Letter from the President: Hiring in Comparative Politics

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This column continues my plea for greater balance between the theoretic and the empirical faces of the comparative politics sub-discipline. Here, I propose a comparative politics hiring strategy for political science departments that is less tied to area expertise and more to theoretically motivated problem solving.

Under present conditions, virtually all positions in comparative politics are defined in terms of area specialization. Large departments in research universities demand an expert for every significant region of the world. If each region is “covered,” most large departments will assume that there are no holes in the comparative field. In smaller departments, there is generally a goal to have one comparativist specialize in Europe, and a second to study “Africa, Latin America, the Middle East or Asia,” as many ads in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter put it.

Comparative positions, unfortunately, are rarely specified by theoretical domain, even if there are a number of intriguing possibilities: democratization; nationalism; the political bases of economic development; the consolidation and destruction of states; bases of political mobilization (ethnic, class, gender, green); and authoritarian rule.

To confirm my observation about the unbalanced specification of jobs in comparative politics, I coded the thirty-nine advertisements for comparative politics positions in the December, 1994 APSA Newsletter. Thirty of the ads were principally specified by continent, region, or country. Two were open to all comparativists and three were looking for scholars in international relations/comparative politics. Only four gave as their principal specification a conceptual issue (one in third world development; one in civil-military relations; one in political economy; and one in women and politics). None asked for candidates who used the comparative method to advance our knowledge addressing a specific theoretical problem.

In light of these considerations, I propose that large departments plan for two or three theory-based appointments in comparative politics. Medium-sized departments, those that barely can cover all regions, could easily advertise many of their comparative positions by theoretical focus, but favor candidates who would be able to teach courses in “Politics and Government in Region X,” with “X” being the region that is not then covered by the department. In this way, many regions could be covered without necessarily having area-based searches. Small departments that have no expectation of covering the globe could easily replace “one from the west, and one for the rest” with “one on democracy and its alternatives and one on social movements,” or some other combination.

There are several advantages in having theoretically based searches in comparative politics. For one, the comparison among applicants would be easier to make. Area specialty is often, in the category made famous by Kurt Vonnegut Jr., a “granfalloon,” which he defines as “a proud and meaningless association of human beings.” Examining files on Africa will yield applicants who are writing on government debt, on poverty, on democratization, on military rule, on tribal conflict, on state collapse, on coups d’etat, and on the political economy of development. It is a myth that African politics is a “field” in which candidates can be arranged according to quality. Meanwhile, theory requires focus. Examining files on “democratization” (whether it be in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia or cross...
Nominating Committee

During the APSA Convention in September, 1995, the Comparative Politics section will choose a new president-elect, a new secretary-treasurer, and two at-large committee members. David Laitin, in consultation with the present executive committee, has chosen the nominating committee, which is to report its recommended slate of candidates to the membership before the convention. Chair of the nominating committee is Barbara Geddes of UCLA. Also on the committee are Sam Nolutshungu (University of Rochester), Richard Samuels (MIT), and John Curtice (University of Strathclyde). The committee invites suggestions for these officers.

Laitin, continued

Regional allows search committees to ask common questions about all applicants: How well was the state of knowledge represented in the submitted work? What is the contribution of this study to that state of knowledge? How convincing is the evidence in support of the new contribution? A theoretically based search allows for better specified criteria of evaluation than do area based searches.

A second advantage of theoretically based searches is the signal they would send to graduate students preparing for their dissertations. Students in comparative politics have a disincentive to do multi-country comparisons that cross regions in the fear that they would not qualify for any advertised jobs. Alternatively, students may believe they can isolate a key variable by examining a process or institution in a country that is not in a preferred region for comparativists (e.g. Canada, Australia, Polynesia). Or they may believe they can push our theoretical knowledge by developing expertise in a language different from the dominant one in the region (e.g. studying the Gujarati community in Kenya, or the Germans in Russia). These students will often be discouraged by their advisors who will fear there will be no jobs for young Ph.D.s with an apparently incompatible set of area skills. Theory based searches would judge skills of dissertation students based on the needs of the research design rather than the accepted package of skills set by the area studies guardians.

A third advantage of searches of the type I am proposing is that departmental discussions about the candidate pool will become far more educational about the state of knowledge in our discipline than they are under present conditions. Departmental members in all fields, in the course of participating in a theory based search, will be brought up to speed on the state of the art in democratic theory, or theories of nationalism, or theories of the state. Such searches would be far more useful for the intellectual growth of the non-comparativists in a department than are area based searches.

My plea is not to avoid the responsibility of political science departments -- to their students, to the university, and to the community -- to have scholars able to understand and interpret key political events throughout the globe. I believe strongly in that responsibility. Nor is it to give succor to scholars who remain ignorant of cases, or who badly misinterpret events in countries they write about. Rather my plea is to alter somewhat the balance between area and theoretically based searches, to give greater breathing room for work that transcends our regional boundaries, and to attune ourselves better to the state of the art in the major theoretical issues driving the study of comparative politics.

A Note from the Editor

With this edition of the APSA-CP NEWSLETTER, we initiate an effort to focus several articles in each issue on a specific topic of current public and scholarly relevance. This time, we concentrate on the recent enlargement of the European Union, beginning on page 4. George Tsebelis (p. 4) and Madalene Hosli (p. 12) discuss the constitutional aspects: the division of power among Commission, Council, and Parliament; and, within Council and Parliament, among the member states. Gary Freeman (p. 7) and Sukkoo Kim (p. 10) examine factor flows of, respectively, labor and capital, and Kim takes issue with Paul Krugman's assertion that economies of scale within the EU are likely to induce great concentration of manufacturing and services. Gary Marks, Francis Nielson, and Jane Salk (p. 17) report on a data-gathering and research project on the rapidly multiplying subnational (usually regional) representations in Brussels.

We welcome suggestions and initiatives for future "focused" issues. Please contact: rogowski@nicco.sscnet.ucla.edu.

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Replication

At the CP-Section business meeting at the 1994 APSA convention, members heard a presentation from Gary King (Harvard). He has been active in seeking a standard in political science journals for there to be an obligatory footnote for all data-based articles which would guide future researchers on how the study could be replicated. There was a general feeling at the meeting that the statement already accepted by journals catering to methodologists and Americans was not fully appropriate for comparativist journals. Yet members felt that a revised formula might well be appropriate, and would help to advance comparative politics as a discipline. David Laitin was authorized to consult with Robert Putnam (Harvard) and Sidney Tarrow (Cornell) to draft a model statement for comparativist journals, which would be sent to the membership for discussion. If membership approves, Laitin will send this statement to editors of comparativist journals with a letter saying that the membership of the comparative politics section urges the accompanying statement to become part of the general statement of the journal on requirements for article submission. Your comments are encouraged. Send them to Laitin at lait@cirosp.spc.uchicago.edu or by mail to him at the Political Science Department, University of Chicago, 5828 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

The statement follows:

Authors of quantitative articles in this journal must indicate in their first footnote which public archive they plan to deposit the information necessary to replicate their numerical results, and the expected date when it will be submitted. The information deposited should include items such as original data, specialized computer programs, lists of computer program recodes, extracts of existing data files, and an explanatory file that describes what is included and explains how to reproduce the exact numerical results in the published article. Authors may find the Public Affairs Video Archive (PAVA) at Purdue University or the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan convenient places to deposit their data.

Statements explaining the inappropriateness of this rule for an article (or of indeterminate periods of embargo of the data or portions of it) may substitute for the requirement. As always, authors are advised to remove information from their datasets that must remain confidential, such as the names of survey respondents. In fact, if the confidentiality of respondents can in any way be compromised through deposit in a public archive, authors are expected to keep those data private and state their reasons for doing so in the footnote. But peer reviewers will be asked to assess this statement as part of the general evaluative process, and to advise the editor accordingly. Authors of articles relying upon qualitative data are encouraged (but not required) to submit a comparable footnote that would facilitate replication where feasible.

NSF Graduate Training Fellowships in Democratization and Democratic Politics at UC Irvine

The National Science Foundation has awarded the University of California, Irvine a five year grant to support graduate research training fellowships in the field of democratization and democratic politics. The grant and additional university funds will provide multi-year support for graduate students entering in Fall 1995 and subsequent years. The program is administered by UC Irvine's Focused Research Program on Democratization.

The global wave of democratization is prompting a reconsideration of past models of political development and the lessons of earlier academic debates on the social, cultural, and institutional foundations of democracy. The program at UC Irvine examines two aspects of these developments: 1) the conditions that foster or impede the development and maintenance of democracies, and 2) the expansion or contraction of the democratic process in established democracies.

