Guest Letter

Reflections on Elections

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I began my career comparing leadership succession in two very different parts of the world: the Soviet bloc countries, on the one hand, and the United States and Western Europe, on the other (Bunce 1981). What interested me at the time was how different approaches to managing leadership change – the clear contrast, simply put, of elites choosing leaders and citizens electing them – affected both regime responsiveness to its citizenry and trends in public policy. What I discovered was that both approaches to leadership change generated predictable cycles of sensitivity to public concerns and innovations in budgetary policy.

Nearly thirty years later (gasp!), in a collaborative study with Sharon Wolchik, I have returned inadvertently to my intellectual roots. Once again, I am wrestling with both the processes and consequences of leadership selection in settings that span the United States, Europe, and Eurasia. However, all the details have changed. Our study focuses on a wave of electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in the post-communist world from the mid-1990s to the present and the impact of American democracy promoters (along with other international and domestic actors) on these electoral confrontations between authoritarians and democrats. Of particular interest is identifying the circumstances under which ordinary citizens and democratic oppositions, at the ballot box and often by necessity soon thereafter in the streets, succeed in defeating authoritarians. We have discovered that dictators lose and leave office (the second does not always follow from the first, as Zimbabwe’s recent election reminds us) because of the hard, creative and often tedious and dangerous work carried out during elections by transnational democracy promotion networks composed of domestic oppositions and civil society groups, Western-based democracy promoters, and “graduates” of successful electoral challenges to authoritarianism in neighboring countries who are eager to share their ideas and experiences. Such networks, for example, were powerful enough to defeat Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia in 1998 and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000, as well as ensure the victory of Viktor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.

However, in elections since 2000 (e.g., in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus), where citizens also mobilized in large numbers to challenge official election results, challenges to dictatorial rule failed – largely because regimes were too vigilant in protecting themselves and transnational networks too limited in their ability to carry out the necessary electoral tasks for an opposition victory.

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Washington, DC and throughout the post-communist region, watching developments in American politics from the 2000 presidential election to the 2007-2008 primary season, and remembering the study I did in the 1970s has led me to think long and hard about the relationship between elections and democratic development and its implications for the role of structure versus agency in democratic change. In particular, I have come to see elections as critical to democratic development while dubbing more and more the value of forcing a choice between an agency-based or structure-based line of explanation. Let me now develop these points by addressing, first, the issue of elections and democracy.

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It has become common practice for scholars and public intellectuals to criticize what they see as the exaggerated emphasis placed on the role of elections in democratic development. For example, critics of highly reductionist definitions of democracy, along with analysts who focus on the rise of hybrid regimes during the Third Wave of democratization, both caution that democracy should not be reduced simply to holding free, fair and regular elections. Moreover, numerous criticisms have been leveled at the tendency of the international community, following the termination of internal wars, to press for early elections. While such elections can help legitimate international intervention and expedite the departure of international players from difficult missions, they also lock in divisive cleavages generated by internal wars. At the same time, the international democracy promotion community has been regularly taken to task for its preoccupation with elections – a focus that has often translated into an election-calibrated cycle of democracy assistance and international attention to democratic performance. A final concern is methodological. Attributing causality to elections is very tricky because of endogeneity problems. As Leonard Morris recently asked me: Are elections so important in themselves, or are they merely visible and efficient summaries of more long-term and complex developments on the ground?

All of these observations about elections and democratization have considerable merit. However, they must be placed alongside some other arguments that remind us of the powerful influence of elections on democratic development. We can begin to make this case by highlighting conclusions drawn in some recent studies of democratization and democratic breakdown. First, just as improvements in democratic performance around the world seem to be very sensitive to the electoral cycle, so democratic breakdowns often occur in response to elections (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Bunce 1994; Fish, 1998; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Bermeo 2003). Second, the mere repetition of elections seems to enhance the quality of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lindberg 2006). Finally, of all types of democratic assistance provided by the US Agency for International Development, support of free and fair elections demonstrates the strongest positive relationship with improved
democratic performance (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson, and Azpuru 2006).

These findings are suggestive, but say little about how and why elections affect democratic development. Here, we can introduce several arguments. One is that, just as democracy has become a global norm, so citizens, especially outside the world of well-entrenched democracies, place free, fair and competitive elections at the center of their definitions of democratic politics. This is one reason, for example, why fraudulent elections have prompted citizens in such diverse locales as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Georgia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Serbia, Togo, and Ukraine to take to the streets to protest official vote counts. In comparison with other aspects of democratic life, moreover, elections are unusually well-designed, particularly when domestic and international engagement is high, to help solve the collective action and coordination problems that often bedevil democratic politics. For example, elections have the distinctive advantages of featuring clear beginnings and endings; a familiar repertoire of procedures and activities; high political and often economic stakes; and a visible and simple metric that defines winners and losers, fair or fraudulent contests. Thus, in new democracies and in authoritarian regimes that tolerate some political competition elections make it easier [...] for citizens to form, register, and defend their political preferences and often fragmented and isolated democratic oppositions to forge alliances with each other, reach out to citizens and civil society groups, and craft effective strategies for winning political power.

Elections in new democracies and in hybrid regimes also provide a necessary focal point for the activities of the international democracy promotion community. International democracy promotion is a remarkably diverse and decentralized set of projects. Elections, however, generate a common objective – that is, encouraging regimes to meet the standard of holding free and fair contests for power – that lends itself to a pooling of international resources, a specific list of easily divisible activities, and powerful incentives for collaboration with domestic groups. At the same time, policies associated with supporting free and fair elections are far less controversial than other forms of democratic assistance, and they have more immediate payoffs – in contrast, for instance, to building rule of law or encouraging the development of civil society.

The outcomes of elections also matter. In our rush to identify the factors that shape successful transitions from dictatorship to democracy we have often forgotten the obvious. It is true that the replacement of dictators with democrats cannot guarantee subsequent democratic progress. Not even democratizing elections can erase the painful reality, to borrow from Thomas Friedman (2005) (who in turn was doing a riff based on comments by Donald Rumsfeld), that: “You go to democracy with the country you have, not the one you wish you had.” However, getting rid of dictators is nonetheless a necessary condition for democratic development. There is in fact very little evidence to support the argument, often made by Western policy-makers for relatively self-serving reasons, that the “right” kinds of policies can encourage dictators to become democrats. In my view, dictators may soften because of domestic difficulties, because threatening actions by their dictatorial allies lead them to “flirt” at times with the other side, or because the international community provides economic incentives in exchange for proof of political liberalization. However, these responses are usually temporary, and they are often followed by increased repression. Dictators, in short, may put up some democratic “decorations,” but they are very quick to take them down – especially after elections, as we recently saw in Egypt and Azerbaijan.

Electoral turnover is also critical for democracy: It counters corruption, facilitates needed corrections in public policies, and expands both popular and elite investment in the democratic rules of the game (Grzymala-Busse 2007). In the post-communist region, for instance, the ideal trajectory for democracy has been one in which there has been a succession of coal-...
tions winning power, beginning with the victory of the liberal opposition (which in every case made a sharp break with communism), followed by the empowerment of the former communists and then, in some cases, populists. If winners know they can lose and losers know they can win (to borrow from Adam Przeworski), the democratic experiment is increasingly viewed by both citizens and elites as inclusive and permanent. It falls to elections, we must remember, to communicate this fundamental lesson.

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But what about the endogeneity problem, noted earlier? The issue here is that this is sometimes a problem for assessing the impact of elections, but sometimes not. Endogeneity, in short, can be situational. Many elections, especially in more established democracies, merely provide an efficient summary of political and economic developments that have taken place in the preceding years. As a result, it is hard to treat such elections as stand-alone contributions to democracy. However, even in this context, elections can have powerful effects on the quality of democracy and domestic and foreign policy. As specialists in elections would observe, how elections are conducted – for example, the quality of campaigns and the structure and size of political turnout – can “massage the data” provided by previous trends in public policies, public opinion, and party identification. Moreover, some elections, whether understood as processes or outcomes, can have dramatic consequences that are hard to reduce to structural considerations. Here, one example drawn from the United States is illustrative. The contested 2000 election did not just speak directly to the quality of American democracy (with the Russian Duma, for example, voting to send election monitors!); it was also responsible for the decision to invade Iraq.

