Guest Letter

Comparative Politics: A View from Britain

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As we informed our readers in the last winter issue of APSA-CP, the President of the Section will now write an opening letter only for the summer issue. For this winter issue, we invited Archie Brown, Professor of Politics at Oxford University, to reflect upon the strengths and weaknesses of American-style comparative politics from the vantage point of a political scientist working within the intellectual traditions of the British academic community. Professor Brown, a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is one of the most distinguished political scientists in Britain and a highly regarded Russia specialist internationally. He is perhaps best known for his prize-winning book *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford, 1996) and (with Michael Kaser and Gerald S. Smith) *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Former Soviet Union*. His most recent edited book is *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* (Palgrave/St. Antony’s, 2004). In addition to his deep knowledge of American comparative politics scholarship, Professor Brown has extensive first-hand knowledge of comparative political science in the United States from his past visiting appointments at Yale University, Columbia University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Connecticut, and the University of Notre Dame.

It goes almost without saying that much of the best work in the world in comparative politics emanates from the United States. Although it is a bit invidious to single out particular individuals, the names of Robert A. Dahl, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Robert Putnam, Peter Hall and Guillermo O'Donnell are among those that come immediately to mind. Richard Rose's contribution has also been remarkable, but he is an American who has lived for so long in Britain that we are inclined to count him as “one of us.”

Along with outstanding work, however, there is much in contemporary political science that is trivial. A worrying trend on both sides of the Atlantic is the elevation of technique over substance. It is sad that young scholars should adopt – or, for the sake of career advancement, go along with – the view that, when faced by a problem in the real world of politics, the height of their ambition should be to formulate a falsifiable hypothesis that may be somewhat related to the issue, however tangentially. The importance of the problem counts for less than the falsifiability of the hypothesis as demanded by the positivistic norms of quantitative social science.

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That this cast of mind skews research and, particularly, publication of research in the most mainstream journals is clear. Let us take the case of authoritarianism. More people live under authoritarian regimes or in hybrid regimes than in democracies. The assessment of Freedom in the World 2004 is that 46 percent of the world’s population live in free countries, 25 percent in countries that are observed, optimism about the spread of democracy and normative commitment to its advance has led to conceptual confusion. Instead of “adjectival democracy,” the qualifiers would be better attached to “authoritarianism.” Indeed, “electoral authoritarianism” should be seen as a significant regime type among (thus far) failed transitions to democracy (Linz 2000, p. 34).

If we take the latest Freedom House figures as a rough guide, then the least that can be said is that a quarter of the world’s population live under authoritarian rule, but if we include hybrid regimes that are closer to authoritarianism than to democracy the figure would be not much short of half the people alive today. For anyone interested in world politics, there is no reason why analyses of the power structure within authoritarian systems, comparison of the different types of authoritarian and totalitarian systems, and examination of the variety of ways in which authoritarian regimes evolve, liberalize and even democratize should be less significant objects of research than, for example, the scrutiny of legislative behavior in Western democracies.

In some ways, of course, studying authoritarian regimes is more difficult than studying democracies. The former do not readily lend themselves to positivistic research. Uncovering and interpreting the workings of the system and analyzing the sources of potential change involve, for the most part, qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. The findings of political scientists often brings regimes rhetorically closer to the democratic end of the political spectrum than they merit with the use of such terms as “electoral democracy,” “illiberal democracy,” or even O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy.” In many instances, the noun, however qualified, is a misnomer, as democratic forms are far outweighed by arbitrary application of the rules and by authoritarian leadership. Accordingly, as Juan Linz has observed, optimism about the spread of democracy and normative commitment to its advance has led to conceptual confusion. Instead of “adjectival democracy,” the qualifiers would be better attached to “authoritarianism.” Indeed, “electoral authoritarianism” should be seen as a significant regime type among (thus far) failed transitions to democracy (Linz 2000, p. 34).

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In some ways, of course, studying authoritarian regimes is more difficult than studying democracies. The former do not readily lend themselves to positivistic research. Uncovering and interpreting the workings of the system and analyzing the sources of potential change involve, for the most part, qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. The findings of political scientists working in this area are, in a very broad sense, falsifiable, but not in the narrow, positivistic manner. They can be discredited and superseded only by the accumulation of more solid evidence and more cogent arguments. It is hard to resist the conclusion that authoritarian political systems do not get the attention they...
deserve in leading journals, or in books that aspire to provide an overview of the discipline of political science, mainly because some of the more fashionable modes of analysis cannot usefully be applied to their study.

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A case in point is A New Handbook of Political Science, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996). In many respects an excellent work, this 845-page volume all but ignores the study of authoritarian government. The partial exception is a short chapter on “Democratization Studies” (Whitehead, 1996a). The relative neglect of non-democratic systems in mainstream political science occurred even before the “Fourth Wave” of democratization during the second half of the 1980s (on the Fourth Wave, see Whitehead 1996b; von Beyme 1996b; Brown 2000; McFaul 2002) – consisting, above all, of the demise of Communist systems in Europe – that saw a significant reduction in the extent of authoritarian rule. The 8-volume Handbook of Political Science of Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (1975), which contained many fine contributions, allocated just a single chapter to totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Fortunately, Juan Linz surmounted that problem by writing a “chapter” that comprised 234 printed pages (Greenstein and Polsby, Vol. 3, Macropolitical Theory). To their credit, Greenstein and Polsby recognized the significance of this contribution and were accommodating editors.

When, a quarter of a century after its original publication, Linz republished that piece as a separate book, amplified by almost fifty pages of “Further Reflections” (Linz, 2000), he noted that his main bargaining counter with his 1975 editors was that, though “a majority of the world’s population was living under nondemocratic rule,” the remainder of the multi-volume Handbook contained no discussion of any aspects of these regimes.

Though I cannot claim a close familiarity with the “perestroika” movement in American political science, the choice of name appears apt. The remarkable political phenomenon that put perestroika into the English language saw the pluralization of Soviet and Russian politics. It is understandable, then, that the term should be appropriated by those whose goal appears to be the promotion of a greater pluralism in American political science. Fewer concerns have been raised in Britain where a pluralism of approaches to the study of politics is more strongly entrenched than in the United States (Barry 1999; Hayward 1999; but for a somewhat different view, see Marsh and Savigny 2004). As the same authors observe, “pluralism involves acknowledging that there are different ways to... of approaches to the study of politics will surely prevail unless political scientists – collectively, narrowly, and absurdly – decide to define the significance of a problem by the degree to which it is amenable to a particular form of analysis.

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David Marsh and Heather Savigny, however, dispute the Goodin and Klingemann view that political science is at present “a broad, pluralist church” (Marsh and Savigny 2004; Goodin and Klingemann 1996). Rather, they contend, “it is still dominated by positivism and, more specifically, by behaviouralism and rational choice theory.” The surveys of different branches of The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century (Hayward, Barry and Brown 1999) suggest that in the U.K. at least this is not so, although Marsh and Savigny draw evidence to support their contention from the methodological orientation of the majority of articles published in Political Studies and especially the British Journal of Political Science. As the same authors observe, “pluralism involves acknowledging that there are different ways to...
do political science.” While this should be obvious, it needs reiteration. When journal editors act as gatekeepers and “establish positivist criteria of what is good work,” then it follows that they will tend to “judge positivist work as good and non-positivist as bad” (Marsh and Savigny 2004). Even when journal editors are, in principle, open to a variety of approaches to the study of politics (true in the case of the BJPS and, perhaps, increasingly of the APSR) the traditions of recent decades will greatly influence what is submitted to them. As a result – to take an exam-ple from a field I know – far more interesting articles on post-Communist politics (representing a wide variety of approaches) are to be found in Post-Soviet Affairs, edited by George Breslauer, the Dean of Social Sciences at Berkeley, than in most of the mainstream political science journals combined.

It is both significant, and encouraging, to find in a recent issue of APSA-CP (Summer 2004) several of the leading figures in comparative politics, whose own work embraces a variety of methodological stand-points, emphasizing the need for a genuine pluralism of approaches, and pointing to the neglect of issues of fundamental importance for the world we live in because falsifying a hypothesis (often a highly artificial one) may, for a young scholar, contribute more to professional acceptance. The broadly positivist Peter Hall sees the field “not as one that makes preeminent use of a comparative method but as one that utilizes many methods to compare politics across nations” (2004). Juan Linz and Samuel Huntington, who differ on many things, are at one in bemoaning the paucity of serious comparative study of political leadership (Munck and Snyder 2004). Adam Przeworski notes that graduate students and assistant professors “learn to package their intellectual ambitions into articles publishable by a few journals and to shy away from anything that might look like a political stance,” and are encouraged to think that “professionalism” involves finding answers to “narrowly formulated questions” (ibid.).

Przeworski notes also the need for further study of the institutions of authoritarian regimes. This is one area where what Barry has called the distinctive trait in the British study of politics, “resistance to intellectual fashion,” was seen to advantage. The state did not have to be “brought back into” political science in Britain (even in the study of democracies) because it was never out. The study of political institutions did not become as unfashionable as it was for a couple of decades in the United States. The twenty years since March and Olsen (1984) have witnessed an about-turn in the USA on the significance of institutional analysis. This underlines the wisdom of Oscar Wilde’s remark that the trouble with being fashionable is that “one becomes so quickly out of date” (Bogdanor 1999).

Although there have been a number of attempts to provide parsimonious explanations of the end of Communist rule in Europe, none of them are wholly satisfactory. Nor are they likely to be, for too many crucial factors were at work. While the partial development of civil society was important in a very few cases (most notably that of Poland), in others changes of and within state institutions were of far greater significance.2 In the Soviet Union, as in China, what X.L. Ding called “institutional amphibiousness” (Ding 1994) was more important for political change than any putative development of civil society. The latter was a consequence, not a cause, of the pluralization of Soviet politics under Gorbachev. By “institutional amphibiousness” Ding means, inter alia, an institution “used for purposes contrary to those it is supposed to fulfill.” Institutions, which were meant to be citadels of ideological orthodoxy, in a number of cases led a double life. Ding sees this in terms of institutions set up by Communist regimes being “gradually co-opted by critical forces for counter purposes, all the while keeping up the protective façade that these were still party-state institutions.” The latter part of that statement is quite widely generalizable, but the first part of the statement should include also the evolution of the thinking of people who entered those institutions without any heterodox intentions, but whose views underwent radical, albeit gradual, change. Ideas were critically important, but ideas needed institutional bearers. A minority of relatively open-minded party officials and party intellectuals entrenched in powerful positions had far greater opportunities to effect transformative change than were available in the broader society. That kind of “institutional amphibiousness” is an important part of the explanation of the origins and early years of perestroika in the Soviet Union, of the reform movement in Czech communism in the second half of the 1960s, and, if Ding is right, of a process underway in China.

Finally, though there is no space to elaborate the point, comparative politics needs to be open not only to a variety of approaches to understanding political change and continuity, but also to be constantly open to insights from other disciplines (not just economics) and other branches of political science. In particular, the mutual isolation of comparative politics and international relations is both intellectually and politically damaging. Although lip service is sometimes paid to the undesirability of this, these two important areas of political science have their separate journals (with the notable and laudable excep-
tion of *World Politics*), separate literatures, and separate “gurus.” If we are to understand some of the more important developments in the last decades of the twentieth century and the early decades of the twenty-first – from the fall of Communism to mayhem in the Middle East to the politics of environmental survival – that will have to change.

### Notes

1. The annual surveys of Freedom House are as good a source of comparative data on democracy worldwide as we have, in spite of the awkward fact that freedom and democracy, while related, are by no means synonymous.