UC Irvine has developed an innovative, interdisciplinary curriculum to train doctoral students in empirical democratic theory addressing these questions. The objective of this program is to provide analytic training that will enable Ph.D. students to contribute to future scientific advances in this field.

The grant will support graduate students entering the Politics program or sociology students entering the Social Relations program at UC Irvine who are interested in issues of democratic transitions or the expansion of democracy in existing democratic systems. Students interested in being considered for this fellowship should indicate this on their application to the Politics or Social Relations Ph.D. programs. For additional information about the NSF fellowships and application materials please write to:

NSF Graduate Training Fellowships Focused Research Program on Democratization School of Social Sciences University of California Irvine, CA 92717

Committee to Select the Gregory Luebbern Award

The Gregory Luebbern Award is presented to the author(s) of the best work (one book and one article) published in comparative politics in the past two years. Last year's winner was Robert Putnam for his distinguished "Making Democracy Work." There was no award for an article. This year's award committee will be chaired by Frances Rosenbluth of Yale University. Serving on the committee will be Catherine Boone (University of Texas) and Kaare Strom (University of California, San Diego). Nominations from membership are encouraged, and should be directed to Prof. Rosenbluth at rosenblu@minerva.cis.yale.edu, or by mail to her at Yale University, Department of Political Science, New Haven, CT 06520.
European Integration

Will Maastricht Reduce the "Democratic Deficit"?

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Indeed, there is an important misperception regarding the European Union, that the European Parliament (EP) was initially a weak Parliament, but that its powers have increased steadily over the years. In particular, it is commonly believed that the Maastricht treaty increased the powers of the Parliament, thereby reducing the democratic deficit. This point of view can be found in practically all of the literature concerning the European Union, scholarly as well as journalistic. Let me offer one example from each category. With respect to scholarly work, the authoritative The European Parliament, by Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton, after expressing a series of questions and reservations, summarizes: "The co-decision procedure is an important, but limited, step forward in Parliament's legislative powers" (p. 194). With respect to journalistic accounts, The Economist of January 22, 1994, under the title "Europe's Feeble Parliament," argues that it is "an ineffectual body... powerless to initiate legislation or vote governments out of office." "More recently," The Economist argues, "the parliament won the right to amend laws on the single market, which gave it a bit more clout." The article concludes that after Maastricht, the powers of the parliament may increase because in the future "it will both approve future commissions and their presidents, and have veto on legislation." The "key" to this development is "the right of veto that comes with co-decision."

In this article I take exception to this "linear progression of Parliamentary power" perspective and argue that, with respect to legislation, Maastricht significantly decreased the powers of the European Parliament. Consequently, to the extent that the democratic deficit is correlated with the powers of the European Parliament, Maastricht certainly has not uniformly decreased it, as the common perception would have us believe. In fact, Maastricht may indeed have increased the overall democratic deficit of European institutions.

There are a series of measures adopted by Maastricht that increase the powers of the Parliament. For example, after Maastricht the Parliament can reject the candidate for President of the Commission. Before 1992 it could only vote down the Commission as a whole. Both measures are far short of the Parliament's standard demand to be able to vote individual Commissioners (ministers) out of office. In addition, the Parliament has been given the right to request the Commission to introduce legislation in areas it (the EP) thinks necessary (such a provision already existed for the Council). This new power is simply an official recognition of the existing situation, because despite the lack of a formal right to initiate legislation, the EP had a very good relationship with the Commission (which alone has the formal right to initiate legislative proposals). For example, legislation banning the import of baby seal skins was introduced in Europe at the request of the EP. All the measures described above have as an effect the unambiguous increase of parliamentary powers. However, they are limited in number and in scope.

The most significant change in terms of parliamentary powers was introduced by the so-called co-decision procedure (the official name within the Maastricht Treaty is: "The procedure laid down in Article 189B of the Treaty"). The co-decision procedure replaced the cooperation procedure (the latter introduced by the Single European Act of 1987) for legislative decision making in most areas of European Union jurisdiction. In particular, after Maastricht, decisions in the areas of the single European market (that is, movement of persons, services, and capital, as well as decisions on harmonization and mutual recognition of national legislation) will be made by the co-decision procedure instead of the cooperation procedure. The co-decision procedure will also be introduced in new jurisdictions of the European Union including Education, Culture, Public Health, and Consumer Protection. Finally, it will be introduced in place of the consultation procedure in the adoption of framework programs for technological development, general programs setting policy directives concerning the environment, etc.

In the remainder of this article, I will focus on the powers of the Parliament under the cooperation and the co-decision procedures, for two reasons: First, because of the wide area of issues that are decided by co-decision instead of cooperation (not only the areas of direct replacement of one procedure by the other, but most of the new areas of European jurisdiction which presumably in the absence of co-decision would have been decided by cooperation). Second, because while analyses of recent developments in the European Union have well understood the areas of increase in parliamentary powers, they have failed to appreciate the negative implication (from the point of view of Parliamentary powers) of this development.

What is the difference between cooperation and co-decision? While the description of these procedures in both the treaties and the scholarly literature is (necessarily) lengthy and cumbersome, one can simplify the description without losing the essence of the strategic properties of each one of them as follows.

Cooperation Procedure. Legislation produced by the Commission is introduced to the Parliament first, and from there to the Council of Ministers in two successive readings. In each reading, the text examined is the one sent by the other actor (Parliament and Council) as modified by the Commission. In the second reading, the Parliament has three options. 1) It can accept the Council's common proposal. 2) It can reject it (in...
which case the veto requires a majority of the Commission and unanimity from the Council to be overruled. 3) It can propose (by the absolute majority of its members) amendments which, if accepted by the Commission, can become law with the support of a qualified majority of the Council (54/76), or can be modified by unanimity in the Council.

Co-decision Procedure. This procedure essentially adds some new stages after the second reading of legislation by Parliament to the cooperation procedure. If in its second reading the Council disagrees with any of the parliamentary amendments, the text is referred to a joint committee (composed of equal members of Council and Parliament representatives). If the committee comes to an agreement this has to be approved by an absolute majority in Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council in order to become law. If there is no agreement, the initiative reverts to the Council, which can decide by qualified majority (or unanimity, see below). Unless an absolute majority of the members of Parliament disagrees, the law is adopted.

A comparison of the two procedures indicates four major differences (there is one more, that the role of the Commission is reduced under the co-decision procedure, but I will not analyze it here). First, the Parliament has an absolute veto power in the co-decision procedure, while it needs the alliance of the majority of the Commission or one member of the Council in order to have its veto sustained in the cooperation procedure. Second, in the co-decision procedure, disagreement even over a single parliamentary amendment triggers the conciliation procedure, while in the cooperation procedure the Council could modify only those parliamentary amendments accepted by the Commission which had unanimous Council agreement (leaving the others intact). Third, according to the co-decision procedure, in certain areas (including culture, and framework programs in research and development) decisions by the Council in the joint committee as well as in the final stage can be made only by unanimity. Last, but by no means least, at the end of the co-decision procedure it is the Council that makes a "take it or leave it" proposal to the Parliament, while in the cooperation procedure these roles were essentially reversed. What is the bottom line of these differences in the provisions of the two legislative procedures?

I will argue that of the four differences only the first favors the Parliament, that this advantage is weak, that the fourth is the most important, and that the difference it makes is significant. In a nutshell, while most of the literature makes much of the unconditional veto power attributed by Maastricht to the Parliament, I will argue that this veto was offered at the expense of agenda setting powers of the Parliament, and that the trade-off leaves the Parliament weaker under the co-decision procedure instituted by Maastricht than under the cooperation procedure instituted by the Single European act.

The first difference (the absolute veto power) unambiguously strengthens the hand of the Parliament in negotiations with the Council. The Parliament under the co-decision procedure does not need allies to see its veto sustained, while in the cooperation procedure the veto was conditional (upon the support of allies). This is the change introduced by the co-decision procedure that has been analyzed exhaustively, and this is the basis of the belief that the powers of the Parliament have increased.

It is interesting to note, however, that in the whole history of the cooperation procedure the Parliament's veto was exercised only twice, and both times it was sustained: once because the Commission dropped the legislation after the Parliament's conditional veto, and once because there was no unanimity in the Council. These events cannot lead to the conclusion that unconditional and conditional vetoes are the same, because the Parliament may have avoided vetoing cases for fear that it would have been overruled. However, the history of vetoes suggests that the conditions for a sustained veto laid down by the cooperation procedure were easy to meet.