In newer democracies and in hybrid regimes, the case for elections as sometimes transformative events is even easier to make. Here, we can note at the outset the importance of founding elections, especially when they create sizeable mandates for the democratic opposition. However, subsequent elections can be energizing events that, especially in settings where democracy and authoritarianism both share and contest the political stage, can have the effect of expanding substantially the size of the electorate through ambitious campaigns, large-scale voter registration and turnout drives, and extensive external and internal election-monitoring. Such elections increase political competition and thereby invigorate oppositions and public debates, and they have the additional effect of expanding citizen engagement in democratic politics and encouraging citizens to be optimistic about opportunities for democratic change and their role in making such changes happen. At the same time, the outcomes of these elections can be very important. They can empower new leaders with new political coalitions who can use their mandates to build democratic institutions and introduce needed changes in foreign and domestic policies.

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It could be countered, of course, that such elections play a pivotal role simply because they are sites for registering longer-term developments, such as weakening authoritarian rule as a result of declining economic performance and defections from the ruling circle. These developments, no doubt, play a role, but their impact is limited by several important considerations. One is that the most common outcome of the fall of dictatorships is the establishment of new dictatorships. Another is that these elections often take place in a climate where, while citizens have become increasingly unhappy with the incumbent regime, they are also dissatisfied with the opposition – which they see as both incompetent and corrupt. This,
along with the tools available to incumbent regimes (whether more or less authoritarian) to shape electoral outcomes, carries a clear implication. Elections have their work cut out for them if they are to function as mechanisms of democratic change. Finally, the pivotal elections Sharon Wolchik and I have been analyzing in our study were very close, with the decisive factor the mobilization of new voters in response to the opposition’s ability, distinctive to these elections in particular, to run sophisticated country-wide campaigns and voter registration and turnout drives. Moreover, without these electoral innovations, citizens would not have been willing and able to take to the streets to defend their votes.

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For all these reasons, therefore, I have become quite skeptical of those who minimize the importance of elections in democratic development.

Moreover, because elections are so influential, but to varying degrees and in various ways as a result of their distinctive capacity to bridge structure, agency, and process, I have also become more skeptical about the value of debating the superiority of each of these explanatory approaches.

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Transplanting Institutions

Introduction

For more than a century, reformers have tried to transplant institutions. The kinds of institutions that have been transplanted are numerous and varied – regimes, constitutions, electoral laws, central bank independence, party organizations, accounting standards, financial regulations, commercial regulations, environmental regulations, health and safety regulations, military codes, judicial procedures, and entire legal systems. Sometimes transplanted institutions fail miserably and are rejected. Often they last, but work differently in a foreign context. And sometimes – rarely, we expect – they succeed, functioning pretty much as intended. Under which conditions do these transplants succeed or fail? Does success depend upon whether the transplant was imposed by outsiders or willingly adopted by domestic actors? On the similarity of economic and social structures of the state that originated the institution and those of the transplant country? On the power of domestic political actors with a vested interest in the old institution? On cultural congruence? On how different the transplanted institution is from the one it displaces? On the breadth of mass support for the transplanted institution?

Although there is not likely to be a universal recipe that would make it possible to transplant any institution in any new place, we think it is probably possible to identify guidelines for understanding which kinds of institutions can be transplanted successfully, which are doomed to fail, and which settings tend to lead to each outcome.

Some major transplantation efforts to share their insights into the conditions that led to the success or failure of transplant projects.

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Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton begin the symposium by analyzing the most fundamental of all institutions – constitutions. Drawing on their ambitious compilation of detailed information about all constitutional provisions since 1789, they argue there have been startlingly few attempts to transplant constitutions wholesale in the situations in which one would most expect such transplants: during military occupations. However, they leave open the possibility that specific constitutional provisions have been imposed more frequently and with greater success. Next, Juliet Johnson reports on her study of the diffusion of central bank independence to post-communist countries. She finds that assessing the prospects of success and failure first requires distinguishing among three phases of the transplantation process, each of which is driven by different factors. Post-communist countries had great success in choosing to adopt central bank independence, due to powerful international pressures; significant success in transforming their own institutions, thanks to the persistent and skilled efforts of the Transnational Central Banking Community; but only limited success in embedding these reforms once they encountered resistance from domestic politicians and economic conditions. In the final essay, Steven Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Mitchell Seligson, and C. Neal Tate summarize their work evaluating the programs of the US Agency for International Development to promote “democratic governance” across the world. Using cutting-edge statistical methods, they show that these programs have had a modest but statistically significant positive impact. There are exceptions – most notoriously, Iraq – but on average the results appear to be real.

Taken together, the three essays suggest that institutional transplants are most likely to take hold when specific institutions are targeted, transplantation efforts are sustained, and domestic actors are receptive. However, more research will be required to specify more precisely which conditions are most favorable for the transplantation of which sorts of institutions.
Military Occupations and their Constitutional Residue

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In February of 1946, General Douglas MacArthur gave members of his staff a week to produce a draft of a new Japanese constitution. That draft formed the core of a constitution that has stood, formally unchanged, for 62 years and counting. The Japanese case suggests that occupiers can alter the institutional course of the host country, perhaps for generations. But we know very little about constitutions written under such unusual circumstances. Given foreign control, one might expect that occupation constitutions are direct transplants, perhaps lifted from the occupier’s own constitution. After all, even in ordinary times, drafters of constitutions borrow foreign ideas (and sometimes whole clauses, typographical errors and all) from abroad. 2 In this essay we report some findings from an investigation of the incidence, content, and durability of constitutions written under foreign military occupation. The focus on this particular species of constitution is part of a much larger project in which we are identifying, collecting, and analyzing written constitutions since 1789. 3 Occupation constitutions represent a small minority (roughly 5%) of constitutions since 1789, but knowing something about their structure and fate is illuminating, particularly with respect to states like current-day Iraq and Afghanistan, whose institutional future is widely discussed and debated. The Japanese case, as we shall see, is not at all typical of such cases.

Do Occupations Typically Result in Constitutional Replacement?

It seems obvious that occupiers would oversee a revision of host constitutions. Military occupations presumably arise from irreconcilable differences between states, some of which are likely to be political. But even if political change is not among the original motives for the conflict and its resulting occupation, it is likely to be part of the solution for occupiers intent on setting their host state on a new domestic and foreign policy course. Constitutions are often commissioned to serve such highly symbolic purposes. New documents signal a clean slate, allowing occupiers to mark publicly the birth of a new political order and to rally potentially resistant citizens around it. Citizens of the occupied state are often left without much choice, even if attachment to the old order is strong. In the Japanese case, for example, most elites after the war were reluctant to let go of the Meiji constitution, let alone replace it with a foreign transplant. Indeed, their hopeful reading of the rather vague Potsdam agreement was that constitutional revision was not necessary (Moore and Robinson 2002: 51). MacArthur squashed that hope but, nonetheless, some Japanese remained comforted by the possibility that any new document could be replaced or dramatically amended after the “guests” left. The irony of that hope, of course, is that the Japanese constitution holds the record – among constitutions currently in-force – for the longest stretch of time without a formal amendment.

What does the history of military occupation tell us about the probability that occupiers will remake host constitutions? We have identified 107 instances of military occupation since 1789. 4 We can compare these episodes of occupation to our chronology of constitutional revision for the countries in question. If we call “occupation constitutions” those documents that were written during and immediately after occupation (within two years), we observe twenty-six occupations that resulted in forty-two constitutions (some occupiers, like the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, oversaw multiple constitutions during their stay). 5 42 constitutions resulting from 26 of the 107 occupations is not a paltry output by any means, especially if we consider that only 800 constitutions or so have been produced worldwide since 1789. However, it does mean that a sizable majority of occupations do not result in new constitutions. Moreover, twelve of the 42 cases we identified as occupation constitutions occurred in the two-year window following occupation, and thus may not necessarily have been associated with the occupation after all. Further research should certainly delve into which kind of occupations (and occupiers) tend to produce new constitutions. Suffice it to say for now that constitutional replacement is not an automatic part of the script of occupying states.

Do Occupiers Transplant Their Own Institutions?