2. Within the category of state institutions, I include, naturally, Communist Party institutions. Notwithstanding the legal fiction in Communist states that the party was a “public organization” rather than part of the state structure, the highest echelons of the party constituted the most authoritative and powerful agencies of the state.

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**On “‘American’ Methods, ‘Comparative’ Theories”**

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I applaud the editors for devoting the winter 2004 APSA-CP symposium to “The Confluence of American and Comparative Politics.” However, I believe that the symposium could have delved deeper into an explanation of the growing influence of rational-choice theories in comparative politics. Debate about “exporting” the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying rational choice continues, and I believe that our subfield would be well-served by a deeper critical appreciation of the connection between the intellectual environment that gave birth to rational choice in the United States and the way in which rational choice has expanded beyond the boundaries of “American” politics.

I suggest that we can connect the rise of rational choice in the U.S. and its growing influence in comparative politics through the end of the Cold War, increased economic globalization, and the worldwide spread of democracy. Insight into this dynamic comes from S.M. Amadae’s *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy*, a book that should be required reading for political scientists. Amadae explores the rise of rational choice in the U.S. and thus in explaining American politics. She argues that rational choice embodies a theory of democracy, one that differs in critical ways from American versions of republicanism, for example. She suggests that “rational choice theory contributes to a modernist epistemology that supports democratic liberalism by upholding the values of free inquiry, universalism, individual autonomy, and government by trade and negotiation, as opposed to autocratic tyranny or mob rule” (256). Support for such a way of knowing the world gained widespread credence and support during the Cold War, when science (including social science) and democracy partnered in the battle against Soviet totalitarianism. This helps explain the rise of rational choice in the U.S.

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The end of the Cold War left rational choice ascendant in the U.S., and left the U.S. globally ascendant. At that time, both government policy and academic discourse (Fukuyama, Huntington, e.g.) sought to justify the export of the U.S. version of capitalist democracy. This is the key to explaining the growth of rational choice in comparative politics. At a minimum, rational choice functionally fits with the contemporary Zeitgeist, finding greater relevance and applicability to studies of democratization (Przeworski’s *Democracy and the Market* comes to mind as a fundamental text in this regard), legislative politics, party competition, and other research topics of interest to compar-
Second, we reject the notion that immigration policy is uninteresting because it is reliably dominated by pro-immigration economic and ethnic interest groups. While a number of important policy outcomes have (at times unintentionally) favored such groups, important exceptions to this generalization exist, including the cases of U.S. immigration restriction measures in the 1920s and 1990s, French immigration policies after World War II and, during the current decade, and Japan’s highly restrictive immigration policy from the 1970s to the present (despite frequent lobbying by business groups). The “client politics” model does not explain these and other important cases.

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The APSA-CP Newsletter’s Winter 2004 symposium on the intersections of American and comparative politics overlooks one of the most potentially fruitful confluences of these subfields: the study of immigration and immigration policymaking. Transnational flows of economic migrants and political refugees have become a defining feature of the global economy during the last three decades. Sociologists, anthropologists, and economists have developed sophisticated models of the causes and consequences of these international flows. Yet even as political scientists devote increasing attention to a range of related issues - trade policy, the welfare state, ethnicity, and nationalism - political science lags behind other social sciences in research on international population movements.

“...many political scientists assume that immigration policy does not vary in theoretically interesting ways.”

We believe that this inattention reflects three common misperceptions. First, many political scientists assume immigration policy does not vary in theoretically interesting ways. Yet our own and others’ research reveals significant cross-national variation in policy outputs, if not in policy outcomes.1 Among developed states, a basic distinction divides “traditional” countries of immigration (the United States, Canada, and Australia) that have long tolerated high levels of legal permanent immigration, vs. newer labor-importing states that have raised greater barriers to legal permanent immigration. Among the latter, a further distinction separates European states (which have moved toward common refugee and asylum policies and nationality laws, while often liberalizing immigrant integration policies in an effort to incorporate immigrants into the body politic) from still newer immigration states in East Asia (which continue to emphasize temporary guestworker programs without provisions for family reunification). While these inter-regional distinctions provide a starting point, still more diversity exists in terms of specific admissions criteria, immigrants’ rights, and policy implementation strategies. There is a need for better, theory-driven typologies of national immigration regimes and the logics of immigration control that they embody.

A third misperception is that immigration does not merit study because structural “pushes” and “pulls” in the global economy make it virtually impossible for modern nation-states to control immigration flows. Yet potential migrants are rational individuals who calculate whether their utility will be enhanced by choosing to emigrate - a calculation inherently subject to policy manipulation, as states raise the cost of migration and/or lower its expected benefits. Policy decisions also determine the rights each class of migrant enjoys, as well as how aggressively those rights are enforced. And to the extent that legal access to industrialized states is a scarce global resource, policymakers...
The Confluence of International Relations and Comparative Politics: Professional Dilemmas

Introduction

For many if not most contemporary scholars of political economy few meaningful intellectual boundaries now exist between the subfields of international relations and comparative politics. Inter-subfield boundaries have conspicuously eroded too for students of contentious politics, ethnic conflict, foreign policy, globalization, immigration, revolution, the welfare state, and the diffusion of institutions, regimes, norms, and culture.

Outside of these research streams, and especially administratively, the two subfields remain divided, however. In the words of Duane Swank below, “conventional compartmentalization and the ‘pigeonholing’ of faculty generally persist.” Indeed, in most, including many of the higher ranked, political science departments, international relations and comparative politics remain distinct subfields, with each retaining separate curricula, faculty lines, student admissions quotas, and Ph.D. qualifying exams.

Whatever its origins or current rationales, the continuing administrative divide between international relations and comparative politics raises multiple professional dilemmas for graduate students and faculty whose scholarship and teaching are organized around themes for which the two subfields are increasingly converging intellectually. Among others, these dilemmas are: Should a student who works at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics claim intellectual citizenship in a single subfield or self-identify explicitly with both? Is it practical to master only one subfield’s literature on a given question, or is it necessary to be equally conversant with both? To which subfield’s journals should one submit one’s work? When job opportunities arise, should one apply for positions in international relations or comparative politics? Will search committees seriously consider one’s candidacy in both subfields? Moreover, once having joined a traditionally organized department and been asked to mentor undergraduate and graduate students, serve on administrative committees and contribute to curriculum planning, with which subfield should one be more actively involved?

Each of the six scholars contributing to this issue’s symposium was asked to consider these and other, related questions. Below, they offer their insights, insights grounded in their unique and rich personal and professional experiences. Prompted by our instructions, the essays generally divide on the set of questions that were privileged. While Alison Brysk and Duane Swank’s contributions primarily, but not exclusively, focus on the dilemmas posed by the current divide for young scholars, the essays by Bernard Grofman and Peter Gourevitch speak more broadly to the intellectual trends lines within and across IR and comparative over time. The contributions by Helen Milner and Layna Mosley, on the other hand, address both subjects.

The alert reader certainly will not fail to notice that our contributors share a similar outlook on most of the aforementioned questions. Each of our authors, for example, echoes in one fashion or another Brysk’s prescription that we need to be asking how, rather than whether, to bridge the borders between IR and comparative. Moreover, each waxes enthusiastic about the growing confluence between international relations and comparative politics although, as Gourevitch’s essay reminds us, this is not an entirely recent trend.

They also agree that a rigid division of intellectual labor between the two subfields is not only difficult to justify but, more importantly, it is an impediment to enlightened scholarship, fruitful hiring, and good teaching. On the latter score, Grofman’s description of the organization of his home department’s graduate core curriculum around three course pillars - micro-politics, macro-politics and political theory – offers a provocative alternative to the traditional model.

Agreed, too, are the contributors on the functionality of retaining some boundaries between IR and comparative. Layna Mosley’s essay, for example, represents these boundaries in a two-by-two table in which international and domestic variables are either primarily dependent or independent ones. As Mosley’s survey of the articles that have appeared in International Organization demonstrates, the majority are “pure” IR or comparative in nature, despite the growing trend toward what she calls international-comparative politics (ICP).

Finally, on the whole, our authors are in accord that the growing confluence between international and comparative is unlikely to reverse itself. If they are correct and given current trends, we can anticipate even greater cross-field hiring and a further intellectual integration of the two subfields in the coming years.

Introduction
Ph.D.s without Borders? Drawing Subdisciplinary Boundaries in Political Science

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The late Harry Eckstein was the founding chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Irvine (UCI) fifteen years ago. Harry had a unique vision for how to do political science in a way that didn’t divide us up into the usual separate tables by things like what country(ies) we happened to mostly study. The main component of that vision was adapted from the distinction in economics between micro-level and macro-level phenomena. The required graduate core curriculum in my department to this day consists of three courses: one in micro-politics (the comparative study of individual-level political behavior, and of the organization and behavior of interest groups and political parties), one in macro-politics (the comparative study of government organization and public policy outputs), and one in political theory (both modern social theory and the classics). One norm that Harry instilled was that no graduate course should ever be titled with the name of a country. In particular, in Harry’s view, the notion of American politics as a distinctive subfield was the last vestige of an atheoretical area studies approach and was to be strongly resisted. Rather, there should be courses like “Political Participation,” “Political Parties,” “Interest Groups,” “Constitutional Design,” “Electoral Systems,” “Legislatures,” “Law and Courts,” “Representation and Redistricting,” “Race and Ethnicity,” “International Relations,” etc. In this spirit, I tell my own students that they should pick loci of politics at different levels (at least one a country; at least one a smaller unit, e.g., Ashtabula, Ohio, and at least one a person who is not a political scientist or other academic) about which they will cultivate deep personal knowledge from which they can draw research ideas, and against which they can test the broader generalizations about politics to which they are exposed. Of course, individual faculty normally teach such courses primarily by drawing on data from the countries which they know the best, but nonetheless, every such course is expected to have at least some comparative content.

Not long after Harry’s arrival, David Easton also joined the UCI faculty, and he still teaches the required graduate course in political theory. In our University of Chicago days - I was an RA for Dave - I learned from him that, essentially, all political science is comparative politics. My long-time colleague, A. Wuffle, has formalized this maxim in terms of the “TNT principle”: analyses should be comparative across Time, and/or across Nations and/or other entities, and/or across Types of institutions or actors (quoted in Grofman, 1999).

In this context, it seems to me to make sense to view IR as a subset of comparative politics. If IR is only the study of relations between states, then what is it that if not a topic for comparative analysis - albeit a somewhat narrowly delimited one? Moreover, if IR is what all kinds of actors and entities do with and to each other in ways that cross state boundaries, then this, too, is obviously a topic for comparative analysis – albeit a much bigger topic than when we confine ourselves just to states as the sole (or key) agents. The distinguished sociologist, Robin Williams (2003: 37), asserts that the use of the phrase “international relations” within political science was misleading, since the field’s primary focus, “at least until the 1990s, was interstate relations.” And he goes on to say that “if cultural homogeneity and common ancestry are the marks of a pure nation-state, few cases exist today.”

“To ask these questions, in my view, is to realize how silly they are.”

Moreover, if IR deals only with relations among states, what exactly are we to make of the constantly evolving European Union, or devolution within the U.K.? Are these topics for comparativists or for IR specialists? Indeed, even if we take the study of war as the topic that has preeminently been a focus of IR theorizing, then what are we to make of the fact that most “wars” in the past two decades are internal to states, or that the U.S. is allegedly fighting a “war” with Al-Qaeda? On the other hand, if we broaden the net of what we mean by IR, are only those in IR allowed to study immigration and refugee flows, or resistance to the spread of McDonald’s franchises, or the spread of norms of human rights, or can comparativists be allowed to join the fun? To ask these questions, in my view, is to realize how silly they are.