The second difference increases the probability that an agreement will not be reached on the basis of the provisions of the cooperation procedure, but will require the new steps added by the co-decision procedure. Consequently, this provision is likely to increase the number of laws that are considered by the joint committee and subsequently are candidates for an ultimate decision by the Council subject to non-agreement by the Parliament.

The third difference reduces the role of the Parliament even further, because it forces it to seek agreement with the least favorable member of the Council instead of disregarding it and trying to come to closure with the qualified majority. It is interesting to note that measures that are considered under this particular provision are many and important.

Finally, the major difference between the two procedures is that while under the cooperation procedure the EP had a conditional agenda setting power (it was able to make a proposal which, upon acceptance by the Commission was easier for the Council to accept than to modify), agenda setting in the co-decision procedure belongs to the joint committee, and ultimately to the Council.

In the remainder of this note, I want to compare the first and the fourth of these changes, and try to assess the essential difference between these two procedures. How important is it that the Parliament has gained an unconditional instead of a conditional veto? How important is it that the EP lost its agenda setting powers in favor of the Council? I argue that agenda setting is much more important than veto, and that in the exchange the Parliament has lost significant powers, on top of the second and third differences between the two procedures which tip the balance against the Parliament even further.

Figure 1 gives a graphic representation of the essence of my argument. Consider the status quo (previously existing legislation at the European level, or, in the absence of it, a series of national enactments). Consider also the ideal points of the Parliament and the Council. Obviously, I am presenting a simplified version here, because I am not taking into account the Commission's preferences (which are incorporated in the cooperation procedure), and I ignore that each one of these collective actors is composed of many individuals with different preferences. However, these complications do not materially affect my argument. Any new legislation must be supported by both the Council (by a qualified majority or unanimity) and the Parliament (more precisely, not op-
posed by an absolute majority of it). If we assume that each one of these two collective actors prefers points that are closer to his own ideal point over the status quo, then the feasible outcomes are included inside the shaded area of the figure. Out of all these possible compromises, the agenda setter (the actor that makes the final proposal) will select the one that is preferable to him, and will present the other actor with a “take it or leave it” proposition. This proposal would be $P_1$, if the Parliament controls the agenda, and $P_2$, if the agenda is controlled by the Council. Note that these differences are real, except in the very limited set of cases where the status quo lies between the ideal points of the Council and the Parliament (in which case no compromise is possible). Note also, whenever the status quo is located in the shaded area named $F$, the agenda setter can achieve his own ideal point as a compromise. If one considers instead of the simplified version I present here, a more complicated situation with multiple members of the Council and Parliament located in a multidimensional (instead of a two-dimensional) space the powers of the agenda setter generally increase. Under certain conditions, it is possible for the agenda setter to select not only the outcome, but also one particular coalition that will support the most advantageous outcome.

In order to make the argument clearer, consider a magnification of the difference between the two procedures represented by the comparison between presidential and parliamentary systems. In presidential systems, the legislature (parliament) makes proposals to the executive (president) who can accept or veto them. In parliamentary systems the roles are reversed: it is the executive that makes proposals to the legislature. Which is the most advantageous position to be in? It is always the president who requests line item vetoes in presidential systems and it is always the parliament that complains about its decline in parliamentary systems. In both cases, complaints have to do with the lack of agenda control.

To conclude, lots of analyses of European institutions are based on the understanding of the workings of the EP as a parliament in a parliamentary system. They ask that the Parliament control the Commission, and that it have legislative veto (see quotes from *The Economist* above). Instead, the legislative work of European institutions more closely follows a presidential system, where the power to propose legislation is very important. In that regard, despite significant increases in its power in other areas, the European Parliament has been shortchanged by the introduction of the co-decision procedure by the Maastricht Treaty. It had to give up the most of conditional agenda setting in order to receive the bone of unconditional veto. I wonder whether an increase or a decrease of the powers of the Parliament was in the minds of the signatories of the Maastricht treaty.

"The research for this note was supported by a Guggenheim fellowship on "The Institutions of the European Union."

FIGURE 1

Comparison of veto power with agenda control
Immigration and further integration in the European Union

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As the European Union (EU) moves into the post-Delors era its leaders are striving to put the finishing touches on the ambitious effort launched in 1985 to achieve a single market. Among the most pressing unfinished business is the removal of remaining barriers to free movement within the Union and the implementation of harmonized asylum and immigration policies to deal with migration pressures from the outside. Whether the EU can accomplish these objectives may have serious implications for the longer-term goals of monetary and political integration. Are conflicts over immigration harbingers of the limits of EU cooperation or can we anticipate more closely coordinated national policies and the expansion of Community competence over immigration?

One way to approach these questions is to engage in a bit of counterfactual speculation. What would be the situation with respect to the realization of free movement within the Union if member states did not possess significant non-European populations deriving from earlier postwar migrations; that is, if the only issue was the internal migration of EU nationals? Even if we take the postwar migrations as given, how would the political situation differ if the asylum crisis that hit Europe after 1989 had not occurred? Suppose the Berlin Wall was still standing, the Soviet Union was still restricting the exit of her citizens, and there was no refugee-generating war in Yugoslavia.

Even in the absence of non-European populations, the realization of free movement would have been contentious because the migration of persons is inherently more problematic than that of goods, services, or capital. Nevertheless, the presence of former guestworker populations makes the situation immeasurably more difficult. Regulation of the movement of third-country nationals has been a principal sticking point in negotiations to remove internal border controls. Finally, although the asylum crisis has had contradictory effects, it has, on balance, accelerated the pace of integration. On the one hand, it has exacerbated popular fears over immigration and created tensions between member states that differ in the extent of their exposure to unwanted migration, both of which have undeniably complicated European immigration issues. On the other hand, the crisis has focused the pace of cooperation and spawned a host of multi-lateral institutions devoted to policy harmonization. Without the asylum crisis, movement toward harmonization would have occurred anyway, but at a much slower pace.

Free movement of workers was clearly the least important of the four freedoms established by the Treaty of Rome. Although liberal trading regimes that involve the circulation of goods, services, and capital imply and require relaxed restrictions on the movement of persons, the architects of the new Europe understood that the first three commodities were more critical and, ultimately, less controversial. Accordingly, free movement within the Community applies only to workers and was gradually phased in for the original six members. As the Community expanded, it imposed long waiting periods on Spain, Portugal, and Greece, all traditional sending states, before their workers were permitted to move freely across borders to take up jobs.

The drive to achieve a single market intensified and broadened the Community's efforts to achieve free circulation for member-state nationals. The chief obstacles that were identified in the 1985 White Paper were physical (passports, border controls, and work and residency permits) and technical (recognition of credentials for professionals, national legislation regulating professional practice, etc.). Significant progress was made toward the elimination of the technical obstacles, but lifting border checks has been much more difficult than was expected. In 1985 five states (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) created the Schengen Group that proposed to move ahead of the community at large and eliminate border controls at an early date. After numerous delays, it appears that on March 26, 1995 these states, plus Spain and Portugal will finally create a border-free zone. Italy and Greece intend to join later. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom are still unsupressed and, of course, the three new members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) must eventually be brought on board.

The scale of internal migration on the part of EU citizens has not been as great as many had feared or expected. Even after the SEA initiatives, only around 4.9 million EU nationals are currently living in a member state other than that of their nationality. They represent about a third of all resident aliens in the Union. Any ramifications from this migration have been overshadowed by the controversies that have erupted over third-country nationals and asylum-seekers. Still, the long-term political consequences of intra-EU migration should not be casually dismissed. These internal migrants are at the rampart of the struggle over EU citizenship. Already in possession of the right to vote locally for MEPs, they will be the beneficiaries of a recent EU General Affairs Council directive ordering member states to permit "settled nationals" from within the EU to vote and run for office in local elections. The implementation of this directive is not likely to go smoothly.

For all the problems encountered on the road to free circulation for EU nationals, the most contentious immigration issues in the Community involve (1) the migration and work rights of third-country nationals and their descendants resident in member states, (2) the effort to create more effective and harmonized immigration policies as a necessary accompaniment to relaxation of internal controls, and (3) the development of policy responses to the wave of asylum seekers from outside the Union. Underlying each of these is the matter of whether decision making authority should be lodged: exclusively with member states, with intergovernmental institutions, or with Community organs.

