagan administration, presidents have used OIRA to evaluate agency policies and either approve of those policies or attempt to change them.

OIRA faces little constraint on which policies it can review so long as those policies are issued by cabinet departments or executive agencies (presidents have not sought to extend OIRA preclearance to independent agencies). Policies must be “significant” to warrant review but according to Executive Order 12,866, any policy that raises “novel legal or policy issues” meets the criteria for significance and OIRA has the last word on which policies are significant. Since the Clinton administration, OIRA has reviewed an average of about 600 policies per year.

But for a president trying to change an agency’s policies, the picture is not entirely rosy. If OIRA wants a revision to an agency’s policy it is the agency that has to make that revision. And the agency has the option to formally withdraw the policy or to informally shelve it (particularly in the absence of a legal deadline).

In the paper, I model two rounds of bargaining over policy between an agency and OIRA. The agency has some uncertainty about what OIRA wants and vice versa, and both the agency and OIRA face costs. The agency faces a cost whenever it proposes a policy since proposing takes time and other resources. OIRA faces a cost in its choice to require an agency to change its policy. When OIRA requires a change, it risks ending up with a status quo that it likes less than the originally proposed policy. This is due to OIRA’s uncertainty about the agency’s preferences and the agency’s ability to withdraw its policy.

The theory shows that the president will lose agency action on some policies that both he (someday she) and the agency would rather have action on than keep the status quo. I
provide preliminary empirical evidence that is generally supportive of the theory. Looking at 1983-2008, I find that policies initiated by cabinet departments and executive agencies are roughly 7 percent more likely to be withdrawn within the same administration that they were initiated than are policies initiated by independent agencies, controlling for how active each agency is in its policymaking.

The results are a first cut from a much larger but still ongoing project about the president’s role in managing the executive branch. Data collection in progress will allow me to extend the time period covered in my analysis, to add more variables that will allow for finer-grained measures, and to address important confounders. Nevertheless, while there is much work to be done, the theory and empirical evidence in this paper stand in their own right as new findings about the strategic underpinnings of presidential preclearance and agency policymaking in American politics.

I have the pleasure of announcing the winner of this year’s graduate student paper award honoring David Naveh. I do so on behalf of myself, Dan Galvin, Matthew Beckmann, and Patricia Sykes. I want to acknowledge their work on the committee.

We are delighted to award Jenna Rezaee’s this year’s award for her paper, “OIRA: The Other Edge of the Sword.” In this paper Rezaee sheds light on one of the most important tools of presidential management of agency policymaking. Rezaee argues that presidential review of agency policymaking through OIRA can have a chilling effect on agency policymaking, including, importantly, policymaking that presidents and agencies would otherwise prefer. There are two reasons why. First, agencies do not know exactly what is acceptable to OIRA and second, OIRA has an incentive to appear tough in order to induce agencies to send them rules that conform to the White House’s preferred position. In this way, this work is similar to other presidency research which demonstrates that presidential efforts to control the bureaucracy are not unalloyed goods and have costs for presidents. It is also an interesting reason why president may be frustrated trying to extract from agencies the work and projects they would like agencies to do. Rezaee analyzes an impressive dataset of proposed rules to show the difference that OIRA review makes in the propensity of agencies to withdraw rules. This is a promising start on an important project.

Please join me in congratulating Jenna Rezaee!
**FEATURED ARTICLES**

**WINNER OF THE RICHARD E. NEUSTADT AWARD FOR BEST BOOK ON THE PRESIDENCY.**

**WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Armed interventions in Libya, Haiti, Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea challenged the US president and Congress with a core question of constitutional interpretation: does the president, or Congress, have constitutional authority to take the country to war? **War Powers** argues that the Constitution doesn’t offer a single legal answer to that question. But its structure and values indicate a vision of a well-functioning constitutional politics, one that enables the branches of government themselves to generate good answers to this question for the circumstances of their own times.

Mariah Zeisberg shows that what matters is not that the branches enact the same constitutional settlement for all conditions, but instead how well they bring their distinctive governing capacities to bear on their interpretive work in context. Because the branches legitimately approach constitutional questions in different ways, interpretive conflicts between them can sometimes indicate a successful rather than deficient interpretive politics. Zeisberg argues for a set of distinctive constitutional standards for evaluating the branches and their relationship to one another, and she demonstrates how observers and officials can use those standards to evaluate the branches’ constitutional politics. With cases ranging from the Mexican War and World War II to the Cold War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Iran-Contra scandal, **War Powers** reinterprets central controversies of war powers scholarship and advances a new way of evaluating the constitutional behavior of officials outside of the judiciary.

**COMMITTEE:**

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BERT ROCKMAN

ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, CHAIR


In **War Powers**, Professor Zeisberg returns to Edward Corwin’s famous “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Hers is a book that owes much to the long history and voluminous analysis of war powers jurisprudence, but as a
bridge to innovative analysis of its own. After all, that jurisprudence rarely attains the neutrality and impartial review necessary for faithful and dispositive constitutional interpretation. Nor can it, since the questions that interest us cannot be answered by "insular" assignment of particular duties to a particular branch. Instead, Zeisberg observes, “the Constitution creates a politics every bit as much as it creates a legal order”.