I start from the premise that the standard “field” divisions within political science are not very helpful from the standpoint of creating a climate in which we will be doing the best possi-
ble research. I think that, if you are going to slice up political science, it often makes more sense to do so by topic than by unit of analysis, rather than having states and the international sphere be somehow sui generis. I recognize the existence of theories that ascribe uniqueness to international politics due to the absence of an overarching (legitimate) authority, but anarchic phenomena are not found only in the international arena, on the one hand, and, on the other, it is disputable that anarchy is a good portrait of the present international system.

Alternatively, the knowledge and analytic tools you need to make sense of the political economy of cities, or of political economy at the national level, is very close to what you need to make sense of international political economy. Similarly, the same kinds of technical skills commonly used to make sense of voting processes in national parliaments also applies to voting processes in city councils or state or provincial legislatures, and carries over to voting patterns in the UN. And making sense of the structure of (domestic) interest groups, and attempting to evaluate their effects on public policy decisions, is conceptually very similar to making sense of the structure of NGOs and INGOs and attempting to evaluate their effects on international policies. Treating similar topics in similar ways would, I think, help the training of graduate students.

As pointed out earlier, I am not trying to argue for contentless training; there are certainly key features of the international environment and its historical evolution that anyone who is interested in international relations must know and understand. But there also is training in statistical techniques, in research design and the philosophy of social science explanation, and in game theory and formal modeling skills, that cuts across lots of substantive domains. In this respect, we also have to be careful to keep in mind the distinction between teaching particular methods as tools and teaching particular methods as answers.

“My views are that empirical political science is about making sense of the world [...] that methods are best dictated by questions....”

UCI has grappled with the issues of where IR fits within political science, as have many universities. While I make no claim that we have definitively resolved them, we have made some progress, and, at minimum, we have not experienced the kinds of schisms that give rise to thoughts about political science and IR going their separate ways. I would first note that, long before it was fashionable, colleagues of mine such as Etel Solingen and Wayne Sandholtz were rejecting hard and fast demarcations between IR and comparative, and demonstrating in their own work just how arbitrary the boundaries were, while others of my colleagues, like Patrick Morgan, were writing about the domestic roots of foreign policy. And this bridging effort has continued in the hiring of new “IR” and “comparative” faculty at UCI, like Bob Uriu (industrial policy, foreign policy), Alison Brysk (human rights), Cecilia Lynch (domestic roots of foreign policy, religion and politics), and Kamal Sadiq (immigration and citizenship), whose work also undermines the notion of a fence separating the topics of concern to students of IR and those of concern to students of comparative.

Second, while we do have a module of six courses in IR that graduate students with IR interests are encouraged to take, such IR courses only constitute one-third of the required graduate course load, and students with IR interests are strongly encouraged to take courses in other areas — not just in mainstream comparative topics but in areas like political psychology, methodology, etc. Also, UCI has a relatively unusual way of handling breadth requirements for graduate training. Rather than the usual multi-hour preliminary exams in some or all of the discipline’s major fields, we require students to complete three papers of potentially publishable quality in at least two different subfields of the discipline (broadly conceived), with at least one of these papers a synthetic literature review. This has helped insure that students with IR interests look to political science more broadly.

Third, the School of Social Sciences at UCI has a long tradition of fostering interdisciplinary work, going back to its first Dean, James March - someone who, in his own work, bridged the disciplines of political science and sociology. At the institutional level, the present Dean of the School of Social Sciences, a cognitive scientist; her predecessor, William Schonfeld; and the Associate Dean, Caesar Sereseres, have pressed for the creation of an interdisciplinary Research Focus in International Studies that not only would include both “comparative” and “IR” faculty in political science, but also numerous faculty in other cognate disciplines. In seeking to foster the growth of such a focus, for the past several years the dean’s office has allocated lines for multidisciplinary faculty searches, with an initial vetting of candidates by a committee with members from several departments. The proposed final organization of that Research Focus is not set, but one idea is to pull
together the considerable concentrations of faculty strength in UCI’s School of Social Sciences such as those in conflict and security studies and human rights (linked to the Institute of Global Peace and Conflict Studies), in immigration studies (linked to the Center for Research in Immigration and Public Policy), in democratization (linked to the Center for the Study of Democracy), and in cross-cultural studies, to create a multi-track program.

I think there are compelling reasons to integrate IR and comparative. I view this integration in the context of a belief that the real fault lines in political science are not based on differences among scholars in the topics under investigation. As I have written elsewhere (Grofman 1997), the real divisions within political science are not those across subfields but in terms of more fundamental differences in orientation, e.g., between those who see political science as a branch of moral philosophy, and those who see it as a search for empirical understanding/explanation; between those who wish to immerse themselves in insider’s knowledge of a delimited domain and detailed description and those whose first reaction is to look for comparative analysis to shed explanatory light on particular cases; between those whose first recourse to any question posed is to go about amassing data and those whose first recourse is thinking the question through from first principles; between those who search for certain answers to relatively small and manageable questions and those who would be willing to settle for not-so-certain answers as long as the questions were big ones; between those who think that both the important questions and the important answers have already been written down by great minds of the past, and those who think that the process of knowledge gathering is ongoing and cumulative; between those who think that political science is the study of governmental institutions and those who think that political science is the study of power and outcomes, especially in terms of “who gets what, when, and how”; and between those who wish to understand the world and those who wish to change it.

My views are that empirical political science is about making sense of the world of political behavior, interactions, and institutions; that methods are best dictated by questions; and that arguments about what conceptual approaches, explanatory variables, etc., are best cannot ever be answered in the abstract, but only with reference to comparisons of competing answers to concrete puzzles. In my own work (2001) I suggest that good social science can be a lot like uncovering clues to solve a crime, but that, in classifying types of mysteries to solve, it is helpful to distinguish between whodunits, howdunits, and whydunits. This threefold distinction allows us to recognize that there are different important questions to ask without privileging any one approach to truth.

I would also insist that one should not confuse the simple question of what level of measurement you have (qualitative versus quantitative) in a particular dependent or independent variable with the much deeper epistemological question of what we mean by a satisfactory explanation. The need to go beyond merely establishing empirical findings about correlations or time lines so as to specify a plausible mechanism capable of producing the observed linkages/correlations is an issue for every scholar, regardless of whether they are doing quantitative or qualitative work. Relatedly, claims to explanatory superiority of the form “My explanation is better than yours because my explanation had truly elegant and incomprehensible (at least to you) mathematical theorems in it about Nash-Zelten perfect game-theoretic equilibria/made use of the concept of social agency/rests on my own deep, personal and nontransferable understanding of the otherwise inscrutable characteristics of Javanese politics/is based on time-series analyses with multi-skedaddled error structure corrected for page proofs,” don’t really get us very far.

When I judge scholarly work, my litmus tests are always “Have I learned something new and interesting? Do I have reason to believe what has been claimed is correct? And, have I been given insights that I can apply in other domains? From this perspective, worrying about what field of the discipline something fits in is much ado about nothing.

Notes

1 I am indebted to helpful conversations about this paper with A Wuffle, now an Associate to Professor at UCI.

2 Before that, political scientists operated more informally within a non-departmentalized School of Social Sciences, and trained a half-dozen or so political scientists before departmentalization, including quite distinguished ones such as Michael Cohen, Lynn Mather, and Matthew Shugart. Nevertheless, it has been only since departmentalization that UCI has had a formalized graduate curriculum.

3 However, the undergraduate political science curriculum at UCI remains much more traditionally organized.

4 Let me be clear: this was never taken to demean the importance of developing country-specific or area-specific knowledge, language skills, etc. Harry himself had a deep under-
standing of politics and history in several countries, including his native Germany, Britain and Norway, and a grounding in philosophy, literature, and classic works in political science and sociology.

5 For example, in the past, in studying voting behavior in the U.S., I often practiced the *Fannie Grofman test*, i.e., I asked myself whether I thought that the theory I was being exposed to could satisfactorily explain the behavior of my mother.

6 I consider myself a comparativist whose primary realm of expertise is the U.S., although I have also written about electoral politics in other countries and about general topics like coalition formation and electoral engineering from a broadly comparative perspective. (Of course, on days of the week that include a y, I have also been known to work on topics in behavioral social choice, or constitutional jurisprudence, or research methodology, or political cartooning and satire.) But, as a founding member of the California Drive-in Church of the Incorrigibly Eclectic, and as the leading (and almost only) member of the “reasonable choice modeling” school of political theory (see Wuffle, 1999 for an elucidation of the credo of this sect), such diversity is perhaps *de rigueur*.

7 Here I follow the common political science convention of using “nation” and “state” and “country” interchangeably, but recognize the distinction that can usefully be drawn between the two concepts (see e.g., Williams, 2003: 36-37).

8 My colleague Mark Petracca begins his introductory undergraduate class in political theory by proclaiming that, from the beginning (Plato and Aristotle), the study of politics was intrinsically comparative and macroanalytical in nature. As he further pointed out to me, (personal communication, November, 2004), “it is difficult to think of a ‘great’ political theorist through the end of the 19th century who was not a comparativist and, of course, so many of America’s founding fathers were likewise students of comparative governance."

9 Williamson (2003: 80) notes, for example, that in 1993 “every one of the thirty-four major armed conflicts then underway were within, not between states.”

10 I have already alluded to the unhelpfulness of making American politics a field within the discipline, although I will confess that the pressures of the marketplace force UCI to label some its graduate students as Americanists in order to find a fit between their interests and the positions that are being advertised.

11 For example, I’ve previously written that “game theory is to political science as calculus is to physics,” (1997), but that doesn’t make every application of calculus a contribution to physics, or every application of game theory a contribution to political science.

12 If the lines between IR and comparative are hard to demarcate, and somewhat meaningless, then so, too, often are the lines between what political scientists study and what sociologists study (see e.g., Williams 2003, a superb work on ethnic conflict by a sociologist to which political science should definitely lay claim), or between what political scientists who do political economy study and what is done by economists working in the same area.

13 My colleague Wuffle has advocated similar views in terms of the so-called *First Law of Epistemioincology*, namely, that truth is like a truffle: “First you have to figure out where to dig; then you have to dig around a lot, and, then, you have to get rid of all the dirt that gets in the way.”

**Blurred Boundaries - Hurray!: Shifting Lines in Comparative and International Politics**

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The confluence between IR and comparative is to some as old as the hills and to others quite new. In fact it is both. If you thought of these fields as very different, then certainly something new is happening in our discipline; but if you worked on problems that linked them, then it is old. I began my career working on French/European politics and comparative political economy. It was impossible to examine the political cleavages within the French Parliament in the period after 1945 without seeing that foreign policy cut through other divisions. Should France join NATO and the Common Market and allow German rearmament? Should France cut its colonies loose, giving up Indochina and Algeria? These questions split the communists and the socialists, and the Gaullists from other conservatives.

Similarly, it was impossible to think about political economy within a
country without locating it in the international economy. The political engagement of agriculture everywhere turned on the world price of its commodities. Local markets were never adequate to explain what farmers wanted and how they would react to policy options. Labor and capital certainly had largely domestic things to fight about (working conditions, wages, etc.) but these two were profoundly influenced by the relative prices of labor and capital in the world, interacting with their relative scarcity at home. Thus was born open economy macroeconomics. Economic interactions among countries go back centuries: the demand for grain by Western Europe from Eastern Europe from the XVth Century on is seen as one of the main causes of the revival of serfdom in the East, leading to authoritarian politics there. Slavery was global then, and tariff conflicts go back several centuries.