The economic logic of the single market suggests that any persons legally

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Rethinking the Small State Debate: Scandinavian Corporatism and European Integration
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The recent domestic political struggles in Scandinavia over whether to join the European Union (EU) suggest that corporativists cannot ignore the forces of internationalization. The fear of exclusion from its largest export market and the desire to have a voice in EU institutions compelled Sweden to abandon its long-held policy of alliance freedom. Sweden, once considered a model social democratic welfare state, joined the European Union on January 1, 1995. To the east in neighboring Finland, the unraveling of the Soviet empire adversely affected the economy and raised fears that Finland will be left out in the cold if it does not align with Europe. Finns are suffering the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, with unemployment as high as 19% of the labor force. As a consequence, 57% of the Finns who participated in the national referendum endorsed membership, and Finland is now a member of the European Union. While Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland hoped that the positive outcome of the Swedish and Finnish referenda would influence the vote in Norway, she was disappointed when 52% of the participants in the November 28 referendum rejected membership in the European Union.

The Scandinavian experience with European integration raises several interesting questions for comparative political scientists. Given the exceptional features of these social democratic welfare states, why do they want any part of joining a club of larger continental powers who do not share the ambitions of Scandinavian social democracy? And further, why do some Scandinavian states acquiesce to European integration while others resist? To what extent can our theories of corporatism account for Scandinavian responses to European integration?

In a wave of scholarship prominent in the 1980s, David Cameron, Gesta Esping-Andersen and Peter Katzenstein provided alternative explanations for the economic and policy successes of small, European corporatist states. Their work made an important contribution to understanding the “Golden Age” of Scandinavian corporatism. However, recent changes in Scandinavian policies and institutions suggest that their analyses apply to a historic period of small state corporatism.

According to Cameron (1984), organized labor movements in small states with predominately left party governments traded off militancy for full employment. He found no resident within the EU should be free to circulate and take up work wherever they can find it. Moreover, the removal of border checks will make it impossible to prevent specific classes of persons from crossing national boundaries. Nonetheless, those opposed to the prospect of non-EU nationals migrating for work have prevailed, so although they will be permitted to move from their country of residence for periods up to three months, they may not undertake employment.

The proposal to eliminate internal borders simply pushed the question of immigration control to the Union’s external frontiers. Now any illegal immigrants, dubious asylum seekers, terrorists, or smugglers who penetrate the community’s external boundaries can move to any member state. Following the analogy of the weak link in the chain, this gives to each member state a stake in the immigration control capacities of its neighbors. The rapid expansion of the numbers of asylum seekers after 1989 has only exacerbated the tensions associated with making 12 states dependent on one another for the regulation of immigration and the management of asylum policy.

It is useful to think of these matters in the language of public goods. States that are able and willing to enforce strict control policies over their borders can externalize immigration problems onto more generous or weaker states. The latter will have incentive to promote the harmonization of policies to avoid absorbing the “costs” displaced by their more effective neighbors. This has been neatly illustrated in the EU where Germany, the country most open to asylum claims (at least until the Basic Law was amended in the summer of 1993) has led the effort to develop a common immigration policy, while Britain, the country with perhaps the most effective border controls, has led the resistance. At the other end of the spectrum, states with limited capacity to control immigration, like Spain, Italy, and Greece, are being pushed by the rest to get up to speed.

Should one be more impressed by the unprecedented collaboration and convergence of European immigration policy in the last ten years or by the undeniable disagreement, disorganization, and continuing insistence on national prerogatives? The progress toward a single market has forced a number of thorny immigration issues onto the table. The coincidence of the asylum crisis has created a more turbulent context within which those issues are being managed, but has also concentrated the minds of national immigration officials and given leverage to advocates of Union-level initiatives. Harmonization, if it is mostly achieved through intergovernmental processes, does not necessarily entail a reduction of national decision-making. The volatility of public reaction to immigration combined with the jealous instincts of politicians to preserve national sovereignty, should ensure that, as much as a monetary union, immigration will test the limits of Europe’s integrative momentum.
evidence that corporatist arrangements undermined the relative power of labor. Instead, where labor’s power resources were strong, wage-earners were insulated from fluctuations in the capitalist economy.

Esping-Andersen (1985) viewed Scandinavian social democracy as a promising example of how state policy can empower the labor movement. His analysis established the relative strength of the labor movement in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. For example, Esping-Andersen contrasted Sweden’s solidaristic policies to the more liberal, market-oriented policies adopted by the Danes.

Katzenstein (1985) attributed the economic success of seven, small European states to what he called “democratic corporatism.” For Katzenstein, these states shared an ideology of social partnership, powerful centralized interest groups, and informal political bargaining. Labor and business were united against the forces of international competition, which permitted these states to adapt flexibly to change.

For no fault of their own, these scholars did not anticipate the revival of European integration in the mid-1980s, or its effects on small, corporatist states. Because of the depth of European policy coordination, and new vulnerabilities facing Scandinavia following the end of the Cold War, these small, corporatist states sought a closer partnership with the EU. However European integration has altered the balance of power between corporatist actors, and draws some Scandinavian states (Sweden and Finland) more rapidly into the fold than others (Norway). For example, consider two critical changes which have occurred in Scandinavian political systems as a consequence of European integration.

First, capital mobility has shifted the balance of power between corporatist actors in Scandinavia. The EU’s creation of an internal market encouraged Scandinavian companies to invest in manufacturing and production facilities on the Continent. While employers threatened to leave the country if the government did not join the EU, Scandinavian labor unions had no comparable, credible threat. The Scandinavian experience with European integration suggests that capital mobility gives business an upper hand, and that some corporatist states are more compelled to sign on to the European project than others.

For manufacturing-dependent Sweden, capital flight encouraged the trade unions to adopt a pro-integrationist strategy, with the hope that EU membership will encourage foreign direct investment and job creation in Sweden. Sweden’s Social Democratic government led the way for a speedy entry into the European Union, and in contrast to Norway, Sweden intends to cooperate fully with the EU’s ambitious integration plans. In petrol-subsidized Norway, on the other hand, protected sectors of the economy (agriculture, fisheries, and rural industry) effectively mobilized against EU membership, and trade unions in Norway are much more skeptical of European integration.

Norway, as an EU outsider and oil-rich nation, will be able to retain more solidaristic policies than other small, corporatist states. Perhaps Norway will replace Sweden as the model Scandinavian social democracy, more resistant to the forces of internationalization.

A second important change in Scandinavian politics is the pursuit of anti-inflationary policies. While these states were once committed to a full employment policy, the current preoccupation of Scandinavian governments is how to reduce inflation. The exceptional levels of unemployment in Sweden and Norway (between one and two percent of the labor force) described by Cameron are no longer features of Scandinavian corporatism. Instead, unemployment in Scandinavia has risen to levels consistent with European Union member-states, and leftist parties no longer remain committed to full employment.

A second wave of scholarship is emerging in the 1990s which reexamines the institutional and policy features of small, corporatist states and effectively incorporates international determinants. These contributors focus on changes in small state corporatism, and emphasize how internationalization and regional integration are responsible for diminishing the exceptional nature of corporatist politics described by Cameron, Esping-Andersen and Katzenstein. Scholars interested in the transformation of small, corporatist states are encouraged to look to recent contributions by Paulette Kurzer, Evelyne Huber and John Stephens, Herman Schwartz, and Torben Iversen.

While first wave theorists made no attempt to distinguish between the economic performance of those states that pursued closer ties to the EU, and those that remain outside, Paulette Kurzer makes an important contribution to the literature by analyzing these differences. In Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe (Cornell, 1993), Kurzer attributes a more rapid break-down in corporatist arrangements to the forces unleashed by the deregulation of capital. Her analysis explains why the labor-business partnership collapsed earlier in Belgium and the Netherlands than in Austria or Sweden.

In their paper entitled, “Economic Internationalization, the European Community, and the Social Democratic Welfare State” (APSA, 1992), Evelyne Huber and John Stephens contend that the combined effect of the strengthened position of capital, the increasing diversity of the trade union movement, increasing international constraints and a decline in economic growth has changed the social democratic full employment welfare state.

Herman Schwartz (“Small States in Big Trouble,” World Politics, July 1994) argues that new political coalitions are forming in small states in order to respond to more competitive international markets. To restore competitiveness, these coalitions are reforming the very nature of politics and the structure of the state.

In Power, Flexibility and the Breakdown of Centralized Bargaining (Harvard, 1994), Torben Iversen argues that changes in structural-economic constraints during the 1970s and 1980s led to a cross-class realignment and a more rapid breakdown of centralized bargaining systems in Sweden and Denmark than in Norway. In Norway, political and economic conditions favored the retention of a centralized system of wage determination.