But this is not the politics of punditry. War Powers is about authority, not about “rights,” which usefully brings it back into the realm of power — and the measurement thereof — to which political scientists can lay special claim. As Zeisberg notes, “that … categories are political does not mean that they cannot be sensibly evaluated.” To do so convincingly is an immense task drawing on decades of scholarship, and it is one the book achieves superbly well. It establishes a “relational conception of war authority” — not about absolute textual meaning or legal claims, but showing how substance and process intersect in a given circumstance: do the branches involved make effective use of their distinctive capacities? Through a series of paired cases ranging from the Mexican War to the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to the Vietnam War-era invasion of Cambodia to the Iran-contra investigation, Zeisberg shows when the branches of government successfully assert their primacy and legitimacy in the area of war powers, and when they do not.

In short, War Powers does an exemplary job in incorporating and explicating the dynamic imbalance of power between the branches. It pays heed to the nuances of the modern roles played by each institution and their groundings in the Constitution and the law, and provides a political analysis that goes far deeper than the standard superficialities of partisan tit-for-tat discourse. It raises issues both timely and timeless, relevant both to today’s national agenda and to the study of the presidency (and to Congress) across multiple administrations. We are therefore delighted to select it for this year’s Neustadt Award.
FEATUED ARTICLES
BEST UNDERGRADUATE PAPER ON EXECUTIVE POLITICS COMPLETED IN THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2013-14: “PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION OF FOREIGN POLICY POWERS.”

The winner of the 2014 Best Undergraduate Paper award is Aaron Goodman of Dartmouth College whose paper is titled “Presidential Delegation of Foreign Policy Powers.” Mr. Goodman challenges the “two presidencies” thesis by arguing that presidents are often hamstrung by institutional limits, especially delegation from Congress.

He writes: “Many of the scholarly theories fall into the “two presidencies” school of thought: because of the substantial formal and extra constitutional powers that he enjoys in the foreign policy realm, the president is able to exert an unusual amount of control over Congress and actively implement his agenda. Although they contribute much to our understanding of the modern presidency, these theories are incomplete. By assuming that the president is always willing to make full use of his powers, they fail to account for the crucial possibility that he may rationally decide to cede some of his institutional prerogatives and delegate authority to Congress.”

Using the 2013 US intervention in Syria as a case study, Mr. Goodman persuasively argues that “Obama’s unexpected behavior demonstrates that, when faced with a threatened domestic policy agenda and public skepticism over the proposed use of force, presidents may find it in their interest to forgo risky unilateral action and delegate foreign policy responsibility to Congress.”

The committee was nearly unanimous in their pick of this paper as the years winner. Please join me in congratulating Mr. Goodman and his professor Brendan Nyhan on an excellent (and now award winning) paper.
A (FIERY, SMOKY) NIGHT TO REMEMBER

FORUM INTRODUCTION

Last fall, APSA – and with it, PEP – weathered an unprecedented and, well, bizarre hiccup as one of the main hotels for our annual convention fell victim to the machinations of a sinister though still officially unknown arsonist. For hours, from around midnight until breakfast time, guests of the Marriott Wardman Park were rousted from their rooms and forced to wait, under a shroud of misinformation and confusion, first outdoors and later in a cramped ballroom.

Thanks to social media and word of mouth, just about every sentient member of PEP – both current and lapsed – knows something of this event, if only that it happened. In place of our usual forum, which has focused in the past on everything from gubernatorial politics to teaching the presidency, we have decided to dedicate this space to the preservation of public memory.

What follows are four testimonials from some of our most valued section members, including Julia Azari, Steve Schier, Mary Stuckey, and Karen Hult and Chuck Walcott. For those of you who were either not in attendance at APSA or fortunate enough to avoid lodging at the Marriott, these are the inside stories you’ve longed for. I’ve longed for them, as well, as even though I too stayed at the Marriott, I spent most of the time that fateful night asleep on the grass outside, as Julia Azari has chronicled online and below. (It really was a rather lovely night, and the lawn is quite lush, so please don’t feel pity.) As I slumbered, the following tales unfolded. Enjoy them; I certainly did.