“...in the U.K., while its presence contributed to absolutism in Prussia/Germany. For Tilly, war-making was a fundamental driver of the modern state. Henrick Spruyt (1994) dissents from this view with an argument about domestic social conflicts; crowns and rising merchant middle classes, fueled by trade, among other factors, in alignment against the traditional aristocracy to form the modern state.

Thus, the grizzly greybeard finds that everyone is now speaking prose. Globalization is not new, though it has distinguishing features in each epoch: in the heyday of trade before WWI, we traded commodities and finished products, though even then intra-industry trade was emerging (specialty steels for example). In the current era, we may well have far more disaggregation of the “value chain” into dispersed pieces scattered around the globe following price and location advantages, so that things are made everywhere, but nothing in any single spot.

In my view, the actual interaction of international and comparative politics is nothing new. It is only the intellectual awareness of it in the field that is relatively unprecedented, even in the subfield of American politics. I recall vividly a colleague’s reaction to a paper on American pork barrel about twenty years ago saying that we did not have to look at the defense budget because that was “different,” expressing indignation that I challenged the notion that the national interest was a sufficient explanation of defense spending. My complaint would seem archaic today, as it is now assumed that national interest is itself a contested notion on which people disagree, and thus the object of politics. Another colleague thought it unnecessary to consider whether the Federal Reserve worried about the exchange rate and foreign trade. So, reality may change - the impact of trade and currency flows on the U.S. may objectively go up (as it has) and down or be more or less compared to other countries, but that then becomes a question in comparative and international political economy, and not an essentialist feature of life in the U.S.

As the Americanists are drawn in to comparative and international politics (comparing institutions, for example, has flourished, often with Americanists leading the way), even that boundary is challenged. “No department can be top rank without leading Americanists,” I once heard a famous specialist say with whom I served on a departmental review committee. Was that a descriptive statement (so influential were Americanists, they would never rank such a department highly) or a prescriptive one - Americanists were theoretical and methodological pioneers, so that a department could not rise without their input? Something of both, I think. Americanists continue to influence the field, in both IR and comparative; think of principal agent theory applied to legislative-executive relationships around the world and to delegation in international institutions. Sometimes this produces sharp criticism: One colleague spoke scornfully of comparativists deriving ideas from the study of U.S. politics - the countries are so different, how can one apply concepts from one to examine another? But using concepts across countries, or across the IR/comparative divide, does not mean all processes are the same; rather, it provides a uniform metric for showing how they differ.

Everyone talks about the fusion across boundaries but distinctions remain alive and important. The distinction is less about “concepts” than subject matter. Suppose all legislatures have properties in common. Does that mean a department should...
Symposium

not care if in hiring legislature specialists it only gets people who know about the legislature of Michigan, or more plausibly the U.S. Congress? Suppose that means having people who know nothing about Japan, China, Brazil, or German. Economics made that move a while back - all economies are the same, there is nothing local at all. Therefore, no one need know anything about a foreign country. There is some backlash to that radical doctrine going on among some subset of economics; macro comparisons obscure important micro-institutional local details. Incentives do matter, but these vary greatly because precisely institutions (not only formal, but social and normative ones) vary a lot.

In politics the radical version is to say we don’t need country or regional specialists as they, it is often claimed, have weak theoretical training. But there is a backlash to that also: some things about China are different from, say, Delaware, so some local skills are needed, valuable, and important. And many research techniques turn precisely on having local knowledge.

So there are specialized forms of knowledge within the frame of political science - not everything is the same. If a department puts up a “best ballplayer for any position” job description, it could end up with people specializing in the same thing. That could work for some departments – one of the virtues of the vast array of institutions in the U.S. is that we can allow, indeed encourage, specialization. Not all departments need to be comprehensive - hyperspecialization could be an effective strategy for distinction and differentiation, though undergraduates may suffer from it. But if there is to be diversity, we need categories – subject matters we think deserve attention, within which we then look for the best candidate. So what categories do help organize our discipline?

IR is fighting internally over one of these: anarchy. Does the presence or absence of anarchy really define the boundary with comparative, as many in the field have traditionally argued? Well, there is a distinction between a lawless world and one with authoritative government. But what is that distinction? Indeed, this is one of the oldest issues in political science generally: what is politics? “The authoritative allocation of value” (David Easton)? “The legitimate use of force” (Weber)? All our disputes are in there: authoritative implies legitimate, and legitimate has to do with values, so whether you care more about institutions or interest groups, it eventually boils down to values, but values are themselves generated by institutions and interest groups, so back we go up the causal chain.

“The arguments in departments should be about questions: what do we want to know, what really matters ....”

So indeed, I am likely to behave differently if there is a reasonable police force and courts around to adjudicate disputes than if I live in a lawless environment a la Hobbes. But the boundaries between these two extreme conditions are getting fuzzier. There is a lot of hierarchy and structure in the relationship among states: the EU, WTO, all sorts of regimes like the post office, airlines, and currency. Anarchy does not capture these, and yet they are not states. Furthermore, states range widely in their coherence and stability. Some are so fragile as to border on lawlessness. Krasner raises the issue of sovereignty and failed states as a key problem in state-centered theories of IR. In the study of civil war and conflict resolutions, scholars such as Barbara Walter, Jim Fearon, and David Lake apply concepts dealing with credible commitment, audience costs, and tipping points. These concepts are relevant in many conditions, regardless of the degree of anarchy.

IR is moving toward a stress on strategic interaction - my behavior involves calculations of what you are likely to do - and there is strategic interaction everywhere in politics. Those interactions contain elements of both a domestic and international context. Lake (1996, 1999) develops a typology of degrees of anarchy and hierarchy that moves along an interaction of tighter or looser bonds. According to evolutionary theories (Kahler 1999, 165-96), it is indeed the interaction of states in the world that shapes their internal characteristics (Spruyt 1994).

So we have a range of authority in the interaction of countries and range of authority within states, and places where the two overlap considerably. Concepts that apply to IR also apply to countries and vice versa. So are we in a world of no boundaries? Well, no, we are not. The concepts may be the same, but the applications are not. Questions differ: how do we explain differences in health policy seems about comparative domestic politics, while how do we explain trade policy is not. An expert on comparative welfare systems or comparative central banks, may know little about the origins of the World Wars, or the debate over the democratic peace - are democracies really less likely to fight each other? (a super example of the interpenetrability of domestic and international politics).

To say all countries’ politics have features in common which allow us to use similar methodologies and ques-
tions does not mean they can be studied without detailed knowledge of particular cases. To say comparative and international interact does not mean there are no subsets of cases: security issues, trade, the environment, migration - all require expertise. Medicine is medicine, but we have specialists. So the deeper issue for departments is why this specialist not that one? If we got rid of all boundaries, would we be sure we would still hire people with specialties? What discourse could we adopt that is persuasive on deciding the benefits of a China specialist vs. a Brazil specialist, someone who does foreign policy or someone who does the politics of economic growth? Could those who want to get rid of boundaries make a credible commitment to everyone else that they respect the need for specialists of different kinds, rather than hiring more people like themselves?

The arguments in departments should be about questions: what do we want to know, what really matters: world peace, prosperity, equality, justice, gender, racism, or growth? The questions drive choices about methods, technique and region. That drives choice - along with the market. And we do earn our living teaching, so what the students at all levels want and need to learn matters as well!

The merging of comparative and international relations is exciting. I have always believed these to be fused, so it is not new to me. What is wonderfully new is the extent of the appreciation of these interactions and the impact that has on work: as more people bring experiences from one subfield, country or region to the mix, they generate more ideas - and sometimes more confusion. But the effect has been I think very positive for the study of comparative (now more comparative than ever and more internationally aware) and the study of IR (now more aware than ever of the micro foundations of national interactions in domestic politics).

ICP: Mood Ring or Next Big Thing?

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In a recent graduate seminar, we spent a week discussing the impact of domestic interests and institutions on international trade relations. I noted that, for many years, domestic politics was not central to the study of international relations (IR); the works we had read, written in the late 1970s and 1980s, were innovative in their incorporation of domestic factors. The students were less than impressed: if we wanted to understand international economic relations, how could we not draw insights from comparative politics? Did any scholar really think, for instance, that the breakdown of the interwar gold standard could be explained only in terms of interstate cooperation? While I agreed with my students’ assessment, I also wondered if times had changed in the decade since my graduate school seminars. I recall debates about the necessity of including domestic factors in our analyses; once we (at least, most of us) agreed that domestic politics played a role, we grappled with how to treat them, and how to do so in a parsimonious but nuanced fashion. My students had skipped the debate about the merits of looking inside states and had moved immediately to the question of how to do it. For graduate students of IR, the “how to” question is fundamental. It also is a central concern for anyone conduct-

ing research at the intersection of comparative politics and IR, on issues of economics, institutions, or human rights, as well as conflict and security. And, particularly during the hiring season, it is an issue with which departments grapple. This essay addresses three related issues: the increasing overlap of IR with comparative politics; the consequences of this overlap for hiring decisions; and its implications for graduate training.

The Intellectual Overlap

Few contemporary scholars of international politics would contend that domestic political factors are inconsequential. While we continue to debate the relative import of domestic variables, even scholars of conflict and security (the old “high politics”) have turned their attention to how nations’ internal features affect their external actions. For instance, the large “democratic peace” literature argues that regime characteristics affect states’ propensity for initiating conflicts and settling disputes. In trade, finance, the environment and human rights, as well, domestic politics plays a central causal role. Conversely, as national polities are increasingly exposed to global trade and investment, multinational corporate activity, and transnational advocacy groups, comparative politics has turned its attention to the influence of external forces on national and local politics - an “open economy politics.” Given current levels of economic integration and cultural connectedness, this is hardly surprising.

In practical terms, then, how should - and to what extent can - we define the boundary between comparative politics and IR? Creating a well-defined boundary is administratively expedient. Field divisions in political science are perhaps best suited for arranging undergraduate programs and courses, and for balancing
across student interests in graduate cohorts. Fields also are useful tools for organizing some sections of APSA and arranging book reviews in *Perspectives on Politics*. But when it comes to research, field boundaries are increasingly artificial. Certainly, there are problems that remain largely the preserve of a given field, even as they draw insights from across political science. These include the formation of military alliances, the design of international institutions, the selection and consequences of electoral systems, and the impact of societal cleavages on mass behavior. Scholars of IR always may have a comparative advantage in deterrence, the causes of interstate war, and the global trade regime, while comparativists dominate the study of democratization, political party systems, and social policy. Comparativists, particularly those with a qualitative orientation, also are likely to retain country- and region-specific expertise.

“Were we to eliminate fields entirely, we most likely would replace them with another set of equally problematic categories.”

At the same time, however, there is a range of issues that draws on both our knowledge of politics within countries and our assessment of the relations between them. When asked, I resort to a two-by-two table (Table 1). This categorization draws on a conversation with Bob Keohane. The rows in the table represent a given study’s main dependent variable: is it domestic or international in nature? Domestic dependent variables include public opinion, social security policies, or the rate of economic growth. International dependent variables include interstate war, the level of interstate cooperation, the ratification of international treaties or the formation and functioning of various international regimes. The columns classify the central independent variable, again either international (e.g. penetration by transnational corporations or intervention by multinational peacekeeping forces) or domestic (e.g. fiscal policy or civil war).

Where both the independent and dependent variables are international, the work falls in the traditional IR category; where both are domestic, the work is comparative (or American) politics. The two remaining categories represent the boundary region: they mix comparative and IR features in a sort of international-comparative politics (ICP). This overlap is most often acknowledged in “comparative and international political economy,” but it also holds in other substantive areas. This division is a simple one; many analyses have multiple independent variables and perhaps more than one dependent variable. And some work is closer to one side of the boundary than the other. An analysis of pension reform that looks mostly at legislative and interest group politics, but also considers pressures emanating from global markets, is “more C than I,” while an analysis of the ways in which international investors make decisions, and therefore create certain incentives for national policies, is “more I than C.”