Katzenstein has also returned to the study of small states in a new project, Unified Germany in an Integrating Europe (forthcoming). He and his colleagues explore the effects of German
On European Economic Integration: Lessons from American History

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I. Introduction.

Two models of international trade exist: the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the "new international" trade model. The Heckscher-Ohlin model shows that countries trade because of differences in nations' resources. It predicts that a nation abundant in a particular resource will produce and export products which are relatively intensive in that resource. The "new international" trade model shows that countries trade because of economies of scale. It predicts that a nation will produce a limited range of goods, but each at a larger and more efficient scale. Whether the European economic integration will be characterized by the standard neoclassical model of trade based on comparative advantage or by the "new international" trade model based on imperfect competition and increasing returns is still an open debate. A study of the evolution of U.S. regional economies from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries provides some insights on the potential path of European economies.

II. Economic and Policy Implications of Economic Integration.

Economic integration can be defined in a number of ways but this section will focus on two types of definitions: the first involves free mobility of final goods and the second involves free mobility of factors such as capital, labor and resources. The predictions of trade models differ depending on the type of economic integration being considered. Suppose that economic integration involves only the free mobility of final goods. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that countries will become more specialized according to their comparative advantage of resources. The "new international" trade model predicts that countries will become more specialized, but on a random basis. Each country will produce a smaller variety of goods at a greater scale, but the location of these industries is indeterminate. Now suppose that economic integration also involves free mobility of factors. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that regions will become less specialized when factors are mobile. As factor mobility equalizes factor prices across countries, all countries will essentially have the same resource endowments. Consequently, all countries produce the same mix of final goods and regional specialization goes to zero. The "new international" trade model predicts that regions will become even more specialized when factors are mobile. Goods can be produced at even greater scale if factors migrate to one location. Accordingly, Krugman (1991) predicts that a potential outcome of European economic integration is the division of Europe into core and peripheral regions. Countries with early advantages will "suck" labor and resources from late starters, thereby becoming concentrated cores. Those with early disadvantages will lose their labor and resources, withering into empty peripheries.

The "new international" trade theory suggests a rethinking of trade policies. A small government subsidy given to a domestic industry at an early point in its lifecycle may result in huge returns. This subsidy gives initial advantages to domestic producers of this industry, but the early small advantages quickly accumulate over time from increasing returns. Domestic producers will produce goods at a larger scale and a lower cost and drive other international competitors out of business. An activist trade policy can secure for a country a larger share of industries with increasing returns. A modest policy action at a critical point in time may cause a nation to become a part of the core rather than the periphery. Given the drastically different welfare and policy consequences of integration implied by the "new international" trade models, it is important to examine whether or not the attention given to these new models is empirically justified.

Figure 1
Index of Regional Specialization: Manufacturing, 1860-1987

Ingebritsen, continued
unification and European integration on the institutions and policies of small European states.

Thus, in contrast to the first wave of scholarship, internationalization figures prominently in the study of small state corporatism. The Scandinavian experience with European integration reminds us that internationalization is not just an external shock or threat — instead, internationalization empowers business at the expense of labor, imposes new policy regimes, and compels Northern Europe’s neutral social democracies to join the European Union.
III. External Economies and Regional Specialization.

External economies as a source of increasing returns have received a considerable amount of attention in recent years. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the economic significance of external economies. Marshallian externalities — labor market pooling, non-traded industry-specific inputs, and technological spillovers — leave few paper trails. Hence, the economic contribution of externalities is difficult to estimate directly. It may be possible, however, to gather some indirect evidence of external economies by examining the extent of regional specialization and localization of industries. Many writers have interpreted regional specialization and localization as providing evidence for external economies. Many of the earliest studies of regional specialization in the United States, for example, were based on the assumption that more highly specialized regions were more likely to experience higher rates of economic growth. More recently, Krugman (1991) in Geography and Trade, the historical patterns of U.S. regional specialization raise doubts as to whether geographic concentration provides evidence for the significance of external economies. The levels of externalities implied by the indexes of regional specialization are at odds with many stylized notions of externalities. As the set of regional economies integrated to form a national economy between the 19th and early 20th centuries, the extent of regional specialization rose from about 35% in 1860 to about 43% in 1927. The extent of specialization leveled off between World War I and World War II and then fell substantially and consistently to the point where regions are less specialized today than they were in 1860. The extent of regional specialization stood at about 23% in 1987 (see Figure 1). If regional specialization is an indicator of the strength of external economies, then external economies reached their peak during the inter-war years and fell significantly since World War II. The historical patterns of externalities implied by the extent of regional specialization, however, contradict those implied by the changes in the composition of manufacturing activities. Since the early 20th century, manufacturing industries shifted from industries intensive in resources to high-tech industries intensive in research and development, information and skilled workers. External economies are likely to be much higher in high-tech industries rather than the old, traditional industries, and yet its shift is not reflected in the patterns of regional specialization.

Localization of industries over time and cross-industry patterns of localization at various points in time also cast doubt as to whether localization can be used as evidence for external economies. Between 1860-1987, the localization indexes indicate that externalities increased most for tobacco and textiles, but least for machinery, electrical

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| Unweighted Average      | 0.265| 0.243| 0.256| 0.286| 0.307| 0.327| 0.284| 0.259|
| Weighted Average        | 0.273| 0.253| 0.242| 0.311| 0.316| 0.259| 0.239| 0.197|
Enlargement, Institutional Balance, and National Representation in the European Union

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The European Union (EU) has just experienced its fifth enlargement with the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden. After the negative outcome of the November 1994 referendum on joining the EU, Norway, however, will stay out. The Union now encompasses 15 member states.

The institutional structures of the present Union were basically established at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's. They represented a balance of representation among the six founding members (Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries). During this time the Community relied strongly on intergovernmental principles, reflected in the strong position of the Council of Ministers relative to the European Parliament (then the “European Assembly”). Certainly, the introduction of the cooperation procedure in the framework of the Single European Act and of the “co-decision procedure” in the Treaty on European Union have enhanced the influence of the European Parliament (EP) in decision-making.

The introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979 has also furthered its democratic legitimacy. However, elections to the EP are still based on different national electoral systems and are focused on national rather than on European issues. Moreover, the decision-making procedures are complex and lack transparency, features which clearly do not further support for the EU in public opinion. The EP is still struggling to make itself more important in the EU framework and to eventually establish a bicameral system in which the EP constitutes a “Lower House” and the Council of Ministers an “Upper House.”

The enlargements have prompted challenges to its institutional structures and decision-making procedures. One of the aims in the expansions was to keep a reasonable balance between the influence of larger and smaller members as well as between richer and poorer. A crucial part of this balance is the distribution of weighted votes in the Council of Ministers, which is constituted of the ministers responsible for the policy area concerned. Table 1 shows how the number of votes has been distributed historically among the member states and how the requirement for a qualified majority was continuously adapted. Columns 2-5 present the situation between 1958 and 1994, and column 6 presents the present constellation.

In the first period, the large members (France, Germany and Italy) had twice the number of votes of Belgium or the Netherlands and four times tiny Luxembourg. In the first enlargement, the large states obtained 10 votes each, the middle-sized 5 and the smallest 3 or 2 votes each. The number of votes for each member state has not changed since. However, due to the addition of votes to new members, the absolute requirement for a qualified majority was adapted to the new vote total in order to maintain the proportion at approximately 71%. The requirement for forming a blocking minority, however, has decreased from 35% in the original constellation of members to 30% today.

In judging the importance of the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers, however, recall that even though the original Treaty of Rome provided for the possibility of applying

V. Conclusion.

The lesson learned from American history is that regional specialization and localization of industries do not necessarily provide evidence for “some kind of increasing returns.” To the contrary, the historical patterns of U.S. regional specialization and localization seem to contradict many stylized facts concerning external economies. At best, external economies or other sources of increasing returns might have been important during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, but their significance appears to have diminished considerably since that time... The evidence suggests that there are limits to such economies, and accordingly raises the possibility that bashing long-run policies on their realization may prove inadvisable.

*Note: This essay is a summary of a chapter of my dissertation chaired by Kenneth Sokoloff.

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qualified majority votes, the "policy of the empty chair" (as exercised by France in the mid-60's) triggered the Luxembourg compromise. According to this agreement—which never obtained legal basis but perpetuated consensual decision-making up to the introduction of the Single European Act in 1987—the member states had to act by consent whenever "crucial national interests" of a member were at stake. Even though the Council of Ministers still meets behind closed doors and member states' positions on decisions are usually known only occasionally (e.g. when representatives try to impress their national electorates by demonstrating how hard they fought for national interests) the application of this voting procedure clearly seems to be on the rise. However, also keep in mind that many decisions are already made at the level of the COREPER, the permanent representatives (or ambassadors) of the member states, without the need for proceeding to an actual vote. Finally, achieving agreement in the Council of Ministers involves log-rolling, side-payments and the conclusion of the characterstic "package deals."