When new constitutions are commis-
tioned by the occupier (or, requested by the newly empowered group of hosts), it seems likely that the constitution of the occupying state would serve as a highly relevant model. Presumably, the occupiers think highly enough of their own institutions to see them replicated elsewhere, notwithstanding the need for adapting them to their new context. Some imitation of the occupier’s charter seems probable even if design is left to domestic actors, who are likely to be handpicked by the occupiers or at least interested in appeasing them. Aside from any ideological or instrumental inclination for transplantation on the part of the hosts, it is quite possible that informational constraints propel them in this direction (Weyland 2005). World powers, understandably, are well represented among the historical list of occupiers and the constitutions of such powers are likely to be among the most prominent and available models for off-the-shelf adoption. Of course, the exalted stature of these powers might render their constitutions less attractive, as smaller, perhaps fledgling states might view the models of world powers as inappropriate or irrelevant to their own needs. Indeed, such a pattern is evident in the case with the United States, whose constitution was widely copied (especially in Latin America) in the 1800s, but which has become less and less influential since then.

Our data allow us to test the possibility of occupational inheritance in rather comprehensive fashion. Our approach is to estimate the similarity between each constitution in the year of its adoption and all the contemporary and historical constitutions that may have served as models, including previous constitutions from the host country. Thus, for example, the Japanese constitution of 1946 can be compared with all 74 constitutions then in force, as well as the 346 constitutions that had been adopted in the world since 1789. Among such dyads we should expect occupation dyads (the host constitution and that of the occupier) to have a higher similarity score than that of the average constitutional dyad, ideally controlling for a set of other factors that would predict similarity.8

The similarity scores for the constitutional dyads exhibit a modest convergence effect, albeit with a fair amount of dispersion, when compared with the larger sample. Across 29 of the 42 occupational dyads for which we have data, the average similarity score is 0.75, ranging from 0.58 (Afghanistan (2004) and its occupier the United States (1789)) to 0.88 (Albania (1939) and its occupier Italy (1848)).8 Other occupation dyads with high similarity scores include Poland (1952) and its occupier the Soviet Union (1936) at 0.82, Laos (1991) and its occupier Vietnam (1980) at 0.79, and Lithuania (1938) and its occupier Germany (1919) at 0.79. Most of the similarity scores for the eight cases in the data (of a total of fourteen) in which the United States played the role of occupier are considerably lower than the non-occupation average of 0.70. The exceptions are Japan 1946 (0.73), Germany 1919, (0.74), and the Dominican Republic 1924 (0.76). Sadly, we do not yet have data on the 1918 constitution of Haiti, which a young Franklin Delano Roosevelt allegedly claimed to have written while serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the US occupation.9 Turning towards another superpower and frequent occupier, we see that the record of the Soviet Union is also not one of constitution imposition. Except for Poland 1952 (0.82) and its predecessor, Poland 1947 (0.75), the constitutions of Soviet-occupied states are not especially similar to that of their occupier. A good, or at least intriguing, comparison is Afghanistan. While the United States-Afghanistan (2004) dyad marks the extreme with respect to dissimilarity (0.58), the
Soviet-Afghanistan (1987) dyad also exhibits below-average similarity (0.67).

Thus, on average, the constitutions of occupied states seem to inherit little from their occupier. This surprises us. Equally surprising is the degree of continuity between the occupied state's previous constitution and the occupation product. Generally, constitutional revisions compare with their predecessor by a score of 0.81. With occupation constitutions, this score averages only a tad below this at 0.80 and ranges from 0.62 (Hungary 1949 and 1946) to 0.97 (Dominican Republic 1924 and 1908) across twenty-two occupation constitutions. The Japanese case is telling. While MacArthur's staff undoubtedly had a heavy hand in crafting the Japanese charter, their product bears striking similarity to the Meiji constitution of 1889 (0.81). Indeed, of the 62 constitutions in force at the time of drafting for which we have data (out of a universe of 74), the Meiji constitution is the eighth most similar. This is a startling reminder that, while externally imposed, the Japanese constitution of 1946 bears a distinctively domestic stamp. And, as the distribution of scores suggests, the Japanese case is not unique. To return to the Afghan cases of 1987 and 2004, both constitutions – supervised by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively – were quite similar to their home-grown predecessor (0.82 and 0.80, respectively).

Taken together, these results suggest that occupiers neither impose their own institutions nor disturb terribly the institutional trajectory of the occupied state. Nonetheless, it is evident that the average effects obscure some interesting variation in both of these senses – variation that merits further scrutiny. Moreover, occupations may have more targeted, but consequential, effects on the occupied state's constitution. We speculate about some such effects in our discussion below.

How Long Do Occupation Constitutions Last?

Who would have thought that a Japanese constitution promulgated at gunpoint and, in part, crafted by a group of American military officers in 1946 would still be in effect (not to mention formally unchanged) in 2008? After all, the life expectancy of constitutions – regardless of how they are produced – is roughly seventeen years. For any number of reasons, one would expect transplanted institutions to be more vulnerable. This would seem to be especially so for constitutions, wrapped up as they are with national identity. Surely, the Japanese case must be exceptional in its longevity.

Indeed, it is. At thirteen years, the expected lifespan of occupation constitutions is shorter than that of other constitutions. Moreover, this life expectancy may even be an overestimate as it includes the years that constitutions were in effect under the protection of the occupier.

Conclusion and Discussion

An exploration of the incidence, content, and stability of occupation constitutions suggests that the occupier’s effect on their host’s core institutions is fairly modest. To summarize: (1) only one quarter of occupations actually result in new constitutions; (2) those constitutions that are produced are, as we might expect, short lived; (3) contrary to our expectations, occupation constitutions bear only a slightly resemblance to the constitution of the occupying country and more closely a far greater resemblance to their own prior laws. Nonetheless, it is stable balance between domestic interests in Japan. Whatever the case, the document’s durability is fairly exceptional. Several other post-WWII constitutions have also proved comparatively resilient (e.g., Austria and Italy) as well as several constitutions resulting from situations of occupation in Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries (Mexico’s constitution of 1867 and Paraguay’s of 1870).

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possible that this analysis misses more subtle, but still consequential, effects of occupation. In particular, it could be that the occupier’s alterations are more targeted, leaving alone the basic structure of governance but tweaking a particularly critical provision. We see this to some extent in each of the cases that we have examined in any detail. In the Japanese case, for example, the “peace clause” (Article 9) represents a key United States demand for military demobilization. In other cases, we see that occupiers have implanted provisions in constitutions that guarantee the occupier’s material interest in trade or investment. The provisions for treaty approval in the Iraqi constitution, which are conducive to oil agreements with the United States, are critical in this sense. Similarly, FDR’s 1918 Haitian constitution eased land holding rights for foreigners, an opening that would allow American investors to acquire lands for highly anticipated agriculture ventures (Schmidt 1995: 111). Perhaps, these more targeted impositions make sense from an occupier’s strategic perspective. Given the long odds of transplants’ surviving, insisting on a limited number of crucial principles or provisions might very well maximize their impact. In his instructions to his staff, General MacArthur had scribbled three requirements for the new Japanese constitution in a short memo, among them military demobilization. Certainly, the product of that limited approach has endured.

Notes

1 We thank the editors, Michael Coppedge and Anthony Messina, for their helpful comments.

2 Elkins is completing a manuscript that describes the global spread of constitutional ideas under more voluntary circumstances in addition to the more coercive context we describe here.

3 The Comparative Constitutions Project. For details, see the project website at comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.

4 We limit ourselves to cases of foreign military occupation in which a sovereign state is occupied by one or more other states, thus excluding cases of colonialism and occupation by multinational forces.

5 We include here only “replacements,” and not amendments, of constitutions. This is sometimes a blurred distinction. We reserve the term amendment for those changes in which drafters follow the amendment process of the old constitution and call replacements those changes in which they work from scratch. In practice, we do not always know the details of the adoption process and, in such cases, we go by what historians and constitutional scholars identify as a new, or replaced, constitution.

6 For cases in which multiple states occupied another, we select only that dyad that includes the primary occupier.

7 Not counting comparisons of constitutions within states, whose similarity can reach 0.99 in places.

8 Again, years represent the date of the constitution’s promulgation.

9 Hans Schmidt (1995: 111) suggests that there is little basis for FDR’s claim (allegedly made during his first presidential campaign) and credits the Office of the Solicitor in the State Department for most of the drafting.

10 But even this small effect may be spurious since the occupier’s constitution might be more influential for reasons other than its political domin-

References


Transplanting Institutions: Central Bank Independence in the Post-Communist World

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Transplantation – also known as diffusion – denotes the spread of ideas, institutions, or innovations from one geographic area to another. While political scientists have long studied such transplantation processes, interest in them reached new heights after the collapse of communism in East Europe and the former Soviet Union.1 My own contribution to these efforts is a nearly completed book on the establishment of independent central banks in the post-communist world, provisionally entitled Priests of Prosperity: The Transnational Central Banking Community and Post-Communist Transformation.