Justin S. Vaughn

Assistant Professor
Boise State University

Around 1 a.m., after the two of us had just fallen asleep after returning from the ballgame in Baltimore (O’s 9, Twins 1), we were awakened by a whooping siren and a voice telling us to evacuate due to a fire. We quickly grabbed purse & wallet, phones and minimal clothing (sweatpants, shirts, shoes), and Karen picked up what she thought were her glasses (actually, they were Chuck’s) and left. We headed for the nearest exit, only to encounter people coming back from there because the stairs smelled of smoke. We found another exit and trooped in orderly fashion down the stairs (smelling smoke there too) and out of the Marriott. A large fire truck had already pulled up in front of the hotel, to be followed by several more of various types. We went to the lawn in front of the hotel and waited as firefighters trooped into the building. Like many others, we had cellphones to amuse...
A (FIERY, SMOKY) NIGHT TO REMEMBER

ourselves though, unlike many, we were not on Twitter, just selective Facebook posts. Hotel staff distributed bottles of water and a few blankets. At no time were we authoritatively informed as to what was going on. Sometime around three it appeared that most of the firefighters had come out, along with their equipment. Apparently some people went back to their rooms, though a firefighter ordered people in our vicinity to stay outside. Not too much later, we were allowed back into the hotel, but only in the lobby and adjacent areas. Hotel staff passed out sheets to everyone. After a little while, we saw firefighters and police rush back in — not a good sign. Resigning ourselves to staying longer, we sought out spots on the floor to lie down, wrapped in our sheets. Chuck went to sleep for a while, though Karen listened instead to several snoring colleagues and the fire alarm that blared until close to 5 or so. Later a hotel staffer ordered people, sort of, to assemble in a large ballroom. We, along with many others, did so, though a number remained in the lobby, scattered about the floor. The ballroom was divided in half by a large curtain. On one side (the soon-to-be immortalized “rapture” section) were many chairs and a dais, from which a police captain made not-terribly-informative but sometimes contradictory announcements. On the other were circular tables with maybe six to eight chairs around each. Hotel staff supplied coffee, soda, and pastries; in the midst of all this, around 6 am, a strange movie crackled on a big screen set up in this overflow room, accompanied by loud rap music. Many of us applauded when a hotel employee found someone to turn it off. After a while, Karen, returning from a bathroom break (monitored by uniformed officers in an adjacent hallway), heard it announced that people needing meds could go, with escort, to their rooms to retrieve them. Since Chuck qualified, he went to our room, escorted by both a firefighter and a police officer, and got his pills along with Karen’s glasses. (At least some of the doors on the floor were open.) Chatting with the officer, Chuck learned that the rumors we had heard, that there were multiple fires and probably an arsonist, were true. Finally, at about 7:30 a.m., after hearing announcements that seemed to promise we’d be kept from our rooms indefinitely and perhaps ordered out of the hotel, we suddenly were freed to go back to our rooms. We finally squeezed into an elevator and reentered our room about 8 a.m.

Bottom line reactions: it seemed to us that the fire and police departments did what they knew how to do; nobody kept the guests informed, probably a failing on the hotel’s part. The timing over Labor Day weekend likely guaranteed that the Marriott’s “A” team wasn’t around, but there should have been something like a plan in place. At no point in the seven or so hours were there amplified announcements, other than those by the police officer in the Salon ballroom. For a large convention hotel in the nation’s capital, it was somewhat disturbing that there was so little evidence of an emergency plan or (practiced) procedures. Even apart from homeland security concerns, compared to the information and apologies we received as hotel guests during and following an electrical outage in Philadelphia several weeks earlier (while attending the Academy of Management meetings), the Marriott’s general lack of response was striking.
While I am a morning person, I am emphatically not a 1:00 in the morning person. So my memories of the “Great APSA Fire” as one person I know referred to it, are dim, murky, and colored by the fact that I was just dumb for the whole event. Seriously dumb. Looking straight at people I have known for years and not recognizing them dumb. So with that in mind….

My room was on the 2nd floor, almost at the end of the hall, so getting out when the first alarm went off was very easy; we went out through the kitchen and down an unlit hall, which was weird, and ended up at the service entrance. I quickly met a person who knew about the previous day’s fire, and so knew it was arson very early. I could look straight down at the fire truck, and when the fireman looked bored, it the whole thing became merely tedious; I figured that if they weren’t interested, nothing interesting was happening. We were allowed back to our rooms after a couple of hours—on the way there, we passed a chair that had clearly been burned. No idea why it was just sitting in the open hall.

As soon as my head hit the pillow, the second alarm went off. When I went out this time, however, there were only four of us where there had been fifty or more the first time, which was disconcerting. We milled about for a few minutes, then went back inside and, after being directed by a guy in a “Syracuse University” tee shirt who said he worked for the hotel (what?), we wound our way around to a hallway (I was by now confused about there in the hotel I actually was) with a bunch of people in sheets, some of them trying to sleep.

Luckily for me, one of those people was Karen Hoffman, who pretty much compensated for my general state of incomprehension (“Yes, Mary, you want a sheet; take two and use one for a pillow.” “The bathrooms are over there.” “Here, we should get a place by the wall…”). Without Karen, I’d have been easy prey for the roving bands of political scientists looking to do whatever it is roving bands of political scientists look to do.

Except that order would clearly have been kept by the constantly roving bands of security people. They were everywhere, going up and down the nearby escalator, talking into their radios, carrying cans and trowels (what?), and repeatedly telling people they were safe.