The 1996 Review Conference of the Maastricht Treaty will deal extensively with the EU's future institutional structures. First, the balance of influence between the EP, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers has to be determined. There is little doubt that the number of commissioners per member state will be reduced. The more the EP's legislative powers increase, the more important will be the allocation of seats to the member states in this body. Mainly due to German unification, the number of seats was adapted for the present constellation, which started in June 1994. According to the new distribution, Germany has 99 representatives (up from 81), the other large members 87, Spain 64, Netherlands 31, and the other medium-sized or smaller members have between 6 (Luxembourg) and 25 seats (Belgium, Greece, and Portugal). Table 2 shows the allocation of seats in the EP in the last constellation (1989-1994) and the present one, as well as the respective population sizes and the ratio of EP representatives per million inhabitants.

Clearly, as is true in the Council of Ministers, the smaller members are more favorably represented for their population size than the larger ones. The ratio of representatives per million inhabitants varies between 1.22 for Germany and 15 for Luxembourg. However, EP members usually work in committees and their votes tend to be cast more in accordance with party affiliation than with nationality.

While the number of EP representatives per state was changed to account for changes in population size and German reunification, it is striking that it was not adapted in the same manner as the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers. There are, however, strong pressures to adapt the formal influence of larger members in that institution. These pressures were already extensive in view of the most recent enlargement, but the Danish "no" in their first referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 may have halted attempts to give larger members a bigger say in the formal decision-making process. The Edinburgh Summit of December 1992 confirmed that the distribution of weighted votes in the Council of Ministers would not be changed with an enlargement by just a few new members. Changes for later stages and further enlargements—such as by Central European states or tiny new members (e.g., Malta or Cyprus)—were not excluded.

The 1996 Review Conference will have to decide about the contents of EU policies and the scope of policy cooperation, as well as about future institutional structures. Clearly, agreeing on new institutional foundations and new decision-making rules will involve much bargaining between the present participants and struggling between larger and smaller members for representation based either more in accordance with the principle of equality between member states or equality between comparable population sizes. One frequent suggestion aims at combating the "democratic deficit" and at enhancing the EP's influence. Another suggestion is to "streamline" the Commission and to curtail its extensive agenda-setting power. Yet other proposals aim to change the allocation of votes in the Council of Ministers, for instance, by introducing a double-majority voting system. Instead of qualified majorities based on the present weighting of votes, decisions in the Council of Ministers would require both a (simple) majority of the EU member states and of the total population they represent. The latter suggestion, however, is likely to lead to a convergence in relative voting power of all members (Germany is an exception, which would actually be able to extend its quantitative influence).

The admission of the three new members in January 1995 has clearly changed the composition of the EU and will therefore also affect future policy outcomes. First, the three new members are comparatively small. This may aggravate problems in terms of the perceived lack of influence of larger members. Second, the new members are relatively prosperous and will thus strengthen the group of the "richer countries." This will certainly have repercussions on future redistributive policies such as contained in the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Finally, there are likely to be effects in policy areas such as environmental protection and external trade policy.

There are different channels through which the new members can influence EU policies. A crucial one will be their turn in holding the Presidency of the European Council. This position rotates among the members, usually for half a year, and allows for crucial influence in agenda-setting and the conclusion of package deals. Another decisive element is their formal power in the EU's institutions. In the EP, they have obtained 20 seats (Austria), 16 (Finland) and 21 (Sweden), raising the total number of representatives to 624. In the Council of Ministers, Austria and Sweden obtained 4 votes each and Finland 3. Thus, the new members will also be rather favorably represented as compared to their population size.

Since the number of votes is not sufficient to estimate an actor's quantitative influence in a voting body, however, Tables 3A and 3B present their relative power with respect to qualified majority votes in the Council of Ministers. The figures are given for the first constellation (1958-73) through the present. The measures used are the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices.

The Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices generate similar outcomes. Two tendencies can be observed.
First, the relative share in voting power has historically decreased for all members due to the increase in the overall number of members. Second, the decrease in relative voting power was extensive for the middle-sized members, but also considerable for the larger ones. The divergence in voting power between the largest member and the smallest one (Luxembourg) has decreased with the different enlargements to a factor of approximately 5 today.

The more qualified majority voting will be applied, the more the distribution of relative voting power will be crucial. The difficult tasks of the 1996 Review Conference will not only consist in establishing a reasonable balance between the different EU institutions, especially between the Commission, the EP and the Council of Ministers, but also to assure an equitable balance between the quantitative influence of the larger and the smaller members in the Union. Determinations about the EU’s institutional foundations will decisively influence the future policy outcomes.

Notes
1One of the most striking examples is the “first-past-the-post” system used in the United Kingdom and proportional election systems in most of the other member states.

2Depending on the timing of the Euroelections — which occur every five years in the same month all over the Union — some elections have the character of “national mid-terms” rather than to the EP. Examples in the 1994 election are relatively strong support for the German Christian Democrats (CDU) who have then joined the second largest political group in the EP, the European People’s Party (EPP), and the “protest vote” for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom (which lead to 63 representatives joining the European Socialists). Only 19 Tories by contrast, were elected and joined the EPP.

3The Spinelly Report of the European Parliament, which drew up a draft constitution for the Community, already aimed at such a structure in 1984. A decade later, in February 1994, the EP approved the “Herman Report,” another draft constitution. The latter, however, was received much more ambiguously by the EP. The proposal is contained in the following EP document: Second Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the Constitution of the European Union (Rapporteur: Mr. Fernand Herman), Session Document A3-0864/94.

4The most famous ones are the General Affairs Council, constituted of the foreign ministers of the member states, the Ecofin, in which the ministers of economics and finance meet and the Agricultural Council, the assembly of ministers of agriculture.

5Article 7 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure holds that proceeding to a vote can be requested by any member state or by the Commission and must be complied with if a majority of the members in the Council supports this request (see Council Decision 93/662/EC of 6 December 1993, Official Journal 1993, L 304/1). This procedure exists since the Single European Act came into force (Summer 1987), but does not seem to have been used frequently.

6The significance of the procedure was demonstrated in a struggle in early 1993, just after the accession negotiations with the new members were successfully concluded, with respect to adapting the respective quotas for a qualified majority (and hence also a blocking minority) in the Council of Ministers. The United Kingdom and Spain were unwilling to allow the requirement for forming a blocking minority to rise from 23 to 27 votes (27 was calculated on the basis that Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway would join the Union in 1995, the total of weighted votes would be 90 and a qualified majority 64). The “Iomina Compromise” decided that the requirement for a qualified majority would be adapted, but 23 votes should be sufficient to force further negotiations on an issue. On this compromise solution see for instance “The Iomina Compromise — Towards a Wider and a Weaker European Union?” Editorial Comments of the Common Market Law Review 31: 453-57.

7Presently there are 23 committees, including the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, the Committee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries, and the Committee on Budgets.

8In Summer 1994, there were 9 different Euro-Groups or parties represented in the EP. Of the total 567 members, 198 belonged to the European Socialists, 157 to the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats), and 43 to the Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group. The other members were spread over the remaining six political groups or were non-attached (27). While the two largest parties had members from all EU member states, membership in other groups varied strongly according to nationalities. The most striking group may have been the “Forza Europa” which consisted of Italians exclusively (in essence followers of Berlusconi).

9See Europe, 13 December 1992, no. 5878.

10This proposal was made in Fall 1993 by Germany’s Christian Democrats and is also included in the EP’s “Herman Report” (see Note 3).


12See also Hosli (1995).

13The European Council meets at least twice a year and consists of the Heads of State or Government of the EU members.