One key lesson I have drawn from this research is the importance of temporally unpacking the transplantation process in order to understand what “success” and “failure” mean in practice. Comparative research on central bank independence (CBI) has been particularly lax on this score [...]”

As I discuss below, each stage also has different requisites for success. In fact, rapid success in one stage can sometimes undermine success in a subsequent one. While near-ideal conditions existed for successfully encouraging post-communist governments to choose CBI and for transforming post-communist central banks internally, this was decidedly not the case for the crucial embedding stage. Instead, many post-communist governments subsequently attempted to undermine their independent central banks, even in “model” reform states such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

The Reform Effort

The reform effort aimed to create independent central banks focused on maintaining price stability in post-communist countries, a potentially overwhelming challenge. Central banks in command and market economies differed in almost every substantive way. Command-oriented central banks were designed for administrative and accounting purposes. They were subordinate to the government and disbursed state funds to enterprises and individuals. They had little or no control over monetary policy; indeed, the phrase “monetary policy” held no practical meaning. Post-communist states faced the daunting task of completely reshaping – and in several cases creating from scratch – central banks capable of controlling inflation, managing payments systems, and regulating unruly new commercial banks. Maintaining central bank independence and price stability, rather than distribution and employment, would need to become the driving professional principles behind post-communist central bankers’ work.

By the time the Berlin Wall fell, central bankers in the advanced industrial democracies had effectively coalesced into a transnational central banking community (TCBC). This community became the key international force promoting CBI in the post-communist world. The TCBC’s
core institutional members were the national central banks (such as the Bank of England and the Bundesbank), the Bank for International Settlements, the European Monetary Institute and its successor the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund department that specialized in central banking. In the waning days of the Soviet bloc, the TCBC set out to help the post-communist countries create central banks molded in its own image: independent, technocratic, respected anti-inflation warriors. It devoted millions of dollars and extensive human resources to targeted training and technical assistance programs. Experienced central bankers integrated their new post-communist colleagues into their community, persuaded them to adopt prevailing central banking mindsets, and led hands-on efforts to help them develop modern tools of central banking.

**Did the Reforms Succeed?**

The question – and answer – is more complicated that it may first appear, as the definition of success varies by the definer and by the transplantation stage. If we define success on the TCBC’s terms, the reforms achieved near-total success in the first stage, significant success in the second, and far less success in the third.

In the choice stage, success meant building a strong base of domestic support for the independent central bank as well as achieving and maintaining macroeconomic stability. As the central bankers became better trained, more experienced, and more capable technically, one might have expected their credibility and support among domestic politicians to grow. Instead, in many cases the opposite happened. Post-communist politicians began regularly attacking their central banks, challenging (and often effectively undermining) the central banks’ independence. Moreover, most post-communist countries experienced currency and/or banking crises, and research revealed that formal central bank independence was typically unrelated to inflation levels in post-communist states (Cukierman et al. 2002, Brada and Kutan 2002).

**Explaining the Outcomes**

The outcomes differed at each stage because each has different requisites for achieving success. While systemic conditions, the active efforts of international actors, and domestic political and economic factors play important roles in all three stages, I argue that each factor respectively plays the dominant role in successive stages. This has important implications for the final results of the transplantation process.

**The Choice Stage**

Systemic conditions primarily determine a government’s initial decision about whether to adopt a foreign institution. The two key elements are crisis and international legitimacy. The deeper and more fundamental the crisis in the prospective borrower state, the more likely the government is to approve a wholesale transplant of foreign institutions rapidly and without extensive domestic debate. Likewise, the more perceived international legitimacy possessed by a particular foreign institution, the more likely the prospective borrower state is to adopt it. In the post-communist world, adopting CBI legislation strongly fulfilled both systemic conditions.

In terms of crisis, post-communist leaders recognized that their states were experiencing widespread policy failures, particularly in the economic sphere, and were therefore unusually open to seeking out alternatives. Command-era central banks clearly needed new mandates and capabilities to function within the chaotic yet increasingly market-oriented environment.

In terms of legitimacy, an international consensus emerged among the advanced industrial democracies in the late 1980s on the desirability of formally insulating monetary authori-
ties from government pressures that might jeopardize price stability. CBI's high international legitimacy led post-communist governments to view politically independent central banks as markers of sovereignty and guarantors of international resource flows. This does not mean that introducing CBI was necessarily a bad idea, but in doing so governments conformed to international expectations rather than responded to specific domestic demands (Marcussen 2005; McNamara 2002).

**The Transformation Stage**

Quickly transforming a complex organization to reflect a foreign model requires active international assistance. Success depends primarily on four factors: the assistance providers' access to the target organization, the consistency and intensity of their efforts, and the incentives they can offer to officials in the target organization to follow their advice. Although Western governments, academic experts, international institutions, and NGOs clamored to advise post-communist states on subjects ranging from party building to privatization to rediscovering religion, the TCBC had unparalleled advantages on all four measures in its campaign to transform central banking.

As Iain Johnston (2001, 492) observes, many scholars wrongly "assume that agents at the systemic level have relatively unobstructed access to states and substate actors from which to diffuse new normative understandings." Access is a necessary condition for rapid transformation. The TCBC had regular access to post-communist central bankers in all but the most politically closed post-communist states.

The TCBC also possessed unifying principles and an organizational infrastructure ensuring that its members presented relatively consistent, coordinated advice. The TCBC promoted two main principles: price stability and political independence. The TCBC also developed an elaborate infrastructure for coordinating and disseminating its ideas and practices, including specialized training centers and regular meetings bringing together donor and recipient assistance coordinators.

Furthermore, the TCBC had the strong motives and extensive means necessary to mount an intensive transformation campaign. The TCBC realized that once post-communist states began to open their economies, they could affect the stability of the international financial system. On a more abstract level, the TCBC wanted to expand its worldwide intellectual influence and reinforce its shared culture. The TCBC used its deep financial and human resources to carry out its assistance efforts. Perhaps most intriguingly, with the rise of the European Central Bank, many West European central banks found themselves overstaffed for their diminished roles; training and technical assistance provided a fruitful new pursuit for many.

Finally, the TCBC provided strong material and ideational incentives for post-communist central bankers to accept its principles and practices. It promised them political independence, control over their budgets, better salaries, and higher status. It treated them as knowledgeable professionals, and offered them international travel, training, and membership in an influential, cohesive transnational community. The nature of central banks (particularly their relatively small, spatially centralized, and highly educated staffs) eased the way as well. As a result, most post-communist central bankers embraced the transformation process.

**The Embedding Stage**

Domestic political and economic conditions come to the fore in the embedding stage. Success in building domestic support requires that, at minimum, most government leaders agree with the general mission of the transformed institution, even when they may occasionally disagree with its particular actions. This condition often did not hold for central banks in the post-communist world, for three reasons. First, as time went on post-communist politicians came to better understand the economic and political trade-offs involved in conservative monetary policy and strict financial supervision. Some politicians, particularly but not uniformly on the left, found CBI too constraining to suit their policy goals. In addition, as former Soviet republics such as Russia and Kyrgyzstan became less democratic over time, their political leaders had less interest in supporting an autonomous government institution championed by foreign democratic states.

Second, post-communist central bankers' new tools often faltered in the unstable transitional economies. Ironically, in this regard the very success of central bank transformation hindered CBI's sustainability. The pace of central bank transformation had outstripped that of most other government and economic institutions. Facing shallow financial markets, weak tax bases, and corrupt and/or inexperienced judiciaries, post-communist central bankers' monetary signals were often ineffective and other government agencies were simply unable to provide the necessary fiscal and judicial support for central bank policies. Yet the central banks' political independence and stability mandates made them perfect scapegoats for governments that could blame them for the many resulting financial crises, thus undermining the central banks' broader
domestic legitimacy and credibility. Perhaps most importantly, a two-track diffusion process characterized post-communist central banking: intensive but narrow TCBC-oriented socialization within the central banks themselves, paralleled by a shallower process among other domestic actors driven primarily by external incentives (Johnson 2006). Many post-communist leaders never accepted that CBI had intrinsic value in the first place. Rather, they legalized this institution in time of crisis because of other powerful incentives, including the promise of monetary sovereignty, international investment, and membership in desirable international organizations. Where these incentives later weakened—either because sovereignty, funds, and membership had been obtained, or because governments ceased to care about them—government support for CBI also waned. On the other hand, during the transformation stage the TCBC socialized the post-communist central banks to believe in CBI and price stability as intrinsically valuable. As a result, post-communist central bankers grew to have more in common with central bankers abroad than with other political and economic actors in their own countries.