With this classification in mind, I categorized all substantive articles published in *International Organization*, arguably the best journal in the field of IR, during the last five years. As the table indicates, a substantial proportion of recent *IO* article remains firmly in “traditional” IR. But the majority is either in the ICP boundary area (41%), or in the domain of comparative politics (18%). While *IO*, given its historical focus on issues other than conflict, may be more open than other IR journals to cross-field scholarship, it is worth noting that this boundary work occurs not only in the substantive field of political economy, but also in areas such as democratization, security, and ideational change.

Recent “traditional” IR includes a variety of contributions to the 2001 special issue (edited by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal) on the rational design of international institutions. Articles falling in the upper right cell of the table, one type of ICP, include Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s analysis of the links between democracy and war (2002); David Singer’s discussion of how domestic pressures affect the nature of international financial regulatory efforts (2004), and Quan Li and Adam Resnick’s (2003) exploration of the causal impact of democracy on flows of foreign direct investment. The other type of ICP, in the lower left cell of the table, is exemplified by Alicià Adserà and Carles Boix’s exploration of the effects of trade openness (as well as regime type) on the size of the public

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Dependent Variable</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>47 articles (41%)</td>
<td>27 articles (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary (ICP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 articles (18%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Boundary (ICP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 articles (18%)</td>
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sector (2002); Jon Pevehouse’s
(2002) argument about the relation-
ship between international organiza-
tions and democratization; and my
own work on the types of pressures
that international bond markets put on
government policymaking (Mosley
2000). Finally, work that falls into the
comparative cell includes Michael
Ross’s analysis of the links between
natural resource endowments and
civil war (2004), and Ken Scheve’s
treatment of public inflation aversion
and macroeconomic policy (2004).

The Consequences for Hiring

Given the intellectual questions that
scholars of IR and comparative polit-
cics currently seek to answer, an over-
lap between the fields is inevitable -
and useful. How do we square this
intellectual overlap with practical con-
siderations? At the individual level, in
which journals and in which book
series should scholars aim to pub-
lish? At the collective level, how
should we modify our hiring practices
and our graduate programs in order
to reflect the rise of ICP scholarship?

The hiring process is the arena in
which tensions over ICP are most
likely to come to the fore. The source
of these tensions is the continued
organization of departments - and,
often, the allocation of job lines -
according to the four (or five) main
fields within political science. While
future hires usually are discussed and
voted upon at the department level,
the ultimate ownership of lines often
rests within fields. Members of the
given field tend to make up a majority
of members of the search committee,
although this varies across institu-
tions. The field-centric system works
reasonably well provided that job can-
didates’ profiles - and the substantive
area on which the search is focused -
fit the job definition, or provided that
field members are comfortable with
work in boundary regions. But when
the strongest candidates for clearly-
defined IR jobs employ domestic vari-
ablest to explain interstate activity, or
when these candidates use external
variables to understand political
processes within countries, strict field
boundaries become problematic.

Many of us have witnessed conversa-
tions in which a candidate was
deemed to be “too comparative” for
an IR job, or “too IR” for a compara-
tive job. Some IR faculty worry about
hiring a comparativist in IR clothing,
while comparative faculty fret about
hiring a candidate who lacks sufficient
knowledge about the intricacies of
various domestic political institutions.
In both cases, faculty may worry
about “wasting a line” on someone
who does not fit firmly within their
field, traditionally defined. These
arguments may be strategic, or they
may reflect real concerns about losing
resources and influence within a
department. The focus on maintaining
the “purity” of the field seems particu-
larly likely when the hiring field is
smaller or weaker. The result may be
a turf war pitting members of the IR
field against members of the compar-
ative politics field. Such field divisions
will be replicated via new hires. How
do we prevent such turf wars?

One solution is to define some posi-
tions more broadly, to reflect intellec-
tual trends in the discipline. Along
these lines, some departments have
recognized the overlap across fields,
and they have begun to hire in terms
of broader substantive themes (“gov-
ernance,” “political economy,” or
Yale’s recent searches along various
dimensions of “rethinking political
order in the emerging world”) rather
than in terms of single fields. Other
departments cast an even wider net,
simply advertising multiple openings
in all fields (as both Minnesota and
NYU did in fall 2004), a “best athlete”
approach. These shifts imply some
recognition that field boundaries are
not always useful and that cross-field
search committees may better serve
overall department interests. Of
course, substantive themes also
leave room for interpretation. (For
instance, a debate about this issue
appeared in the APSA Political
Economy section newsletter in 2003).

Another approach is to consider the
administrative utility of field distinc-
tions. Field divisions are useful for
insuring balance across faculty and
graduate student interests, organizing
graduate courses and qualifying
exams, and designing undergraduate
curricula. Were we to eliminate fields
entirely, we most likely would replace
them with another set of equally prob-
lematic categories. And some work in
IR and comparative continues to fall
within the purview of traditionally
defined fields. But field divisions also
can be obstacles to hiring scholars
working at the ICP boundary, or at
other field boundaries in political sci-
ence.

“When hiring at the ICP
boundary [...] we must be
reasonable in our expecta-
tions: a single ICP person
will not be both 100% com-
parativist and 100% IR.”

This shift would not eliminate tensions
over resources; rather, it would move
debates from the field or search com-
mittee to the department. And
debates would be more likely to occur
as the position is defined, rather than
as the candidates are selected for
interviews or job offers. Some tasks
are best accomplished at the field
level; there is no need to consult
comparative scholars when schedul-
When it comes to coursework and exams, do we do our graduate students a disservice by maintaining hard and fast distinctions between IR and Comparative? Alternatively, do we hurt students' professional prospects by encouraging them to work in the messy border area? My own graduate experience (at Duke, 1993-1999) involved substantial exposure to the ICP boundary: field boundaries were not reified and students were encouraged to draw on faculty across fields. The prevailing norm was that talks by visiting speakers, job candidates, and graduate students were attended by wide swath of people, with little regard for field. Priority was placed on exploring interesting social scientific questions, rather than conforming to field boundaries. When it came time to assemble my dissertation committee, I chose as co-chairs a comparativist and an IR scholar. This worked very well, as each had different expertise, and each was excited to learn from the other.

The positive side of training students to work at the international-comparative boundary is that it is a fruitful area for research. Given this fact, perhaps we should encourage students to choose “two main fields” of political science (IR and comparative), rather than “main” and “second” fields. While this may buck the trend toward increasing specialization in political science, it also facilitates cross-field work. Similarly, students should expect that some questions on their IR comprehensive exams will make reference to domestic politics, while some questions on comparative exams will make reference to international factors (economic globalization, international institutions, global diffusion of ideas).

The possible downside is that students may face an “identity crisis” when they go on the job market or when they attempt to publish their
work. In my five years as a faculty member at Notre Dame, where there were strong distinctions between the IR and comparative fields, I was not always sure where my work fit in. In order to avoid this problem, but to work at the ICP boundary, students may feel compelled to acquire expertise in both fields. This is a colossal task, especially in an era when graduate students must master far more literature than scholars did thirty years ago, and at a time when we also expect graduate students to be well-informed consumers (perhaps even producers) of statistical and formal methods. How do we address this problem?

First, we should encourage students working on “boundary topics” to use a variety of methods in their work. This is good practice generally, as different types of evidence help to triangulate one’s case. But it’s also good for those working on ICP topics. If IR students do fieldwork (using interviews, surveys, or archives), they may have an easier time gaining acceptance among qualitatively-oriented comparativists. While we might discourage ICP students from spending too much time developing single-country expertise, some graduate research fellowships (such as the SSRC’s International Dissertation Research Fellowships) allow for short research stints in several countries - possibly a nice compromise. Similarly, if students master quantitative methods, they may have an easier time gaining acceptance from both fields, at least among those scholars using large-N approaches. This does not exempt students from paying attention to the appropriate operationalizations of their variables, but it may allow them to capitalize on the relative fungibility of methods skills across political science.

Second, we can make students aware of the tradeoffs they face in specializing too heavily or in falling between fields. Over the long run, training graduate students to work successfully at the intersection of IR and comparative will facilitate cross-field hiring, and may reduce some institutions’ tendency to rely too heavily on field distinctions. But, in the meantime, graduate students often face pressure to privilege one field at the expense of the other, and they ought to do so with good information about their choices.

Integrating International Relations and Comparative Politics: Professional Dilemmas

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Recognition of the increasing interaction between international and domestic politics has become widespread. While there is still a tendency for some in international relations simply to assume a well-functioning state and a black box for what goes on within it, many are aware that foreign relations are inextricably linked to domestic politics. Civil wars, anarchy within states, regime type and change, as well as economic changes are harder and harder to divorce from a country’s international behavior. How aggressive or pacific countries are often depends much on their internal dynamics (e.g., Doyle 1986; Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In comparative politics, numerous forces, including increasing globalization, have forced scholars to consider the international environment surrounding a country as an essential part of any explanation of domestic politics. Research on domestic topics like the welfare state and inequality now usually includes references to the impact of international factors (e.g., Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Mahler 2004). Studies of democratization have broadened to include international influences, such as the extent of capital mobility or of trade dependence, or the degree to which countries in the neighborhood are democratic (e.g., Boix 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2004).

These changes in the world and in scholarship have not been matched by changes in the structure of American political science departments. Most American departments remain organized around the four central subfields that developed in the mid-twentieth century: American, theory, comparative and international politics. As I have argued elsewhere, this division reflects a rather parochial and dated organization of the intellectual landscape (Milner 1998). American politics should be considered a part of comparative, thus inducing students of the American polity to better integrate their research with broad comparative themes and pushing those who research other countries to react to theories initiated in American politics and vice versa. Moreover, the administrative boundaries that artificially separate comparative and international politics are often wide and costly, inhibiting the free interchange of ideas. Departments tend to hire faculty, train students, and offer courses within these subfield boundaries. And the higher the degree of subfield autono-
my within a department, the more difficult will be any exchange across those boundaries, as the jealous guarding of that autonomy often induces even higher barriers. As with trade barriers between countries, these boundaries raise the costs of exchanging ideas and research between the two subfields and thus inhibit the development of a more integrated political science. Such a unified science of politics should be our aim. Devising general theories or propositions about politics is essential, but discovering where and under what conditions they do and do not apply is just as valuable. Comparative and international research allows better specification of those conditions. More integration of the subfields, I claim, would lead to greater progress in the discipline.

A common objection to this position is practical. Subfields, it is argued, usefully organize or segregate knowledge so that students and researchers can more easily find their way in an area. Without such boundaries, political scientists would be expected to know too much and could never get on with new research. All disciplines have such subfields, and most have arisen from the historical evolution of the discipline. This practical advantage is not to be discounted. However, as with most path-dependent processes, these subfield identities tend to become rigid, natural-seeming and difficult to breach or alter. Thus the question must be posed whether this intellectual organization of the discipline continues to serve it well, or whether its intellectual costs now exceed its benefits. Many of the natural sciences have been reorganized in recent years as intellectual developments have demanded a different training for and orientation to the discipline. Change is thus not impossible, but merely difficult and usually driven by exogenous factors.2

Without a total reorganization of departments, can the discipline still make progress with the current subfield categorization? The central question is how we train our students to develop cross-subfield expertise and to find top-notch jobs. Publishing new research that crosses subfield boundaries does not seem to be much of a problem; plenty of journals do this and do not worry about the subfield designation. The problems lie in the extent to which there exist rigid subfield boundaries for accepting new Ph.D. students, training them, offering courses and hiring new faculty. In all of these areas, the higher the barriers to inter-subfield exchange, the less likely are students to pursue such potentially innovative research. To make matters worse, there now exists a fair amount of research that overcomes these boundaries so students find it harder to learn this body of research on their own.