14Earlier calculations of power indices for EC member states have been presented in Brans, Steven J. (1985), Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. On paradoxes of voting power as caused by an increase in the number of members see Brans, Steven J. and Affuso, Paul J. (1985), “New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers,” Electoral Studies 4, 135-39. The calculation of different power indices is see page 16
### Table 1: Council of Ministers Vote Weighing and Qualified Majority Requirement, 1955-1995

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<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>(70.6%)</td>
<td>(70.7%)</td>
<td>(71.4%)</td>
<td>(71.1%)</td>
<td>(71.3%)</td>
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<td><strong>Blocking Minority</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(absolute and %)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35.3%)</td>
<td>(31.9%)</td>
<td>(30.2%)</td>
<td>(30.3%)</td>
<td>(29.9%)</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>


### Table 2: Seats Distribution and the Number of Representatives in the European Parliament per Million Inhabitants

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<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU25</strong></td>
<td>554</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>348.4</td>
<td>3.76 (avg.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Austria       | 20                          | 9.9                           | 2.53                     |
| Finland      | 18                          | 5.1                           | 3.14                     |
| Sweden       | 71                          | 8.7                           | 2.41                     |
| **EU15**     | 624                         | 770.1                         | 3.14 (avg.)              |

### Table 3A: The Banishf Power Index with respect to Qualified Majority Votes in the Council of Ministers, 1958-1995 (In Percent)

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<td>-</td>
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<td>15.77</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.59</td>
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<td>15.77</td>
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<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
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<td>15.77</td>
<td>12.87</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>99.98</td>
<td>99.99</td>
<td>99.97</td>
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### Table 3A: The Shapley-Shubik Power Index with respect to Qualified Majority Votes in the Council of Ministers, 1958-1995 (In Percent)

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Projects and Databases

The Special Project on Political Economy
Margaret Levi
Professor of Political Science
University of Washington

The special project on Political Economy was constituted at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) during 1993-94. The group consisted of: Robert Bates, Professor of Government, Harvard University; Avner Greif, Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University; Margaret Levi, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington; Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Associate Professor of Economics, UCLA; and Barry Weingast, Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. We share a commitment to two broad avenues of investigation into processes of social change. First, we all agree on the importance of approaching significant issues from a political economy perspective rather than through separate investigations of the political and economic realms. Second, we believe that institutions play a central role in directing the process of economic and social development. Thus far, we have focused on historical settings. As our year at the Center came to a close, we began to turn toward more contemporary issues in economic development, more specifically problems of market reform and political transition.

We met approximately once per week and, occasionally, more often. We spent many months engaging in critical reading and debate. We covered literatures on medieval and early modern European history; readings on the public finance and bureaucratic structures of pre-industrial societies; and general readings on political economy. In this process, we developed a sense of what intellectual perspectives distinguish us from many of the others who label themselves political economists. Around mid-year we decided to prepare a volume that will contain an introductory essay and a contribution from each of us. The introductory essay will be collectively written and provide an analytical overview on institutions, social stability, and social change. Each of the individual essays will represent a focused political economy account of a particular situation of institutional stability and change. We agreed at the outset that a volume would be worthwhile only if it would represent an accomplishment out of the ordinary. We have concluded that the common ground among our diverse perspectives constitutes a new approach to the study of institutions and their effect on society. The introductory essay expresses this common ground. The separate essays, drawn from our individual, long-term research efforts, reveal a remarkable diversity of topics through a very similar lens. It is not that the pieces of our argument are unavailable elsewhere; it is that the literature on institutions is too rich, containing too many different ways of approaching the topic. Most collections reflect this diversity and thus fail to present a unified approach to institutions and their social consequences. In contrast, our effort reflects a more focused approach, emphasizing a special subset of tools we think should receive greater prominence.

The core analytical issue concerns the long-term maintenance and survival of institutions. Too many institutional analyses take the institutions as given, ignoring questions about their origin and maintenance. If they attend to these issues, they do so inadequately. We articulate what constitutes an explanation of the origins and survival of an institution, provide a series of tools needed to answer the question, and then provide five important essays that illustrate the program. We hope this approach will constitute an important focal point in social science research on institutions. To that end, we have designed the volume so it will be accessible to graduate students as well as to scholars already working in the area.

Each of the essays in the volume will investigate in a historical setting how particular institutions were created and maintained. This necessarily implies an understanding of the institution’s economic and political consequences. Summaries of the specific contributions are as follows.

Robert Bates examines the origins and maintenance of the International Coffee Organization that regulated international trade between 1962-1989. He demonstrates that because of problems with policing the behavior of small producers such as El Salvador, economic models alone cannot explain the success of this cartel. Success required the participation of the consuming nations such as the United States and France. Bates further argues...
The authors are assembling a database on offices set up by subnational (regional and local) governments in Brussels. We have sent detailed questionnaires to the 70 subnational offices located in Brussels, and currently have responses from almost 50. Our questionnaire focuses on political and organizational issues, including the size, timing of establishment, and political activities of regional offices.

This is, to our knowledge, the first systematic survey of this form of political mobilization. As of the time of writing, some 70 regional and local governments representing almost one half of the population of the European Union have established offices in Brussels. Although they have no legal or formal place in the Union, the largest and best funded of these offices combine several functions. 1) They provide the Commission and Parliament with regional viewpoints on all issues that concern them. 2) They survey the European scene for upcoming issues to be brought to the attention of policy makers in their home governments. 3) They participate in dense networks with other regional offices and EU organizations of every type. 4) They lobby for a greater voice in EU decision making.

These offices exist in the shadows of the EU, sometimes in ignorance of the existence of similar efforts on the part of other regions from their own country. Their numbers and their staff and resources have grown rapidly. The first regional offices, from Saarland and Hamburg, were set up in 1985. By 1988 there were 15 such offices. Six years later their number has more than quadrupled. On average the regional offices that are currently established in Brussels are barely four years old.


Levi, continued

that, in the context of communist insurgency, the consuming nations participated in the cartel as part of their foreign policy programs.

Avner Greif investigates the relationship between Genoa’s domestic politics and economic success in the twelfth and thirteenth century. Because increased trade provided more resources for domestic political competition, the expansion of Genoa’s commerce was contingent on finding a political settlement that would endure despite bitter factional competition. Greif demonstrates how, after a century of failed attempts, the introduction of the podesta system in 1194 provided a lasting solution to the problem.

Margaret Levi analyses the coevolution of democratic, economic, and military institutions in six western democracies. During the half century before World War I, each of these countries gradually expanded the franchise, industrialized, and passed compulsory military service laws. Democratic institutions tied military service to a commitment to egalitarian politics; but the exigencies of a full-scale war also require consideration of costs to both government and industry in manpower allocation decisions. The historical, comparative perspective clearly shows the importance of egalitarian norms and of differences in the credibility of governmental actors and institutions on the conception policy bargain.

Jean-Laurent Rosenthal argues that the standard wisdom about France and England in the eighteenth century is false, namely, that this reflected an economic, military, and political competition between an unlimited, absolutist political system and a limited government. He shows that, despite a massive expansion of military potential in the seventeenth century, France and Britain each had limited governments in the eighteenth century, albeit of very different kinds. Because French monarchs adopted a contractual rather than consultative form of limited government, the costs of altering key components of the institutional system were higher. However, they maintained a greater level of autonomy than their British counterparts.

Barry Weingast offers a new interpretation of the American Civil War. This work begins by showing the relationship between antebellum economics and politics. It then uses the approach to demonstrate not only how political institutions suppressed disputes over the divisive issue of slavery, but why these mechanisms survived for the first six decades under the Constitution and then fell apart in the seventh. The perspective also shows how long-term processes can result in sudden, massive political change.

These terse summaries fail to do justice to the papers. Each is crafted with great attention to the details of the case. Thus, our research does more than simply assert that institutions are important; it shows which institutions created a particular problem or constrained possible solutions to a problem. Our emphasis on context-sensitive research, however, does not preclude an effort to be systematic or to draw the implications of our research for broader topics.
ANNOUNCEMENTS

NSF Division of Social, Behavioral, and Economic Research (SBER)

The Division of Social, Behavioral, and Economic Research (SBER) supports research in a broad range of disciplines and in interdisciplinary areas. The goals of the Division are to advance fundamental scientific knowledge about (1) cognitive and psychological processes in human beings; (2) cultural, social, political, spatial, environmental, and biological factors related to human behavior; (3) human behavior, interaction, and decision making; (4) social, political, legal, and economic systems, organizations, and institutions; and (5) the intellectual, value, process, and impact factors related to the development and use of science and technology. SBER programs consider proposals that fit neatly within disciplines, but they also encourage and support interdisciplinary projects, which are evaluated through joint review among programs as appropriate.

All programs in SBER consider proposals for research projects and for research conferences and workshops. Some programs also consider proposals for doctoral dissertation improvement assistance, the acquisition of specialized research and computing equipment, group international travel, and large-scale data collection. Research participation by undergraduate and graduate students also is supported to the greatest extent possible.