This two-track diffusion process led to increased conflict among post-communist central bankers and governments, further undermining the efficacy of central bank policies. Central banks, no matter how capable, cannot achieve macroeconomic stability without the cooperation of their governments, especially in fiscal policy. Success in the choice and transformation stages had again jeopardized further progress in the embedding stage. Such difficulties ultimately engendered internally Western-style central banks that often become progressively isolated and impotent domestically, particularly in the former Soviet Union.

Transplant Shock

Transplanted institutions rarely come through intact, even under the best of circumstances. This analysis of post-communist central banking shows an important reason why: it is a multi-stage process that too many would-be transplanters treat as a single event. Encouraging a government to adopt a new institution, directing the transformation of existing structures, and embedding the new institution within society each require different conditions and tools. Not only is each stage typically difficult to work through, but, as this research reveals, under certain circumstances early successes can actually derail later ones.

Notes


References


Watering, not Transplanting: The Case for Democracy Assistance

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Can institutions be transplanted? At the purely formal level, the question seems trivial: institutions have traveled – via diffusion or imposition – across politics for centuries. The key question, however, lies at a deeper level: do the behavioral effects of formal rules travel equally well across political systems?

In behavioral terms, institutions are reinvented every time they are transplanted. New actors decode the rules in a new setting, creating a coalition or a critical mass of local players that interpret norms in a particular way. (For instance, a stop sign means “stop” for a driver in Pittsburgh but it means “yield” for a driver in Buenos Aires.) Because rules solve coordination problems, violating the interpretation held by a dominant coalition may be dangerous. Formal institutions only have similar consequences when dominant behavioral coalitions embrace equivalent interpretations of the rules in each local setting.

The establishment of democracy constitutes a major historical example of this process. For example, Latin American countries adopted republican institutions in the early nineteenth century, before many European counterparts, and yet they took longer in establishing viable democracies. Rulers in Latin America often celebrated elections and kept legislatures open, but those regimes were highly unstable (Przeworski 2009). Formal republican procedures did not ensure that dominant coalitions in Latin America embraced effective competition and respect for civil liberties until the second half of the twentieth century. Similarly, in other parts of the world contemporary authoritarian leaders now distort republican procedures to create a façade for nondemocratic politics.

The adoption of particular institutions (elections, legislatures, universal suffrage, and so on) is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the establishment of democracy. What is also needed is a behavioral coalition willing to embrace a liberal interpretation of the formal rules in each country. Such logic appears to be compatible with the numerous activities undertaken in recent decades by agencies in the US and elsewhere that are involved in international democracy assistance: while some programs from international donors focus on institutional design, electoral rules, and so forth, a far greater number focus on empowering agents – individual citizens, politicians, elected officials, NGOs, judges and political parties – that struggle for democratic change in the domestic arena. The problem in the field is not how to transplant democratic institutions, but how to water their roots.

But, are such efforts at democracy assistance likely to achieve their intended goals? Can international donors really empower the local actors willing to embrace a progressive democratization agenda? And will such empowerment transform the dominant behavioral coalition to the extent of having an impact on aggregate levels of political rights and civil liberties for the whole country? Our answer to those questions, based on the results of a four-year study undertaken to evaluate the global impact of all USAID democracy assistance programs from 1990-2004, is a qualified “yes”.

Beginning in 2004, our research team at the University of Pittsburgh and Vanderbilt University conducted analyses of the effects of US foreign assistance on democracy world-wide during the post-Cold War period (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007; Finkel et al. 2008). The project was conducted as an independent study in the context of the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, a comprehensive effort by the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Our results indicated that democracy assistance has a moderate but significant positive impact on levels of democracy, that this kind of investment has a stronger impact at lower levels of human development, in contexts of political instability, and in ethnically divided societies, and...
that democracy programs have a smaller (and statistically insignificant) impact in countries that constitute geo-strategic priorities for the United States.

**Findings of the World-Wide Study**

Our dataset covered 165 countries between 1990 and 2004. We relied on an original database reporting 44,958 activities conducted by all USAID sectors. Each entry in the database reported the purpose of the activity, the total amount appropriated for the project, and the recipient country. We aggregated the data at the country-level to assess the impact of USAID Democracy and Governance programs (USAID DG) on aggregate levels of democracy. USAID DG assistance was measured as appropriated funds in constant 2000 dollars, both as an aggregated total for each country, and also broken down into four main areas: 1) Elections and Political Process; 2) Rule of Law; 3) Civil Society; and 4) Governance. A fifth category covering regional and sub-regional programs was also included.

The main indicator of democracy used in the study was the Freedom House index, but we replicated the results using the Polity IV index and some composite measures of specific democratic dimensions (free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, an independent civil society, and effective governance).

Following the democratization literature, our study incorporated several control variables, including total investment in other USAID programs, US military assistance, bilateral non-US foreign assistance, the country’s level of economic development, economic growth, social conflict, state failure, democratic diffusion, years of prior democracy, population, income inequality, the size of the country, ethnic fractionalization, and human development. Some models also included indicators of political culture based on survey data (institutional trust, personal satisfaction, and social engagement), plus measures of constitutional rights, threats to the ruling elite, and the role of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The dataset included time-varying and time-invariant (i.e., country-level) covariates. We employed a hierarchical growth model to predict each country’s level of democracy as a function of a latent democratization trend, unique to each country, plus our battery of predictors and controls.

Our initial findings indicated that democracy assistance increases national levels of democracy among recipient countries by a small but significant amount. We also found that this impact was stronger in a sample covering 1990-2003 than in a sample including data for 2004. Further analysis using a “jackknife” procedure indicated that this difference was explained by the unusually high level of USAID DG investment in Iraq in 2004, because the extreme levels of democracy assistance (approximately 31% of all US democracy assistance) was not accompanied by an equivalent positive change in democracy scores. Once the “Iraq effect” was controlled for (using a dummy for this observation), democracy assistance had a positive impact such that $10 million of USAID DG funding would produce an increase of more than one-quarter of a point (.29 units) on the 13-point Freedom House democracy index in a given year. Although apparently small, this effect represents a five-fold increase in the amount of democratic change that the average country would be otherwise expected to achieve, ceteris paribus, in any given year.

The analysis of conditional coefficients indicated that the marginal effect of a million dollars invested in democracy is greater in countries that are in greater need of external assistance: countries that are poorer, socially divided, and suffer from lower levels of human capital. As shown in Figure 1, above a certain level of development – roughly HDI levels achieved by Brazil or Tuvalu – the effect of USAID DG is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Democracy assistance also makes a stronger contribution under conditions of state failure. Although this may be surprising, given the uncertain conditions that prevail in failed states, related analyses tend to support this insight.

By contrast, democracy assistance is less effective in countries that receive a substantial percentage of US military assistance. In Figure 1, the coefficient for USAID DG is insignificant for any country receiving more than 1.1 percent of the total US military assistance in any given year. This pattern explains the “Iraq Effect”
described above. Because Iraq represented a foreign policy priority mainly for security reasons in 2004 (it received 23 percent of all military assistance in 2004, vis-à-vis 0.6 percent for the average eligible country) and it was also the largest recipient of democracy assistance (31 percent of all USAID DG funds spent in 2004), the overall impact of USAID DG was depressed when compared to a model including data for 1990-2003. In fact, once we allowed the effect of USAID DG to be conditional on US military assistance, the impact of the Iraq 2004 dummy lost its statistical significance, indicating that Iraq was an extreme manifestation of a more general pattern by which democracy assistance is less powerful when the overall policy towards the recipient country is driven by security concerns.

Our analysis also found that democracy assistance is less effective when investment is unstable, that is when funds allocated to the recipient country vary considerably from one year to the next. The findings suggest that in about half of the recipient countries the level of uncertainty in democracy investment may be high enough to compromise its impact. In addition, our analysis showed the democracy assistance is more effective when surveys reveal a political culture in which citizens are more trusting, satisfied and engaged.