“As with trade barriers between countries, these boundaries raise the cost of exchanging ideas and research between the subfields and thus inhibit the development of a more integrated political science.”

A number of factors can help to lower these subfield boundaries. First, students can be trained in more than one subfield. Most American departments now require students to take courses in more than one subfield and often to take general exams in several areas. This graduate student program is an improvement upon those that encourage students only to work in one subfield. Many programs, however, encourage students to declare a major and minor field, thus compromising the goal of knowing substantial amounts about at least two subfields. Departments should make substantial knowledge in at least two of the four main subfields mandatory for all students.

A second step would be to reorganize teaching slightly. Even if students do work in two subfields, their knowledge of the intersection of the two may be limited. If courses remain hermetically sealed within subfield boundaries, even this plan leaves large voids. Students on their own initiative have to recognize and develop the connections between the subfields since syllabi and teaching often remain balkanized. Furthermore, with the growing literature that examines such cross-subfield issues, it has become harder for students to develop this knowledge on their own. Team teaching across the subfields would also be helpful. Bringing a comparative politics and an international relations faculty member together to teach a course would have large advantages for the faculty and students. This type of team teaching, however, seems rare. Most faculty members are categorized into a subfield when they arrive in a department, usually as part of the search process. Subfields then jealously guard their faculty and course offerings, especially at the graduate level. To the extent that job searches tend to be defined by subfield, the problem of teaching across the fields becomes more difficult. Opening up space in the graduate curriculum for courses in the intersection of comparative and international relations would help, as would allowing team teaching of cross-subfield courses.

Another way to approach the problem is to try to redefine the job search...
process. A modest step would be to require that search committees always include at least one member who is not in the subfield, although preferably these members from outside the subfield would have interests within it. Searching outside the subfield boundaries, something that the Yale Political Science department has recently attempted, may be a stronger way to erode subfield boundaries. This process in turn can help young scholars redefine themselves outside the traditional boundaries and encourage them to pursue such research.

“The problems lie in the extent to which there exist rigid subfield boundaries for accepting new Ph.D. students, training them, offering courses and hiring new faculty.”

But the curriculum is also important. If one hires outside the traditional subfields, but then organizes teaching within them, little positive effect may be noticed. Offering courses on broad topics—like political economy, institutions, or conflict and cooperation—where comparative and international politics meet is probably more useful for fostering cross-field linkages than the more traditional survey courses of the subfields. Some universities have added new subfields like political economy in order to develop a curricular space for new areas that cross the traditional boundaries. This step has the benefit of encouraging research, training, and hiring in the new area, but it also may further balkanize the discipline as new subfields become as hermetic as the old ones.

Opportunities to pursue research in the interstices between comparative and international politics do exist. Once a graduate student is through the general exams, s/he can pick her/his advisors to promote an integrated research program for the dissertation. Most American departments now encourage (or require) students to have more than one advisor and this gives them the opportunity to choose ones from different subfields. A further step would be to recommend or require that dissertation committees contain faculty members from at least two subfields. Doing so would encourage students to take courses from faculty in other subfields and try to work with them before the dissertation began. Publishing research that crosses over the subfield divide is also not difficult. The major research journals are very open to such work and many actively seek it out. University presses also seem acceptant of such cross subfield research, even though many retain particular series that sometimes represent the subfields.

In sum, all is not bleak for scholars desiring to research questions that involve the interaction of comparative and international politics. While problems still exist within departments due to the often rigid and high subfield boundaries, scholars can overcome these and develop ways to bring together the two areas. It is important to remember that progress has been made. In the 1950s and 1960s, some universities in the U.S., including Yale, had separate doctoral programs in international relations and political science, and some in the U.K. still do. This total separation of international politics from political science has been overcome, and many of the theories and tools from the rest of political science now are applied to the subfield. As I have argued elsewhere, this integration has been a major benefit to the discipline. Taking courses in the international and comparative politics subfields, identifying faculty who do research in both, and designing a dissertation and doctoral committee to include both areas are short-term solutions to the problems internal to departments. Longer-term ones probably rely on reorganizing the discipline by adding or completely modifying the subfield boundaries. Once a critical mass of scholars and research exists in this area, pressure for such disciplinary change will grow and make it more likely.

Notes

1 I would also argue that political science would benefit if the theory subfield were much more integrated into the rest of the discipline. Its separation from American, comparative and international detracts from the theory building in those areas and in turn hurts theory by detaching it from the more empirical sides of political science. Note that one of the most important theories in international relations in the past two decades, the Democratic Peace, arose out in part of political theory and Kant’s ideas (Doyle 1986).

2 An interesting question is what such a reorganization of political science would look like. What new subfields would emerge? How would the discipline be reconfigured? And would there be a consensus among departments so that one type of new organization would prevail nationally?

3 Yale’s five areas are 1. Crafting and Operating Institutions, 2. Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances, 3. Distributive Politics, 4. Representation and Popular Rule, and 5. Order, Conflict, and Violence. Interestingly, however, courses, general exams and field surveys are still organized largely along the lines of the four traditional subfields.
There is little doubt that the real boundaries between comparative and international politics have partially, and in some cases completely, broken down in recent years. Comparativists who study political behavior, institutions, public policy and political economy in national states increasingly build theoretical and empirical models that incorporate sophisticated specifications of international variables; international relations scholars in many areas of inquiry increasingly ground theory and analysis in domestic politics. Both groups also focus more and more on political phenomena that occur at the nexus of the traditional subfields.

There are two reasons for this confluence of comparative and international politics that are worth thinking about for the purposes of this symposium. First, and most obvious, substantive changes in the real world of politics force us to develop theory that accounts for ever more complex forces that determine those things worth explaining. Simultaneous processes of economic, cultural, and political globalization, the political and socio-cultural mobilization of regions around the globe, and the continuing and dramatic evolution of the character and form of national political systems pose real and often insurmountable challenges for traditional theory and analysis in comparative politics and international relations.

Second, new advances in theory and analysis that have occurred simultaneously and broadly in international and comparative politics – especially the development of rational choice, institutionalist, and constructivist/ideational approaches to politics in both subfields – have led traditional comparative and international relations scholars to draw upon one another more readily and to expand analytical frameworks to account for a confluence of domestic and international causal processes. Thus, to take three examples of things worth explaining, political scientists today are more likely than in the past to explain changes in cleavage structures and party systems in developed and newly democratic political systems, the widespread adoption of similar policy reforms and institutions around the globe (e.g., neoliberalism), or the character and operation of new and established supra-national political institutions on the basis of theory and analysis that truly spans the conventional subfield lines.

That said, it is equally true that disciplinary organization lags significantly behind the real worlds of politics and political analysis. As to the departmental construction of the discipline and the distribution of faculty across subfields, conventional compartmentalization and the “pigeonholing” of faculty generally persist. For instance, if one examines the published subfield breakdowns of the faculty of the top-25 political science departments in the United States, one finds that the traditional four-fold division between political theory, American politics, comparative politics, and international relations - supplemented variously with public policy, political economy, and methodology - dominates disciplinary structure.
Moreover, of those faculty designated as comparative politics specialists, only 11.6 percent are listed as international relations scholars. Further, this longstanding compartmentalized conceptualization of the discipline is reflected well in numerous American Political Science Association publications that characterize what political scientists purportedly do. For instance, a perusal of a couple of years of PS suggests that job seeking, submissions to the American Political Science Review, and many other activities largely take place within the four major and three or so minor subfields that typically structure political science departments. Given this disconnect between much of real world political science and formal disciplinary structure, what should the young scholars whose work bridges subfield lines do when contemplating “going on the market” and building careers?

What is To Be Done?, or Why the Dependent Variable Matters

For all intents and purposes, young scholars whose research significantly bridges comparative and international politics and are seeking jobs, establishing intellectual identities, and building careers have at least three viable strategies - flexible specialization, generalization, or the non-traditional approach. The optimal strategy, in my view, is almost always determined by the focus of the dissertation and early research projects. If the dependent variable is, at its essence, a national or subnational political phenomenon, the best strategy is probably to specialize and to pursue jobs and initial career building primarily in comparative politics. This is prudent despite the likely substantive connections to, or extensive theoretical integration of, international forces in theoretical and empirical models. In such a case, the research question has in all likelihood been framed by the traditional questions of comparative politics and influenced most heavily by the theoretical and analytical models and methods of the comparative subfield. The distribution of graduate course work is also likely to be shaped by “the choice of dependent variable.” Thus, the great likelihood is that one’s position is strongest if one focuses on the comparative politics job market and lands in the comparative politics faculty list during the early career years of annual departmental reviews and promotion and tenure.

The same strategy can, of course, be recommended to those whose research leads them to focus principally on explanation of inter- or supranational phenomena. It is important to point out, however, that with the specialization strategy, young scholars are increasingly likely - given the real world substantive and theoretical changes noted above - to branch out in subsequent years from comparative (international) to international relations- (comparative-) oriented research projects. Such a pattern of flexible specialization, always present to a degree within the discipline, will be an increasingly acceptable and, indeed, a rewarding scholarly career path.

In contrast to flexible specialization, young scholars whose dissertation and related early research seek to understand an interrelated set of national and supranational political phenomena have two additional career strategies that should prove successful in market and intellectual terms. For instance, illustrative of an increasingly common research program, imagine a dissertation, or a dissertation and a consciously linked set of articles, that seeks to explain the domestic and international sources of a set of politics’ immigration policies, the impact of these policies on international and regional flows as well as the politics and content of immigration policies of supranational institutions, and, perhaps, how these international outcomes feed back on the domestic politics of the focal set of political systems. Such a research program is likely to draw heavily from the traditional subfield literatures and the contemporary research streams that bridge traditional boundaries. This research program is also likely to necessitate extensive graduate course work in comparative and international politics and cognate fields.

“... professional practices and formal structures of the discipline should gradually catch up with the real worlds of politics and political analysis.”

I would argue that there are two plausible job market/early career strategies that make sense for young scholars whose work fits this model. First, one can legitimately apply for both comparative and international politics jobs where the substantive and area/regional requisites of the positions mesh with the expertise of the candidate. This generalist strategy, perhaps modestly tweaked to accommodate the nature of the faculty line one ultimately fills, can of course also guide the research program in early career years as one might focus on both traditional comparative politics and international relations questions or on substantive problems at the nexus of the two fields. If one’s research significantly contributes to both fields and/or emergent “bridge research streams,” annual review and tenure promotion processes will in all likelihood go quite well. The viability of this generalization strategy will increase in the
future as more and more faculty colleagues bridge the subfield divide and reorient the criteria for judging successful work in comparative and international politics.

Finally, young scholars whose work spans traditional subfield divides may choose a non-traditional strategy of applying for positions outside the core subfields or for positions whose main teaching and research components are in interdisciplinary programs and institutes. That is, one might seek departmentally based, tenure-track positions that avoid traditional subfield pigeonholing (e.g., political economy, public policy, political behavior, global politics and a variety of commonly listed specialized positions) or seek tenure-track appointments in interdisciplinary programs or institutes that avoid traditional subfield biases and constraints (e.g., substantive area and regional studies programs and institutes). These faculty lines, where scholars working across the old boundaries of comparative and international politics may well be advantaged, are probably most common for political economists and for scholars of regions. In the long term, however, professional practices and formal structures of the discipline should gradually catch up with the real worlds of politics and political analysis discussed above. If this occurs, choices between job-seeking and career-building strategies and associated professional dilemmas will proportionally diminish, to notable betterment of the discipline.