Political scientists often take words at their face value; rhetoricians, not so much. The more often I heard the phrase, “it’s perfectly safe,” the nearer I assumed the apocalypse to be. This was not, I should say, a great thought to have while trying to sleep.
When we moved to the ballroom, such was the state of my brain that I was both horrorstruck by and fixated on the repeated threat to show us a movie (would it be Backdraft? David Crockett thought maybe Towering Inferno) not least because it meant that we would be there for hours. My conversation by this point was pretty much reduced to a constant mutter of “I'm so tired,” and “this is a public speaking nightmare.” The latter comment shows, I suppose, the effects of over a decade’s work in a Communication department.

My mother lives in Richmond, so when we were told that they would let us get our stuff and then we would have to find somewhere to go, I thought about calling her, knowing that she would either come get me or make my brother, who also lives there, do so, and wondering how many political scientists I could cram into her car. I also wondered whether people would rather be lined up on the floors in her house than in the hotel; I did know that her floors would be significantly cleaner, and by that point, found the idea of clean floors pretty much the height of my ambition.

They let us back into our rooms; they posted cops pretty much everywhere in the building and one was outside my door, receiving constant updates on his radio. So I could hear phrases like “command center” and “units deployed,” which added a weirdly militaristic note to the whole thing. I chatted with him for a bit; he reminded me that he was there to keep me safe. I pretty much hoped he wouldn’t shoot me or anyone else and kind of wished that people would stop telling me how safe I was. And on that thought, went to sleep.

As many of you probably know, the main APSA hotel had a fire evacuation on Friday night. The situation lasted about 7 hours. There were no serious injuries and the conference resumed on Saturday. It was, to say the least, a very bizarre event. Below is my account of the events. The timeline probably has some inaccuracies, and I would welcome corrections, as well as any additional stories or impressions that people want to share, in the comments. I’ve intentionally left sartorial commentary to others.

1 AM – the fire alarm rings.
Lilly Goren, my conference roommate, and I mumble confirmations that it is indeed an alarm and I start rummaging around in my suitcase with no real purpose. Lilly takes charge of the situation and tells me to grab our room key, even though she has already put on shoes and I have not.

1:02 AM I walk down six flights of stairs carrying my phone, our room key, and my shoes.

1:10 AM We wander into the outside courtyard, where several fire trucks have pulled up. I look around for people to see if anyone has visibly
been interrupted in the throes of an illicit love affair. I didn’t see that, but I did see some fire trucks.

1:30 AM I run into (fellow Mischief) Seth and Jen. Jen and I had never actually met in person and I had hoped that we would meet at this APSA, while I was wearing clothes and drinking a tasty beverage. But it was still nice to meet her while milling around in a parking lot in our pajamas.

They also confirmed that there was an actual fire and that a mutual friend had inhaled some smoke.

I dismiss the idea of leading a Poseidon Adventure sing along.

2 AM Lilly and I see Routledge editor Michael Kerns, who was accompanied by his children, and feel frustrated at our inability to do anything to help him or any of the other people who are trying to get through the situation with kids.

Hotel personnel hand out sheets to people who are cold.

ETA: At some point in this general timeframe, Lilly and I spot a person who looks more or less like our friend and coauthor Justin Vaughn sleeping on a bench on the lawn. We decide our observation at a distance is reliable enough, and don’t seek confirmatory evidence. Rumor has it that he rolled off the bench later in the night, but I don’t have confirmation of that either.

Shortly thereafter, a hotel representative tells us that we can go in the building to use the restrooms in the lobby. I had been weighing using the impeccably landscaped bushes versus trying to sneak into one of the bars with no money wearing my toothpaste-stained pajamas, so I was pretty grateful for this.

On the way back from the restroom I have a joyous reunion with some friends from grad school, and then it occurs to me that since my phone is completely dead, I have no way to tell Lilly why it’s taking me so long to get back to our meeting spot. I have not been this untethered in years.

3:30 AM I start to tell myself that things look promising, although no one has any idea what’s actually happening. We’re back in the building and I have a surprisingly satisfying nap on the mezzanine level, but am starting to get jealous of people who brought ipads.

I feel confident that I’ll be returning to my room soon, and start to worry that the firemen who are tromping by will step on my glasses.

4 AM It turns out that big groups of firemen going back into the building in heavy gear isn’t a good sign.

The fire alarm starts going off again. We shuffle outside, many of us wearing white sheets, so we look like either an audition for a Peanuts Halloween special or a very unenergetic - and shockingly diverse - Klan meeting.

4:30 AM It’s not clear what is going on, so some people shuffle back in. Other people commit to sleeping on the lawn outside, but that seems... wet, so I head back in. Lilly and I find the charging station and rejoice, until we realize that it doesn’t work very well. People are pretty polite as we take turns using the only iphone charger that (sort of) works. I wonder when this pre-fire alarm civility will disintegrate.
I just remembered that during this part of the evening, Lilly and I had an in-depth discussion about Rick Perlstein and his books.

At this point, the fire alarm is still going off. Some people are sleeping throughout the lobby and the area near the registration tables and escalators. Others are using their phones or ipads, propping themselves up against signs directing us to the book room and the theme sessions. The vestiges of APSA start to look like ancient ruins from a now-extinct society whose priorities are beyond our comprehension.