Reverse Causality, Long-Term Effects, and Sub-Sectors

We devoted much attention to the potential problem of the endogeneity of USAID DG assistance, that is, the possibilities that either unobserved variables were causing both funding allocations and democratic outcomes, thus producing a spurious relationship between the two, or that funding allocations were the direct effect (and not the cause) of the democratization process. In order to deal with this potential problem, we employed a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) design. We instrumented USAID DG using all exogenous time-varying covariates, along with a measure of inflation and a measure of State Department priorities (the number of times that a Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State was mentioned in relation to a particular country by the New York Times in a given year). The effect of USAID DG remained consistent in models addressing the problem of endogeneity. These additional tests make it far more likely that the initial findings are valid, and that democracy assistance does, indeed, produce a positive impact on democratization in recipient countries.

Our study also probed the long-term impact of USAID DG assistance within the context of a dynamic model that included the lagged Freedom House score as an additional independent variable (we employed the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments procedure to handle the statistical problems inherent in these kinds of models). We found that that democracy assistance may take time to work. In this model, the immediate impact of USAID DG assistance on
Freedom House is estimated to be .020, so that a one-million dollar investment changes Freedom House scores by .020 units. If the million dollar investment was continued in the next year, the **two-term cumulative multiplier** effect would be .033. Continuing these calculations for a persistent one-million dollar investment over five years yields a cumulative impact of .050 on the Freedom House scale. The long-run effects of a permanent one-million dollar investment in USAID DG investment are thus quite a bit higher than in the baseline model described in the previous section. A permanent (or relatively long-term) ten million dollar investment is predicted to have a cumulative (equilibrium) impact of over one-half of a point on the Freedom House scale.

The report also explored other issues, such as the impact of sub-sectoral investment in the areas of Elections, Rule of Law (and human rights in particular), Civil Society (and free media in particular), and Governance on different dimensions of democracy. The results show that USAID civil society and media assistance have a significant positive impact, investment in elections and political parties is beneficial for the quality of elections, and investment in governance programs impacts the quality of governance, though the latter effect is relatively small in magnitude. The main anomaly in our study was investment in human rights programs, which shows a negative correlation with human rights outcomes. We tested alternative explanations for this anomalous finding, but the puzzle remains.

The establishment of elections, parliaments, and political parties is therefore necessary but not sufficient for the development of democracy. The good news is that international donors can support and empower behavioral coalitions willing to make democracy work. Our evidence indicates that USAID democracy investment has had a positive impact on democratization under many conditions — but not always. Shifts in where, when, and how USAID spends its democracy assistance, and shifting trends in democracy worldwide could make the assistance more or less effective in the future. Yet, the analysis of fifteen years of data provide a robust basis for concluding that democracy assistance in the post-Cold War period has worked.

**Notes**

1. Michael Bratton, Michael Coppendge, Mark Hallerberg, and Pamela Paxton participated as part of an independent Expert Advisory Panel at different stages of the project. We are indebted to them for their comments, suggestions, and criticism.

2. We also controlled for democracy assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy, and for total US development assistance not channeled through USAID or NED.

3. The reports, replication datasets, and more details about the statistical procedures used in the project are available at http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html

4. This figure is nearly identical to the value estimated for 1990-2003, i.e., the period before the Iraq War (see Finkel et al. 2007, p. 422).

5. For more on recent trends in USAID and other international donor assistance programs, see the recent reports in Azpuru et al. (2008) and Youngs (2008).

**References**


When the Field Is Home: Conducting Research in One’s Country of Origin

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When I attended the Institute on Qualitative Research Methods (IQRM) in preparation for my fieldwork in Germany, I discovered that my plans to “go home” to conduct research were by no means unique. In fact, it seemed that most international graduate students had selected their country of origin as at least one of their dissertation case studies. In conversation with them and after reviewing the literature on field research, it became clear that there was very little advice to be found for our situation — overwhelmingly the literature assumes that the most difficult part about being in the field is the foreignness of the researcher. So what about the problems confronted by those of us who are familiar with our research site?

I have subsequently conducted both in-depth interviews with scholars who have returned from their field research at home and an online survey targeting international graduate students (IGSs) of Political Science in the United States. Of the 127 individuals who completed the survey, 51% were male and 48% were female, and their age ranged from 22 to 64 years, though the vast majority (89%) were between 25 and 35 years old. My goal was to assess how widespread “going home” actually is, and where the benefits and pitfalls of this choice lie. This article presents selected results about the advantages and disadvantages of the “indigenous researcher.”

Field research is extremely popular among IGSs: 69% of IGSs are planning to or have already conducted field research. Of these, 62% go “home” to conduct research. Despite the fact that the home country choice is quite common (and indeed, many American scholars study the United States), there seems to be a stigma attached to it. As the authors of Overseas Research write: “Having raised the issue of insider research, we should note it often carries less status professionally. Many grant-makers will not fund research in the country of origin […]. Furthermore, some potential employers, especially academic departments, look down upon those who return to their native lands for research as if they somehow lacked the courage to step away from the familiar” (Barrett and Cason 1997).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Region</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa &amp; Middle East</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central &amp; South America</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (incl. Russia &amp; Turkey)</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>32</td>
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Advantages of Fieldwork at Home

True, travelling to a familiar place to study politics offers clear advantages. One of the most significant benefits seems to be linguistic – 94% speak the relevant language(s) fluently. The vast majority of survey respondents (96%) also say they are familiar with the home country culture, understand cultural subtleties (87%), and are aware of regional similarities and differences (83%). According to Fengshi Wu, now an assistant professor in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong, feeling comfortable with the language and understanding cultural subtleties – what’s unspoken or cannot be said – made her much more confident in the interpretations of her qualitative data. Thus, indigenous researchers come into the field with a high level of understanding of cultural nuances, informal conversations, hints, idioms, jokes, and so forth. Cultural and linguistic skills are important even before the research itself begins. These scholars are well-equipped to assess whether their research design can be implemented practically and are likely to have fewer misconceptions that have to be “worked off” before they can get to the “meat” of their study. Robert Yin notes the high cost of selecting the wrong case for your theoretical goals – home researchers are more likely than not to avoid this problem (Yin 2003).
Disadvantages of Fieldwork at Home

Do all these advantages make fieldwork at home so easy that funding agencies and academic departments should rightly be suspicious of scholars choosing this path? I believe that, on the contrary, employers and colleagues should value the cultural and theoretical insight which indigenous researchers bring to the profession. Moreover, fieldwork at home comes with disadvantages and challenges which are rarely acknowledged. In particular, personal obligations often become burdensome: 43% of survey respondents say that family and/or friends in their home country might be a distraction from research; 45% have other obligations (such as non-academic professional or familial commitments) while in the field. In other words, social responsibilities prevent an exclusive concentration on academic work. Furthermore, being an “insider” is not always the most beneficial vantage point during research, nor do home country scholars automatically meet the definition of an “insider.”

Being viewed as an outsider can be a crucial advantage during research. Outsiders are expected to be naïve, can ask more general questions, and are not penalized as harshly for errors. On the flip side, insiders are expected not to pursue certain lines of inquiry (Lee 2001), and quickly elicit incredulity when they violate this expectation. Outsiders also may be able to gain access to interlocutors more easily – people may be curious or flattered that someone came from far away to investigate their problems. And vulnerable groups especially can be more likely to trust those who are perceived as not directly

Table 2. Experiences of Culture Shock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Experience of 'reverse culture shock' when returning to the US after conducting field research in home country?</th>
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<td>Strongly agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>19%</td>
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implicated in local issues and communities.

On a related point, because indigenous researchers value their relationships in a country often above and beyond their meaning for the research project, it can be difficult to obtain multiple perspectives without putting existing social relations at risk. As Ming-Yeh Lee argues, “for the indigenous researcher in a violent social conflict, opportunity, access, and security favor the study of one’s own social group. To put this another way, the advantage researchers have, in being socially placed and accredited by preexisting links to the setting, also usually restricts them to studying ‘their own kind’” (Lee 2001). Notwithstanding their advantage of using prior knowledge to keep out of trouble, field workers at home can also in some cases be more vulnerable to restrictions on civil liberties or be in more physical danger than outsiders.