Notes

1 I would like to thank my colleagues at Marquette, especially Lowell Barrington, Michael Fleet, and H. Richard Friman, as well as Andy Martin at Harvard’s Minda de Gunzburg Center of European Studies, for helpful discussions on the issues at hand.

2 I use the U.S. News and World Report, “Best Graduate Schools” (2003 Edition), ranking of political science departments and official department websites for the data discussed in this article. Much of what I say assumes, correctly I believe, that the vast majority of large and moderately sized graduate degree-granting departments follow this disciplinary division.

Bridging the Divide Between Comparative Politics and International Relations

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In graduate school during the mid-1980s, I remember memorizing international relations’ “levels of analysis” as if they were skeletal structures, and preparing comparative politics sub-fields for the qualifying exam that turned out to bear little relevance to my dissertation research on human rights in Argentina. A few years later, as a beginning scholar, transnational influence on democratization and social movements had become so central that my first article dealing with this insufficiently explored variable, “From Above and Below,” (Brysk 1993) was cited widely - perhaps even more than the well-received but more classically comparative case study from which it derived (Brysk 1994). By the end of that decade, as I sat down to write my second book, a comparison of Indian rights movements in five Latin American countries (Brysk 2000), I realized that my research had carried me beyond the logic of case comparison I had learned from Alexander George (Eckstein 1975). My comparative cases were all “contaminated” by transnational diffusion of social movement frames, repertoires, resources, and arenas - and that turned out to be the main finding and theoretical innovation of that study.

“My comparative cases were all ‘contaminated’ by transnational diffusion of social movements frames, repertoires, resources, and arenas - that turned out to be the main finding and theoretical innovations of that study.”

My own confluence of international relations and comparative politics was dictated by both the structure and content of my professional development: coming of age along with the era of globalization, and my research interest in human rights. Grappling with globalization was a pedagogical as well as a research imperative; I taught my first course in comparative politics shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (the text I had ordered still compared “three systems”), and my first course in international relations coincided with the outbreak of the first Gulf War - my grad school notes on “the state” didn’t quite cover the situation. Since my field of interest, human rights, is a universal norm promoted by global actors that seek to change...
state behavior and institutions, most research questions naturally traverse levels of analysis - and many argue that the most fruitful research on this topic is precisely that which synthesizes comparative and transnational perspectives (Landman 2002). Even my initial regional specialization in Latin American politics encouraged me to “think globally,” since it is the region whose political and economic development has been most extensively analyzed as a function of its international relations - from dependency theory onwards. And you can’t teach either human rights or Latin American politics (well) without drawing on both international and comparative literature.

“...one way I have bridged the divide is to transcend it via interdisciplinary identification.”

In terms of employment opportunities, straddling the divide has meant a demanding short-term stretch that brings long-term flexibility. Although I “majored” in comparative and “minored” in IR, my first job was actually in the hybrid field of “Inter-American relations” (I prepared three different job talks that year!). My search for my next position, inspired by personal needs rather than professional growth, called for a return to Latin American Politics (I also carried reference letters from scholars in several sub-fields, which I highly recommend to job-seekers). At both of these institutions, I participated actively in the Latin American Studies programs - and these interdisciplinary regional studies ties proved valuable background for my current affiliation in International Studies; one of my qualifications for my current position was the ability to help build a newly established International Studies program. In this sense, one way I have bridged the divide is to transcend it via interdisciplinary identification.

My main caveat in this regard, however, is that all three institutions housed me in political science, and the more traditional members of these departments regularly insisted that I establish my bona fides within the discipline. I have learned that to establish credibility and gain employment, members of multiple sub-fields must emphasize readily recognizable disciplinary debates, vocabulary, and literature even more than more conventionally situated peers. For example, I made sure to cite Weber on legitimacy before plunging into an exegesis of symbolic politics (Weber 1964). I am active in the APSA, ISA, and LASA, but until tenure always sent my work first to disciplinary journals and presses with strong recognition in Political Science. Even within political science, international relations colleagues generally press the young scholar seeking employment or tenure for more grand theory and demand sweeping, ‘parsimonious’ propositions, while simultaneously comparativists contest broader studies’ command of every permutation of each case - and question the competence of any short-term interloper on their lifelong turf.

As I have ascended the academic hierarchy, I now find that I am called upon often as an interpreter of interdisciplinary and cross-field training and publication in publication, recruitment and promotion processes. I attempt to translate thematic, area studies, and transnational research and venues to anxious colleagues on thesis, search and tenure committees; I remember reassuring a very senior comparativist colleague over dinner that a candidate’s constructivist approach was an emerging and widely shared alternative research tradition, not an idiosyncratic methodology beyond post-modernism. I advise my own students and junior colleagues that it is still critical to frame boundary-crossing research in disciplinary and sub-disciplinary terms - and to network with sympathetic mid-level and senior colleagues who will vet your contribution to the discipline.

“... international relations colleagues generally press [...] for more grand theory and demand sweeping, ‘parsimonious’ propositions, while [...] comparativists contest broader studies’ command of every permutation of each case - and question the competence of any short-term interloper on their lifelong turf.”

Despite the limitations described above, it is the logic of comparative inquiry - rather than the concepts of a particular sub-field of comparative politics - that has contributed most constructively to my research and ability to train graduate students. Moreover, I have found it salutary to apply a comparative mode of analysis to topics conventionally considered the province of international relations. Every book or article I write, every dissertation or honors thesis I supervise, as well as students in the graduate research design courses I have...
taught must answer the question: Of what is this a case? “A case” can mean anything from a country study to a transnational social movement to a foreign policy decision to a shift in the international system. No matter what the methodology, all good social science must tell us the context and boundary conditions for the phenomenon analyzed, how that problem fits into a broader class of questions, and what any relationships revealed imply for the family of cases. If the research strategy is positivist, this will also generate testable hypotheses about the relationships - whether causal, genealogical, typological, or other.

The logic of comparison has also guided my forays (and mentoring) “outside the box” of regional studies. After editing several volumes on human rights and globalization, I realized that my next research puzzle - the emergence and impact of transnational private authority—was generated from the international system level, and reflected a confluence of responses differentiated more by sector and issue - type than national or even regional identity. This led me to follow issues like financial responsibility for human rights violations across time and space from Holocaust-era lawsuits in Europe to conflict diamonds in Africa to financial seizures of deposed dictators from Ferdinand Marcos to Slobodan Milosevic (Brysk 2005). Similarly, studying the comparative influence of transnational factors has inspired a diverse agenda for my current work, comparing foreign and transnational civic actors on political outcomes in my country cases. I have found some sort of qualified concept of “global civil society” essential to capture the power and political resources of groups like missionaries, environmentalists, and academics (Keane 2003). Similarly, as I attempt to compare human rights foreign policies in my current work, the global socialization of national policy-makers to redefine national interest requires a notion of “international society” (Bull 1995). Overall, I am inspired by an emerging research agenda and intellectual network in transnationalism, which provides and analyzes empirical, methodological, theoretical, and normative uses of the concept across diverse fields of inquiry (Khagram and Levitt 2004).

The question we need to be asking and teaching is not whether, but how, to bridge these borders. For at least a generation, we have known about the mutual influences between the state and global levels (Gourevitch 1978), as well as the existence of issues and dynamics that transcend national boundaries (Keohane and Nye 1971). Yet despite the proliferation of useful research on these vertical and horizontal dynamics of world politics, as well as the ubiquitous discussion of globalization, we still know far too little about the relationship between levels and the corresponding modes of inquiry. Are the relationships between the local, national, and international nested? Competitive? Issue-specific? Regionally-based? What does it mean to carry a concept like “democratization” across levels of analysis - and what gets lost in translation? When do we need “local knowledge” to understand the impact or even the limits of global phenomena, and when will conventional comparison miss something that is more than the sum of its parts? At this point, the best we can do may be simply to keep reminding ourselves and our students of these questions, and to read broadly beyond our sub-fields so as to avoid reinventing the wheel.

Fortunately for our careers, the world keeps changing, thus presenting new puzzles that will require constantly evolving frameworks of analysis. Standing at the borders, straddling the bridge between comparative politics and international relations, affords a privileged and fascinating view of some of the most consequential phenomena of our era: from migration to religion, from military conflict to development crisis. Some of the border posts are still manned (usually) by disciplinary police, whose legitimate interest in orderly traffic must be weighed against the potential for reactionary parochialism. We can negotiate a constructive flow that yields benefits for both sides, if we stand together - and if our papers are in order.
Comparative Politics Textbooks: A Review

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Charles Hauss, Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges (Wadsworth, 2002). 560 pp. $83.95


W. Phillips Shively, Comparative Governance (McGraw-Hill Primis, 2005). This is a custom-made volume whose price and number of pages vary depending on how many of the available modules a teacher chooses to adopt. See http://www.mhhe.com/primis/catalog/p
catalog/D19-1.htm.

Since comparative politics textbooks aim to impart information about some number of countries and also introduce methods of comparison, the most successful ones do both. To accomplish that, most of them rely on a number of country experts whose country chapters are tied together by a conceptual framework provided by the textbook editor or co-editors. The large volumes edited by Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell Jr., Kaare Strom and Russell J. Dalton (Comparative Politics Today); by Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger (European Politics in Transition); and by Michael J. Sodaro (Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction) are the leading examples of that approach, Sodaro’s being the newest and methodologically the most current. Although reliable sales figures are unavailable, these three (plus the less theoretical volume by Charles Hauss, see below) seem to be the most widely adopted texts.

W. Phillips Shively’s Comparative Governance is similarly conceived as a collection of country studies by various authors, tied together by an editor who supplies the theoretical frame, but it is distinctive because it is available as a series of modules from which instructors can choose countries and theoretical sections to create a customized volume. Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach’s Comparative Politics is the most theoretically unified of the texts combining country studies with a conceptual framework. The ten relatively brief country chapters describe political systems from the perspective of political development. The editors return to the theme of comparison after each set of countries.

A few texts take a different tack, organizing information about a set of countries into a comparative framework without having separate chapters on individual countries. Michael
Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair’s Representative Government in Modern Europe is the best example of that approach. Then there are many single-authored textbooks, exemplified in my review by the volumes by Michael J. Roskin and by Charles Hauss. They have a unity that multi-authored volumes lack but the country studies in them have a secondary-source flavor that is inevitable when a single scholar describes up to a dozen different systems. Finally, there are the country studies in separate volumes that have no single organizing framework, typified by the Pearson Longman series (The British Polity, The French Polity, The German Polity). They offer detailed descriptions on each country and give the instructor the advantage and the challenge of drawing comparisons. Table 1 summarizes the features of the comparative politics texts that I have chosen to discuss from among the numerous volumes available for the introductory course.

Comparative Politics Today, edited by the late Gabriel A. Almond and continued by Powell, Strom and Dalton, is the standard by which the first type of text - conceptual framework plus country studies - must be judged. It is the longest established, boasts among its collaborators outstanding senior researchers in the field, and traces its ancestry to the influential series, “Studies in Political Development,” sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council in the early 1960s. Its greatest virtue is a large array of country studies that are succinct, reasonably parallel in organization, and each is the authoritative product of a scholar actively engaged in research on that country. But pedagogically this volume poses an obstacle. The editors precede the excellent country studies with a 150-page conceptual and theoretical framework that introduces an enormous array of terms and that, despite many revisions over the decades, still bears the marks of its origins: the structural/functional approach of the 1950s and 1960s. As an organizing framework it has the advantage of providing a template for the country studies. The authors of these studies use it faithfully enough to facilitate comparison among political systems, though the text does not explicitly draw comparisons after the introductory section. But although the authors provide examples of comparative research in their introductory section, structural-functionalism has not turned out to facilitate comparative research. By leading undergraduates through this framework, the editors do not introduce students to current research approaches. This is a shortcoming of nearly all of these texts, a point to which I will return at the end of this review.