The fire alarm continues to bleat. My phone gets about 4% charged, and I take the opportunity to tweet:

Can someone please turn the f@#$ing fire alarm off? #APSA2014

The fire alarm stops. As my phone loses power, I receive several replies that my tweet worked. I abandon my methodological training and take the credit. This makes me feel better about the wisdom of tweeting obscenities directed at the organization that controls a great deal of my professional life.

Rumors that the fires were intentional start to circulate.

We are told to go into a ballroom for a debriefing. We crowd into the room, and the fire chief starts to talk and then asks that someone from the Marriott join him on the stage. We are informed that there is a “serious situation” in the hotel, but that we are not in any danger. Arson rumors were not confirmed, but the fire chief tells us that we can probably discern what’s happening.

The fire chief and the police chief give some fairly vague instructions about what will happen next, but it’s indicated that we will have to get our things and leave the hotel. We’re told that if we want to leave as we are, we are free to go (someone had already asked if we were being detained, and the answer was no), and that if we have friends in the area we may want to do that, as long as we are willing to abandon our possessions for the next five or six hours.

We are promised food and coffee, and they tell us they are looking into putting on a movie. (The food and coffee materialized but the movie never did.) Although we are not being detained, they ask that we stay in the ballrooms and use only one set of restrooms, so that no one “slips out.”

As minimal as this information is, it’s the first time we’ve been assembled and given any real information.

People start to yell at the various authorities on the stage. I silently debate whether the faction
that I am going to lead will focus on hoarding the water or controlling access to the restrooms as our strategy when order breaks down.

The head of the Presidency and Executive Politics section sits down next to me in the ballroom, and we briefly chat about what’s going to happen at our section’s business meeting later. I then loudly and confidently inform him that the business meeting will not happen, because the conference is definitely over at this point. It cannot possibly continue, I tell him. In fact, the discipline itself may be never be able to reconstitute fully. We will never recover from this.

I may have been a little sleep-deprived at that point.

The hotel manager informs us that panels have been canceled at the Marriott until noon. People who have flights to catch get in line to be “expedited.”

It occurs to me that we are probably going to be questioned, since the situation seems to be that someone has tried to set the hotel on fire and they still don’t know who. A couple of years ago I was in a coffee shop and someone tried to hold it up. There were about 15 people there, and we were all told to stay put for questioning. That took two hours. I contemplate the fact that APSA 2015 may have a very low rejection rate because some of us will still be in the ballroom when the abstract deadline passes.

6:30 AM I spot Thad Hall, who had been pretty close to one of the fires and inhaled some smoke. I’m extremely glad to see him until he takes a picture of me and posts it on Facebook.

7AM I wander into the area with coffee, figuring that I’m already jittery and agitated so I might as well run with it. I run into Dave Hopkins, who I’m always glad to see, but especially so at that moment, because many of my other companions are falling asleep (understandably) and I’m too jittery.

I repeat my theory that the conference is over, there will be no panels today, or possibly ever again. We agree to sit down and not talk about work, and then talk about work for about 20 minutes. I blather incoherently to him about how he should read Robert Mason’s book about the Republican Party.

Usually I’m pretty interested in contradictions, but I try not to dwell on the whole “someone tried to burn down the hotel and kill you all, and we haven’t caught that person, but also we’re all safe” thing.

7:45 AM We are informed that we’re free to go back to our rooms and stay there (or go wherever else we want.) Someone asks if a suspect has been apprehended, and that has not happened. But we’re told we’re perfectly safe and free to go, and that panels will resume at 9, not noon.

8AM Some of my fellow Mischief went out to breakfast, but I went back to my room to tweet out my nervous energy and get some sleep. I still don’t know what actually happened.

I am grateful to Lilly Goren, who in addition to being an excellent companion throughout the whole situation, has helped me recall the timeline and events, and otherwise craft this post.
A (FIERY, SMOKY) NIGHT TO REMEMBER

By now many of you may know about or have experienced the Friday night hotel evacuation due to multiple arson attempts at the Marriott Wardman Park, the main American Political Science Association convention hotel. Everyone who was a victim of the events has an interesting story to tell, and here is mine.

The fires occurred on the floor just above the room I shared with David Crockett of Trinity University. We were roused twice by fire alarms, one at 1 am and one at 3:35 am. During the first alarm, hundreds stood outside for more than two hours while many police and fire vehicles arrived on the scene. One colleague, Justin Vaughn of Boise State, slumbered soundly on the lawn. David Hopkins of Boston College, who was alert enough to bring his smart phone with him from his room, shared the tweets the quickly arrived at the APSA tweet site.

Two of the initial tweets were memorable. One simply declared “Worst APSA ever!” (No, that was the cancelled APSA at New Orleans two years ago). John Pitney of Claremont McKenna College tweeted “I will be really upset if this turns out to be a field experiment.” Funny, but no experiment this.