A further concern is whether familiarity with a culture is helpful in “translating observations into data.” As Robert Burgess asks: “will researchers recognize patterns in a society in which they are thoroughly acculturated? Are there problems in selecting what to study? Will researchers give full coverage to situations with which they are already familiar?” (Burgess 1984). For outsiders, processing the collected data into theoretical propositions might come easier, precisely because some subtleties are missed – my interview partner Sohini Guha (McGill University) said that she was so immersed in the “thickness” of the data that she found it hard to achieve the distance necessary to see the “big picture.” Finally, insiders are frequently accused of bias due to the emotions they are thought to invest in their research (Naples 1996). An outsider role might more easily avoid over identifying with or against the group under study (Burgess 1984). On this point, the literature concludes that scholars need to be clear about their biases and make what Edward Said called a personal “inventory” as part of the research process (Rossman and Rallis 1998; Said 1979).

Insider and Outsider Dynamics

While the injunction to be aware of biases derived from insider status is certainly important, identity is more than a potentially distorting variable – it is an ever-changing and malleable part of fieldwork. My research with “indigenous scholars” suggests that whether you are an insider or outsider is usually not a straightforward matter. Both perceptions by others and a researcher’s own feeling about his or her identity change over time, depending on location and context. Despite linguistic proficiency, cultural skills and logistical advantages, my interviewees report often not feeling like insiders [...]

“[…] whether you are an insider or outsider is usually not a straightforward matter. [...] Despite linguistic proficiency, cultural skills and logistical advantages, my interviewees report often not feeling like insiders [...]

huge empathy. But the gap is too large – it impedes all the time. You’re painfully aware that it’s just six months of your life, that you’re there in the first place because you’ll be getting back and writing a thesis. And because you empathize, there’s so much guilt. The outsider status is ridden with guilt.”
In fact, educational level appears to be perceived as the most significant difference between researchers and subjects—whether at home or in a foreign country (see Chart 1).

Shahrashoub Razavi, a scholar who conducted field research in her home country of Iran, writes: “Working in one’s own society does not resolve the issue of power asymmetry. Although nationality or color may not present a problem, the fact that the researcher (by definition) has had educational opportunities not available to many others means that she or he is relatively privileged in terms of background as well (unless one chooses to work among the elite)” (Razavi 1993).

Moreover, scholarly identity can change immensely over time. As Fengshi Wu, who conducted her research in China, pointed out, particularly in a country undergoing political and economic transition, a few years abroad for graduate school can mean you are no longer intimately familiar with the politics and culture in your home. “It’s important to understand that our assumptions and memories may no longer hold, that we may need to adapt.” Lee writes, “[The researcher], although quite clearly a native, is often distanced from the setting by education and metropolitan ways sometimes acquired in another country” (Lee 2001). Numerous of my interviewees mentioned being perceived as neither insider nor outsider, but rather as a ‘third category’: a returner. Wu told me that her respondents would comment, “You don’t understand China anymore, you’re so westernized.” A subject who conducted research in the Philippines, related that due to the historical relationship between her country and the United States, returners must confront the legacies of colonialism. Survey results confirm that the identity of a “returner” is a highly relevant one: 32% report being perceived as a returner (see Chart 1) and, when asked about their own sentiments, 39% also felt like a returner in their home country.

While IGSs report feeling and being perceived like insiders in their home countries to much greater extent than during their research elsewhere, a significant proportion of them cite other identities which complicate their research irrespective of the research location: class, ethnic, gender, generational, and regional diversities. Furthermore, there is no real agreement on whether an insider or outsider status is more beneficial. Much depends on context, timing and the identity of interlocutors. In anthropology, the idea that there is a distinction between conducting field work at home or in a foreign place has not given, “Gabon Ntseane writes (Ntseane 2001).

Insider privilege, then, is something that must be earned rather than assumed. Though “indigenous” researchers can often have an easier time earning this status, their identity can also become extremely problematic. In general, fieldworkers must learn how to be aware of what they bring to the research process, how this affects their interactions in the field, and how they choose to deal with their identity. They must gauge whether they want to work toward becoming insiders or trusted out-

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siders. Most scholars play up parts of their identity to enhance access, rapport, and understanding—it is part of virtually any social scientist’s toolbox. I would speculate, however, that the patchwork identities of IGSs make them especially sensitive to insider/outsider dynamics because they confront them in everyday life. Furthermore, fieldwork in one’s own country seems to necessitate confronting the issue of objectivity. In conclusion, there are clear advantages that come with going home to conduct research—and political scientists should value the insight that
comes with doing so. However, indigenous fieldwork is by no means automatically easier than in a foreign location. All researchers may face the problems of being an insider or outsider in a complicated research context. The experience of going home to conduct research should be food for thought for anyone headed to the field.

Notes

1 I would like to thank all the interviewees and survey participants who took part in this study. Without their thoughtful responses, this project would not have been possible. Further, I would like to thank Ken Cousins, Mike Evans, Martin O. Heisler, and Miranda Schreurs for their invaluable advice and assistance. Any errors are of course solely my responsibility.

2 Interviewees from both the United States and Canada were found through an ad in the APSA-CP newsletter, a request sent to the IQRM listserv, and personal referrals.

3 The survey was conducted between March 2 and April 18, 2008 through SurveyMonkey.com. Requests for IGSs to participate were sent to approximately forty US graduate programs in Political Science and the IQRM alumni listserv, and a link was posted on the APSA-CP newsletter website. Two hundred eight individuals began the lengthy online questionnaire and it was completed by 127 (a response rate of 61.1%).

4 The large number of field researchers among IGSs is partly explained by the fact that almost half (49.3%) of them have declared Comparative Politics their primary field.

5 What “home” means to someone is often quite complicated and the closeness of the relationship with that place varies greatly from scholar to scholar. For the purposes of this article, I adopt a distinction between conducting research in a place that is “foreign” and a place with which one is more or less intimately familiar, where one has lived for a long period of time and feels culturally at home.

6 Of course, as one of my interviewees pointed out, social responsibilities do not arise only when one is already familiar with a place, but can be the condition for receiving the social help one needs to conduct research anywhere, as well as an ethical imperative.

References


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The Religion and State Dataset

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The Religion and State (RAS) dataset — compiled under the leadership of Jonathan Fox with the assistance of Shmuel Sandler and others — provides a much-needed contribution to an under-studied area of comparative politics. While significant work has been done on the role of religion in shaping political culture, very little systematic analysis has been conducted on the relationship between religion and the state, particularly the extent to which government is directly involved in religion. This examination of government involvement in religion (GIR) is the primary objective of the RAS dataset.

The units of this dataset are all countries with populations of more than 250,000, as well as Western European countries whose populations are below that benchmark, for a total of 175 countries. Fox does not explain why he opted to include less populated Western European countries, but not their counterparts elsewhere, but he and his collaborators are to be commended for including all the countries with medium-to-large populations, including Middle Eastern countries that are often omitted from such analyses with little theoretical justification other than the fact that their inclusion might unduly bias the resulting analysis of government involvement in religion due to the unusually close ties (official and unofficial) between the religious and political structures in this region.

However, given that the Middle East remains part of the universe of cases in which GIR occurs, it seems highly questionable to exclude them.

This dataset covers the period from 1990 to 2002, with the variables for each country coded separately for each year in the set, except that the demographic data on religious distribution for each country was coded only once for the entire time period. This makes sense to the extent that the religious demography of countries changes slowly. However, the methodology used in deciding the demographic distribution needs to be explained and the choice to code it only once needs to be justified by the authors of the dataset since their cases include the former Soviet Socialist Republics which experienced some religious fluidity in their early years as they emerged from the period of Communist repression of religion. In the codebook, Fox provides his main sources for the religious demography data, but does not explain his coding criteria for the demographic data. Besides demography, there are two other exceptions to the yearly coding of variables. One is for cases such as unlike the Eastern European countries, not all of which existed as independent states in 1990. Rather than being coded for all of the years between 1990 and 2002, these cases are coded starting with the year they gained independence. The second exception involves cases of civil war where government essentially stopped functioning, thus making valid coding of GIR impossible; Bosnia in the 1990s is an example (RAS Codebook, 1-3).

The RAS dataset employs a number of different variables to analyze the religion-state relationship. For the demographic variable, the percentage of adherents to the majority religion and the number of minority religions in the country with 5 percent or more adherents are both measured. To examine the separation or connection between religion and state, six variables are used. The first three are the source variables and the last three are derived from the first two. The six variables measure: 1) Whether there is an established religion (or religions) or not; 2) In cases in which the answer to number one is no, what the relationship is between religion and state (ranging from hostility to the existence of civil religion); 3) What in practice (as opposed to official policy) is the state support for religion (ranging from no restrictions on minority religions to their complete prohibition); 4) The range of relationships between religion and state (ranging from hostility to state support for just one religion); and 5) Official support for religion (from no support to one established religion); 6) The level of hostility toward religion.