Kesselman and Krieger’s European Politics in Transition has a different, less abstract organizing framework, one that focuses on continuity and change in the “European model” of politics. It emphasizes the challenges of economic policy and social diversity and offers fewer and somewhat more detailed country studies than do Almond et al. There is a parallel organization across the country studies and each draws explicit comparisons at the end. The book is reminiscent of the conventional texts on the “major foreign powers” of half a century ago in that it deals only with European states, avoids theoretical abstractions, and emphasizes classic issues of state and economy. The

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<td>Sodaro ed.</td>
<td>Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Concepts and methods of political science</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shively ed.</td>
<td>Comparative Governance</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Power, the state, conflict management</td>
<td>26 plus U.S. plus EU</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopstein and Lichbach eds.</td>
<td>Comparative Politics</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>How political development shapes interests, identities, and institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallagher, Laver, Mair</td>
<td>Representative Government in Modern Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutions, parties, elections, policies</td>
<td>23 plus EU</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roskin</td>
<td>Countries and Concepts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>History, institutions, political culture, issues</td>
<td>5 major plus 4 brief third world</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauss</td>
<td>Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Democratization and global interdependence</td>
<td>10 plus EU and U.S.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conradt, Norton, Safran</td>
<td>Representative Government in Modern Europe</td>
<td>1 each</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>1 each</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Characteristics of Comparative Politics Textbooks
four country studies - on the U.K., France, Germany and Italy - are solid, succinct, and comparable. They are supplemented by a very substantial description of the institutions and policies of the European Union, and by a relatively superficial and somewhat confusing section on the new political systems of East Central Europe. While Almond et al. offer instructors a large set of country studies from which to choose, instructors adopting Kesselman and Krieger are likely to use all of it. The special challenge of Kesselman and Krieger's approach is that the editors insist on interpreting European political systems in terms of "transition." This situates their account in that continent's awareness of the profound changes it experienced after 1945 and again after 1990. But it introduces a temporal variable that is bound to be of secondary interest to students trying to focus on cross-national rather than longitudinal comparisons.

Sodaro's Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction is really two books. The first half is a comprehensive introduction to political science, to the principal concepts and research methods in the field, with extensive examples of problems that the discipline addresses. The examples give it concreteness. The second half consists of eight relatively short country studies covering ten countries, each of which is stronger on parties and electoral systems than on the basic institutions of government. What ties these country studies loosely to the first half of the book are hypothesis-testing exercises, but these seem contrived and are not in any case carried out as serious research exercises. The book's length - 744 double-columned text pages - and its ambitious attempt both to introduce the entire discipline of political science as well as a set of non-American political systems, makes it difficult to use in one-semester courses. But it does offer instructors a set of choices among country studies and also among the introductory sections. As a result, it could be used selectively much like the even larger volume edited by Almond, Powell, Strom and Dalton.

"The dilemma between emphasizing concepts and methods [...] and providing detailed descriptions of a variety of political systems is unresolved."

Choice is the impressive feature of Shively's Comparative Governance. Its introductory framework is relatively concrete. After a succinct but lucid discussion of the purpose of comparison, it introduces the concept of the state and its role in managing conflict, avoiding abstraction by frequent specific examples. The framework serves to organize the 27 country studies among which instructors can choose. These have considerable parallel structure but are brief and therefore serve either as introductions to be supplemented by additional country-specific reading or as a survey of a wide range of political systems once over lightly.

The strength of the text edited by Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach is that it engages in systematic comparison by focusing on the different developmental paths that states have taken and by returning to that comparison after each of four sets of countries. The editors have not imposed a straitjacket on the authors of the country chapters, though they have stressed a unifying set of aspects of politics: interests, identities, and institutions. The country chapters are varied but also very brief. Students will not come away with any detailed knowledge of the ten political systems the book covers. But they will gain an interpretation of the differences among countries that result from their different developmental paths and will see the value of comparison more effectively than in any other text.

The most successful attempt to integrate a conceptual framework with information about a variety of political systems is Gallagher, Laver and Mair's Representative Government in Modern Europe. It is organized by traditional institutional categories - constitutions, executives, parliaments, party systems, elections, and policy - and in each of these sections provides a fair amount of factual description. In attempting to cover most of the countries of Europe, at least in its tabular presentations, it risks mind-boggling variety, but it offsets this by generally focusing on a subset of five or six main examples. The book implicitly reflects the research interests of its authors, who are eminent European scholars, and is therefore a sophisticated treatment, although the conceptual framework is entirely conventional. Indeed its advantage is that students acquainted only with the U.S. political system will find the conceptual organization of this book familiar.

The two single-authored works are basically arranged as a sequence of country studies. Roskin's Countries and Concepts is a heroic attempt by a single author to describe nine political systems. Five of them, today's major powers - the U.K., France, Germany, Russia and Japan - are rendered in considerable detail, and four of them, categorized as "third world," are treated more lightly. The focus is on issues, or what the author calls "quarrels," and there is some parallel struc-
ture guided by attention to history, political institutions, and political culture. The book is peppered with “feature boxes” that constantly interrupt the flow of the text with key concepts, factoids, maps, important events, examples of political culture, and biographies of political leaders and historic figures. These may either prove distracting, or possibly engaging for students with short attention spans. By contrast to all the other texts I have discussed, this is the most concrete, and concludes with 50 very specific “lessons” from the nine countries covered. It is hard to know how students would organize these lessons, or whether they would merely regard them as a traveler regards his or her notes after a tour d’horizon: as a scrapbook to be filled.

Charles Hauss’s *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges* consists principally of 11 country studies plus a chapter on the European Union. Although it introduces the concept of the political system, it does not use it as an organizing framework but rather returns in each country section to the themes of democratization, liberalization, globalization, and sources of conflict. It also precedes each of three sets of country studies with general chapters respectively on the industrialized democracies, the current and former communist regimes, and the third world. An instructor who chooses to use the whole book may find that it introduces too many organizing principles and too many countries, just the opposite of the volume by Kopstein and Lichbach whose focus may be too narrow for many instructors.

This review of the most widely used comparative politics textbooks demonstrates the variety of approaches that exist and the lack of consensus on what constitutes an introduction to comparative politics. The trend seems to be toward books covering a large number of political systems on all of the continents of the world. The dilemma between emphasizing concepts and methods for comparison, and providing detailed descriptions of a variety of political systems, is unresolved. This dilemma occurs in graduate education as well, but at that level it is ultimately resolved in the conduct of specific research projects. Is there no way of accomplishing something like that for undergraduates by organizing a set of country studies around a current research paradigm? It seems to me that rational choice institutionalism, with its attention to both the individual political actor and collective results, is well suited to organizing information about a set of political systems.

“It seems to me that rational choice institutionalism, with its attention to both the individual political actor and collective results, is well suited to organizing information about a set of political systems.”
also make decisions about how to allocate visas among different migrant-sending states.

"[I]mmigration policy in the United States and most industrialized states has been broadly regressive, shifting the benefits of migration disproportionately to migrant employers and organized crime networks, while penalizing migrants and other workers."

These choices have broad implications for how the costs and benefits of migration are distributed among different segments of immigrants, native-born workers, employers, consumers, and taxpayers. Indeed, immigration policy in the United States and most industrialized states has been broadly regressive, shifting the benefits of migration disproportionately to migrant employers and organized crime networks, while penalizing migrants and other workers. These distributional issues drive much of the contemporary debate over immigration in the U.S. and Europe, a debate overlayed by fears of lax immigration control as a national security threat.

A priority research agenda for comparativist (and Americanist) political scientists interested in international migration would include the following items:

First, while considerable attention has been devoted to cross-cutting interest group cleavages, efforts to develop a comprehensive model of immigration policymaking have had limited success. Why do the same groups demonstrate variable influence over policy outcomes over time and across different types of immigration issues (control, integration, asylum procedures, etc.)? How do policymakers weigh the competing demands of economic growth, challenges to national identity, threats to national security, and general public restrictionism?

Second, how do these domestic interest group battles play out in an era of increasing international economic integration? Have relatively open (de facto) immigration policies strengthened employers and/or contributed to the declining power of labor movements in the U.S. and other industrialized states, as a Heckscher-Ohlin view of the world would suggest? More generally, given that immigration control policies often have more immediate consequences for labor-exporting countries than for receiving states, to what extent does immigration policymaking resemble a “two-level game” rather than a strictly domestic political process?

Third, in light of this latter question, what opportunities exist for the negotiation of cooperative approaches to immigration control that combine expanded access to legal immigration with greater cooperation on border enforcement? Similarly, does the negotiation of successful multilateral regimes governing trade and investment (for example) offer templates for constructing international migration institutions?

Notes

Recorded Vote Data from John Carey

I have recently made available recorded vote data from 19 legislative chambers in 18 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Uruguay). In addition to the data and codebook, also available on the site are some files with STATA code to produce the measures of party voting unity I employ in my research.

Also available on the site are transcripts from interviews with 61 legislators and party leaders from 8 countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela) from 2000-2001. The interviews follow a stable protocol for the most part, regarding how decisions are reached within parties and carried out (or not) in the legislative environment, and how legislators interact with party leaders, the executive, and the citizens they represent. The interviews frequently cover other topics, as well however, according to the subject’s train of thought. The transcripts are available in both English and Spanish.

Please feel free to use any of the data - qualitative or quantitative - available on the site, and to direct other users to it. If you have any problems, questions, or suggestions, don’t hesitate to let me know.

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Pew Global Attitudes Dataset

The Pew Research Center For The People and The Press has released its Global Attitudes dataset. In the foreword to the codebook, Director Andrew Kohut describes the project as follows:

“In 44 national surveys, based on interviews with more than 38,000 people, we explore public views about the rapid pace of change in modern life; global interconnectedness through trade, foreign investment and immigration; and people’s attitudes toward democracy and governance. The surveys’ themes range from economic globalization and the reach of multinational corporations to terrorism and the U.S. response. The results illuminate international attitudes toward the United States and show where U.S. and foreign opinions align and collide.”

This report was widely covered in the media for shedding light on public opinion in both industrialized and developing countries, and especially in Islamic societies. The countries surveyed were Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The survey contained nearly 100 questions, though some sensitive questions were not asked in some countries (especially China, Egypt, and Vietnam).

The datafile and codebook, along with those for dozens of other surveys, can be downloaded at: http://people-press.org/dataarchive/.

Protest and Repression Data from Ron Francisco

Interval daily and sub-daily data on European countries’ protest and repression are available at: http://lark.cc.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/index.html

There are data organized by country for 16 years, from 1980 through 1995. The variables/categories include date, day of the week, protest group, protest target, target agent, description of the event, linked dates to the protest event, time or duration of the event, the number of protesters, the number arrested, injured and killed, a dichotomous measure of property damage, the number of state agents, the number injured and number killed, an estimate of the protest group’s organization strength, the source and the source date.

The data are coded from 500 sources. There are 26 countries on the website at present, all from Western and East Central Europe. Eventually, 28 counties will be available. There are also links at the website to similar data for Latin America (Colombia, Peru and El Salvador), Burma, and South Korea. A codebook lists the source codes, acronyms and provides further information on coding methods.

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