During the second alarm, we were allowed back onto the lobby and mezzanine floors of the hotel and given bed sheets, but all were too tired for a toga party. Hundreds of bedraggled political scientists sprawled on the carpet, furniture and in the restaurants on the two floors. Police and fire officials made frequent announcements from a podium in a large auditorium stuffed with sheeted scholars.

I tried sleeping on the carpet by the main doors with my baseball cap over my face, but discomfort and disorientation prevented slumber. My roommate Crockett alerted me to the presence of the tweeter John Pitney, who was walking a bit aimlessly through the hotel lobby. I got up and greeted him because we were supposed to have breakfast in a few hours at 8:30 am and I wanted to assure him that that would not be happening. I also informed him of a shortcut up the stairs to our part of the building and he wanted me to show him the route.

We picked our way among the sheeted throng up to the mezzanine to the door that led to our route upstairs. Suddenly the door opened and there was Theodore Lowi, orange rolling suitcase and all. Lowi explained that he had to catch an early plane, and Jack and I decided to help find a taxi to the airport. We could not find an escalator but did accompany Lowi down a long stairway, carefully proceeding past many prone scholars.

We made our way slowly to the registration desk and asked the attendant where we could find a cab. It was about 5:30 in the morning and the place was surrounded my dozens of police cars and fire engines. “Just go outside the front
A (FIERY, SMOKY) NIGHT TO REMEMBER

doors, you’ll find one.” Jack and I were dubious about this, but, for lack of a better alternative, we navigated through the bodies on the floor to the main hotel entrance.

Instead of a cab, we indeed found the driveway and street stuffed with police vehicles and fire trucks. Fortunately, Jack had his smartphone and planned to call for a cab when we reached Connecticut Avenue. But this was no sure thing, because his phone battery was low.

We slowly walked through the crowded driveway and along the street. As we approached the intersection with Connecticut Avenue, we saw a cab pull up at the red light. Jack and I waved frantically and, miraculously, the cab stopped for us. We said our goodbyes, and I closed the door and the taxi sped off. Jack and I ended up having breakfast together after all – a free repast of watery coffee and small rolls at 6 am in the crowded auditorium.
NEW IN PRINT: BOOKS ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY AND EXECUTIVE POLITICS

ECONOMIC ACTORS, ECONOMIC BEHAVIORS, AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: THE CONSTRAINED EFFECTS OF RHETORIC

C. DAMIEN ARTHUR
Assistant Professor
Marshall University

The discussion regarding the power and effectiveness of presidential economic rhetoric is contentious. Some empirical research asserts that presidents are served well in their economic goals by using the ‘bully-pulpit’. It is clear that presidents speak about the economy more so than any other issue, treating their rhetoric as a mechanism of power that hopefully persuading others. These claims are theoretically suspect, however; especially when you consider the self-interested actions of economic actors, the constraints of the separated system of American government, and the assumptions in the notion that the president’s rhetoric can engender political will and overcome a vitriolic political process. Assuming that the president is the most important economic actor in the system, there are serious questions that should be considered when asserting that presidential rhetoric has the power to shape the behaviors of economic actors.

Much of the research regarding the power and the effectiveness of presidential rhetoric must be questioned. This debate should be empirically measured as scholarship attempts to better understand the president’s use of the ‘bully pulpit’. There is no definitive argument in the literature explicating the limitations of presidential rhetoric influencing others to take actions on the economy. Does the rhetoric engender substantive actions or are the presidents’ decisions to address the economy so often an institutional necessity? A more comprehensive empirical assessment shows the extent to which presidential rhetoric can predict the behavior of the economic actors; it determines if the rhetoric matters in the way that some of the literature suggests.

The purpose of this book was to utilize a more comprehensive approach for analyzing the effectiveness of the president’s rhetoric and then methodologically measure its effect on the economy. It utilized a comprehensive theory and multiple data sets to assess rhetoric’s effect on three specific economic entities: the Federal Reserve (the Federal Funds Rate 1954–2012), the Public (National Election System (NES) 1948–2008), and the Congress (Policy Agendas Project 1948–2008), allowing for a more comprehensive research operationalization into the contention that the president’s ability to influence economic indicators comes from his ‘bully pulpit’ and his position as the most important economic actor in the system.
Therefore, this analysis contributes to the literature by pointing out the limitations of the president’s ability to use rhetoric to influence the decisions of economic actors. According to this research, the presence of presidential rhetoric, aggregated expressions of positivity and negativity, does not, significantly, predict changes in economic actor behaviors. Presidents are not successful, overall, at shaping the behaviors of economic actors with their rhetoric. The research suggests that these economic actors have their own goals and perspectives, and, even though presidents have increased their responsibilities towards the economy and maximized their rhetoric regarding the economy significantly, these increases in rhetoric, responsibility, and attention to the economy have not created the desired effects that presidents have sought, according to multiple models and significance tests.

Recent research on the U.S. presidential/media framing relationship in time of war has uncovered a general pattern in the post-Vietnam era: As the situation on the ground departs from the president’s initial, rose-tinted narrative of success, early positive news coverage grows more negative as it reflects that more unpleasant objective reality, and presidential and media frames increasingly diverge in substance and tone. But what is the intersection of presidential and media narratives as the conflict actually winds to a conclusion?