The dataset employs lengthy lists of variables to measure religious discrimination against minority religions (sixteen variables), restrictions on the majority religion or on all religions (eleven variables), and types of religious legislation (thirty-three variables). The former two are coded on a four-point scale (from no government restriction/involvement to essentially complete government involvement on the issue) while the latter is coded dichotomously (either a country has such legislation or does not have it). With each of these three categories, the individual variables are aggregated into a composite variable to form a measure of, for example, restrictions on minority religion. There are two important things to note here. The first concerns the choice to measure discrimination against minority religions separately from discrimination against religion more broadly. The justification provided for this is that these measure two separate things, with the first more about repression of specific religious groups and the second (including repressing...
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the majority religion) measuring a repression of religion per se. While this is well argued, it is also theoretically possible that repression of a majority religion could occur at the hands of a religious minority that wields political power. Such repression would more closely resemble what is theoretically aligned with the minority religion repression variable, but in this dataset it would fall under the broader repression variable. This point is overlooked in the RAS dataset, but in defense of its creators it is difficult to think of a real world case in which this is occurring on a large scale. The second point to note is that with the minority religion repression variable, the dataset creators are careful to measure only the repression of minority religious expression, not all repression of minority religious groups. This is an important distinction as it attempts to keep the data clean of noise resulting from factors other than religion (such as ethnic issues or socioeconomic status).

Ultimately, all of the above variables are combined to create a composite GIR variable. Arguably the creation of this composite indicator is the most valuable contribution of the RAS dataset as it provides an effective and parsimonious measure of government involvement in religion, both in encouraging religion and repressing it. This concept has long been overlooked in studies of the state and democracy by researchers who have focused on the freedom of religion, which is qualitatively different in the sense that governments can and do allow a good bit of freedom of religion while still being very involved in religious life. Fox and his collaborators have conceptualized this variable in a way previous attempts have not, in contrast with others who have looked simply at whether or not a state has an established religion. As Fox points out, conceptualizing GIR in this manner is problematic and inadequate, as most countries have at least some formal religion-state connection and often that formal connection is stronger in countries where the actual GIR is weaker.

The key indicators in the dataset demonstrate both validity and reliability. Intuitively, the examination of religious demography and legislation is important, and Fox’s justification for why separate examinations were conducted of GIR vis-à-vis minority religions, versus GIR with the majority religion or religion more broadly, is largely convincing (RAS Codebook, 5-7). The indicators appear to be valid in that they effectively examine government involvement in religion using a variety of different measurements. Validity is less of a problem with this dataset than with others because the measures the RAS project uses are not proxies for state involvement, but involvement itself. There may be other aspects of GIR worth considering (see the note below on the coming revision of this dataset), but on the face of it, this dataset includes what seem to be the primary GIR variables.

Multiple coders were used to increase reliability and provide a trustworthy operational procedure. A single researcher coded each country, with different people doing the coding for different cases. To provide reliability and consistency, all coding was overseen by Fox and approximately twenty-five percent of all the cases were recoded and the recoding was compared with the original coding to check for inter-coder reliability (RAS Codebook, 1).

In conclusion, this dataset is a worthy and overdue contribution to the study of the state more broadly, and to the study of religion and the state specifically. Several works have already been published using this dataset, including Jonathan Fox’s broad examination of the dataset’s key findings in his recent book A World of Survey of Religion and the State, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), as well as his intriguing article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science (2007) “Do Democracies Have Separation of Religion and State?” For a complete list of publications using this dataset, as well as for more information on Fox and his research team, or to download the data (which is available in SPSS format), see the web address for this dataset: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/.

As valuable as the current dataset is, Fox and his collaborators plan to expand its scope in the near future by increasing the number of variables from 62 to around 300. Among the intended additions will be variables addressing the extent of religious education, state restriction on abortions and laws on proselytizing. While sometimes addressing GIR less directly than the variables in the original dataset, when combined with the original variables the expanded dataset will allow for more fine-grained analyses of government involvement in religion.

Notes

1 Fox is a Senior Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic studies and a lecturer at the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel.

2 Fox and his collaborators state on their project website that they had three goals in establishing this data set, all of which consider different aspects of GIR: Those goals are: 1) To provide an accurate description of government religion policies worldwide; 2) to create a tool which will lead to greater understanding of the factors that influence government...
 religion policy; 3) to provide the means to examine how government religion policy influences other political, social, and economic factors as well as how those factors influence government religion policy. See http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/.

3 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State Codebook, p. 1; available at: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/Religion%20and%20State%20Codebook.pdf This choice may have been made due to the ease of acquiring information on those countries or there may be some strong theoretical reason why it was done, but whatever the case, it needs to be justified. This source is hereafter cited in the text as RAS Codebook.

4 See Michael Ross’s 2001 article, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, 53:2 (325-361) for an explanation and critique of this problem.

5 See ibid, p. 11 for the formula for this indicator.

Dataset Announcements

Constituency-Level Elections

Dawn Brancati claims to have compiled the single largest dataset of constituency-level election results around the world. It includes election results for over 1000 elections, which have occurred in more than 60 countries around the world between 1944 and 2007. Together these elections total over 50,000 electoral districts and include legislative elections for lower and upper houses at the national level of government. The dataset incorporates a number of sub-national elections as well. The results include vote and seat data for all parties that participate in an election even if they win only a single vote. The total number of political parties in the dataset exceeds 5,000. Source: http://www.cle.wustl.edu/

Governance Matters VII


Fractionalization

The economists Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg have compiled indicators of the sizes of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups and used them to calculate indices of each type of fractionalization. Their dataset covers approximately 190 countries and a large number of groups. The data on religious and linguistic groups come from the Encyclopedia Britannica as of 2001; data on ethnicity comes from six different sources. The authors’ definition of ethnicity allows them to base their indicator on race, language, or national origin or heritage, depending on local understandings of ethnic differences. The data are more completely described in their article, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003): 155-194.

The data can be downloaded at: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls

Unified Democracy Scores

Daniel Pemstein, Stephen Meserve, and James Melton have produced a new indicator of democracy that measures the latent dimension underlying ten commonly used democracy indicators. This is done in a way that makes it possible to treat this scale as interval data.


Editors’ Notes

The editors welcome suggestions of other relatively new and potentially useful datasets that should be announced or reviewed in APSA-CP. Anyone interested in reviewing a dataset for the newsletter should contact Michael Coppedge at coppedge.1@nd.edu.

We invite our readers to request hard copies of back issues (beginning with the winter 2003 newsletter issue) at the cost of $1.50 per issue. They should send their request(s) by email to egonzal4@nd.edu.
Section Awards

The Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award for the best book in the field of comparative politics published in 2006 or 2007:

Stathis Kalyvas
Yale University
*The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (CUP, 2006).

The Gregory Luebbert Article Award for the best article in the field of comparative politics published in 2006 or 2007:

Keith Darden
Yale University
and
Anna Grzymala-Busse
University of Michigan

The Sage Paper Award to the best paper in the field of comparative politics presented at the 2007 APSA Annual Meeting:

Daniel Ziblatt
Harvard University
“Rural Inequality and Electoral Authoritarianism”

The Data Set Award for a publicly available data set that has made an important contribution to the field of comparative politics:

Lyle Scruggs
University of Connecticut
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset
http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm

Online Learning Center

ICPSR is pleased to announce the beta launch of the Online Learning Center (OLC). The site is located at: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/OLC/ and can be found under the Courses & Learning Tools tab on the ICPSR main page.

The OLC is the result of discussions with teaching faculty about using data in their classrooms and the challenges such undertakings can entail. Instructors directed ICPSR to develop tools that would: 1) quickly locate relevant data that are easy to work with and that nicely demonstrate the concept(s); and 2) enable the instructor to customize the materials to their own teaching approach and syllabus.

To that end, Data-driven Learning Guides, a core element of the OLC, were created for the express purpose of making ICPSR data more user-friendly for classroom exercises. The guides are designed for faculty to use for in-class demonstrations or to assign as supplemental activities for giving students greater exposure to concepts.

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