SBER conducts special research emphases on a number of topics. Following are brief descriptions of some of those special emphases, all of which encourage interdisciplinary research activities. Investigators are encouraged to contact the Division for more information about these and additional emphases that may have been developed after publication of this flyer:

Democratization. Investigations are encouraged to test key hypotheses about the nature of large-scale socioeconomic and political change and the functions of institutions that affect and are affected by such change in transitional areas like the former Soviet Union, central and eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa south of the Sahara.

Human Capital. Research is encouraged on conditions that enhance or constrain human potential and development, with special emphasis placed on generating basic knowledge relevant to issues like workforce productivity; poverty and deprivation; education; ethnicity, race, gender, and discrimination; and urban systems.

Human Dimensions of Global Change. Research is encouraged on the complex ways that humans affect and are affected by natural systems, with special emphasis placed on policy-relevant topics like resource use and management; collective actions; the varied processes through which individuals and institutions formulate, implement, and evaluate environmental policies and other actions.

Programs in SBER are committed to the principle that information and materials collected with public funds belong in the public domain. SBER programs also are committed to the advancement of scientific inquiry by using scarce research resources to benefit a larger number of researchers. As a result, SBER programs strongly encourage the sharing of data, information, and materials among scientists. Because the kinds of information and materials gathered through SBER-funded research projects vary so widely, however, flexibility is needed in the development of plans to make data, other forms of information, and materials acquired during the conduct of SBER-funded projects readily available. Prior to the initial receipt of an award, investigators receiving support from SBER programs are expected to submit specific plans regarding how they intend to make available materials gathered during the conduct of their project. These plans should describe how and where information and materials will be stored and how access will be provided to other users. Investigators should discuss their plans for sharing information and materials with relevant SBER program officers.

CLUSTERS AND PROGRAMS IN SBER:

Economic, Decision, and Management Sciences Cluster:

Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program

The Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program supports research that explores fundamental issues in management science; risk analysis; societal and public policy decision making; behavioral decision making; and judgment, organizational design, and decision making under uncertainty. Research should fundamentally address social, behavioral, or organizational aspects of operational processes and decision making. Research funded by the Program is directed at increasing the understanding and effectiveness of problem-solving, information processing, and decision making by individual, groups, organizations, and society. Funded research must be relevant to an operational or applied context, grounded in theory, based on empirical observation or subject to empirical validation, and generalizable. The overall objective of the Program is to build an interdisciplinary science for decision making, risk assessment, and management. The Program conducts a special Joint NSF-Private Sector initiative through which NSF funding is matched by contributions from private firms to conduct basic research that is firmly grounded in real, practical contexts. Investigators should contact DRMS program officers for more information about this initiative.

Economics Program

The Economics Program supports basic scientific research designed to
improve the understanding of the processes and institutions of the U.S. economy and of the world system of which it is a part. The Program strengthens both empirical and theoretical economic analysis as well as the methods for rigorous research on economic behavior. Topics of current interest are computational economics, the transformation of command economies, human resource-related issues (poverty, labor productivity, the family, gender and racial discrimination, etc.), and global environmental change. The Program also funds conferences and interdisciplinary research that strengthens links among economics and the other social and behavioral sciences as well as mathematics and statistics. The Program supports research in almost every subfield of economics, including econometrics, economic history, finance, industrial organization, international economics, labor economics, public finance, macroeconomics, and mathematical economics.

Science, Technology, and Society Cluster

Science and Technology Studies Program

The Science and Technology Studies Program supports historical, philosophical and social scientific research on the nature and processes of development in science and technology and the differences in the nature of theory and evidence in various scientific and technological fields. It supports research on the interactions among science, technology and society, and examinations of topics like the social construction of scientific knowledge and institutions and processes of scientific innovation and change. More information is in the program announcement (NSF 91-109).

Social and Political Sciences Cluster

Law and Social Science Program

The Law and Social Science Program supports scientific research on law and law-like systems of rules. The Program encourages theoretically focused empirical studies aimed at advancing scientific knowledge about the impact of law; the nature, sources, and consequences of variations and changes in legal institutions, legal decision making, and the dynamics of normative ordering in society. Included are studies of dispute processing, administrative and judicial decision making, social control, compliance and deterrence, the regulatory role of law, legal and social change, and related inquiries on the relationship between legal processes and other social processes. The Program supports cross-cultural research through its Global Perspectives on Sociolegal Studies initiative.

Political Science Program

The Political Science Program supports social scientific research to improve the understanding of politics, political behavior, and political institutions and processes. The Program supports rigorous empirical research of theoretical importance in American politics, political behavior, comparative politics, international relations; public choice and political economy; and other fields of political science. Research areas that have been supported recently include studies of the process of democratization; activists in American political parties; information and issues in voting; congressional elections and campaigns; divided government; support for political institutions; electoral systems; nationalism and its relationship to ethnicity and language; international political economy; and international conflict.

Preparation and Submission of Proposals

The Division of Social, Behavioral, and Economic Research makes awards based on the evaluation of proposals through a merit-review procedure. Proposals may be evaluated by a specific program or by two or more programs (within the Division or in other NSF divisions). Investigators are urged to read proposal guidelines carefully and to contact appropriate program officers if they have any questions. Pre-proposal contact is especially valuable when investigators plan research on topics of possible interest to two or more programs. Proposals must be prepared and submitted in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Grant Proposal Guide (GPG). (This booklet (NSF 94-2) replaces the Grants for Research and Education in Science and Engineering (GRESE) brochure, the last version of which was NSF 92-89.) Investigators should read GPG carefully, because many proposal requirements have changed in recent years. Especially noteworthy are strict limitations on the use of appendices as well as on the length of project descriptions and biographical sketches for senior personnel. Failure to comply with these limitations may result in NSF’s refusal to accept and evaluate a proposal. Investigators should note that NSER programs may grant exemptions to some requirements under unusual circumstances, but such exemptions require prior approval and may inhibit joint review of proposals with other programs.

GPG and other NSF publications are available at no cost from the NSF. Requests for information are expedited if you order by fax at 703/644-4278 or electronically by e-mail at pubs@nsf.gov. You may also place orders by voice mail at 703/306-1130. Requests must include the NSF publication number, title, number of copies needed, your name, and a complete mailing address.

GPG and other NSF announcements also are available through the Science and Technology Information System (STIS), which may be accessed via electronic mail. STIS may be used to obtain electronic documents via e-mail, to transfer files via anonymous FTP, and to communicate on-line. Full instructions for use of STIS are in the STIS Flyer (NSF 94-4). For assistance in using STIS, contact:

stis-request@nsf.gov (Internet)
703/306-1234 (phone)
703/306-0202 (fax)
703/306-0090 (TDD)

Consult GPG or specific program announcements to determine the number of copies of the proposal that should be sent to NSF. The specified number of copies of the proposal, including the copy bearing original signatures of principal investigators and institutional representatives, should be sent to the NSF Proposal Processing Unit at:
Announcement No.
(Specify NSF 94-64 or another specific announcement number)
National Science Foundation/PFU
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22230
Only one copy of NSF Form 1225
(Information About Principal Investigators/Project Directors) should be sent.
This copy should be attached to the copy
with original signatures.
Proposals for research support may
be submitted at any time but should
reach the programs by the target dates
listed below to facilitate review within
six months. Proposals for conferences,
meetings, and workshops should be
made at least one year in advance of the
scheduled date.

Proposal Submission Target Dates for
SBER Programs

Investigators should submit propos-
als by the following dates in order for
their proposals to be considered in the
regular competitions conducted by each
program. Investigators should contact
program officers well in advance of
these target dates to learn if there have
been changes in target dates or deadlines
for submission of proposals. SBER
programs will make every effort to
ensure that proposals submitted on or
before a specific target date are evalu-
ated in the next evaluation cycle. The
postmark date will be used to date
proposals delivered by the U.S. Postal
Service. Proposals delivered by other
delivery services will be dated as the
date when they are received by the NSF
Proposal Processing Center.

Economic, Decision, and Management
Sciences Cluster

Decision, Risk, and Management
Science Program
Regular Research and Dissertation
Improvement Proposals: January 15
and August 15

Economics Program
Regular Research and Dissertation
Improvement Proposals: January 15 and
August 15

Science, Technology, and Society
Cluster

Science and Technology Studies
Program
Regular Research and Dissertation
Improvement Proposals: February 1
and August 1

Social and Political Sciences
Cluster

Law and Social Science Program
Regular Research and Dissertation
Improvement Proposals: January 15
and August 15

Global Perspectives on Sociolegal
Studies Proposals: February 1

Political Science Program
Regular Research and Dissertation
Improvement Proposals: January 15
and August 15

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