Utilizing the research technique of qualitative content analysis, this book compares the thematic content of President Obama’s public narratives of the U.S. exits from Afghanistan and Iraq to the endgame themes and storylines of five leading U.S. media outlets – the New York Times, Washington Post, Associated Press (AP), NBC News, and Fox News – during two key foreign policy moments in Obama’s first term: the eight weeks surrounding his 2009 primetime address on the new way
forward in Afghanistan and his August 2010 announcement of the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq.

The results indicate a significant disconnect between Obama’s increasingly favorable tale of what the wars had accomplished and the brighter future each conflict made possible and the media’s far less sanguine interpretations of what the wars represented. While Obama spoke of Afghanistan as a just, necessary, and ultimately successful war, the media privileged a negative strategic frame that emphasized discord and disarray within the Obama administration and the dismal political and security situation in the Af/Pak region. The media frame of the exit from Iraq was even more fraught and unfavorable. While Obama spoke of the possibility of democratization and overcoming extremism, all five media outlets honed in on the high levels of violence in Iraq, its dysfunctional political system, and Iraqi economic and social chaos as well as the toll that the war had taken on American troops, the U.S. economy and the nation’s global reputation. Even conservative media commentators refrained from sounding a trumpet of victory in either conflict. The most successful presidential narrative – adopted by Obama and the media alike — was President Bush’s overarching frame that the U.S. had been forced to wage globalized war against terrorist enemies. These two case studies thus provide evidence for some degree of media independence when reality conflicts with official rhetoric as wars conclude, but also some evidence for the staying power of an underlying, compelling presidential frame.

My new book, The Unilateral Presidency and the News Media: The Politics of Framing Executive Power, examines the dynamic process of traditional print and online news coverage of direct presidential actions. Since President George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, there has been an energetic debate concerning the proper scope and exercise of executive unilateral powers. With a mere “stroke of the pen” presidents can change the political and policy status quo. However, the Constitution is silent about these actions, Congress seldom acts to limit them, and the public is usually unaware of these powers. My research investigates the role of the news media in bringing attention to these unwritten powers of the presidency, examining the amount and temporal patterns of coverage, type of frames that are used, who influences the frames, and whether these frames are placed in a constitutional context.

Recent scholarship on presidential news finds that modern chief executives operate in a more
adversarial news environment. Employing a content analysis of more than 7,700 quoted sources in nearly 1,200 print (New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today) and online (Daily Kos, Talking Points Memo, Huffington Post, Townhall, Michelle Malkin, and Hot Air) news items across twelve administrations (Truman - Obama), I demonstrate that coverage of the unilateral presidency is an exception to this rule as news frames are largely favorable to executive power. This is due to presidential sources being treated as more authoritative than congressional sources in the news and a political system that is indifferent to executive unilateral actions. Thus, the news provides cover to the president by normalizing the use of these unwritten powers allowing the unilateral executive to “hide in plain sight” from public scrutiny. However, when the political system pushes back against the unitary executive, the media responds in kind. The news media matters because the framing of issues affects public knowledge and policymaking. This project synthesizes and contributes to the literatures on the news media, presidential power, policymaking, and framing and will compel scholars to reconsider the role of the executive and the media in the theory and practice of democracy.
they find most threatening. In practice, I found that the presidents of the late 19th century disagreed significantly on what it means to be an American is consistent with how they identify threats. Grover Cleveland’s saw violations of international law as a threat to the lawful American. Benjamin Harrison viewed foreign attempts to gain power and wealth as threats to the prosperous American. Finally, William McKinley perceived illiberal societies to be the greatest threat to the enlightened American.

The connection between “who we are” and what dangers keep presidents up at night can be seen today, whether the topic is immigration or the war against ISIS. In this sense, Enemies provides a new perspective on the wax and wane of presidential foreign policymaking that we know so well.

Russia’s 1993 constitution establishes basic strategic premises for presidential decree power: a statute can supersede a decree, but not vice versa; a decree can fill gaps in law; a decree cannot make policy in areas reserved for federal legislation (including budgeting and taxation), or matters requiring a constitutional law). The book I recently published, Presidential Decree Power in Russia: A Comparative Perspective analyzes the way Russian presidents Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev used their decree powers to make policy. The book finds that the use of decree power by Russian presidents is consistent with the premise—associated with Richard Neustadt’s picture of US presidential authority—that presidents must anticipate how other political actors will react to their exercise of executive power.

The book discusses the evolution of executive decree power from 1905 to the present, focusing particularly on the post-Soviet period. It tracks the use of decrees in relation to legislative action both quantitatively and
through a series of case studies. It uses spatial models to illustrate graphically the use of decrees to prompt or block legislation in policy space. It devotes a chapter to policy issues where both laws and decrees were deployed to shape final outcomes.

The book argues that decrees are part of a larger political interaction with the legislature and the bureaucracy. My research suggests that the problem of enforcement of decrees is at least as serious for Russian presidents as it is for American presidents (recall Neustadt's famous reference to Truman's prediction that Eisenhower would face trouble getting his orders enforced: "'Poor Ike! He'll find it's not a bit like the army...'") Generally, decrees that grant rights to actors (such as a stream of rents from control of an asset) are closer to being self-enforcing than decrees that try to roll back or withhold rights and rents.

As scholars of US and Latin American presidents also find, Russian presidential decrees can be alternatives to acting through legislation under a limited range of conditions. A president is aware that a decree can be overturned (for example, by a successor) as readily as it is adopted. He is also aware that decrees can readily be ignored by a bureaucracy deeply skilled in the arts of evasion. Thus not only constitutional, but quite practical strategic considerations as well, affect the use of decree power.

After sweeping environmental statutes were enacted during the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s marked the beginning of an era when persistent gridlock would regularly frustrate new legislation and reforms to existing laws. In response, environmental groups became more specialized and professional, learning how to effect policy change through the courts, states, and federal agencies rather than through grassroots movements. Without a significantly mobilized public and with a generally uncooperative Congress, presidents since the 1990s have been forced to step into a new role of increasing presidential dominance over environment and natural resource policies. Rather than working with Congress, presidents instead have employed unilateral actions and administrative strategies to further their environmental goals.

In Presidential Administration and the Environment, I examine strategies and tools used by U.S. presidents to pursue their environmental policy goals without Congress.
Using primary sources from presidential libraries such as speeches and staff communications, I analyzed how presidents such as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have used alternative executive approaches to pass environmental policies. From there, I present case studies in land management, water policy, toxics, and climate change. The four cases examine the role that executive leadership has played in affecting policy within these four areas, explain how this role has changed over time, and conclude by investigating how Obama’s policies compare thus far with those of his predecessors.

For example, pollution rules for coal-fired power plants recently announced by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are the latest example of President Obama bypassing Congress. The proposed 30 percent cut in carbon dioxide emissions will bring existing sources in line with new facilities. Combined with new automotive efficiency standards, these rules will go a long way toward meeting the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol to stabilize the climate.

Like Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush before him, Obama is pursuing an environmental policy agenda through unilateral action and administrative leadership. Due to chronic gridlock, Congress effectively ceded its policy leadership on the environment to the White House. After passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a successful emissions trading market to reduce acid rain, Congress settled into a role of reacting to initiatives from the executive branch. The book argues that leaders from both parties have been reluctant to enact new environmental legislation or reform existing statutes, and this enables presidents and their appointees to make critical policy decisions on their own. Thus, it becomes less likely that Congress will face up to emerging environmental challenges, such as climate change, which could be addressed more effectively through the legislative process.
MALIGNED PRESIDENTS: THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

MAX J. SKIDMORE
Curators’ Professor and Thomas Jefferson Fellow
University of Missouri-Kansas City

Literature overwhelmingly portrays the “Gilded Age” as a time of congressional supremacy and weak—even nondescript—presidents.

Works by specialists, either of the Gilded Age itself or of Gilded Age presidents, suggest something quite different. All presidents from Grant through Cleveland fought major battles with Congress that they won—even Garfield, with his severely truncated presidency. McKinley had no need to do so, because he dominated (his biographer Lewis Gould said more than once that McKinley was “the first modern president”). Grant had a powerful record of accomplishment: reshaping the judiciary, influencing the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and the passage of civil rights laws, energizing the veto, creating the first national park and providing the groundwork for environmental policies, and much more. The flaws of his presidency have been both exaggerated and misrepresented. His contemporary critics were more likely to accuse him of abusing power than of being subservient to Congress. Hayes continued Grant’s efforts to secure control over cabinet appointments, and Garfield essentially drove the powerful Roscoe Conkling from the Senate. Arthur secured passage of the foundation for the merit-based civil service, and helped somewhat to soften racist legislation. Cleveland set a one-term record for vetoes that still stands and secured repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act. Harrison was enormously active, made the strongest effort on behalf of civil rights between Grant and Truman, and also provided the model for McKinley’s highly effective presidency. Yet we read that he was a “figurehead,” and was “whiggish.”

Most presidential generalists simply repeat the conclusions of others. Much of the bias has a long history. “Reformers” objected because their counsel went unheeded (or sometimes because they were not offered governmental positions). Later writers often misunderstood and thus misrepresented the writings of Woodrow Wilson and of Lord Bryce on the American presidency. Above all, the efforts of “Lost Cause” romantics to re-cast Civil War and post-war history in a neo-confederate light succeeded for at least a half century to warp America’s understanding of itself.

Much of this reflects racism, ranging from unconscious to overt. Reformers considered efforts to ensure civil rights in the south at best to be unimportant, and at worst to be undesirable. Neo-confederates denied slavery’s importance, and even today some on the far right portray human chattel slavery as benign.

Maligned Presidents seeks to correct the misconceptions, and gently suggests the need for more careful scholarship.